While reading SafeSetID.rst I stumbled across those things. This patch
removes these spurious '???' characters.
Signed-off-by: Christian Kujau <[email protected]>
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst
index 212434ef65ad..7bff07ce4fdd 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ setid capabilities from the application completely and refactor the process
spawning semantics in the application (e.g. by using a privileged helper program
to do process spawning and UID/GID transitions). Unfortunately, there are a
number of semantics around process spawning that would be affected by this, such
-as fork() calls where the program doesn???t immediately call exec() after the
+as fork() calls where the program doesn't immediately call exec() after the
fork(), parent processes specifying custom environment variables or command line
args for spawned child processes, or inheritance of file handles across a
fork()/exec(). Because of this, as solution that uses a privileged helper in
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ own user namespace, and only approved UIDs/GIDs could be mapped back to the
initial system user namespace, affectively preventing privilege escalation.
Unfortunately, it is not generally feasible to use user namespaces in isolation,
without pairing them with other namespace types, which is not always an option.
-Linux checks for capabilities based off of the user namespace that ???owns??? some
+Linux checks for capabilities based off of the user namespace that "owns" some
entity. For example, Linux has the notion that network namespaces are owned by
the user namespace in which they were created. A consequence of this is that
capability checks for access to a given network namespace are done by checking
--
BOFH excuse #451:
astropneumatic oscillations in the water-cooling
On Thu, 10 Oct 2019 20:36:16 -0700 (PDT)
Christian Kujau <[email protected]> wrote:
> While reading SafeSetID.rst I stumbled across those things. This patch
> removes these spurious '???' characters.
>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Kujau <[email protected]>
I've applied this, thanks. I did take the liberty of rewriting the
changelog to adhere to normal standards:
Author: Christian Kujau <[email protected]>
Date: Thu Oct 10 20:36:16 2019 -0700
docs: SafeSetID.rst: Remove spurious '???' characters
It appears that some smart quotes were changed to "???" by even smarter
software; change them to the dumb but legible variety.
Signed-off-by: Christian Kujau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Thanks,
jon
Ah, thanks for this. We had this fixed in
http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2019-May/013525.html,
but looks like it got forgotten somehow.
On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 9:00 AM Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 10 Oct 2019 20:36:16 -0700 (PDT)
> Christian Kujau <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> > While reading SafeSetID.rst I stumbled across those things. This patch
> > removes these spurious '???' characters.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Christian Kujau <[email protected]>
>
> I've applied this, thanks. I did take the liberty of rewriting the
> changelog to adhere to normal standards:
>
> Author: Christian Kujau <[email protected]>
> Date: Thu Oct 10 20:36:16 2019 -0700
>
> docs: SafeSetID.rst: Remove spurious '???' characters
>
> It appears that some smart quotes were changed to "???" by even smarter
> software; change them to the dumb but legible variety.
>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Kujau <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
>
> Thanks,
>
> jon