Return-path: Received: from hostap.isc.org ([149.20.54.63]:38249 "EHLO hostap.isc.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754787AbYEMMbc (ORCPT ); Tue, 13 May 2008 08:31:32 -0400 Date: Tue, 13 May 2008 15:30:48 +0300 From: Jouni Malinen To: Emmanuel Grumbach Cc: Johannes Berg , Linux Wireless , Tomas Winkler Subject: Re: 11n + wpa_supplicant Message-ID: <20080513123048.GB6309@jm.kir.nu> (sfid-20080513_143136_045286_12EBB35C) References: <8704f27d0805130118p6f597743sebed5a2cdb6d59cb@mail.gmail.com> <1210667328.3646.24.camel@johannes.berg> <8704f27d0805130141s403167b8q49eecb645d0461c1@mail.gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii In-Reply-To: <8704f27d0805130141s403167b8q49eecb645d0461c1@mail.gmail.com> Sender: linux-wireless-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Tue, May 13, 2008 at 11:41:15AM +0300, Emmanuel Grumbach wrote: > in mac80211 we perfectly know what the AP supports (in > ieee80211_send_assoc, I can read the IEs from the AP) , that's no the > issue here, the issue is what security alg the user will chose in the > 4way. This decision affects the associate even though it occurs after > the association Unless you are talking about IBSS (which would not use association), "the user" (as in the non-AP STA/Supplicant) does not select pairwise cipher in 4-way handshake; this happens in (re)association request. Only the AP/Authenticator is able to propose another cipher suite in 4-way handshake if per-client security policy rejects use of whatever cipher was selected during association (and I've not heard of anyone having implemented this). -- Jouni Malinen PGP id EFC895FA