Return-path: Received: from mail-oa0-f45.google.com ([209.85.219.45]:59232 "EHLO mail-oa0-f45.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753191Ab3KOTHh (ORCPT ); Fri, 15 Nov 2013 14:07:37 -0500 Received: by mail-oa0-f45.google.com with SMTP id m1so4437061oag.32 for ; Fri, 15 Nov 2013 11:07:36 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20131115184510.GA911@redhat.com> References: <2ea03f60bb65429cbe5d74a6d356fde3eefcf06c.1384160397.git.dborkman@redhat.com> <20131111134357.GC10104@thunk.org> <20131112000307.GB14929@order.stressinduktion.org> <20131112115350.GA14077@thunk.org> <20131112131627.GD14929@order.stressinduktion.org> <20131112134603.GE14929@order.stressinduktion.org> <20131114025448.GB31602@thunk.org> <20131115184510.GA911@redhat.com> Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2013 11:07:35 -0800 Message-ID: (sfid-20131115_200843_083620_CFBF166E) Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: seed random_int_secret at least poorly at core_initcall time From: Kees Cook To: Dave Jones Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" , Daniel Borkmann , "David S. Miller" , Florian Weimer , netdev@vger.kernel.org, Eric Dumazet , linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Sender: linux-wireless-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 10:45 AM, Dave Jones wrote: > On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 10:33:04AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > > > Ingo wanted even more > > unpredictability, in the face of total failure from these more dynamic > > sources, so x86 also "seeds" itself with the build string and the > > boot_params. These last two are hardly high entropy, but they should > > at least make 2 different systems not have _identical_ entropy at the > > start. It's far from cryptographically secure, but it's something, I > > hope. > > Those are both likely to be the same on some configurations. > On x86, we could maybe hash the dmi tables ? Vendor stupidity aside, > things like serial numbers in those tables _should_ be different. Yeah, DMI tables were suggested as well. (Hopefully people will start using -uuid with KVM!) How hard would that be to hook up to the pre-random-init code? -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security