The attached patch against the git refpolicy from 3 days ago makes Chrome work
with Pulseaudio, DRI, Flash, and lots of little things.
Adds tunables chromium_exec_plugins and xserver_allow_dri.
I think this is ready to merge with the names of the tunables and interfaces
being the only possible changes needed.
--
My Main Blog http://etbe.coker.com.au/
My Documents Blog http://doc.coker.com.au/
On Wed, Feb 12, 2020 at 01:30:39PM +1100, Russell Coker wrote:
> The attached patch against the git refpolicy from 3 days ago makes Chrome work
> with Pulseaudio, DRI, Flash, and lots of little things.
Flash is dead. My chrome even pops up a banner every time i start it
saying flash is disabled by default and will be completely removed in a
few months. Not sure adding the flash is worth it.
> Adds tunables chromium_exec_plugins and xserver_allow_dri.
>
> I think this is ready to merge with the names of the tunables and interfaces
> being the only possible changes needed.
>
> --
> My Main Blog http://etbe.coker.com.au/
> My Documents Blog http://doc.coker.com.au/
> Chromium and DRI policy
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
> @@ -39,6 +39,13 @@ gen_tunable(chromium_bind_tcp_unreserved
> ## </desc>
> gen_tunable(chromium_rw_usb_dev, false)
>
> +## <desc>
> +## <p>
> +## Allow chromium to execute it's config (for plugins like Flash)
> +## </p>
> +## </desc>
> +gen_tunable(chromium_exec_plugins, false)
> +
> type chromium_t;
> domain_dyntrans_type(chromium_t)
>
> @@ -63,6 +70,9 @@ type chromium_tmpfs_t;
> userdom_user_tmpfs_file(chromium_tmpfs_t)
> optional_policy(`
> pulseaudio_tmpfs_content(chromium_tmpfs_t)
> + pulseaudio_rw_tmpfs_files(chromium_t)
> + pulseaudio_stream_connect(chromium_t)
> + pulseaudio_use_fds(chromium_t)
> ')
>
> type chromium_xdg_config_t;
> @@ -77,7 +87,9 @@ xdg_cache_content(chromium_xdg_cache_t)
> #
>
> # execmem for load in plugins
> -allow chromium_t self:process { execmem getsched getcap setcap setrlimit setsched sigkill signal };
> +allow chromium_t self:process { execmem getsched getcap setcap setrlimit setsched sigkill signal signull };
> +allow chromium_t self:dir { write add_name };
> +allow chromium_t self:file create;
> allow chromium_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
> allow chromium_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
> allow chromium_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket client_stream_socket_perms;
> @@ -96,6 +108,7 @@ allow chromium_t chromium_renderer_t:uni
>
> allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_dgram_socket { getattr read write };
> allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
> +allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:file read_file_perms;
>
> allow chromium_t chromium_naclhelper_t:process { share };
>
> @@ -108,6 +121,9 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(chromium_t, ch
> manage_fifo_files_pattern(chromium_t, chromium_tmp_t, chromium_tmp_t)
> files_tmp_filetrans(chromium_t, chromium_tmp_t, { file dir sock_file })
>
> +# for /run/user/$UID
> +userdom_user_runtime_filetrans(chromium_t, chromium_tmp_t, { file sock_file })
> +
> manage_files_pattern(chromium_t, chromium_tmpfs_t, chromium_tmpfs_t)
> allow chromium_t chromium_tmpfs_t:file map;
> fs_tmpfs_filetrans(chromium_t, chromium_tmpfs_t, file)
> @@ -128,7 +144,11 @@ dyntrans_pattern(chromium_t, chromium_re
> domtrans_pattern(chromium_t, chromium_sandbox_exec_t, chromium_sandbox_t)
> domtrans_pattern(chromium_t, chromium_naclhelper_exec_t, chromium_naclhelper_t)
>
> +# for self:file create
> +kernel_associate_proc(chromium_t)
> +
> kernel_list_proc(chromium_t)
> +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chromium_t)
> kernel_read_net_sysctls(chromium_t)
>
> corecmd_exec_bin(chromium_t)
> @@ -145,6 +165,9 @@ dev_read_sound(chromium_t)
> dev_write_sound(chromium_t)
> dev_read_urand(chromium_t)
> dev_read_rand(chromium_t)
> +tunable_policy(`xserver_allow_dri', `
> + dev_rw_dri(chromium_t)
> +')
> dev_rw_xserver_misc(chromium_t)
> dev_map_xserver_misc(chromium_t)
>
> @@ -178,14 +201,15 @@ userdom_use_user_terminals(chromium_t)
> userdom_manage_user_certs(chromium_t)
> userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_cert(chromium_t, dir, ".pki")
>
> -xdg_create_cache_dirs(chromium_t)
> -xdg_create_config_dirs(chromium_t)
> -xdg_create_data_dirs(chromium_t)
> +xdg_manage_cache(chromium_t)
> +xdg_manage_config(chromium_t)
> +xdg_manage_data(chromium_t)
NAK. Chrome should only be able to create the base ~/.config/cache dirs,
not manage other things inside them.
