Capture file handles and how they map to local inodes. In particular,
NFSv4 PUTFH uses fh_verify() so we can now observe which file handles
are the target of OPEN, LOOKUP, RENAME, and so on.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
---
fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c | 5 +++--
fs/nfsd/trace.h | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
index c29baa03dfaf..5e2ed4b2a925 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
@@ -331,8 +331,6 @@ fh_verify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type, int access)
struct dentry *dentry;
__be32 error;
- dprintk("nfsd: fh_verify(%s)\n", SVCFH_fmt(fhp));
-
if (!fhp->fh_dentry) {
error = nfsd_set_fh_dentry(rqstp, fhp);
if (error)
@@ -340,6 +338,9 @@ fh_verify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type, int access)
}
dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
exp = fhp->fh_export;
+
+ trace_nfsd_fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, type, access);
+
/*
* We still have to do all these permission checks, even when
* fh_dentry is already set:
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/trace.h b/fs/nfsd/trace.h
index a60ead3b227a..8467fd8f94c2 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/trace.h
+++ b/fs/nfsd/trace.h
@@ -171,6 +171,52 @@ TRACE_EVENT(nfsd_compound_encode_err,
__entry->opnum, __entry->status)
);
+#define show_fs_file_type(x) \
+ __print_symbolic(x, \
+ { S_IFLNK, "LNK" }, \
+ { S_IFREG, "REG" }, \
+ { S_IFDIR, "DIR" }, \
+ { S_IFCHR, "CHR" }, \
+ { S_IFBLK, "BLK" }, \
+ { S_IFIFO, "FIFO" }, \
+ { S_IFSOCK, "SOCK" })
+
+TRACE_EVENT(nfsd_fh_verify,
+ TP_PROTO(
+ const struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
+ const struct svc_fh *fhp,
+ umode_t type,
+ int access
+ ),
+ TP_ARGS(rqstp, fhp, type, access),
+ TP_STRUCT__entry(
+ __field(unsigned int, netns_ino)
+ __sockaddr(server, rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_remotelen)
+ __sockaddr(client, rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_remotelen)
+ __field(u32, xid)
+ __field(u32, fh_hash)
+ __field(void *, inode)
+ __field(unsigned long, type)
+ __field(unsigned long, access)
+ ),
+ TP_fast_assign(
+ __entry->netns_ino = SVC_NET(rqstp)->ns.inum;
+ __assign_sockaddr(server, &rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_local,
+ rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_locallen);
+ __assign_sockaddr(client, &rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_remote,
+ rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_remotelen);
+ __entry->xid = be32_to_cpu(rqstp->rq_xid);
+ __entry->fh_hash = knfsd_fh_hash(&fhp->fh_handle);
+ __entry->inode = d_inode(fhp->fh_dentry);
+ __entry->type = type;
+ __entry->access = access;
+ ),
+ TP_printk("xid=0x%08x fh_hash=0x%08x inode=%p type=%s access=%s",
+ __entry->xid, __entry->fh_hash, __entry->inode,
+ show_fs_file_type(__entry->type),
+ show_nfsd_may_flags(__entry->access)
+ )
+);
DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(nfsd_fh_err_class,
TP_PROTO(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
Record permission errors in the trace log. Note that the new trace
event is conditional, so it will only record non-zero return values
from nfsd_permission().
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
---
fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c | 8 +-------
fs/nfsd/trace.h | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
index 5e2ed4b2a925..877da093ed2d 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
@@ -392,13 +392,7 @@ fh_verify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type, int access)
skip_pseudoflavor_check:
/* Finally, check access permissions. */
error = nfsd_permission(rqstp, exp, dentry, access);
-
- if (error) {
- dprintk("fh_verify: %pd2 permission failure, "
- "acc=%x, error=%d\n",
- dentry,
- access, ntohl(error));
- }
+ trace_nfsd_fh_verify_err(rqstp, fhp, type, access, error);
out:
if (error == nfserr_stale)
nfsd_stats_fh_stale_inc(exp);
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/trace.h b/fs/nfsd/trace.h
index 8467fd8f94c2..b6f3c1366a82 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/trace.h
+++ b/fs/nfsd/trace.h
@@ -211,13 +211,55 @@ TRACE_EVENT(nfsd_fh_verify,
__entry->type = type;
__entry->access = access;
),
- TP_printk("xid=0x%08x fh_hash=0x%08x inode=%p type=%s access=%s",
- __entry->xid, __entry->fh_hash, __entry->inode,
+ TP_printk("xid=0x%08x fh_hash=0x%08x type=%s access=%s",
+ __entry->xid, __entry->fh_hash,
show_fs_file_type(__entry->type),
show_nfsd_may_flags(__entry->access)
)
);
+TRACE_EVENT_CONDITION(nfsd_fh_verify_err,
+ TP_PROTO(
+ const struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
+ const struct svc_fh *fhp,
+ umode_t type,
+ int access,
+ __be32 error
+ ),
+ TP_ARGS(rqstp, fhp, type, access, error),
+ TP_CONDITION(error),
+ TP_STRUCT__entry(
+ __field(unsigned int, netns_ino)
+ __sockaddr(server, rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_remotelen)
+ __sockaddr(client, rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_remotelen)
+ __field(u32, xid)
+ __field(u32, fh_hash)
+ __field(void *, inode)
+ __field(unsigned long, type)
+ __field(unsigned long, access)
+ __field(int, error)
+ ),
+ TP_fast_assign(
+ __entry->netns_ino = SVC_NET(rqstp)->ns.inum;
+ __assign_sockaddr(server, &rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_local,
+ rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_locallen);
+ __assign_sockaddr(client, &rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_remote,
+ rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_remotelen);
+ __entry->xid = be32_to_cpu(rqstp->rq_xid);
+ __entry->fh_hash = knfsd_fh_hash(&fhp->fh_handle);
+ __entry->inode = d_inode(fhp->fh_dentry);
+ __entry->type = type;
+ __entry->access = access;
+ __entry->error = be32_to_cpu(error);
+ ),
+ TP_printk("xid=0x%08x fh_hash=0x%08x type=%s access=%s error=%d",
+ __entry->xid, __entry->fh_hash,
+ show_fs_file_type(__entry->type),
+ show_nfsd_may_flags(__entry->access),
+ __entry->error
+ )
+);
+
DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(nfsd_fh_err_class,
TP_PROTO(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
struct svc_fh *fhp,