The following patches allow for encryption of the on-disk swsusp image
to prevent data gathering of e.g. in-kernel keys or mlocked data after
resume.
For this purpose the aes cipher must be compiled into the kernel as
module load is not possible at resume time.
A random key is generated at suspend time, stored in the suspend header
on disk and deleted from the header at resume time. If you don't resume
a mkswap on the suspend partition will also delete the temporary key.
Only the data pages are encrypted as only these may contain sensitive data.
This works on my x86_64 laptop (64bit mode) and probably needs testing
on other platforms.
--
Andreas Steinmetz SPAMmers use [email protected]
> The following patches allow for encryption of the on-disk swsusp image
> to prevent data gathering of e.g. in-kernel keys or mlocked data after
> resume.
> For this purpose the aes cipher must be compiled into the kernel as
> module load is not possible at resume time.
> A random key is generated at suspend time, stored in the suspend header
> on disk and deleted from the header at resume time. If you don't resume
> a mkswap on the suspend partition will also delete the temporary key.
> Only the data pages are encrypted as only these may contain sensitive data.
> This works on my x86_64 laptop (64bit mode) and probably needs testing
> on other platforms.
What about an option for an user-defined key? One that can be set when
suspending?
Folkert van Heusden
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Hi!
> > The following patches allow for encryption of the on-disk swsusp image
> > to prevent data gathering of e.g. in-kernel keys or mlocked data after
> > resume.
> > For this purpose the aes cipher must be compiled into the kernel as
> > module load is not possible at resume time.
> > A random key is generated at suspend time, stored in the suspend header
> > on disk and deleted from the header at resume time. If you don't resume
> > a mkswap on the suspend partition will also delete the temporary key.
> > Only the data pages are encrypted as only these may contain sensitive data.
> > This works on my x86_64 laptop (64bit mode) and probably needs testing
> > on other platforms.
>
> What about an option for an user-defined key? One that can be set when
> suspending?
That's logical next step, but lets try to solve one problem at a time.
Pavel
--
Boycott Kodak -- for their patent abuse against Java.