The template userdom_user_content_access_template is for this exact
thing. By default chrome will have no access then the template generates
booleans the user can easily toggle to enable access. That stuff was
done specifically to confine things like browsers.
> xdg_manage_downloads(chromium_t)
> -xdg_read_config_files(chromium_t)
> -xdg_read_data_files(chromium_t)
>
> xserver_user_x_domain_template(chromium, chromium_t, chromium_tmpfs_t)
> +xserver_stream_connect_xdm(chromium_t)
> +
> +xserver_manage_mesa_shader_cache(chromium_t)
>
> tunable_policy(`chromium_bind_tcp_unreserved_ports',`
> corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(chromium_t)
> @@ -198,6 +222,11 @@ tunable_policy(`chromium_rw_usb_dev',`
> udev_read_db(chromium_t)
> ')
>
> +tunable_policy(`chromium_exec_plugins',`
> + # sometimes .config/google-chrome/PepperFlash/32.0.0.142/libpepflashplayer.so gets chromium_tmp_t
> + can_exec(chromium_t, { chromium_xdg_config_t chromium_tmp_t })
> +')
> +
Not really sure theres much point to adding this just to remove it in 6
months.
> tunable_policy(`chromium_read_system_info',`
> kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chromium_t)
> # Memory optimizations & optimizations based on OS/version
> @@ -229,6 +258,10 @@ optional_policy(`
> ')
>
> optional_policy(`
> + networkmanager_dbus_chat(chromium_t)
> +')
> +
> +optional_policy(`
> dbus_all_session_bus_client(chromium_t)
> dbus_system_bus_client(chromium_t)
>
> @@ -241,8 +274,13 @@ optional_policy(`
> ')
>
> optional_policy(`
> + devicekit_dbus_chat_disk(chromium_t)
> devicekit_dbus_chat_power(chromium_t)
> ')
> +
> + optional_policy(`
> + systemd_dbus_chat_hostnamed(chromium_t)
> + ')
> ')
>
> optional_policy(`
> @@ -252,6 +290,10 @@ optional_policy(`
> dpkg_read_db(chromium_t)
> ')
>
> +optional_policy(`
> + ssh_dontaudit_agent_tmp(chromium_t)
> +')
> +
> ifdef(`use_alsa',`
> optional_policy(`
> alsa_domain(chromium_t, chromium_tmpfs_t)
> @@ -259,6 +301,7 @@ ifdef(`use_alsa',`
>
> optional_policy(`
> pulseaudio_domtrans(chromium_t)
> + pulseaudio_read_home(chromium_t)
> ')
> ')
>
> @@ -299,6 +342,9 @@ userdom_use_user_terminals(chromium_rend
>
> xdg_read_config_files(chromium_renderer_t)
>
> +# should we have a tunable for this?
> +xdg_read_pictures(chromium_t)
I personally don't really want my browser to be able to access my
photos. A boolean would be good yeah. Maybe name it similar to the ones
userdom_user_content_access_template makes?
