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Date:   Thu, 22 Sep 2022 14:49:08 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To:     Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc:     Christian =?iso-8859-1?Q?K=F6nig?= <christian.koenig@amd.com>,
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        Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/12] slab: Introduce kmalloc_size_roundup()
Message-ID: <202209221446.5E90AEED@keescook>
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On Thu, Sep 22, 2022 at 11:05:47PM +0200, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> On 9/22/22 17:55, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 22, 2022 at 09:10:56AM +0200, Christian K?nig wrote:
> > [...]
> > > So when this patch set is about to clean up this use case it should probably
> > > also take care to remove ksize() or at least limit it so that it won't be
> > > used for this use case in the future.
> > 
> > Yeah, my goal would be to eliminate ksize(), and it seems possible if
> > other cases are satisfied with tracking their allocation sizes directly.
> 
> I think we could leave ksize() to determine the size without a need for
> external tracking, but from now on forbid callers from using that hint to
> overflow the allocation size they actually requested? Once we remove the
> kasan/kfence hooks in ksize() that make the current kinds of usage possible,
> we should be able to catch any offenders of the new semantics that would appear?

That's correct. I spent the morning working my way through the rest of
the ksize() users I didn't clean up yesterday, and in several places I
just swapped in __ksize(). But that wouldn't even be needed if we just
removed the kasan unpoisoning from ksize(), etc.

I am tempted to leave it __ksize(), though, just to reinforce that it's
not supposed to be used "normally". What do you think?

-- 
Kees Cook