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From: Stephan =?ISO-8859-1?Q?M=FCller?= <smueller@chronox.de>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Constant Time Memory Comparisons Are Important
Date: Sun, 11 Jun 2017 23:06:14 +0200
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Am Samstag, 10. Juni 2017, 04:59:06 CEST schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:

Hi Jason,

> Whenever you're comparing two MACs, it's important to do this using
> crypto_memneq instead of memcmp. With memcmp, you leak timing information,
> which could then be used to iteratively forge a MAC. This is far too basic
> of a mistake for us to have so pervasively in the year 2017, so let's begin
> cleaning this stuff up. The following 6 locations were found with some
> simple regex greps, but I'm sure more lurk below the surface. If you
> maintain some code or know somebody who maintains some code that deals
> with MACs, tell them to double check which comparison function they're
> using.

Are you planning to send an update to your patch set? If yes, there is another 
one which should be converted too: crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c.

Otherwise, I will send a patch converting this one.

Thanks.

Ciao
Stephan