> +
> xserver_user_x_domain_template(chromium_renderer, chromium_renderer_t, chromium_tmpfs_t)
>
> tunable_policy(`chromium_read_system_info',`
> @@ -360,3 +406,6 @@ tunable_policy(`chromium_read_system_inf
>
> dev_read_sysfs(chromium_naclhelper_t)
> dev_read_urand(chromium_naclhelper_t)
> +kernel_list_proc(chromium_naclhelper_t)
> +
> +miscfiles_read_localization(chromium_naclhelper_t)
> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
> @@ -2424,6 +2424,24 @@ interface(`kernel_rw_all_sysctls',`
>
> ########################################
> ## <summary>
> +## Associate a file to proc_t (/proc)
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +## <summary>
> +## Domain allowed access.
> +## </summary>
> +## </param>
> +## <rolecap/>
> +#
> +interface(`kernel_associate_proc',`
> + gen_require(`
> + type proc_t;
> + ')
> + allow $1 proc_t:filesystem associate;
> +')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
> ## Send a kill signal to unlabeled processes.
> ## </summary>
> ## <param name="domain">
> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/xserver.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/services/xserver.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/xserver.te
> @@ -55,6 +55,13 @@ gen_tunable(xserver_gnome_xdm, false)
> ## </desc>
> gen_tunable(xserver_object_manager, false)
>
> +## <desc>
> +## <p>
> +## Allow DRI access
> +## </p>
> +## </desc>
> +gen_tunable(xserver_allow_dri, false)
> +
> attribute x_domain;
>
> # X Events
> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
> @@ -48,8 +48,9 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',`
> files_search_tmp($2)
>
> # Communicate via System V shared memory.
> + allow $2 xserver_t:fd use;
> allow $2 xserver_t:shm r_shm_perms;
> - allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file read_file_perms;
> + allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file { map read_file_perms };
>
> # allow ps to show iceauth
> ps_process_pattern($2, iceauth_t)
> @@ -75,10 +76,6 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',`
> allow $2 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file { read write };
> dontaudit $2 xdm_t:tcp_socket { read write };
>
> - # Client read xserver shm
> - allow $2 xserver_t:fd use;
> - allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file read_file_perms;
> -
> # Read /tmp/.X0-lock
> allow $2 xserver_tmp_t:file { getattr read };
>
> @@ -91,6 +88,9 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',`
> # open office is looking for the following
> dev_getattr_agp_dev($2)
> dev_dontaudit_rw_dri($2)
> + tunable_policy(`xserver_allow_dri',`
> + dev_rw_dri($2)
> + ')
This whole dri thing might need to be looked at separately from this
patch. It apparently depends on the graphics driver so I used to think
it should be a boolean. But other policies just add rw_dri without a
boolean so not really sure. Personally on my machine I just add
dev_rw_dri(x_domain) and be done with it.
> # GNOME checks for usb and other devices:
> dev_rw_usbfs($2)
>
> @@ -1670,6 +1670,26 @@ interface(`xserver_rw_mesa_shader_cache'
>
> rw_dirs_pattern($1, mesa_shader_cache_t, mesa_shader_cache_t)
> rw_files_pattern($1, mesa_shader_cache_t, mesa_shader_cache_t)
> + xdg_search_cache_dirs($1)
> +')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
> +## Manage the mesa shader cache.
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +## <summary>
> +## Domain allowed access.
> +## </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`xserver_manage_mesa_shader_cache',`
> + gen_require(`
> + type mesa_shader_cache_t;
> + ')
> +
> + manage_dirs_pattern($1, mesa_shader_cache_t, mesa_shader_cache_t)
> + manage_files_pattern($1, mesa_shader_cache_t, mesa_shader_cache_t)
> allow $1 mesa_shader_cache_t:file map;
>
> xdg_search_cache_dirs($1)
> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/apps/chromium.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/apps/chromium.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/apps/chromium.if
> @@ -38,7 +38,15 @@ interface(`chromium_role',`
>
> allow $2 chromium_t:process signal_perms;
> allow $2 chromium_renderer_t:process signal_perms;
> + allow $2 chromium_sandbox_t:process signal_perms;
> allow $2 chromium_naclhelper_t:process signal_perms;
> + allow chromium_t $2:process { signull signal };
> + allow $2 chromium_t:file manage_file_perms;
> +
> + allow $2 chromium_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
> +
> + # for /tmp/.ICE-unix/* sockets
> + allow chromium_t $2:unix_stream_socket connectto;
>
> allow chromium_sandbox_t $2:fd use;
> allow chromium_naclhelper_t $2:fd use;
> @@ -109,6 +117,7 @@ interface(`chromium_domtrans',`
> gen_require(`
> type chromium_t;
> type chromium_exec_t;
> + class dbus send_msg;
> ')
>
> corecmd_search_bin($1)
> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
> @@ -772,3 +772,21 @@ interface(`ssh_delete_tmp',`
> files_search_tmp($1)
> delete_files_pattern($1, sshd_tmp_t, sshd_tmp_t)
> ')
> +
> +#######################################
> +## <summary>
> +## dontaudit access to ssh agent tmp dirs
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +## <summary>
> +## Domain not to audit.
> +## </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`ssh_dontaudit_agent_tmp',`
> + gen_require(`
> + type ssh_agent_tmp_t;
> + ')
> +
> + dontaudit $1 ssh_agent_tmp_t:dir list_dir_perms;
> +')
On 2/16/20 5:00 AM, Jason Zaman wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 12, 2020 at 01:30:39PM +1100, Russell Coker wrote:
>> The attached patch against the git refpolicy from 3 days ago makes Chrome work
>> with Pulseaudio, DRI, Flash, and lots of little things.
>
> Flash is dead. My chrome even pops up a banner every time i start it
> saying flash is disabled by default and will be completely removed in a
> few months. Not sure adding the flash is worth it.
Agreed. If there are any flash-specific rules, please remove them.
>> Adds tunables chromium_exec_plugins and xserver_allow_dri.
>>
>> I think this is ready to merge with the names of the tunables and interfaces
>> being the only possible changes needed.
>>
>> --
>> My Main Blog http://etbe.coker.com.au/
>> My Documents Blog http://doc.coker.com.au/
>
>> Chromium and DRI policy
>>
>> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
>> ===================================================================
>> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
>> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
>> @@ -39,6 +39,13 @@ gen_tunable(chromium_bind_tcp_unreserved
>> ## </desc>
>> gen_tunable(chromium_rw_usb_dev, false)
>>
>> +## <desc>
>> +## <p>
>> +## Allow chromium to execute it's config (for plugins like Flash)
>> +## </p>
>> +## </desc>
>> +gen_tunable(chromium_exec_plugins, false)
>> +
>> type chromium_t;
>> domain_dyntrans_type(chromium_t)
>>
>> @@ -63,6 +70,9 @@ type chromium_tmpfs_t;
>> userdom_user_tmpfs_file(chromium_tmpfs_t)
>> optional_policy(`
>> pulseaudio_tmpfs_content(chromium_tmpfs_t)
>> + pulseaudio_rw_tmpfs_files(chromium_t)
>> + pulseaudio_stream_connect(chromium_t)
>> + pulseaudio_use_fds(chromium_t)
>> ')
>>
>> type chromium_xdg_config_t;
>> @@ -77,7 +87,9 @@ xdg_cache_content(chromium_xdg_cache_t)
>> #
>>
>> # execmem for load in plugins
>> -allow chromium_t self:process { execmem getsched getcap setcap setrlimit setsched sigkill signal };
>> +allow chromium_t self:process { execmem getsched getcap setcap setrlimit setsched sigkill signal signull };
>> +allow chromium_t self:dir { write add_name };
>> +allow chromium_t self:file create;
>> allow chromium_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
>> allow chromium_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
>> allow chromium_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket client_stream_socket_perms;
>> @@ -96,6 +108,7 @@ allow chromium_t chromium_renderer_t:uni
>>
>> allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_dgram_socket { getattr read write };
>> allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
>> +allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:file read_file_perms;
>>
>> allow chromium_t chromium_naclhelper_t:process { share };
>>
>> @@ -108,6 +121,9 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(chromium_t, ch
>> manage_fifo_files_pattern(chromium_t, chromium_tmp_t, chromium_tmp_t)
>> files_tmp_filetrans(chromium_t, chromium_tmp_t, { file dir sock_file })
>>
>> +# for /run/user/$UID
>> +userdom_user_runtime_filetrans(chromium_t, chromium_tmp_t, { file sock_file })
>> +
>> manage_files_pattern(chromium_t, chromium_tmpfs_t, chromium_tmpfs_t)
>> allow chromium_t chromium_tmpfs_t:file map;
>> fs_tmpfs_filetrans(chromium_t, chromium_tmpfs_t, file)
>> @@ -128,7 +144,11 @@ dyntrans_pattern(chromium_t, chromium_re
>> domtrans_pattern(chromium_t, chromium_sandbox_exec_t, chromium_sandbox_t)
>> domtrans_pattern(chromium_t, chromium_naclhelper_exec_t, chromium_naclhelper_t)
>>
>> +# for self:file create
>> +kernel_associate_proc(chromium_t)
Where under /proc/self does this work?
