From: pebenito@ieee.org (Chris PeBenito)
Date: Sat, 29 Apr 2017 11:30:19 -0400
Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH] little misc strict
In-Reply-To: <20170427064841.4ubil3jlfwt6jdcv@athena.coker.com.au>
References: <20170427064841.4ubil3jlfwt6jdcv@athena.coker.com.au>
Message-ID: <b3426a61-e256-ffc8-0d75-14ea2b777a4e@ieee.org>
To: refpolicy@oss.tresys.com
List-Id: refpolicy.oss.tresys.com

On 04/27/2017 02:48 AM, Russell Coker via refpolicy wrote:
> This is the last of the strict patches for now.
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170427/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170427.orig/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170427/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te
> @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ optional_policy(`
>  # Groupadd local policy
>  #
>
> -allow groupadd_t self:capability { audit_write chown dac_override kill setuid sys_resource };
> +allow groupadd_t self:capability { audit_write chown dac_override fsetid kill setuid sys_resource };
>  dontaudit groupadd_t self:capability { fsetid sys_tty_config };
>  allow groupadd_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execheap execstack };
>  allow groupadd_t self:process { setrlimit setfscreate };
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170427/policy/modules/contrib/mta.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170427.orig/policy/modules/contrib/mta.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170427/policy/modules/contrib/mta.if
> @@ -121,6 +121,23 @@ interface(`mta_role',`
>
>  ########################################
>  ## <summary>
> +##	Enable system_mail_t to run in the specified role
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="role">
> +##	<summary>
> +##	Role allowed access.
> +##	</summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`system_mail_role',`
> +	gen_require(`
> +		type system_mail_t;
> +	')
> +	role $1 types system_mail_t;
> +')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
>  ##	Make the specified domain usable for a mail server.
>  ## </summary>
>  ## <param name="type">
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170427/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170427.orig/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170427/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
> @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ ubac_fd_exempt(sysadm_t)
>  init_exec(sysadm_t)
>  init_admin(sysadm_t)
>
> +selinux_read_policy(sysadm_t)
> +
>  # Add/remove user home directories
>  userdom_manage_user_home_dirs(sysadm_t)
>  userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(sysadm_t)
> @@ -104,6 +106,10 @@ optional_policy(`
>  ')
>
>  optional_policy(`
> +	system_mail_role(sysadm_r)

I'm not particularly fond of interfaces that simply add a type to a 
role, as it seems like there should be some other path to get that 
association.  I dropped this pending further explanation, e.g. why 
sysadm would be using the system_mail_t domain.

> +')
> +
> +optional_policy(`
>  	amanda_run_recover(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
>  ')
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170427/policy/modules/services/xserver.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170427.orig/policy/modules/services/xserver.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170427/policy/modules/services/xserver.te
> @@ -273,7 +273,8 @@ manage_files_pattern(xauth_t, xauth_tmp_
>  files_tmp_filetrans(xauth_t, xauth_tmp_t, { file dir })
>
>  allow xdm_t xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
> -userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(xdm_t, xauth_home_t, file)
> +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(xdm_t, xauth_home_t, file, ".Xauthority")
> +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(xdm_t, user_home_t, file, ".xsession-errors")

Fixed this last line to use the correct interface,
userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content().

>  allow xauth_t xdm_t:process sigchld;
>  allow xauth_t xdm_t:fd use;
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170427/policy/modules/system/fstools.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170427.orig/policy/modules/system/fstools.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170427/policy/modules/system/fstools.te
> @@ -134,6 +134,8 @@ files_search_all(fsadm_t)
>  mls_file_read_all_levels(fsadm_t)
>  mls_file_write_all_levels(fsadm_t)
>
> +selinux_getattr_fs(fsadm_t)
> +
>  storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(fsadm_t)
>  storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(fsadm_t)
>  storage_raw_read_removable_device(fsadm_t)
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170427/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170427.orig/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170427/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te
> @@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ seutil_libselinux_linked(load_policy_t)
>
>  userdom_use_user_terminals(load_policy_t)
>  userdom_use_all_users_fds(load_policy_t)
> +dev_read_urand(load_policy_t)
>
>  ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
>  	optional_policy(`
> @@ -358,6 +359,7 @@ fs_getattr_pstore_dirs(restorecond_t)
>  fs_getattr_tracefs(restorecond_t)
>  fs_list_inotifyfs(restorecond_t)
>  fs_relabelfrom_noxattr_fs(restorecond_t)
> +fs_getattr_pstorefs(restorecond_t)
>
>  selinux_validate_context(restorecond_t)
>  selinux_compute_access_vector(restorecond_t)
> @@ -488,6 +490,7 @@ kernel_read_system_state(semanage_t)
>  kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(semanage_t)
>
>  corecmd_exec_bin(semanage_t)
> +corecmd_exec_shell(semanage_t)
>
>  dev_read_urand(semanage_t)
>
> @@ -590,6 +593,7 @@ files_read_usr_symlinks(setfiles_t)
>  files_dontaudit_read_all_symlinks(setfiles_t)
>
>  fs_getattr_all_xattr_fs(setfiles_t)
> +fs_getattr_nfs(setfiles_t)
>  fs_getattr_pstore_dirs(setfiles_t)
>  fs_getattr_pstorefs(setfiles_t)
>  fs_getattr_tracefs(setfiles_t)

Otherwise merged.

-- 
Chris PeBenito