2022-04-15 23:41:23

by Ahmad Fatoum

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v7 0/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys

Series applies on top of v5.18-rc2

v6 was here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/[email protected]/

Changelog is beneath each individual patch.


The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core
built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.

Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique
never-disclosed device-specific key.

There has been multiple discussions on how to represent this within the kernel:

The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core
built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.

Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique
never-disclosed device-specific key. There has been multiple
discussions on how to represent this within the kernel:

- [RFC] crypto: caam - add red blobifier
Steffen implemented[1] a PoC sysfs driver to start a discussion on how to
best integrate the blob mechanism.
Mimi suggested that it could be used to implement trusted keys.
Trusted keys back then were a TPM-only feature.

- security/keys/secure_key: Adds the secure key support based on CAAM.
Udit Agarwal added[2] a new "secure" key type with the CAAM as backend.
The key material stays within the kernel only.
Mimi and James agreed that this needs a generic interface, not specific
to CAAM. Mimi suggested trusted keys. Jan noted that this could serve as
basis for TEE-backed keys.

- [RFC] drivers: crypto: caam: key: Add caam_tk key type
Franck added[3] a new "caam_tk" key type based on Udit's work. This time
it uses CAAM "black blobs" instead of "red blobs", so key material stays
within the CAAM and isn't exposed to kernel in plaintext.
James voiced the opinion that there should be just one user-facing generic
wrap/unwrap key type with multiple possible handlers.
David suggested trusted keys.

- Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
Sumit reworked[4] trusted keys to support multiple possible backends with
one chosen at boot time and added a new TEE backend along with TPM.
This now sits in Jarkko's master branch to be sent out for v5.13

This patch series builds on top of Sumit's rework to have the CAAM as yet another
trusted key backend.

The CAAM bits are based on Steffen's initial patch from 2015. His work had been
used in the field for some years now, so I preferred not to deviate too much from it.

This series has been tested with dmcrypt[5] on an i.MX6Q/DL and an i.MX8M[6].

Looking forward to your feedback.

Cheers,
Ahmad

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/[email protected]/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/[email protected]/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/[email protected]/
[6]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/[email protected]od.outlook.com/

---
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
To: "Horia Geantă" <[email protected]>
To: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
To: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
To: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
To: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
To: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Cc: David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Trumtrar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Luebbe <[email protected]>
Cc: David Gstir <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Cc: Franck LENORMAND <[email protected]>
Cc: Sumit Garg <[email protected]>
Cc: Andreas Rammhold <[email protected]>
Cc: Tim Harvey <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthias Schiffer <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]

Ahmad Fatoum (6):
KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support
KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material
crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator
KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys
doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source
MAINTAINERS: add myself as CAAM trusted key maintainer

.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 ++
.../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 60 ++++++-
MAINTAINERS | 9 +
drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig | 3 +
drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c | 164 ++++++++++++++++++
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 2 +-
include/keys/trusted_caam.h | 11 ++
include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h | 102 +++++++++++
security/keys/Kconfig | 18 +-
security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 38 ++++
security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 10 +-
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 82 +++++++++
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 45 ++++-
14 files changed, 527 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c
create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_caam.h
create mode 100644 include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h
create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c

--
2.30.2


2022-04-16 01:01:07

by Ahmad Fatoum

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v7 1/6] KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support

With recent rework, trusted keys are no longer limited to TPM as trust
source. The Kconfig symbol is unchanged however leading to a few issues:

- TCG_TPM is required, even if only TEE is to be used
- Enabling TCG_TPM, but excluding it from available trusted sources
is not possible
- TEE=m && TRUSTED_KEYS=y will lead to TEE support being silently
dropped, which is not the best user experience

Remedy these issues by introducing two new boolean Kconfig symbols:
TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM and TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE with the appropriate
dependencies.

Any new code depending on the TPM trusted key backend in particular
or symbols exported by it will now need to explicitly state that it

depends on TRUSTED_KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM

The latter to ensure the dependency is built and the former to ensure
it's reachable for module builds. There are no such users yet.

Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andreas Rammhold <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tim Harvey <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.[email protected]>
---
v6 -> v7:
- s/Tested-By/Tested-by/
v5 -> v6:
- Rebased on asym_tpm removal
v4 -> v5:
- collected Jarkko's Reviewed-by
v3 -> v4:
- rebased on top of Andreas' regression fix and pulled it back
into series
v2 -> v3:
- factored this patch out as a fix for backporting
v1 -> v2:
- Move rest of TPM-related selects from TRUSTED_KEYS to
TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM (Sumit)
- Remove left-over line in Makefile (Sumit)
- added Fixes: tag
- adjust commit message to reference the regression reported
by Andreas
- have ASYMMETRIC_TPM_KEY_SUBTYPE depend on TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM,
because it references global symbols that are exported
by the trusted key TPM backend.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/f8285eb0[email protected]pengutronix.de/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/[email protected]/T/#t

To: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
To: James Morris <[email protected]>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>
To: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
To: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
To: Sumit Garg <[email protected]>
To: David Howells <[email protected]>
To: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
To: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Cc: David Gstir <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthias Schiffer <[email protected]>
Cc: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
---
security/keys/Kconfig | 18 ++++++--------
security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++
security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 8 +++----
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig

diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index 0e30b361e1c1..abb03a1b2a5c 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -70,23 +70,19 @@ config BIG_KEYS

config TRUSTED_KEYS
tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
- depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM
- select CRYPTO
- select CRYPTO_HMAC
- select CRYPTO_SHA1
- select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
- select ASN1_ENCODER
- select OID_REGISTRY
- select ASN1
+ depends on KEYS
help
This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing
keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
- generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys,
- if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace will only ever
- see encrypted blobs.
+ generated and sealed by a trust source selected at kernel boot-time.
+ Userspace will only ever see encrypted blobs.

If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.

+if TRUSTED_KEYS
+source "security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig"
+endif
+
config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
depends on KEYS
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fc4abd581abb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
+ bool "TPM-based trusted keys"
+ depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS
+ default y
+ select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_HMAC
+ select CRYPTO_SHA1
+ select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+ select ASN1_ENCODER
+ select OID_REGISTRY
+ select ASN1
+ help
+ Enable use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as trusted key
+ backend. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
+ which will be generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM.
+ The TPM only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other
+ criteria match.
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE
+ bool "TEE-based trusted keys"
+ depends on TEE >= TRUSTED_KEYS
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted
+ key backend.
+
+if !TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM && !TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE
+comment "No trust source selected!"
+endif
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
index feb8b6c3cc79..2e2371eae4d5 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
@@ -5,10 +5,10 @@

obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
trusted-y += trusted_core.o
-trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm1.o

$(obj)/trusted_tpm2.o: $(obj)/tpm2key.asn1.h
-trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o
-trusted-y += tpm2key.asn1.o
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm2.o
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += tpm2key.asn1.o

-trusted-$(CONFIG_TEE) += trusted_tee.o
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) += trusted_tee.o
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
index 9b9d3ef79cbe..7cdbd16aed30 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm or tee)");

static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = {
-#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_TCG_TPM)
+#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM)
{ "tpm", &trusted_key_tpm_ops },
#endif
-#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_TEE)
+#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE)
{ "tee", &trusted_key_tee_ops },
#endif
};
--
2.30.2

2022-04-28 15:39:54

by Pankaj Gupta

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: RE: [EXT] [PATCH v7 0/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys

Hi Ahmad,

I have tested the patch-set.
It is working as expected even when CAAM is compiled as kernel module.

Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>

Regards
Pankaj

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ahmad Fatoum <[email protected]>
> Sent: Saturday, April 16, 2022 2:27 AM
> To: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>; Horia Geanta
> <[email protected]>; Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>; Pankaj
> Gupta <[email protected]>; Herbert Xu
> <[email protected]>; David S. Miller <[email protected]>;
> James Bottomley <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]; David Howells <[email protected]>; James
> Morris <[email protected]>; Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>; Steffen
> Trumtrar <[email protected]>; Jan Luebbe
> <[email protected]>; David Gstir <[email protected]>; Eric Biggers
> <[email protected]>; Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>; Franck
> Lenormand <[email protected]>; Sumit Garg
> <[email protected]>; Andreas Rammhold <[email protected]>;
> [email protected]; Matthias Schiffer <[email protected]
> group.com>; [email protected]; [email protected];
> [email protected]; [email protected]; linux-security-
> [email protected]
> Subject: [EXT] [PATCH v7 0/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP
> CAAM-based trusted keys
>
> Caution: EXT Email
>
> Series applies on top of v5.18-rc2
>
> v6 was here:
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.k
> ernel.org%2Flinux-integrity%2F20220316164335.1720255-1-
> a.fatoum%40pengutronix.de%2F&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cpankaj.gupta%40n
> xp.com%7C59fba782ed2445f72a3708da1f228c18%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd
> 99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C637856530483504933%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZ
> sb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6M
> n0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=HX0dpx79%2BRpfD0CTzd59XgcdEIOmUV0BtL3Y
> 36Sx1AY%3D&amp;reserved=0
>
> Changelog is beneath each individual patch.
>
>
> The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core
> built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
>
> Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique never-
> disclosed device-specific key.
>
> There has been multiple discussions on how to represent this within the
> kernel:
>
> The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core
> built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
>
> Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique never-
> disclosed device-specific key. There has been multiple discussions on how to
> represent this within the kernel:
>
> - [RFC] crypto: caam - add red blobifier
> Steffen implemented[1] a PoC sysfs driver to start a discussion on how to
> best integrate the blob mechanism.
> Mimi suggested that it could be used to implement trusted keys.
> Trusted keys back then were a TPM-only feature.
>
> - security/keys/secure_key: Adds the secure key support based on CAAM.
> Udit Agarwal added[2] a new "secure" key type with the CAAM as backend.
> The key material stays within the kernel only.
> Mimi and James agreed that this needs a generic interface, not specific
> to CAAM. Mimi suggested trusted keys. Jan noted that this could serve as
> basis for TEE-backed keys.
>
> - [RFC] drivers: crypto: caam: key: Add caam_tk key type
> Franck added[3] a new "caam_tk" key type based on Udit's work. This time
> it uses CAAM "black blobs" instead of "red blobs", so key material stays
> within the CAAM and isn't exposed to kernel in plaintext.
> James voiced the opinion that there should be just one user-facing generic
> wrap/unwrap key type with multiple possible handlers.
> David suggested trusted keys.
>
> - Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
> Sumit reworked[4] trusted keys to support multiple possible backends with
> one chosen at boot time and added a new TEE backend along with TPM.
> This now sits in Jarkko's master branch to be sent out for v5.13
>
> This patch series builds on top of Sumit's rework to have the CAAM as yet
> another trusted key backend.
>
> The CAAM bits are based on Steffen's initial patch from 2015. His work had
> been used in the field for some years now, so I preferred not to deviate too
> much from it.
>
> This series has been tested with dmcrypt[5] on an i.MX6Q/DL and an
> i.MX8M[6].
>
> Looking forward to your feedback.
>
> Cheers,
> Ahmad
>
> [1]:
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.k
> ernel.org%2Flinux-crypto%2F1447082306-19946-2-git-send-email-
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> d99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C637856530483504933%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbG
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> integrity%2FDU2PR04MB8630D83FE9BBC0D782C4FAF595089%40DU2PR04MB
> 8630.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com%2F&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cpankaj.gupta
> %40nxp.com%7C59fba782ed2445f72a3708da1f228c18%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa
> 92cd99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C637856530483504933%7CUnknown%7CTWFp
> bGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVC
> I6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=jOJusQxZ%2BUfjxDKyMImc4BYjO8sFmamV
> b5LnAo%2BknFc%3D&amp;reserved=0
>
> ---
> To: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
> To: "Horia Geant?" <[email protected]>
> To: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
> To: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
> To: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
> To: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
> To: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
> Cc: David Howells <[email protected]>
> Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>
> Cc: Steffen Trumtrar <[email protected]>
> Cc: Jan Luebbe <[email protected]>
> Cc: David Gstir <[email protected]>
> Cc: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
> Cc: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
> Cc: Franck LENORMAND <[email protected]>
> Cc: Sumit Garg <[email protected]>
> Cc: Andreas Rammhold <[email protected]>
> Cc: Tim Harvey <[email protected]>
> Cc: Matthias Schiffer <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: [email protected]
>
> Ahmad Fatoum (6):
> KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support
> KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material
> crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator
> KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys
> doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source
> MAINTAINERS: add myself as CAAM trusted key maintainer
>
> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 ++
> .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 60 ++++++-
> MAINTAINERS | 9 +
> drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig | 3 +
> drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile | 1 +
> drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c | 164 ++++++++++++++++++
> include/keys/trusted-type.h | 2 +-
> include/keys/trusted_caam.h | 11 ++
> include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h | 102 +++++++++++
> security/keys/Kconfig | 18 +-
> security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 38 ++++
> security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 10 +-
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 82 +++++++++
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 45 ++++-
> 14 files changed, 527 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) create mode 100644
> drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c create mode 100644
> include/keys/trusted_caam.h create mode 100644 include/soc/fsl/caam-
> blob.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
> create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
>
> --
> 2.30.2