>> kernel_list_proc(chromium_t)
>> +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chromium_t)
>> kernel_read_net_sysctls(chromium_t)
>>
>> corecmd_exec_bin(chromium_t)
>> @@ -145,6 +165,9 @@ dev_read_sound(chromium_t)
>> dev_write_sound(chromium_t)
>> dev_read_urand(chromium_t)
>> dev_read_rand(chromium_t)
>> +tunable_policy(`xserver_allow_dri', `
>> + dev_rw_dri(chromium_t)
>> +')
>> dev_rw_xserver_misc(chromium_t)
>> dev_map_xserver_misc(chromium_t)
>>
>> @@ -178,14 +201,15 @@ userdom_use_user_terminals(chromium_t)
>> userdom_manage_user_certs(chromium_t)
>> userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_cert(chromium_t, dir, ".pki")
>>
>> -xdg_create_cache_dirs(chromium_t)
>> -xdg_create_config_dirs(chromium_t)
>> -xdg_create_data_dirs(chromium_t)
>> +xdg_manage_cache(chromium_t)
>> +xdg_manage_config(chromium_t)
>> +xdg_manage_data(chromium_t)
>
> NAK. Chrome should only be able to create the base ~/.config/cache dirs,
> not manage other things inside them.
> The template userdom_user_content_access_template is for this exact
> thing. By default chrome will have no access then the template generates
> booleans the user can easily toggle to enable access. That stuff was
> done specifically to confine things like browsers.
>
>> xdg_manage_downloads(chromium_t)
>> -xdg_read_config_files(chromium_t)
>> -xdg_read_data_files(chromium_t)
>>
>> xserver_user_x_domain_template(chromium, chromium_t, chromium_tmpfs_t)
>> +xserver_stream_connect_xdm(chromium_t)
>> +
>> +xserver_manage_mesa_shader_cache(chromium_t)
>>
>> tunable_policy(`chromium_bind_tcp_unreserved_ports',`
>> corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(chromium_t)
>> @@ -198,6 +222,11 @@ tunable_policy(`chromium_rw_usb_dev',`
>> udev_read_db(chromium_t)
>> ')
>>
>> +tunable_policy(`chromium_exec_plugins',`
>> + # sometimes .config/google-chrome/PepperFlash/32.0.0.142/libpepflashplayer.so gets chromium_tmp_t
>> + can_exec(chromium_t, { chromium_xdg_config_t chromium_tmp_t })
>> +')
>> +
>
> Not really sure theres much point to adding this just to remove it in 6
> months.
>
>
>> tunable_policy(`chromium_read_system_info',`
>> kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chromium_t)
>> # Memory optimizations & optimizations based on OS/version
>> @@ -229,6 +258,10 @@ optional_policy(`
>> ')
>>
>> optional_policy(`
>> + networkmanager_dbus_chat(chromium_t)
>> +')
>> +
>> +optional_policy(`
>> dbus_all_session_bus_client(chromium_t)
>> dbus_system_bus_client(chromium_t)
>>
>> @@ -241,8 +274,13 @@ optional_policy(`
>> ')
>>
>> optional_policy(`
>> + devicekit_dbus_chat_disk(chromium_t)
>> devicekit_dbus_chat_power(chromium_t)
>> ')
>> +
>> + optional_policy(`
>> + systemd_dbus_chat_hostnamed(chromium_t)
>> + ')
>> ')
>>
>> optional_policy(`
>> @@ -252,6 +290,10 @@ optional_policy(`
>> dpkg_read_db(chromium_t)
>> ')
>>
>> +optional_policy(`
>> + ssh_dontaudit_agent_tmp(chromium_t)
>> +')
>> +
>> ifdef(`use_alsa',`
>> optional_policy(`
>> alsa_domain(chromium_t, chromium_tmpfs_t)
>> @@ -259,6 +301,7 @@ ifdef(`use_alsa',`
>>
>> optional_policy(`
>> pulseaudio_domtrans(chromium_t)
>> + pulseaudio_read_home(chromium_t)
>> ')
>> ')
>>
>> @@ -299,6 +342,9 @@ userdom_use_user_terminals(chromium_rend
>>
>> xdg_read_config_files(chromium_renderer_t)
>>
>> +# should we have a tunable for this?
>> +xdg_read_pictures(chromium_t)
>
> I personally don't really want my browser to be able to access my
> photos. A boolean would be good yeah. Maybe name it similar to the ones
> userdom_user_content_access_template makes?
>
>> +
>> xserver_user_x_domain_template(chromium_renderer, chromium_renderer_t, chromium_tmpfs_t)
>>
>> tunable_policy(`chromium_read_system_info',`
>> @@ -360,3 +406,6 @@ tunable_policy(`chromium_read_system_inf
>>
>> dev_read_sysfs(chromium_naclhelper_t)
>> dev_read_urand(chromium_naclhelper_t)
>> +kernel_list_proc(chromium_naclhelper_t)
>> +
>> +miscfiles_read_localization(chromium_naclhelper_t)
>> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
>> ===================================================================
>> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
>> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
>> @@ -2424,6 +2424,24 @@ interface(`kernel_rw_all_sysctls',`
>>
>> ########################################
>> ## <summary>
>> +## Associate a file to proc_t (/proc)
>> +## </summary>
>> +## <param name="domain">
>> +## <summary>
>> +## Domain allowed access.
>> +## </summary>
>> +## </param>
>> +## <rolecap/>
>> +#
>> +interface(`kernel_associate_proc',`
>> + gen_require(`
>> + type proc_t;
>> + ')
>> + allow $1 proc_t:filesystem associate;
>> +')
>> +
>> +########################################
>> +## <summary>
>> ## Send a kill signal to unlabeled processes.
>> ## </summary>
>> ## <param name="domain">
>> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/xserver.te
>> ===================================================================
>> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/services/xserver.te
>> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/xserver.te
>> @@ -55,6 +55,13 @@ gen_tunable(xserver_gnome_xdm, false)
>> ## </desc>
>> gen_tunable(xserver_object_manager, false)
>>
>> +## <desc>
>> +## <p>
>> +## Allow DRI access
>> +## </p>
>> +## </desc>
>> +gen_tunable(xserver_allow_dri, false)
>> +
>> attribute x_domain;
>>
>> # X Events
>> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
>> ===================================================================
>> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
>> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
>> @@ -48,8 +48,9 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',`
>> files_search_tmp($2)
>>
>> # Communicate via System V shared memory.
>> + allow $2 xserver_t:fd use;
>> allow $2 xserver_t:shm r_shm_perms;
>> - allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file read_file_perms;
>> + allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file { map read_file_perms };
>>
>> # allow ps to show iceauth
>> ps_process_pattern($2, iceauth_t)
>> @@ -75,10 +76,6 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',`
>> allow $2 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file { read write };
>> dontaudit $2 xdm_t:tcp_socket { read write };
>>
>> - # Client read xserver shm
>> - allow $2 xserver_t:fd use;
>> - allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file read_file_perms;
>> -
>> # Read /tmp/.X0-lock
>> allow $2 xserver_tmp_t:file { getattr read };
>>
>> @@ -91,6 +88,9 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',`
>> # open office is looking for the following
>> dev_getattr_agp_dev($2)
>> dev_dontaudit_rw_dri($2)
>> + tunable_policy(`xserver_allow_dri',`
>> + dev_rw_dri($2)
>> + ')
>
> This whole dri thing might need to be looked at separately from this
> patch. It apparently depends on the graphics driver so I used to think
> it should be a boolean. But other policies just add rw_dri without a
> boolean so not really sure. Personally on my machine I just add
> dev_rw_dri(x_domain) and be done with it.
This is a good point. If we can get some clarity that would be useful,
since many things are muddy with X.
>> # GNOME checks for usb and other devices:
>> dev_rw_usbfs($2)
>>
>> @@ -1670,6 +1670,26 @@ interface(`xserver_rw_mesa_shader_cache'
>>
>> rw_dirs_pattern($1, mesa_shader_cache_t, mesa_shader_cache_t)
>> rw_files_pattern($1, mesa_shader_cache_t, mesa_shader_cache_t)
>> + xdg_search_cache_dirs($1)
>> +')
>> +
>> +########################################
>> +## <summary>
>> +## Manage the mesa shader cache.
>> +## </summary>
>> +## <param name="domain">
>> +## <summary>
>> +## Domain allowed access.
>> +## </summary>
>> +## </param>
>> +#
>> +interface(`xserver_manage_mesa_shader_cache',`
>> + gen_require(`
>> + type mesa_shader_cache_t;
>> + ')
>> +
>> + manage_dirs_pattern($1, mesa_shader_cache_t, mesa_shader_cache_t)
>> + manage_files_pattern($1, mesa_shader_cache_t, mesa_shader_cache_t)
>> allow $1 mesa_shader_cache_t:file map;
>>
>> xdg_search_cache_dirs($1)
>> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/apps/chromium.if
>> ===================================================================
>> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/apps/chromium.if
>> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/apps/chromium.if
>> @@ -38,7 +38,15 @@ interface(`chromium_role',`
>>
>> allow $2 chromium_t:process signal_perms;
>> allow $2 chromium_renderer_t:process signal_perms;
>> + allow $2 chromium_sandbox_t:process signal_perms;
>> allow $2 chromium_naclhelper_t:process signal_perms;
>> + allow chromium_t $2:process { signull signal };
>> + allow $2 chromium_t:file manage_file_perms;
>> +
>> + allow $2 chromium_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
>> +
>> + # for /tmp/.ICE-unix/* sockets
>> + allow chromium_t $2:unix_stream_socket connectto;
>>
>> allow chromium_sandbox_t $2:fd use;
>> allow chromium_naclhelper_t $2:fd use;
>> @@ -109,6 +117,7 @@ interface(`chromium_domtrans',`
>> gen_require(`
>> type chromium_t;
>> type chromium_exec_t;
>> + class dbus send_msg;
>> ')
>>
>> corecmd_search_bin($1)
>> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
>> ===================================================================
>> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
>> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
>> @@ -772,3 +772,21 @@ interface(`ssh_delete_tmp',`
>> files_search_tmp($1)
>> delete_files_pattern($1, sshd_tmp_t, sshd_tmp_t)
>> ')
>> +
>> +#######################################
>> +## <summary>
>> +## dontaudit access to ssh agent tmp dirs
>> +## </summary>
>> +## <param name="domain">
>> +## <summary>
>> +## Domain not to audit.
>> +## </summary>
>> +## </param>
>> +#
>> +interface(`ssh_dontaudit_agent_tmp',`
>> + gen_require(`
>> + type ssh_agent_tmp_t;
>> + ')
>> +
>> + dontaudit $1 ssh_agent_tmp_t:dir list_dir_perms;
>> +')
>
--
Chris PeBenito