From: guido@trentalancia.net (Guido Trentalancia) Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2017 14:13:43 +0200 (CEST) Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH 0/33] description In-Reply-To: <1492649990.14733.70.camel@trentalancia.net> References: <1492649990.14733.70.camel@trentalancia.net> Message-ID: <808781969.181179.1492690424033@pim.register.it> To: refpolicy@oss.tresys.com List-Id: refpolicy.oss.tresys.com I forgot to add: the Download directory is always writable and can be used as a shared "parking" area for all sort of files (not necessarily only those that are downloaded from the network). Files that are considered "safe" after inspection can be picked from the shared parking area and moved elsewhere within the home directory (or outside of it). Applications that do not have a corresponding policy module run as "user_u" and therefore always have full read/write access to the whole home directory, that's why it is important to confine as much applications as possible. A couple of patches in this set (the 22nd and the 25th) wrongly bring "/34" in the email subject: this is a mistake, please read "/33". I hope you find the patchset an useful step towards assuring user data confidentiality. Regards, Guido > On the 20th of April 2017 at 2.59 Guido Trentalancia via refpolicy wrote: > > > This patchset aims to ensure user data confidentiality by curbing on > userdomain file read and/or write permissions for all applications and > daemons that potentially deal with such files and directories. > > Several modules would greatly benefit from further testing. > > Where possible a boolean has been introduced to revert the less > restrictive and more risky behavior (by setting it to "true"). > > Regards, > > Guido > _______________________________________________ > refpolicy mailing list > refpolicy at oss.tresys.com > http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy