2024-03-28 18:27:39

by Pavitrakumar M

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v1 0/4] Add spacc crypto driver support

Add the driver for SPAcc(Security Protocol Accelerator), which is a
crypto acceleration IP from Synopsys. The SPAcc supports many cipher,
hash, aead algorithms and various modes.The driver currently supports
below,

aead:
- ccm(sm4)
- ccm(aes)
- gcm(sm4)
- gcm(aes)
- rfc8998(gcm(sm4))
- rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)

cipher:
- cbc(sm4)
- ecb(sm4)
- ofb(sm4)
- cfb(sm4)
- ctr(sm4)
- cbc(aes)
- ecb(aes)
- ctr(aes)
- xts(aes)
- cts(cbc(aes))
- cbc(des)
- ecb(des)
- cbc(des3_ede)
- ecb(des3_ede)
- chacha20
- xts(sm4)
- cts(cbc(sm4))
- ecb(kasumi)
- f8(kasumi)
- snow3g_uea2
- cs1(cbc(aes))
- cs2(cbc(aes))
- cs1(cbc(sm4))
- cs2(cbc(sm4))
- f8(sm4)

hash:
- michael_mic
- sm3
- hmac(sm3)
- sha3-512
- sha3-384
- sha3-256
- sha3-224
- hmac(sha512)
- hmac(sha384)
- hmac(sha256)
- hmac(sha224)
- sha512
- sha384
- sha256
- sha224
- sha1
- hmac(sha1)
- md5
- hmac(md5)
- cmac(sm4)
- xcbc(aes)
- cmac(aes)
- xcbc(sm4)
- sha512-224
- hmac(sha512-224)
- sha512-256
- hmac(sha512-256)
- mac(kasumi_f9)
- mac(snow3g)
- mac(zuc)
- sslmac(sha1)
- shake128
- shake256
- cshake128
- cshake256
- kcmac128
- kcmac256
- kcmacxof128
- kcmacxof256
- sslmac(md5)

Pavitrakumar M (4):
Add SPAcc driver to Linux kernel
Add SPACC Kconfig and Makefile
Add SPAcc dts overlay
Enable Driver compilation in crypto Kconfig and Makefile file

arch/arm64/boot/dts/xilinx/Makefile | 3 +
.../arm64/boot/dts/xilinx/snps-dwc-spacc.dtso | 35 +
drivers/crypto/Kconfig | 1 +
drivers/crypto/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Kconfig | 95 +
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Makefile | 16 +
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c | 1382 ++++++++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c | 1183 +++++++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.c | 2917 +++++++++++++++++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.h | 839 +++++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.c | 324 ++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.h | 236 ++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.c | 365 +++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.h | 113 +
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_interrupt.c | 204 ++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c | 670 ++++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_skcipher.c | 754 +++++
17 files changed, 9138 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/arm64/boot/dts/xilinx/snps-dwc-spacc.dtso
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Kconfig
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Makefile
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.c
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.h
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.c
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.h
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.c
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.h
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_interrupt.c
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_skcipher.c


base-commit: 6a8dbd71a70620c42d4fa82509204ba18231f28d
--
2.25.1



2024-03-28 18:27:47

by Pavitrakumar M

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v1 3/4] Add SPAcc dts overlay

Signed-off-by: Manjunath Hadli <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pavitrakumar M <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ruud Derwig <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/boot/dts/xilinx/Makefile | 3 ++
.../arm64/boot/dts/xilinx/snps-dwc-spacc.dtso | 35 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/arm64/boot/dts/xilinx/snps-dwc-spacc.dtso

diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/xilinx/Makefile b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/xilinx/Makefile
index 1068b0fa8e98..1e98ca994283 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/xilinx/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/xilinx/Makefile
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ dtb-$(CONFIG_ARCH_ZYNQMP) += zynqmp-zcu1275-revA.dtb

dtb-$(CONFIG_ARCH_ZYNQMP) += zynqmp-sm-k26-revA.dtb
dtb-$(CONFIG_ARCH_ZYNQMP) += zynqmp-smk-k26-revA.dtb
+dtb-$(CONFIG_ARCH_ZYNQMP) += zynqmp-smk-k26-revA.dtb

zynqmp-sm-k26-revA-sck-kv-g-revA-dtbs := zynqmp-sm-k26-revA.dtb zynqmp-sck-kv-g-revA.dtbo
dtb-$(CONFIG_ARCH_ZYNQMP) += zynqmp-sm-k26-revA-sck-kv-g-revA.dtb
@@ -29,3 +30,5 @@ zynqmp-smk-k26-revA-sck-kv-g-revA-dtbs := zynqmp-smk-k26-revA.dtb zynqmp-sck-kv-
dtb-$(CONFIG_ARCH_ZYNQMP) += zynqmp-smk-k26-revA-sck-kv-g-revA.dtb
zynqmp-smk-k26-revA-sck-kv-g-revB-dtbs := zynqmp-smk-k26-revA.dtb zynqmp-sck-kv-g-revB.dtbo
dtb-$(CONFIG_ARCH_ZYNQMP) += zynqmp-smk-k26-revA-sck-kv-g-revB.dtb
+zynqmp-zcu104-revC-snps-dwc-spacc-dtbs := zynqmp-zcu104-revC.dtb snps-dwc-spacc.dtbo
+dtb-$(CONFIG_ARCH_ZYNQMP) += zynqmp-zcu104-revC-snps-dwc-spacc.dtb
diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/xilinx/snps-dwc-spacc.dtso b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/xilinx/snps-dwc-spacc.dtso
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..603ad92f4c49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/xilinx/snps-dwc-spacc.dtso
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * dts file for Synopsys DWC SPAcc
+ *
+ * (C) Copyright 2024 Synopsys
+ *
+ * Ruud Derwig <[email protected]>
+ */
+
+/dts-v1/;
+/plugin/;
+
+/ {
+ #address-cells = <2>;
+ #size-cells = <2>;
+
+ fragment@0 {
+ target = <&amba>;
+
+ overlay1: __overlay__ {
+ #address-cells = <2>;
+ #size-cells = <2>;
+
+ dwc_spacc: spacc@400000000 {
+ compatible = "snps-dwc-spacc";
+ reg = /bits/ 64 <0x400000000 0x3FFFF>;
+ interrupts = <0 89 4>;
+ interrupt-parent = <&gic>;
+ clock-names = "ref_clk";
+ spacc_priority = <0>;
+ spacc_index = <0>;
+ };
+ };
+ };
+};
--
2.25.1


2024-03-28 18:27:47

by Pavitrakumar M

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v1 2/4] Add SPACC Kconfig and Makefile

Signed-off-by: shwetar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pavitrakumar M <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ruud Derwig <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Kconfig | 95 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Makefile | 16 ++++++
2 files changed, 111 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Kconfig
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Makefile

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9eb41a295f9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+config CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC
+ tristate "Support for dw_spacc Security protocol accelerators"
+ depends on HAS_DMA
+ default m
+
+ help
+ This enables support for the HASH/CRYP/AEAD hw accelerator which can be found
+ on dw_spacc IP.
+
+config CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_CIPHER
+ bool "Enable CIPHER functionality"
+ depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC
+ default y
+ select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_DES
+ select CRYPTO_AES
+ select CRYPTO_CBC
+ select CRYPTO_ECB
+ select CRYPTO_CTR
+ select CRYPTO_XTS
+ select CRYPTO_CTS
+ select CRYPTO_OFB
+ select CRYPTO_CFB
+ select CRYPTO_SM4_GENERIC
+ select CRYPTO_CHACHA20
+
+ help
+ Say y to enable Cipher functionality of SPACC.
+
+config CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_HASH
+ bool "Enable HASH functionality"
+ depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC
+ default y
+ select CRYPTO_HASH
+ select CRYPTO_SHA1
+ select CRYPTO_MD5
+ select CRYPTO_SHA256
+ select CRYPTO_SHA512
+ select CRYPTO_HMAC
+ select CRYPTO_SM3
+ select CRYPTO_CMAC
+ select CRYPTO_MICHAEL_MIC
+ select CRYPTO_XCBC
+ select CRYPTO_AES
+ select CRYPTO_SM4_GENERIC
+
+ help
+ Say y to enable Hash functionality of SPACC.
+
+config CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_AEAD
+ bool "Enable AEAD functionality"
+ depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC
+ default y
+ select CRYPTO_AEAD
+ select CRYPTO_AUTHENC
+ select CRYPTO_AES
+ select CRYPTO_SM4_GENERIC
+ select CRYPTO_CHACHAPOLY1305
+ select CRYPTO_GCM
+ select CRYPTO_CCM
+
+ help
+ Say y to enable AEAD functionality of SPACC.
+
+config CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_AUTODETECT
+ bool "Enable Autodetect functionality"
+ depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC
+ default y
+ help
+ Say y to enable Autodetect functionality
+
+config CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_DEBUG_TRACE_IO
+ bool "Enable Trace MMIO reads/writes stats"
+ depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC
+ default n
+ help
+ Say y to enable Trace MMIO reads/writes stats.
+ To Debug and trace IO register read/write opration
+
+config CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_DEBUG_TRACE_DDT
+ bool "Enable Trace DDT entries stats"
+ default n
+ depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC
+ help
+ Say y to enable Enable Trace DDT entries stats.
+ To Debug and trace DDT opration
+
+config CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_SECURE_MODE
+ bool "Enable Spacc secure mode stats"
+ default n
+ depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC
+ help
+ Say y to enable Spacc secure modes stats.
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Makefile b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bf46c8e13a31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC) += snps-spacc.o
+snps-spacc-objs = spacc_hal.o spacc_core.o \
+spacc_manager.o spacc_interrupt.o spacc_device.o
+
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_HASH),y)
+snps-spacc-objs += spacc_ahash.o
+endif
+
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_CIPHER),y)
+snps-spacc-objs += spacc_skcipher.o
+endif
+
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_AEAD),y)
+snps-spacc-objs += spacc_aead.o
+endif
--
2.25.1


2024-03-28 18:27:48

by Pavitrakumar M

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v1 4/4] Enable Driver compilation in crypto Kconfig and Makefile file

Signed-off-by: Pavitrakumar M <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ruud Derwig <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/Kconfig | 1 +
drivers/crypto/Makefile | 1 +
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/Kconfig
index 3d02702456a5..aa384d138ae1 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -704,6 +704,7 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_BCM_SPU
ahash, and aead algorithms with the kernel cryptographic API.

source "drivers/crypto/stm32/Kconfig"
+source "drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Kconfig"

config CRYPTO_DEV_SAFEXCEL
tristate "Inside Secure's SafeXcel cryptographic engine driver"
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/Makefile b/drivers/crypto/Makefile
index 95331bc6456b..4408927a5a0c 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/crypto/Makefile
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_BCM_SPU) += bcm/
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SAFEXCEL) += inside-secure/
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ARTPEC6) += axis/
obj-y += xilinx/
+obj-y += dwc-spacc/
obj-y += hisilicon/
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_AMLOGIC_GXL) += amlogic/
obj-y += intel/
--
2.25.1


2024-03-28 18:29:13

by Pavitrakumar M

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v1 1/4] Add SPAcc driver to Linux kernel

Signed-off-by: shwetar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pavitrakumar M <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ruud Derwig <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c | 1382 ++++++++++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c | 1183 ++++++++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.c | 2917 ++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.h | 839 ++++++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.c | 324 +++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.h | 236 ++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.c | 365 +++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.h | 113 +
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_interrupt.c | 204 ++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c | 670 +++++
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_skcipher.c | 754 +++++
11 files changed, 8987 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.c
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.h
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.c
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.h
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.c
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.h
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_interrupt.c
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_skcipher.c

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f4b1ae9a4ef1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1382 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/sm4.h>
+#include <crypto/gcm.h>
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/authenc.h>
+#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+
+#include "spacc_device.h"
+#include "spacc_core.h"
+
+static LIST_HEAD(spacc_aead_alg_list);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(spacc_aead_alg_mutex);
+
+#define SPACC_B0_LEN 16
+#define SET_IV_IN_SRCBUF 0x80000000
+#define SET_IV_IN_CONTEXT 0x0
+#define IV_PTEXT_BUF_SZ 8192
+#define XTRA_BUF_LEN 4096
+#define IV_B0_LEN (XTRA_BUF_LEN + SPACC_B0_LEN +\
+ SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE)
+
+struct spacc_iv_buf {
+ unsigned char iv[SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE];
+ unsigned char fulliv[SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + SPACC_B0_LEN + XTRA_BUF_LEN];
+ unsigned char ptext[IV_PTEXT_BUF_SZ];
+ struct scatterlist sg[2], fullsg[2], ptextsg[2];
+};
+
+static struct kmem_cache *spacc_iv_pool;
+
+static void spacc_init_aead_alg(struct crypto_alg *calg,
+ const struct mode_tab *mode)
+{
+ snprintf(calg->cra_name, sizeof(mode->name), "%s", mode->name);
+ snprintf(calg->cra_driver_name, sizeof(calg->cra_driver_name),
+ "spacc-%s", mode->name);
+ calg->cra_blocksize = mode->blocklen;
+}
+
+static struct mode_tab possible_aeads[] = {
+ { MODE_TAB_AEAD("rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)",
+ CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305, CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
+ 16, 12, 1), .keylen = { 16, 24, 32 }
+ },
+ { MODE_TAB_AEAD("gcm(aes)",
+ CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM, CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
+ 16, 12, 1), .keylen = { 16, 24, 32 }
+ },
+ { MODE_TAB_AEAD("gcm(sm4)",
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM, CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
+ 16, 12, 1), .keylen = { 16 }
+ },
+ { MODE_TAB_AEAD("ccm(aes)",
+ CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM, CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
+ 16, 16, 1), .keylen = { 16, 24, 32 }
+ },
+ { MODE_TAB_AEAD("ccm(sm4)",
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM, CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
+ 16, 16, 1), .keylen = { 16, 24, 32 }
+ },
+};
+
+static int ccm_16byte_aligned_len(int in_len)
+{
+ int len;
+ int computed_mod;
+
+ if (in_len > 0) {
+ computed_mod = in_len % 16;
+ if (computed_mod)
+ len = in_len - computed_mod + 16;
+ else
+ len = in_len;
+ } else {
+ len = in_len;
+ }
+
+ return len;
+}
+
+/* taken from crypto/ccm.c */
+static int spacc_aead_format_adata(u8 *adata, unsigned int a)
+{
+ int len = 0;
+
+ /* add control info for associated data
+ * RFC 3610 and NIST Special Publication 800-38C
+ */
+ if (a < 65280) {
+ *(__be16 *)adata = cpu_to_be16(a);
+ len = 2;
+ } else {
+ *(__be16 *)adata = cpu_to_be16(0xfffe);
+ *(__be32 *)&adata[2] = cpu_to_be32(a);
+ len = 6;
+ }
+
+ return len;
+}
+
+
+/* taken from crypto/ccm.c */
+static int spacc_aead_set_msg_len(u8 *block, unsigned int msglen, int csize)
+{
+ __be32 data;
+
+ memset(block, 0, csize);
+ block += csize;
+
+ if (csize >= 4)
+ csize = 4;
+ else if (msglen > (unsigned int)(1 << (8 * csize)))
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+
+ data = cpu_to_be32(msglen);
+ memcpy(block - csize, (u8 *)&data + 4 - csize, csize);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int spacc_aead_init_dma(struct device *dev, struct aead_request *req,
+ u64 seq, uint32_t icvlen,
+ int encrypt, int *alen)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *reqtfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(reqtfm);
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+
+ gfp_t mflags = GFP_ATOMIC;
+ struct spacc_iv_buf *iv;
+ int ccm_aad_16b_len = 0;
+ int rc, B0len;
+ int payload_len, fullsg_buf_len;
+ unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(reqtfm);
+
+ /* always have 1 byte of IV */
+ if (!ivsize)
+ ivsize = 1;
+
+ if (req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP)
+ mflags = GFP_KERNEL;
+
+ ctx->iv_buf = kmem_cache_alloc(spacc_iv_pool, mflags);
+ if (!ctx->iv_buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ iv = ctx->iv_buf;
+
+ sg_init_table(iv->sg, ARRAY_SIZE(iv->sg));
+ sg_init_table(iv->fullsg, ARRAY_SIZE(iv->fullsg));
+ sg_init_table(iv->ptextsg, ARRAY_SIZE(iv->ptextsg));
+
+ B0len = 0;
+ ctx->ptext_nents = 0;
+ ctx->fulliv_nents = 0;
+
+ memset(iv->iv, 0, SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE);
+ memset(iv->fulliv, 0, IV_B0_LEN);
+ memset(iv->ptext, 0, IV_PTEXT_BUF_SZ);
+
+ /* copy the IV out for AAD */
+ memcpy(iv->iv, req->iv, ivsize);
+
+ /* now we need to figure out the cipher IV which may or
+ * may not be "req->iv" depending on the mode we are
+ */
+ if (tctx->mode & SPACC_MANGLE_IV_FLAG) {
+ switch (tctx->mode & 0x7F00) {
+ case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC3686:
+ case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4106:
+ case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4543:
+ {
+ unsigned char *p = iv->fulliv;
+ /* we're in RFC3686 mode so the last
+ * 4 bytes of the key are the SALT
+ */
+ memcpy(p, tctx->csalt, 4);
+ memcpy(p + 4, req->iv, ivsize);
+
+ p[12] = 0;
+ p[13] = 0;
+ p[14] = 0;
+ p[15] = 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4309:
+ {
+ unsigned char *p = iv->fulliv;
+ int L, M;
+ u32 lm = req->cryptlen;
+
+ /* CCM mode */
+ /* p[0..15] is the CTR IV */
+ /* p[16..31] is the CBC-MAC B0 block*/
+ B0len = SPACC_B0_LEN;
+ /* IPsec requires L=4*/
+ L = 4;
+ M = tctx->auth_size;
+
+ /* CTR block */
+ p[0] = L - 1;
+ memcpy(p + 1, tctx->csalt, 3);
+ memcpy(p + 4, req->iv, ivsize);
+ p[12] = 0;
+ p[13] = 0;
+ p[14] = 0;
+ p[15] = 1;
+
+ /* store B0 block at p[16..31] */
+ p[16] = (1 << 6) | (((M - 2) >> 1) << 3)
+ | (L - 1);
+ memcpy(p + 1 + 16, tctx->csalt, 3);
+ memcpy(p + 4 + 16, req->iv, ivsize);
+
+ /* now store length */
+ p[16 + 12 + 0] = (lm >> 24) & 0xFF;
+ p[16 + 12 + 1] = (lm >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ p[16 + 12 + 2] = (lm >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ p[16 + 12 + 3] = (lm) & 0xFF;
+
+ /*now store the pre-formatted AAD */
+ p[32] = (req->assoclen >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ p[33] = (req->assoclen) & 0xFF;
+ /* we added 2 byte header to the AAD */
+ B0len += 2;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM) {
+ unsigned char *p = iv->fulliv;
+ int L, M;
+
+ u32 lm = (encrypt) ?
+ req->cryptlen :
+ req->cryptlen - tctx->auth_size;
+
+ /* CCM mode */
+ /* p[0..15] is the CTR IV */
+ /* p[16..31] is the CBC-MAC B0 block*/
+ B0len = SPACC_B0_LEN;
+
+ /* IPsec requires L=4 */
+ L = req->iv[0] + 1;
+ M = tctx->auth_size;
+
+ /* CTR block */
+ memcpy(p, req->iv, ivsize);
+ memcpy(p + 16, req->iv, ivsize);
+
+ /* Store B0 block at p[16..31] */
+ p[16] |= (8 * ((M - 2) / 2));
+
+ /* set adata if assoclen > 0 */
+ if (req->assoclen)
+ p[16] |= 64;
+
+ /* now store length, this is L size starts from 16-L
+ * to 16 of B0
+ */
+ spacc_aead_set_msg_len(p + 16 + 16 - L, lm, L);
+
+ if (req->assoclen) {
+
+ /* store pre-formatted AAD:
+ * AAD_LEN + AAD + PAD
+ */
+ *alen = spacc_aead_format_adata(&p[32], req->assoclen);
+
+ ccm_aad_16b_len =
+ ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->assoclen + *alen);
+
+ /* Adding the rest of AAD from req->src */
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(p + 32 + *alen,
+ req->src, 0,
+ req->assoclen, 0);
+
+ /* Copy AAD to req->dst */
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(p + 32 + *alen, req->dst,
+ 0, req->assoclen, 1);
+
+ }
+
+ /* Adding PT/CT from req->src to ptext here */
+ if (req->cryptlen)
+ memset(iv->ptext, 0,
+ ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->cryptlen));
+
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(iv->ptext, req->src,
+ req->assoclen,
+ req->cryptlen, 0);
+
+
+ } else {
+
+ /* default is to copy the iv over since the
+ * cipher and protocol IV are the same
+ */
+ memcpy(iv->fulliv, req->iv, ivsize);
+
+ }
+
+ /* this is part of the AAD */
+ sg_set_buf(iv->sg, iv->iv, ivsize);
+
+ /* GCM and CCM don't include the IV in the AAD */
+ if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM_RFC4106 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM_RFC8998 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_NULL) {
+
+ ctx->iv_nents = 0;
+ payload_len = req->cryptlen + icvlen + req->assoclen;
+ fullsg_buf_len = SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len;
+
+ /* this is the actual IV getting fed to the core
+ * (via IV IMPORT)
+ */
+
+ sg_set_buf(iv->fullsg, iv->fulliv, fullsg_buf_len);
+
+ rc = spacc_sgs_to_ddt(dev,
+ iv->fullsg, fullsg_buf_len,
+ &ctx->fulliv_nents, NULL, 0,
+ &ctx->iv_nents, req->src,
+ payload_len, &ctx->src_nents,
+ &ctx->src, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+ } else if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM) {
+
+
+ ctx->iv_nents = 0;
+
+ if (encrypt)
+ payload_len =
+ ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->cryptlen + icvlen);
+ else
+ payload_len =
+ ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->cryptlen);
+
+ fullsg_buf_len = SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len;
+
+
+ /* this is the actual IV getting fed to the core (via IV IMPORT)
+ * This has CTR IV + B0 + AAD(B1, B2, ...)
+ */
+ sg_set_buf(iv->fullsg, iv->fulliv, fullsg_buf_len);
+ sg_set_buf(iv->ptextsg, iv->ptext, payload_len);
+
+ rc = spacc_sgs_to_ddt(dev,
+ iv->fullsg, fullsg_buf_len,
+ &ctx->fulliv_nents, NULL, 0,
+ &ctx->iv_nents, iv->ptextsg,
+ payload_len, &ctx->ptext_nents,
+ &ctx->src, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+ } else {
+ payload_len = req->cryptlen + icvlen + req->assoclen;
+ fullsg_buf_len = SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len;
+
+ /* this is the actual IV getting fed to the core (via IV IMPORT)
+ * This has CTR IV + B0 + AAD(B1, B2, ...)
+ */
+ sg_set_buf(iv->fullsg, iv->fulliv, fullsg_buf_len);
+
+ rc = spacc_sgs_to_ddt(dev, iv->fullsg, fullsg_buf_len,
+ &ctx->fulliv_nents, iv->sg,
+ ivsize, &ctx->iv_nents,
+ req->src, payload_len, &ctx->src_nents,
+ &ctx->src, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ }
+
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto err_free_iv;
+
+ /* Putting in req->dst is good since it won't overwrite anything
+ * even in case of CCM this is fine condition
+ */
+ if (req->dst != req->src) {
+ if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM) {
+ /* If req->dst buffer len is not-positive,
+ * then skip setting up of DMA
+ */
+ if (req->dst->length <= 0) {
+ ctx->dst_nents = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (encrypt)
+ payload_len = req->cryptlen + icvlen +
+ req->assoclen;
+ else
+ payload_len = req->cryptlen - tctx->auth_size +
+ req->assoclen;
+
+ /* For corner cases where PTlen=AADlen=0, we set default
+ * to 16
+ */
+ rc = spacc_sg_to_ddt(dev, req->dst,
+ payload_len > 0 ? payload_len : 16,
+ &ctx->dst, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto err_free_src;
+
+ ctx->dst_nents = rc;
+ } else {
+
+ /* If req->dst buffer len is not-positive,
+ * then skip setting up of DMA
+ */
+ if (req->dst->length <= 0) {
+ ctx->dst_nents = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (encrypt)
+ payload_len = SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + req->cryptlen
+ + icvlen + req->assoclen;
+ else {
+ payload_len = req->cryptlen - tctx->auth_size +
+ req->assoclen;
+ if (payload_len == 0)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+
+ rc = spacc_sg_to_ddt(dev, req->dst, payload_len,
+ &ctx->dst, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto err_free_src;
+
+ ctx->dst_nents = rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_free_src:
+ if (ctx->fulliv_nents)
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->fullsg, ctx->fulliv_nents,
+ DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+ if (ctx->iv_nents)
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->sg, ctx->iv_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+ if (ctx->ptext_nents)
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->ptextsg, ctx->ptext_nents,
+ DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->src, ctx->src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->src);
+
+err_free_iv:
+ kmem_cache_free(spacc_iv_pool, ctx->iv_buf);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void spacc_aead_cleanup_dma(struct device *dev, struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ struct spacc_iv_buf *iv = ctx->iv_buf;
+
+ if (req->src != req->dst) {
+ if (req->dst->length > 0) {
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->dst, ctx->dst_nents,
+ DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+ pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->dst);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->fulliv_nents)
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->fullsg, ctx->fulliv_nents,
+ DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+ if (ctx->ptext_nents)
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->ptextsg, ctx->ptext_nents,
+ DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+ if (ctx->iv_nents)
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->sg, ctx->iv_nents,
+ DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+ if (req->src->length > 0) {
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->src, ctx->src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->src);
+ }
+
+ kmem_cache_free(spacc_iv_pool, ctx->iv_buf);
+}
+
+static bool spacc_keylen_ok(const struct spacc_alg *salg, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ unsigned int i, mask = salg->keylen_mask;
+
+ BUG_ON(mask > (1ul << ARRAY_SIZE(salg->mode->keylen)) - 1);
+
+ for (i = 0; mask; i++, mask >>= 1) {
+ if (mask & 1 && salg->mode->keylen[i] == keylen)
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static void spacc_aead_cb(void *spacc, void *tfm)
+{
+ struct aead_cb_data *cb = tfm;
+ int err = -1;
+ struct spacc_iv_buf *iv = (struct spacc_iv_buf *)cb->ctx->iv_buf;
+ u32 status_reg = readl(cb->spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_STATUS);
+ u32 status_ret = (status_reg >> 24) & 0x3;
+
+ dma_sync_sg_for_cpu(cb->tctx->dev, cb->req->dst,
+ cb->ctx->dst_nents, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+
+ /* ICV mismatch send bad msg */
+ if (status_ret == 0x1) {
+ err = -EBADMSG;
+ goto REQ_DST_CP_SKIP;
+ }
+
+ /* copy the ptext to req->src/dst for CCMs only */
+ if (cb->tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
+ cb->tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
+ cb->tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM) {
+
+ if (cb->req->src == cb->req->dst) {
+ /* encryption op */
+ if (cb->ctx->encrypt_op) {
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(iv->ptext,
+ cb->req->dst,
+ cb->req->assoclen,
+ cb->req->cryptlen +
+ cb->tctx->auth_size,
+ 1);
+ } else {
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(iv->ptext,
+ cb->req->dst,
+ cb->req->assoclen,
+ cb->req->cryptlen, 1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ err = cb->spacc->job[cb->new_handle].job_err;
+
+REQ_DST_CP_SKIP:
+ spacc_aead_cleanup_dma(cb->tctx->dev, cb->req);
+ spacc_close(cb->spacc, cb->new_handle);
+
+ /* call complete */
+ aead_request_complete(cb->req, err);
+}
+
+static int spacc_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned
+ int keylen)
+{
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+ const struct spacc_alg *salg = spacc_tfm_aead(&tfm->base);
+ struct spacc_priv *priv;
+ struct rtattr *rta = (void *)key;
+ struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param;
+ unsigned int x, authkeylen, enckeylen;
+ const unsigned char *authkey, *enckey;
+ unsigned char xcbc[64];
+
+ int err = -EINVAL;
+ int singlekey = 0;
+
+ /* are keylens valid? */
+ ctx->ctx_valid = false;
+
+ switch (ctx->mode & 0xFF) {
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_NULL:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+ authkey = key;
+ authkeylen = 0;
+ enckey = key;
+ enckeylen = keylen;
+ ctx->keylen = keylen;
+ singlekey = 1;
+ goto skipover;
+ }
+
+ if (!RTA_OK(rta, keylen))
+ goto badkey;
+
+ if (rta->rta_type != CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM)
+ goto badkey;
+
+ if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) < sizeof(*param))
+ goto badkey;
+
+ param = RTA_DATA(rta);
+ enckeylen = be32_to_cpu(param->enckeylen);
+
+ key += RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
+ keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
+
+ if (keylen < enckeylen)
+ goto badkey;
+
+ authkeylen = keylen - enckeylen;
+
+ /* enckey is at &key[authkeylen] and
+ * authkey is at &key[0]
+ */
+ authkey = &key[0];
+ enckey = &key[authkeylen];
+
+skipover:
+ /* detect RFC3686/4106 and trim from enckeylen(and copy salt..) */
+ if (ctx->mode & SPACC_MANGLE_IV_FLAG) {
+ switch (ctx->mode & 0x7F00) {
+ case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC3686:
+ case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4106:
+ case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4543:
+ memcpy(ctx->csalt, enckey + enckeylen - 4, 4);
+ enckeylen -= 4;
+ break;
+ case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4309:
+ memcpy(ctx->csalt, enckey + enckeylen - 3, 3);
+ enckeylen -= 3;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!singlekey) {
+ if (authkeylen > salg->mode->hashlen) {
+ dev_warn(ctx->dev, "Auth key size of %u is not valid\n",
+ authkeylen);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!spacc_keylen_ok(salg, enckeylen)) {
+ dev_warn(ctx->dev, "Enc key size of %u is not valid\n",
+ enckeylen);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* if we're already open close the handle since
+ * the size may have changed
+ */
+ if (ctx->handle != -1) {
+ priv = dev_get_drvdata(ctx->dev);
+ spacc_close(&priv->spacc, ctx->handle);
+ put_device(ctx->dev);
+ ctx->handle = -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Open a handle and
+ * search all devices for an open handle
+ */
+ priv = NULL;
+ for (x = 0; x < ELP_CAPI_MAX_DEV && salg->dev[x]; x++) {
+ priv = dev_get_drvdata(salg->dev[x]);
+
+ /* increase reference */
+ ctx->dev = get_device(salg->dev[x]);
+
+ /* check if its a valid mode ... */
+ if (spacc_isenabled(&priv->spacc, salg->mode->aead.ciph & 0xFF,
+ enckeylen) &&
+ spacc_isenabled(&priv->spacc,
+ salg->mode->aead.hash & 0xFF, authkeylen)) {
+ /* try to open spacc handle */
+ ctx->handle = spacc_open(&priv->spacc,
+ salg->mode->aead.ciph & 0xFF,
+ salg->mode->aead.hash & 0xFF,
+ -1, 0, spacc_aead_cb, tfm);
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->handle < 0)
+ put_device(salg->dev[x]);
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->handle < 0) {
+ dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Failed to open SPAcc context\n");
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ /* setup XCBC key */
+ if (salg->mode->aead.hash == CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_XCBC) {
+ err = spacc_compute_xcbc_key(&priv->spacc,
+ salg->mode->aead.hash,
+ ctx->handle, authkey,
+ authkeylen, xcbc);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ dev_warn(ctx->dev, "Failed to compute XCBC key: %d\n",
+ err);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ authkey = xcbc;
+ authkeylen = 48;
+ }
+
+ /* handle zero key/zero len DEC condition for SM4/AES GCM mode */
+ ctx->zero_key = 0;
+ if (!key[0]) {
+ int i, val = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < keylen ; i++)
+ val += key[i];
+
+ if (val == 0)
+ ctx->zero_key = 1;
+ }
+
+ err = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, ctx->handle,
+ SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION, enckey,
+ enckeylen, NULL, 0);
+
+ if (err) {
+ dev_warn(ctx->dev,
+ "Could not write ciphering context: %d\n", err);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ if (!singlekey) {
+ err = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, ctx->handle,
+ SPACC_HASH_OPERATION, authkey,
+ authkeylen, NULL, 0);
+ if (err) {
+ dev_warn(ctx->dev,
+ "Could not write hashing context: %d\n", err);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* set expand key */
+ spacc_set_key_exp(&priv->spacc, ctx->handle);
+ ctx->ctx_valid = true;
+
+ memset(xcbc, 0, sizeof(xcbc));
+
+ /* copy key to ctx for fallback */
+ memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen);
+
+ return 0;
+
+badkey:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int spacc_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+ unsigned int authsize)
+{
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+ ctx->auth_size = authsize;
+
+ /* taken from crypto/ccm.c */
+ switch (ctx->mode) {
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM:
+ switch (authsize) {
+ case 4:
+ case 8:
+ case 12:
+ case 13:
+ case 14:
+ case 15:
+ case 16:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM:
+ switch (authsize) {
+ case 4:
+ case 6:
+ case 8:
+ case 10:
+ case 12:
+ case 14:
+ case 16:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+ switch (authsize) {
+ case 16:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int spacc_aead_fallback(struct aead_request *req,
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *ctx,
+ int encrypt)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct aead_request *subreq = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ struct crypto_aead *reqtfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct aead_alg *alg = crypto_aead_alg(reqtfm);
+ const char *aead_name = alg->base.cra_name;
+
+ ctx->fb.aead = crypto_alloc_aead(aead_name, 0,
+ CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK |
+ CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (!ctx->fb.aead) {
+ pr_err("Spacc aead fallback tfm is NULL!\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ subreq = aead_request_alloc(ctx->fb.aead, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!subreq)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ crypto_aead_setkey(ctx->fb.aead, ctx->key, ctx->keylen);
+ crypto_aead_setauthsize(ctx->fb.aead, ctx->auth_size);
+
+ aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->fb.aead);
+ aead_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags,
+ req->base.complete, req->base.data);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst, req->cryptlen,
+ req->iv);
+ aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen);
+
+ if (encrypt)
+ ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(subreq);
+ else
+ ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
+
+ aead_request_free(subreq);
+ crypto_free_aead(ctx->fb.aead);
+ ctx->fb.aead = NULL;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int spacc_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, u64 seq, int
+ encrypt)
+{
+ int rc;
+ int B0len;
+ int alen;
+ u32 dstoff;
+ int icvremove;
+ int ivaadsize;
+ int ptaadsize;
+ int iv_to_context;
+ int spacc_proc_len;
+ u32 spacc_icv_offset;
+ int spacc_pre_aad_size;
+ int ccm_aad_16b_len;
+ struct crypto_aead *reqtfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(reqtfm);
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(reqtfm);
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
+ u32 msg_len = req->cryptlen - tctx->auth_size;
+ u32 l;
+
+ ctx->encrypt_op = encrypt;
+ alen = 0;
+ ccm_aad_16b_len = 0;
+
+ if (tctx->handle < 0 || !tctx->ctx_valid || (req->cryptlen +
+ req->assoclen) > priv->max_msg_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* IV is programmed to context by default */
+ iv_to_context = SET_IV_IN_CONTEXT;
+
+ if (encrypt) {
+ switch (tctx->mode & 0xFF) {
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+ /* For cryptlen = 0 */
+ if (req->cryptlen + req->assoclen == 0)
+ return spacc_aead_fallback(req, tctx, encrypt);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM:
+ l = req->iv[0] + 1;
+
+ /* 2 <= L <= 8, so 1 <= L' <= 7. */
+ if (req->iv[0] < 1 || req->iv[0] > 7)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* verify that msglen can in fact be represented
+ * in L bytes
+ */
+ if (l < 4 && msg_len >> (8 * l))
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_debug("Unsupported algo");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Handle the decryption */
+ switch (tctx->mode & 0xFF) {
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+ /* For assoclen = 0 */
+ if (req->assoclen == 0 && (req->cryptlen - tctx->auth_size == 0)) {
+ ret = spacc_aead_fallback(req, tctx, encrypt);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM:
+ /* 2 <= L <= 8, so 1 <= L' <= 7. */
+ if (req->iv[0] < 1 || req->iv[0] > 7)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_debug("Unsupported algo");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ icvremove = (encrypt) ? 0 : tctx->auth_size;
+
+ rc = spacc_aead_init_dma(tctx->dev, req, seq, (encrypt) ?
+ tctx->auth_size : 0, encrypt, &alen);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (req->assoclen)
+ ccm_aad_16b_len = ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->assoclen + alen);
+
+ /* Note: This won't work if IV_IMPORT has been disabled */
+ ctx->cb.new_handle = spacc_clone_handle(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
+ &ctx->cb);
+ if (ctx->cb.new_handle < 0) {
+ spacc_aead_cleanup_dma(tctx->dev, req);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ctx->cb.tctx = tctx;
+ ctx->cb.ctx = ctx;
+ ctx->cb.req = req;
+ ctx->cb.spacc = &priv->spacc;
+
+ /* Write IV to the spacc-context
+ * IV can be written to context or as part of the input src buffer
+ * IV in case of CCM is going in the input src buff.
+ * IV for GCM is written to the context.
+ */
+ if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM_RFC4106 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM_RFC8998 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_NULL) {
+ iv_to_context = SET_IV_IN_CONTEXT;
+ rc = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, ctx->cb.new_handle,
+ SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION, NULL, 0,
+ req->iv, ivsize);
+ }
+
+ /* CCM and GCM don't include the IV in the AAD */
+ if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM_RFC4106 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM_RFC8998 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_NULL) {
+ ivaadsize = 0;
+ } else {
+ ivaadsize = ivsize;
+ }
+
+ /* CCM requires an extra block of AAD */
+ if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM)
+ B0len = SPACC_B0_LEN;
+ else
+ B0len = 0;
+
+ /* GMAC mode uses AAD for the entire message.
+ * So does NULL cipher
+ */
+ if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM_RFC4543 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_NULL) {
+ if (req->cryptlen >= icvremove)
+ ptaadsize = req->cryptlen - icvremove;
+ } else {
+ ptaadsize = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate and set the below, important parameters
+ * spacc icv offset - spacc_icv_offset
+ * destination offset - dstoff
+ * IV to context - This is set for CCM, not set for GCM
+ */
+ if (req->dst == req->src) {
+ dstoff = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len +
+ req->assoclen + ivaadsize));
+
+ if (req->assoclen + req->cryptlen >= icvremove)
+ spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE +
+ B0len + req->assoclen +
+ ivaadsize + req->cryptlen -
+ icvremove));
+ else
+ spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE +
+ B0len + req->assoclen +
+ ivaadsize + req->cryptlen));
+
+ /* CCM case */
+ if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM) {
+ iv_to_context = SET_IV_IN_SRCBUF;
+ dstoff = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len +
+ ccm_aad_16b_len + ivaadsize));
+
+ if (encrypt)
+ spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
+ + B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len
+ + ivaadsize
+ + ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->cryptlen)
+ - icvremove));
+ else
+ spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
+ + B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len + ivaadsize
+ + req->cryptlen - icvremove));
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ dstoff = ((uint32_t)(req->assoclen + ivaadsize));
+
+ if (req->assoclen + req->cryptlen >= icvremove)
+ spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
+ + B0len + req->assoclen
+ + ivaadsize + req->cryptlen
+ - icvremove));
+ else
+ spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
+ + B0len + req->assoclen
+ + ivaadsize + req->cryptlen));
+
+ /* CCM case */
+ if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM) {
+ iv_to_context = SET_IV_IN_SRCBUF;
+ dstoff = ((uint32_t)(req->assoclen + ivaadsize));
+
+ if (encrypt)
+ spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
+ + B0len
+ + ccm_aad_16b_len + ivaadsize
+ + ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->cryptlen)
+ - icvremove));
+ else
+ spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
+ + B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len + ivaadsize
+ + req->cryptlen - icvremove));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate and set the below, important parameters
+ * spacc proc_len - spacc_proc_len
+ * pre-AAD size - spacc_pre_aad_size
+ */
+ if (encrypt) {
+ if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM_RFC8998) {
+ rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc,
+ ctx->cb.new_handle,
+ encrypt ? OP_ENCRYPT : OP_DECRYPT,
+ ICV_ENCRYPT_HASH, IP_ICV_APPEND,
+ spacc_icv_offset,
+ tctx->auth_size, 0);
+
+ spacc_proc_len = B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len
+ + req->cryptlen + ivaadsize
+ - icvremove;
+ spacc_pre_aad_size = B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len
+ + ivaadsize + ptaadsize;
+
+ } else {
+ rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc,
+ ctx->cb.new_handle,
+ encrypt ? OP_ENCRYPT : OP_DECRYPT,
+ ICV_ENCRYPT_HASH, IP_ICV_APPEND,
+ spacc_icv_offset,
+ tctx->auth_size, 0);
+
+ spacc_proc_len = B0len + req->assoclen
+ + req->cryptlen - icvremove
+ + ivaadsize;
+ spacc_pre_aad_size = B0len + req->assoclen
+ + ivaadsize + ptaadsize;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
+ tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM_RFC8998) {
+ rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc,
+ ctx->cb.new_handle,
+ encrypt ? OP_ENCRYPT : OP_DECRYPT,
+ ICV_ENCRYPT_HASH, IP_ICV_OFFSET,
+ spacc_icv_offset,
+ tctx->auth_size, 0);
+
+ spacc_proc_len = B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len
+ + req->cryptlen + ivaadsize
+ - icvremove;
+ spacc_pre_aad_size = B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len
+ + ivaadsize + ptaadsize;
+
+ } else {
+ rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc,
+ ctx->cb.new_handle,
+ encrypt ? OP_ENCRYPT : OP_DECRYPT,
+ ICV_ENCRYPT_HASH, IP_ICV_APPEND,
+ req->cryptlen - icvremove +
+ SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len +
+ req->assoclen + ivaadsize,
+ tctx->auth_size, 0);
+
+ spacc_proc_len = B0len + req->assoclen
+ + req->cryptlen - icvremove
+ + ivaadsize;
+ spacc_pre_aad_size = B0len + req->assoclen
+ + ivaadsize + ptaadsize;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(&priv->spacc, ctx->cb.new_handle,
+ &ctx->src,
+ (req->dst == req->src) ? &ctx->src :
+ &ctx->dst, spacc_proc_len,
+ (dstoff << SPACC_OFFSET_DST_O) |
+ SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE,
+ spacc_pre_aad_size,
+ 0, iv_to_context, 0);
+
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ spacc_aead_cleanup_dma(tctx->dev, req);
+ spacc_close(&priv->spacc, ctx->cb.new_handle);
+
+ if (rc != -EBUSY) {
+ dev_err(tctx->dev, " failed to enqueue job, ERR: %d\n",
+ rc);
+ }
+
+ if (!(req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG))
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* At this point the job is in flight to the engine ... remove first use
+ * so subsequent calls don't expand the key again... ideally we would
+ * pump a dummy job through the engine to pre-expand the key so that by
+ * time setkey was done we wouldn't have to do this
+ */
+ priv->spacc.job[tctx->handle].first_use = 0;
+ priv->spacc.job[tctx->handle].ctrl &= ~(1UL
+ << priv->spacc.config.ctrl_map[SPACC_CTRL_KEY_EXP]);
+
+ return -EINPROGRESS;
+}
+
+static int spacc_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ return spacc_aead_process(req, 0ULL, 1);
+}
+
+static int spacc_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ return spacc_aead_process(req, 0ULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int spacc_aead_init(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+ const struct spacc_alg *salg = spacc_tfm_aead(&tfm->base);
+
+ crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct spacc_crypto_reqctx));
+
+ ctx->zero_key = 0;
+ ctx->fb.aead = NULL;
+ ctx->handle = -1;
+ ctx->mode = salg->mode->aead.ciph;
+ ctx->dev = get_device(salg->dev[0]);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void spacc_aead_exit(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(ctx->dev);
+
+ ctx->fb.aead = NULL;
+ /* close spacc handle */
+ if (ctx->handle >= 0) {
+ spacc_close(&priv->spacc, ctx->handle);
+ ctx->handle = -1;
+ }
+
+ put_device(ctx->dev);
+}
+
+struct aead_alg spacc_aead_algs = {
+ .setkey = spacc_aead_setkey,
+ .setauthsize = spacc_aead_setauthsize,
+ .encrypt = spacc_aead_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = spacc_aead_decrypt,
+ .init = spacc_aead_init,
+ .exit = spacc_aead_exit,
+
+ .base.cra_priority = 300,
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct spacc_crypto_ctx),
+ .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD
+ | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC
+ | CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK
+ | CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY
+ | CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY
+};
+
+static int spacc_register_aead(unsigned int aead_mode,
+ struct platform_device *spacc_pdev)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct spacc_alg *salg;
+
+ salg = kmalloc(sizeof(*salg), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!salg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ salg->mode = &(possible_aeads[aead_mode]);
+ salg->dev[0] = &spacc_pdev->dev;
+ salg->dev[1] = NULL;
+ salg->calg = &salg->alg.aead.base;
+ salg->alg.aead = spacc_aead_algs;
+
+ spacc_init_aead_alg(salg->calg, salg->mode);
+
+ salg->alg.aead.ivsize = salg->mode->ivlen;
+ salg->alg.aead.maxauthsize = salg->mode->hashlen;
+ salg->alg.aead.base.cra_blocksize = salg->mode->blocklen;
+
+ salg->keylen_mask = possible_aeads[aead_mode].keylen_mask;
+
+ if (salg->mode->aead.ciph & SPACC_MANGLE_IV_FLAG) {
+ switch (salg->mode->aead.ciph & 0x7F00) {
+ case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC3686: /*CTR*/
+ case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4106: /*GCM*/
+ case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4543: /*GMAC*/
+ case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4309: /*CCM*/
+ case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC8998: /*GCM/CCM*/
+ salg->alg.aead.ivsize = 12;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_register_aead(&salg->alg.aead);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(salg);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Registered %s\n", salg->mode->name);
+
+ mutex_lock(&spacc_aead_alg_mutex);
+ list_add(&salg->list, &spacc_aead_alg_list);
+ mutex_unlock(&spacc_aead_alg_mutex);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int probe_aeads(struct platform_device *spacc_pdev)
+{
+ int err;
+ unsigned int x, y;
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = NULL;
+
+ size_t alloc_size = max_t(unsigned long,
+ roundup_pow_of_two(sizeof(struct spacc_iv_buf)),
+ dma_get_cache_alignment());
+
+ spacc_iv_pool = kmem_cache_create("spacc-aead-iv", alloc_size,
+ alloc_size, 0, NULL);
+
+ if (!spacc_iv_pool)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (x = 0; x < ARRAY_SIZE(possible_aeads); x++) {
+ possible_aeads[x].keylen_mask = 0;
+ possible_aeads[x].valid = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* compute cipher key masks (over all devices) */
+ priv = dev_get_drvdata(&spacc_pdev->dev);
+
+ for (x = 0; x < ARRAY_SIZE(possible_aeads); x++) {
+ for (y = 0; y < ARRAY_SIZE(possible_aeads[x].keylen); y++) {
+ if (spacc_isenabled(&priv->spacc,
+ possible_aeads[x].aead.ciph & 0xFF,
+ possible_aeads[x].keylen[y]))
+ possible_aeads[x].keylen_mask |= 1u << y;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* scan for combined modes */
+ priv = dev_get_drvdata(&spacc_pdev->dev);
+
+ for (x = 0; x < ARRAY_SIZE(possible_aeads); x++) {
+ if (!possible_aeads[x].valid && possible_aeads[x].keylen_mask) {
+ if (spacc_isenabled(&priv->spacc,
+ possible_aeads[x].aead.hash & 0xFF,
+ possible_aeads[x].hashlen)) {
+
+ possible_aeads[x].valid = 1;
+ err = spacc_register_aead(x, spacc_pdev);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ return err;
+}
+
+int spacc_unregister_aead_algs(void)
+{
+ struct spacc_alg *salg, *tmp;
+
+ mutex_lock(&spacc_aead_alg_mutex);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(salg, tmp, &spacc_aead_alg_list, list) {
+ crypto_unregister_alg(salg->calg);
+ list_del(&salg->list);
+ kfree(salg);
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&spacc_aead_alg_mutex);
+
+ kmem_cache_destroy(spacc_iv_pool);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..53c76ee16c53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1183 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/dmapool.h>
+#include <crypto/sm3.h>
+#include <crypto/sha1.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+#include <crypto/sha3.h>
+#include <crypto/md5.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+
+#include "spacc_device.h"
+#include "spacc_core.h"
+
+#define PPP_BUF_SZ 128
+
+struct sdesc {
+ struct shash_desc shash;
+ char ctx[];
+};
+
+struct my_list {
+ struct list_head list;
+ char *buffer;
+};
+
+static struct dma_pool *spacc_hash_pool;
+static LIST_HEAD(spacc_hash_alg_list);
+static LIST_HEAD(head_sglbuf);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(spacc_hash_alg_mutex);
+
+static struct mode_tab possible_hashes[] = {
+ { .keylen[0] = 16, MODE_TAB_HASH("cmac(aes)", MAC_CMAC, 16, 16),
+ .sw_fb = true },
+ { .keylen[0] = 48 | MODE_TAB_HASH_XCBC, MODE_TAB_HASH("xcbc(aes)",
+ MAC_XCBC, 16, 16), .sw_fb = true },
+
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("cmac(sm4)", MAC_SM4_CMAC, 16, 16), .sw_fb = true },
+ { .keylen[0] = 32 | MODE_TAB_HASH_XCBC, MODE_TAB_HASH("xcbc(sm4)",
+ MAC_SM4_XCBC, 16, 16), .sw_fb = true },
+
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("hmac(md5)", HMAC_MD5, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ MD5_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("md5", HASH_MD5, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ MD5_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("hmac(sha1)", HMAC_SHA1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("sha1", HASH_SHA1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("sha224", HASH_SHA224, SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ SHA224_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("sha256", HASH_SHA256, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("sha384", HASH_SHA384, SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ SHA384_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("sha512", HASH_SHA512, SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("hmac(sha512)", HMAC_SHA512, SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("hmac(sha224)", HMAC_SHA224, SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ SHA224_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("hmac(sha256)", HMAC_SHA256, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("hmac(sha384)", HMAC_SHA384, SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ SHA384_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("sha3-224", HASH_SHA3_224, SHA3_224_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ SHA3_224_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("sha3-256", HASH_SHA3_256, SHA3_256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ SHA3_256_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("sha3-384", HASH_SHA3_384, SHA3_384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ SHA3_384_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("sha3-512", HASH_SHA3_512, SHA3_512_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ SHA3_512_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("hmac(sm3)", HMAC_SM3, SM3_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ SM3_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("sm3", HASH_SM3, SM3_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ SM3_BLOCK_SIZE), .sw_fb = true },
+ { MODE_TAB_HASH("michael_mic", MAC_MICHAEL, 8, 8), .sw_fb = true },
+};
+
+
+static void spacc_hash_cleanup_dma_dst(struct device *dev,
+ struct ahash_request *req)
+{
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+
+ dma_pool_free(spacc_hash_pool, ctx->digest_buf, ctx->digest_dma);
+ pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->dst);
+}
+
+static void spacc_hash_cleanup_dma_src(struct device *dev,
+ struct ahash_request *req)
+{
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->src, ctx->src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->src);
+}
+
+static void spacc_hash_cleanup_dma(struct device *dev,
+ struct ahash_request *req)
+{
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->src, ctx->src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->src);
+
+ dma_pool_free(spacc_hash_pool, ctx->digest_buf, ctx->digest_dma);
+ pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->dst);
+}
+
+static void spacc_hash_cleanup_ppp(struct ahash_request *req)
+{
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+
+ if (ctx->total_nents) {
+ ctx->total_nents = 0;
+ ctx->cur_part_pck = 0;
+ }
+ ctx->acb.tctx->flag_ppp = 0;
+}
+
+static void spacc_init_calg(struct crypto_alg *calg,
+ const struct mode_tab *mode)
+{
+
+ snprintf(calg->cra_name, sizeof(calg->cra_name),
+ "%s", mode->name);
+
+ snprintf(calg->cra_driver_name, sizeof(calg->cra_driver_name),
+ "spacc-%s", mode->name);
+
+ calg->cra_blocksize = mode->blocklen;
+}
+
+static void sgl_node_delete(void)
+{
+ /* go through the list and free the memory. */
+ struct my_list *cursor, *temp;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(cursor, temp, &head_sglbuf, list) {
+ kfree(cursor->buffer);
+ list_del(&cursor->list);
+ kfree(cursor);
+ }
+}
+
+static void sg_node_create_add(char *sg_buf)
+{
+ struct my_list *temp_node = NULL;
+
+ /*Creating Node*/
+ temp_node = kmalloc(sizeof(struct my_list), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ /*Assgin the data that is received*/
+ temp_node->buffer = sg_buf;
+
+ /*Init the list within the struct*/
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&temp_node->list);
+
+ /*Add Node to Linked List*/
+ list_add_tail(&temp_node->list, &head_sglbuf);
+}
+
+static int spacc_ctx_clone_handle(struct ahash_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
+
+ ctx->acb.new_handle = spacc_clone_handle(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
+ &ctx->acb);
+
+ if (ctx->acb.new_handle < 0) {
+ spacc_hash_cleanup_dma(tctx->dev, req);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ ctx->acb.tctx = tctx;
+ ctx->acb.ctx = ctx;
+ ctx->acb.req = req;
+ ctx->acb.spacc = &priv->spacc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int spacc_hash_init_dma(struct device *dev, struct ahash_request *req,
+ int final)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
+ const struct spacc_alg *salg = spacc_tfm_ahash(&tfm->base);
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
+
+ gfp_t mflags = GFP_ATOMIC;
+ int rc = -1, blk_sz = 64;
+ char *sgl_buffer = NULL;
+ int prev_rem_len = ctx->rem_len;
+ int nbytes = req->nbytes;
+
+ if (req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP)
+ mflags = GFP_KERNEL;
+
+ ctx->digest_buf = dma_pool_alloc(spacc_hash_pool, mflags,
+ &ctx->digest_dma);
+
+ if (!ctx->digest_buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = pdu_ddt_init(&ctx->dst, 1 | 0x80000000);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ pr_err("ERR: PDU DDT init error\n");
+ rc = -EIO;
+ goto err_free_digest;
+ }
+ pdu_ddt_add(&ctx->dst, ctx->digest_dma, SPACC_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ if (ctx->total_nents && !ctx->single_shot) {
+ switch (salg->mode->id) {
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA384:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA384:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA512:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA512:
+ blk_sz = 128;
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_MICHAEL:
+ blk_sz = 64;
+ break;
+ default:
+ blk_sz = 64;
+ }
+
+ ctx->rem_len = modify_scatterlist(req->src,
+ &(tctx->ppp_sgl[0]),
+ tctx->ppp_buffer,
+ prev_rem_len, blk_sz,
+ sgl_buffer,
+ nbytes, final);
+
+ sg_node_create_add(sgl_buffer);
+ }
+
+ /* partial packet handling */
+ if (ctx->total_nents && !ctx->single_shot) {
+
+ if (final) {
+ spacc_ctx_clone_handle(req);
+
+ if (ctx->small_pck)
+ ;/* small packet, do nothing */
+ else {
+ /* set to LAST PARTIAL PKT, Regular PPP pkt,
+ * final chunk
+ * Also for final rem_len = 0, setting up last
+ * pkt with 0 len doesnt work
+ */
+ rc = spacc_partial_packet(&priv->spacc,
+ ctx->acb.new_handle,
+ LAST_PARTIAL_PCK);
+ if (rc != CRYPTO_OK)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ } else if (!final && tctx->ppp_sgl[0].length != 0) {
+ spacc_ctx_clone_handle(req);
+
+ /* not a small packet anymore */
+ ctx->small_pck = 0;
+
+ /* Set FIRST/MIDDLE partial pkt */
+ if (ctx->first_ppp_chunk) {
+ ctx->first_ppp_chunk = 0;
+
+ if (ctx->total_nents == ctx->rem_nents &&
+ ctx->rem_len == 0) {
+ /* case of UPDATE % blksz == 0 */
+ spacc_partial_packet(&priv->spacc,
+ ctx->acb.new_handle,
+ NO_PARTIAL_PCK);
+ } else {
+ spacc_partial_packet(&priv->spacc,
+ ctx->acb.new_handle,
+ FIRST_PARTIAL_PCK);
+ }
+ } else {
+
+ if (ctx->total_nents == ctx->rem_nents &&
+ ctx->rem_len == 0) {
+ rc = spacc_partial_packet(&priv->spacc,
+ ctx->acb.new_handle,
+ LAST_PARTIAL_PCK);
+ } else
+ spacc_partial_packet(&priv->spacc,
+ ctx->acb.new_handle,
+ MIDDLE_PARTIAL_PCK);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* set first+last pkt together */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (tctx->ppp_sgl[0].length) {
+ rc = spacc_sg_to_ddt(dev, &(tctx->ppp_sgl[0]),
+ tctx->ppp_sgl[0].length,
+ &ctx->src, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ } else {
+ ;/* Handle ZERO msg or ZERO last chunk */
+ }
+
+ } else if (ctx->total_nents > 0 && ctx->single_shot) {
+ /* single shot */
+ spacc_ctx_clone_handle(req);
+
+ if (req->nbytes) {
+ rc = spacc_sg_to_ddt(dev, req->src, req->nbytes,
+ &ctx->src, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ } else {
+ memset(tctx->ppp_buffer, '\0', PPP_BUF_SZ);
+ sg_set_buf(&(tctx->ppp_sgl[0]), tctx->ppp_buffer,
+ PPP_BUF_SZ);
+ rc = spacc_sg_to_ddt(dev, &(tctx->ppp_sgl[0]),
+ tctx->ppp_sgl[0].length,
+ &ctx->src, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+ }
+ } else if (ctx->total_nents == 0 && req->nbytes == 0) {
+ spacc_ctx_clone_handle(req);
+
+ /* zero length case */
+ memset(tctx->ppp_buffer, '\0', PPP_BUF_SZ);
+ sg_set_buf(&(tctx->ppp_sgl[0]), tctx->ppp_buffer, PPP_BUF_SZ);
+ rc = spacc_sg_to_ddt(dev, &(tctx->ppp_sgl[0]),
+ tctx->ppp_sgl[0].length,
+ &ctx->src, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+ } else if (ctx->total_nents == 0 && !ctx->single_shot) {
+ /* INIT-FINUP sequence */
+ spacc_ctx_clone_handle(req);
+ rc = spacc_sg_to_ddt(dev, req->src, req->nbytes,
+ &ctx->src, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ } else {
+ ;/* do nothing */
+ }
+
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto err_free_dst;
+
+ ctx->src_nents = rc;
+
+ return rc;
+
+err_free_dst:
+ pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->dst);
+err_free_digest:
+ dma_pool_free(spacc_hash_pool, ctx->digest_buf, ctx->digest_dma);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void spacc_free_mems(struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx,
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx,
+ struct ahash_request *req)
+{
+ spacc_hash_cleanup_dma_dst(tctx->dev, req);
+ spacc_hash_cleanup_dma_src(tctx->dev, req);
+
+ if (ctx->final_part_pck) {
+ ctx->final_part_pck = 0;
+ spacc_hash_cleanup_ppp(req);
+ }
+}
+
+static void spacc_digest_cb(void *spacc, void *tfm)
+{
+ struct ahash_cb_data *cb = tfm;
+ int err = -1;
+ int dig_sz;
+
+ dig_sz = crypto_ahash_digestsize(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(cb->req));
+
+ if (cb->ctx->single_shot || cb->ctx->final_part_pck) {
+ if (cb->ctx->single_shot)
+ cb->ctx->single_shot = 0;
+ memcpy(cb->req->result, cb->ctx->digest_buf, dig_sz);
+ err = cb->spacc->job[cb->new_handle].job_err;
+ spacc_free_mems(cb->ctx, cb->tctx, cb->req);
+ spacc_close(cb->spacc, cb->new_handle);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(cb->tctx->digest_ctx_buf, cb->ctx->digest_buf, dig_sz);
+ err = cb->spacc->job[cb->new_handle].job_err;
+ spacc_free_mems(cb->ctx, cb->tctx, cb->req);
+ spacc_close(cb->spacc, cb->new_handle);
+ }
+
+ /* call complete once at the end */
+ if (cb->req->base.complete)
+ ahash_request_complete(cb->req, err);
+}
+
+static int do_shash(unsigned char *name, unsigned char *result,
+ const u8 *data1, unsigned int data1_len,
+ const u8 *data2, unsigned int data2_len,
+ const u8 *key, unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ int rc;
+ unsigned int size;
+ struct crypto_shash *hash;
+ struct sdesc *sdesc;
+
+ hash = crypto_alloc_shash(name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(hash)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(hash);
+ pr_err("ERR: Crypto %s allocation error %d\n", name, rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(hash);
+ sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sdesc) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto do_shash_err;
+ }
+ sdesc->shash.tfm = hash;
+
+ if (key_len > 0) {
+ rc = crypto_shash_setkey(hash, key, key_len);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("ERR: Could not setkey %s shash\n", name);
+ goto do_shash_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("ERR: Could not init %s shash\n", name);
+ goto do_shash_err;
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data1, data1_len);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("ERR: Could not update1\n");
+ goto do_shash_err;
+ }
+
+ if (data2 && data2_len) {
+ rc = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data2, data2_len);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("ERR: Could not update2\n");
+ goto do_shash_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, result);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("ERR: Could not generate %s hash\n", name);
+
+do_shash_err:
+ crypto_free_shash(hash);
+ kfree(sdesc);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int spacc_hash_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ int x, rc;
+ const struct spacc_alg *salg = spacc_tfm_ahash(&tfm->base);
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
+ unsigned int digest_size, block_size;
+ char hash_alg[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+
+ block_size = crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(&tfm->base);
+ digest_size = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+ /*
+ * If keylen > hash block len, the key is supposed to be hashed so that
+ * it is less than the block length. This is kind of a useless
+ * property of HMAC as you can just use that hash as the key directly.
+ * We will just not use the hardware in this case to avoid the issue.
+ * This test was meant for hashes but it works for cmac/xcbc since we
+ * only intend to support 128-bit keys...
+ */
+
+ if (keylen > block_size && salg->mode->id != CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_CMAC) {
+ dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Exceeds keylen: %u\n", keylen);
+ dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Req. keylen hashing %s\n",
+ salg->calg->cra_name);
+
+ memset(hash_alg, 0x00, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
+ switch (salg->mode->id) {
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA224:
+ rc = do_shash("sha224", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA256:
+ rc = do_shash("sha256", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA384:
+ rc = do_shash("sha384", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA512:
+ rc = do_shash("sha512", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_MD5:
+ rc = do_shash("md5", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA1:
+ rc = do_shash("sha1", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ pr_err("ERR: %d computing shash for %s\n",
+ rc, hash_alg);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ keylen = digest_size;
+ dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "updated keylen: %u\n", keylen);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(tctx->ipad, key, keylen);
+ }
+
+ tctx->ctx_valid = false;
+
+ if (salg->mode->sw_fb) {
+ rc = crypto_ahash_setkey(tctx->fb.hash, key, keylen);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* close handle since key size may have changed */
+ if (tctx->handle >= 0) {
+ spacc_close(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle);
+ put_device(tctx->dev);
+ tctx->handle = -1;
+ tctx->dev = NULL;
+ }
+
+ priv = NULL;
+ for (x = 0; x < ELP_CAPI_MAX_DEV && salg->dev[x]; x++) {
+ priv = dev_get_drvdata(salg->dev[x]);
+ tctx->dev = get_device(salg->dev[x]);
+ if (spacc_isenabled(&priv->spacc, salg->mode->id, keylen)) {
+ tctx->handle = spacc_open(&priv->spacc,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
+ salg->mode->id, -1,
+ 0, spacc_digest_cb, tfm);
+
+ } else
+ pr_debug(" Keylen: %d not enabled for algo: %d",
+ keylen, salg->mode->id);
+
+ if (tctx->handle >= 0)
+ break;
+
+ put_device(salg->dev[x]);
+ }
+
+ if (tctx->handle < 0) {
+ pr_err("ERR: Failed to open SPAcc context\n");
+ dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Failed to open SPAcc context\n");
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle, OP_ENCRYPT,
+ ICV_HASH, IP_ICV_OFFSET, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ spacc_close(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle);
+ tctx->handle = -1;
+ put_device(tctx->dev);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ if (salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_XCBC ||
+ salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SM4_XCBC) {
+ rc = spacc_compute_xcbc_key(&priv->spacc, salg->mode->id,
+ tctx->handle, tctx->ipad,
+ keylen, tctx->ipad);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ dev_warn(tctx->dev,
+ "Failed to compute XCBC key: %d\n", rc);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ rc = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
+ SPACC_HASH_OPERATION, tctx->ipad,
+ 32 + keylen, NULL, 0);
+ } else {
+ rc = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
+ SPACC_HASH_OPERATION, tctx->ipad,
+ keylen, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ memset(tctx->ipad, 0, sizeof(tctx->ipad));
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ pr_err("ERR: Failed to write SPAcc context\n");
+ dev_warn(tctx->dev, "Failed to write SPAcc context %d: %d\n",
+ tctx->handle, rc);
+
+ /* Non-fatal; we continue with the software fallback. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ tctx->ctx_valid = true;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int spacc_hash_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ const struct spacc_alg *salg = spacc_tfm_ahash(tfm);
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = NULL;
+
+ tctx->handle = -1;
+ tctx->ctx_valid = false;
+ tctx->flag_ppp = 0;
+ tctx->dev = get_device(salg->dev[0]);
+
+ if (salg->mode->sw_fb) {
+ tctx->fb.hash = crypto_alloc_ahash(salg->calg->cra_name, 0,
+ CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(tctx->fb.hash)) {
+ if (tctx->handle >= 0)
+ spacc_close(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle);
+ put_device(tctx->dev);
+ return PTR_ERR(tctx->fb.hash);
+ }
+
+ crypto_ahash_set_reqsize(__crypto_ahash_cast(tfm),
+ sizeof(struct spacc_crypto_reqctx) +
+ crypto_ahash_reqsize(tctx->fb.hash));
+
+ } else {
+ crypto_ahash_set_reqsize(__crypto_ahash_cast(tfm),
+ sizeof(struct spacc_crypto_reqctx));
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void spacc_hash_cra_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
+
+ sgl_node_delete();
+ crypto_free_ahash(tctx->fb.hash);
+
+ if (tctx->handle >= 0)
+ spacc_close(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle);
+
+ put_device(tctx->dev);
+}
+
+static int spacc_hash_init(struct ahash_request *req)
+{
+ int x = 0, rc = 0;
+ struct crypto_ahash *reqtfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(reqtfm);
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+ const struct spacc_alg *salg = spacc_tfm_ahash(&reqtfm->base);
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
+
+
+ ctx->digest_buf = NULL;
+
+ ctx->single_shot = 0;
+ ctx->total_nents = 0;
+ ctx->cur_part_pck = 0;
+ ctx->final_part_pck = 0;
+ ctx->rem_len = 0;
+ ctx->rem_nents = 0;
+ ctx->first_ppp_chunk = 1;
+ ctx->small_pck = 1;
+ tctx->ppp_sgl = NULL;
+
+ if (tctx->handle < 0 || !tctx->ctx_valid) {
+ priv = NULL;
+ dev_dbg(tctx->dev, "%s: open SPAcc context\n", __func__);
+
+ for (x = 0; x < ELP_CAPI_MAX_DEV && salg->dev[x]; x++) {
+ priv = dev_get_drvdata(salg->dev[x]);
+ tctx->dev = get_device(salg->dev[x]);
+ if (spacc_isenabled(&priv->spacc, salg->mode->id, 0)) {
+ tctx->handle = spacc_open(&priv->spacc,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
+ salg->mode->id, -1, 0,
+ spacc_digest_cb, reqtfm);
+ }
+
+ if (tctx->handle >= 0)
+ break;
+
+ put_device(salg->dev[x]);
+ }
+
+ if (tctx->handle < 0) {
+ dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Failed to open SPAcc context\n");
+ goto fallback;
+ }
+
+ rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
+ OP_ENCRYPT, ICV_HASH, IP_ICV_OFFSET,
+ 0, 0, 0);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ spacc_close(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle);
+ dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Failed to open SPAcc context\n");
+ tctx->handle = -1;
+ put_device(tctx->dev);
+ goto fallback;
+ }
+ tctx->ctx_valid = true;
+ } else {
+ ;/* do nothing */
+ }
+
+ /* alloc ppp_sgl */
+ tctx->ppp_sgl = kmalloc(sizeof(*(tctx->ppp_sgl)) * 2, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tctx->ppp_sgl)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ sg_init_table(tctx->ppp_sgl, 2);
+
+ return 0;
+fallback:
+
+ ctx->fb.hash_req.base = req->base;
+ ahash_request_set_tfm(&ctx->fb.hash_req, tctx->fb.hash);
+
+ return crypto_ahash_init(&ctx->fb.hash_req);
+}
+
+static int spacc_hash_final_part_pck(struct ahash_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *reqtfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(reqtfm);
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
+
+ int rc;
+
+ ctx->final_part_pck = 1;
+
+ /* In all the final calls the data is same as prev update and
+ * hence we can skip this init dma part and just enQ ddt
+ * No use in calling initdata, just process remaining bytes in ppp_sgl
+ * and be done with it.
+ */
+
+ rc = spacc_hash_init_dma(tctx->dev, req, 1);
+
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ ;/* small packet */
+ }
+
+ /* enqueue ddt for the remaining bytes of data, everything else
+ * would have been processed already, req->nbytes need not be
+ * processed
+ * Since this will hit only for small pkts, hence the condition
+ * ctx->rem_len-req->nbytes for the small pkt len
+ */
+ if (ctx->rem_len)
+ rc = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(&priv->spacc,
+ ctx->acb.new_handle, &ctx->src, &ctx->dst,
+ tctx->ppp_sgl[0].length,
+ 0, tctx->ppp_sgl[0].length, 0, 0, 0);
+ else {
+ /* zero msg handling */
+ rc = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(&priv->spacc,
+ ctx->acb.new_handle,
+ &ctx->src, &ctx->dst, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ spacc_hash_cleanup_dma(tctx->dev, req);
+ spacc_close(&priv->spacc, ctx->acb.new_handle);
+
+ if (rc != -EBUSY) {
+ dev_err(tctx->dev, "ERR: Failed to enqueue job: %d\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (!(req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG))
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+
+ return -EINPROGRESS;
+}
+
+static int spacc_hash_update(struct ahash_request *req)
+{
+ int rc;
+ int nents = sg_nents(req->src);
+ int nbytes = req->nbytes;
+
+ struct crypto_ahash *reqtfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(reqtfm);
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
+
+ ctx->rem_nents += sg_nents_for_len(req->src, req->nbytes);
+
+ if (!nbytes)
+ return 0;
+
+
+ if (req->src) {
+ /* set partial packet flag */
+ ctx->cur_part_pck++;
+
+ if (ctx->total_nents == 0 && nents > 0) {
+ /* assigned once for a req */
+ ctx->total_nents = nents;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (tctx->handle < 0 ||
+ !tctx->ctx_valid ||
+ nbytes > priv->max_msg_len) {
+ goto fallback;
+ }
+
+ rc = spacc_hash_init_dma(tctx->dev, req, 0);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto fallback;
+
+ if (rc == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* assumption: update wont be getting a zero len */
+ rc = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(&priv->spacc, ctx->acb.new_handle,
+ &ctx->src, &ctx->dst,
+ tctx->ppp_sgl[0].length,
+ 0, tctx->ppp_sgl[0].length, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ spacc_hash_cleanup_dma(tctx->dev, req);
+ spacc_close(&priv->spacc, ctx->acb.new_handle);
+
+ if (rc != -EBUSY) {
+ dev_err(tctx->dev,
+ "ERR: Failed to enqueue job: %d\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+ } else if (!(req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG))
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ goto fallback;
+ }
+
+ return -EINPROGRESS;
+
+fallback:
+ dev_dbg(tctx->dev, "%s Using SW fallback\n", __func__);
+
+ ctx->fb.hash_req.base.flags = req->base.flags;
+ ctx->fb.hash_req.nbytes = req->nbytes;
+ ctx->fb.hash_req.src = req->src;
+
+ return crypto_ahash_update(&ctx->fb.hash_req);
+}
+
+static int spacc_hash_final(struct ahash_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *reqtfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(reqtfm);
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+ struct ahash_cb_data *acb = &ctx->acb;
+ int err;
+
+ if (tctx->handle < 0 || !tctx->ctx_valid)
+ goto fallback;
+
+ /* a corner case of final, where rem_len is 0, we dont proccess
+ * that 0-size chunk and send the prev computed hash
+ */
+ if (ctx->total_nents == ctx->rem_nents && ctx->rem_len == 0 &&
+ ctx->total_nents != 0) {
+
+ memcpy(req->result, acb->tctx->digest_ctx_buf,
+ crypto_ahash_digestsize(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(acb->req)));
+
+ err = acb->spacc->job[acb->new_handle].job_err;
+
+ /* cleanup everything before exiting on this path */
+ spacc_free_mems(ctx, tctx, req);
+ spacc_close(acb->spacc, acb->new_handle);
+
+ return CRYPTO_OK;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->total_nents || ctx->small_pck) {
+ err = spacc_hash_final_part_pck(req);
+ /* no returns from here, this is final, process everything
+ * and copy result/digest and exit from here
+ */
+
+ if (err == -ENOMEM) {
+ /* Hash init failed */
+ memcpy(req->result, acb->tctx->digest_ctx_buf,
+ crypto_ahash_digestsize(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(acb->req)));
+
+ err = acb->spacc->job[acb->new_handle].job_err;
+ spacc_close(acb->spacc, acb->new_handle);
+ err = CRYPTO_OK;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(req->result, acb->tctx->digest_ctx_buf,
+ crypto_ahash_digestsize(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(acb->req)));
+
+ err = acb->spacc->job[acb->new_handle].job_err;
+ spacc_close(acb->spacc, acb->new_handle);
+
+ return 0;
+
+fallback:
+ ctx->fb.hash_req.base.flags = req->base.flags;
+ ctx->fb.hash_req.result = req->result;
+
+ return crypto_ahash_final(&ctx->fb.hash_req);
+}
+
+static int spacc_hash_digest(struct ahash_request *req)
+{
+ int final = 0;
+ int rc, total_len = 0;
+ struct crypto_ahash *reqtfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(reqtfm);
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
+
+ if (tctx->flag_ppp) {
+ /* from finup */
+ ctx->single_shot = 0;
+ ctx->final_part_pck = 1;
+ final = 2;
+ } else {
+ /* direct single shot digest call */
+ ctx->single_shot = 1;
+ ctx->rem_len = 0;
+ ctx->total_nents = sg_nents(req->src);
+ }
+
+ rc = spacc_hash_init_dma(tctx->dev, req, final);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto fallback;
+
+ if (rc == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (final) {
+ if (ctx->total_nents) {
+ /* INIT-UPDATE-UPDATE-FINUP/FINAL */
+ total_len = tctx->ppp_sgl[0].length;
+ } else if (req->src->length == 0 && ctx->total_nents == 0) {
+ /* zero msg handling */
+ total_len = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* handle INIT-FINUP sequence, process req->nbytes */
+ total_len = req->nbytes;
+ }
+
+ rc = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(&priv->spacc, ctx->acb.new_handle,
+ &ctx->src, &ctx->dst, total_len,
+ 0, total_len, 0, 0, 0);
+ } else {
+ rc = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(&priv->spacc, ctx->acb.new_handle,
+ &ctx->src, &ctx->dst, req->nbytes,
+ 0, req->nbytes, 0, 0, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ spacc_hash_cleanup_dma(tctx->dev, req);
+ spacc_close(&priv->spacc, ctx->acb.new_handle);
+
+ if (rc != -EBUSY) {
+ pr_debug("Failed to enqueue job, ERR: %d\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (!(req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG))
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ goto fallback;
+ }
+
+ return -EINPROGRESS;
+
+fallback:
+ /* Start from scratch as init is not called before digest */
+ ctx->fb.hash_req.base = req->base;
+ ahash_request_set_tfm(&ctx->fb.hash_req, tctx->fb.hash);
+
+ ctx->fb.hash_req.nbytes = total_len;
+ ctx->fb.hash_req.src = req->src;
+ ctx->fb.hash_req.result = req->result;
+
+ return crypto_ahash_digest(&ctx->fb.hash_req);
+}
+
+static int spacc_hash_finup(struct ahash_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *reqtfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(reqtfm);
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+ int rc;
+
+ if (tctx->handle < 0 || !tctx->ctx_valid)
+ goto fallback;
+
+ /* set this flag for rem_len usage */
+ tctx->flag_ppp = 1;
+ rc = spacc_hash_digest(req);
+ return rc;
+
+fallback:
+ ctx->fb.hash_req.base.flags = req->base.flags;
+ ctx->fb.hash_req.nbytes = req->nbytes;
+ ctx->fb.hash_req.src = req->src;
+ ctx->fb.hash_req.result = req->result;
+
+ return crypto_ahash_finup(&ctx->fb.hash_req);
+}
+
+static int spacc_hash_import(struct ahash_request *req, const void *in)
+{
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+
+ memcpy(ctx, in, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int spacc_hash_export(struct ahash_request *req, void *out)
+{
+ const struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+
+ memcpy(out, ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const struct ahash_alg spacc_hash_template = {
+ .init = spacc_hash_init,
+ .update = spacc_hash_update,
+ .final = spacc_hash_final,
+ .finup = spacc_hash_finup,
+ .digest = spacc_hash_digest,
+ .setkey = spacc_hash_setkey,
+ .export = spacc_hash_export,
+ .import = spacc_hash_import,
+
+ .halg.base = {
+ .cra_priority = 300,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_init = spacc_hash_cra_init,
+ .cra_exit = spacc_hash_cra_exit,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct spacc_crypto_ctx),
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
+ CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
+ CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK |
+ CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY
+ },
+};
+
+static int spacc_register_hash(struct spacc_alg *salg)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ salg->calg = &salg->alg.hash.halg.base;
+ salg->alg.hash = spacc_hash_template;
+
+ spacc_init_calg(salg->calg, salg->mode);
+ salg->alg.hash.halg.digestsize = salg->mode->hashlen;
+ salg->alg.hash.halg.statesize = sizeof(struct spacc_crypto_reqctx);
+
+ rc = crypto_register_ahash(&salg->alg.hash);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ mutex_lock(&spacc_hash_alg_mutex);
+ list_add(&salg->list, &spacc_hash_alg_list);
+ mutex_unlock(&spacc_hash_alg_mutex);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int probe_hashes(struct platform_device *spacc_pdev)
+{
+ int rc;
+ unsigned int i;
+ int registered = 0;
+ struct spacc_alg *salg;
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&spacc_pdev->dev);
+
+ spacc_hash_pool = dma_pool_create("spacc-digest", &spacc_pdev->dev,
+ SPACC_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ SPACC_DMA_ALIGN, SPACC_DMA_BOUNDARY);
+
+ if (!spacc_hash_pool)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(possible_hashes); i++)
+ possible_hashes[i].valid = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(possible_hashes); i++) {
+ if (possible_hashes[i].valid == 0 &&
+ spacc_isenabled(&priv->spacc,
+ possible_hashes[i].id & 0xFF,
+ possible_hashes[i].hashlen)) {
+
+ salg = kmalloc(sizeof(*salg), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!salg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ salg->mode = &possible_hashes[i];
+
+ /* Copy all dev's over to the salg */
+ salg->dev[0] = &spacc_pdev->dev;
+ salg->dev[1] = NULL;
+
+ rc = spacc_register_hash(salg);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(salg);
+ continue;
+ }
+ dev_dbg(&spacc_pdev->dev, "registered %s\n",
+ possible_hashes[i].name);
+
+ registered++;
+ possible_hashes[i].valid = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return registered;
+}
+
+int spacc_unregister_hash_algs(void)
+{
+ struct spacc_alg *salg, *tmp;
+
+ mutex_lock(&spacc_hash_alg_mutex);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(salg, tmp, &spacc_hash_alg_list, list) {
+ crypto_unregister_alg(salg->calg);
+ list_del(&salg->list);
+ kfree(salg);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&spacc_hash_alg_mutex);
+
+ dma_pool_destroy(spacc_hash_pool);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.c b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..779e1264790d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2917 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/of_device.h>
+#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include "spacc_hal.h"
+#include "spacc_core.h"
+
+static const u8 spacc_ctrl_map[SPACC_CTRL_VER_SIZE][SPACC_CTRL_MAPSIZE] = {
+ { 0, 8, 4, 12, 24, 16, 31, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 14, 15 },
+ { 0, 8, 3, 12, 24, 16, 31, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 14, 15 },
+ { 0, 4, 8, 13, 15, 16, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 }
+};
+
+static const int keysizes[2][7] = {
+ /* 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 */
+ { 5, 8, 16, 24, 32, 0, 0 }, /* cipher key sizes*/
+ { 8, 16, 20, 24, 32, 64, 128 }, /* hash key sizes*/
+};
+
+
+/* bits are 40, 64, 128, 192, 256, and top bit for hash */
+static const unsigned char template[] = {
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_NULL] = 0,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_AES_ECB] = 28,/* AESECB 128/224/256*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CBC] = 28,/* AESCBC 128/224/256*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CTR] = 28,/* AESCTR 128/224/256*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM] = 28,/* AESCCM 128/224/256*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM] = 28,/* AESGCM 128/224/256*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_AES_F8] = 28,/* AESF8 128/224/256*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_AES_XTS] = 20,/* AESXTS 128/256*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CFB] = 28,/* AESCFB 128/224/256*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_AES_OFB] = 28,/* AESOFB 128/224/256*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS1] = 28,/* AESCS1 128/224/256*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS2] = 28,/* AESCS2 128/224/256*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS3] = 28,/* AESCS3 128/224/256*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_ECB] = 0, /* MULTI2*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_CBC] = 0, /* MULTI2*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_OFB] = 0, /* MULTI2*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_CFB] = 0, /* MULTI2*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_CBC] = 8, /* 3DES CBC*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_ECB] = 8, /* 3DES ECB*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_DES_CBC] = 2, /* DES CBC*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_DES_ECB] = 2, /* DES ECB*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_KASUMI_ECB] = 4, /* KASUMI ECB*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_KASUMI_F8] = 4, /* KASUMI F8*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_SNOW3G_UEA2] = 4, /* SNOW3G*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_ZUC_UEA3] = 4, /* ZUC*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_STREAM] = 16, /* CHACHA20*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305] = 16, /* CHACHA20*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_ECB] = 4, /* SM4ECB 128*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CBC] = 4, /* SM4CBC 128*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CFB] = 4, /* SM4CFB 128*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_OFB] = 4, /* SM4OFB 128*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CTR] = 4, /* SM4CTR 128*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM] = 4, /* SM4CCM 128*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM] = 4, /* SM4GCM 128*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_F8] = 4, /* SM4F8 128*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_XTS] = 4, /* SM4XTS 128*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS1] = 4, /* SM4CS1 128*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS2] = 4, /* SM4CS2 128*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS3] = 4, /* SM4CS3 128*/
+
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_MD5] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_MD5] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA1] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA1] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA224] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA224] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA256] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA256] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA384] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA384] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA512] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA512] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA512_224] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA512_224] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA512_256] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA512_256] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_XCBC] = 154, /* XCBC*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_CMAC] = 154, /* CMAC*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KASUMI_F9] = 130, /* KASUMI*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SNOW3G_UIA2] = 130, /* SNOW*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_ZUC_UIA3] = 130, /* ZUC*/
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_POLY1305] = 144,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_SSLMAC_MD5] = 130,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_SSLMAC_SHA1] = 132,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_CRC32] = 0,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_MICHAEL] = 129,
+
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA3_224] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA3_256] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA3_384] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA3_512] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHAKE128] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHAKE256] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_CSHAKE128] = 130,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_CSHAKE256] = 130,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMAC128] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMAC256] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMACXOF128] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMACXOF256] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SM3] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SM3] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SM4_XCBC] = 242,
+ [CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SM4_CMAC] = 242,
+};
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_AUTODETECT)
+static const struct {
+ unsigned int min_version;
+ struct {
+ int outlen;
+ unsigned char data[64];
+ } test[7];
+} testdata[CRYPTO_MODE_LAST] = {
+ /* NULL*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[0].outlen = 0
+ },
+
+ /* AES_ECB*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0xc6, 0xa1, 0x3b, 0x37,
+ 0x87, 0x8f, 0x5b, 0x82, 0x6f, 0x4f, 0x81, 0x62, 0xa1,
+ 0xc8, 0xd8, 0x79, },
+ .test[3].outlen = 16, .test[3].data = { 0x91, 0x62, 0x51, 0x82,
+ 0x1c, 0x73, 0xa5, 0x22, 0xc3, 0x96, 0xd6, 0x27, 0x38,
+ 0x01, 0x96, 0x07, },
+ .test[4].outlen = 16, .test[4].data = { 0xf2, 0x90, 0x00, 0xb6,
+ 0x2a, 0x49, 0x9f, 0xd0, 0xa9, 0xf3, 0x9a, 0x6a, 0xdd,
+ 0x2e, 0x77, 0x80, },
+ },
+
+ /* AES_CBC*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0x0a, 0x94, 0x0b, 0xb5,
+ 0x41, 0x6e, 0xf0, 0x45, 0xf1, 0xc3, 0x94, 0x58, 0xc6,
+ 0x53, 0xea, 0x5a, },
+ .test[3].outlen = 16, .test[3].data = { 0x00, 0x60, 0xbf, 0xfe,
+ 0x46, 0x83, 0x4b, 0xb8, 0xda, 0x5c, 0xf9, 0xa6, 0x1f,
+ 0xf2, 0x20, 0xae, },
+ .test[4].outlen = 16, .test[4].data = { 0x5a, 0x6e, 0x04, 0x57,
+ 0x08, 0xfb, 0x71, 0x96, 0xf0, 0x2e, 0x55, 0x3d, 0x02,
+ 0xc3, 0xa6, 0x92, },
+ },
+
+ /* AES_CTR*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0x0a, 0x94, 0x0b, 0xb5,
+ 0x41, 0x6e, 0xf0, 0x45, 0xf1, 0xc3, 0x94, 0x58, 0xc6,
+ 0x53, 0xea, 0x5a, },
+ .test[3].outlen = 16, .test[3].data = { 0x00, 0x60, 0xbf, 0xfe,
+ 0x46, 0x83, 0x4b, 0xb8, 0xda, 0x5c, 0xf9, 0xa6, 0x1f,
+ 0xf2, 0x20, 0xae, },
+ .test[4].outlen = 16, .test[4].data = { 0x5a, 0x6e, 0x04, 0x57,
+ 0x08, 0xfb, 0x71, 0x96, 0xf0, 0x2e, 0x55, 0x3d, 0x02,
+ 0xc3, 0xa6, 0x92, },
+ },
+
+ /* AES_CCM*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 32, .test[2].data = { 0x02, 0x63, 0xec, 0x94,
+ 0x66, 0x18, 0x72, 0x96, 0x9a, 0xda, 0xfd, 0x0f, 0x4b,
+ 0xa4, 0x0f, 0xdc, 0xa5, 0x09, 0x92, 0x93, 0xb6, 0xb4,
+ 0x38, 0x34, 0x63, 0x72, 0x50, 0x4c, 0xfc, 0x8a, 0x63,
+ 0x02, },
+ .test[3].outlen = 32, .test[3].data = { 0x29, 0xf7, 0x63, 0xe8,
+ 0xa1, 0x75, 0xc6, 0xbf, 0xa5, 0x54, 0x94, 0x89, 0x12,
+ 0x84, 0x45, 0xf5, 0x9b, 0x27, 0xeb, 0xb1, 0xa4, 0x65,
+ 0x93, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xc0, 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xe2, 0x6c, 0x46,
+ 0x29, },
+ .test[4].outlen = 32, .test[4].data = { 0x60, 0xf3, 0x10, 0xd5,
+ 0xc3, 0x85, 0x58, 0x5d, 0x55, 0x16, 0xfb, 0x51, 0x72,
+ 0xe5, 0x20, 0xcf, 0x8e, 0x87, 0x6d, 0x72, 0xc8, 0x44,
+ 0xbe, 0x6d, 0xa2, 0xd6, 0xf4, 0xba, 0xec, 0xb4, 0xec,
+ 0x39, },
+ },
+
+ /* AES_GCM*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 32, .test[2].data = { 0x93, 0x6c, 0xa7, 0xce,
+ 0x66, 0x1b, 0xf7, 0x54, 0x4b, 0xd2, 0x61, 0x8a, 0x36,
+ 0xa3, 0x70, 0x08, 0xc0, 0xd7, 0xd0, 0x77, 0xc5, 0x64,
+ 0x76, 0xdb, 0x48, 0x4a, 0x53, 0xe3, 0x6c, 0x93, 0x34,
+ 0x0f, },
+ .test[3].outlen = 32, .test[3].data = { 0xe6, 0xf9, 0x22, 0x9b,
+ 0x99, 0xb9, 0xc9, 0x0e, 0xd0, 0x33, 0xdc, 0x82, 0xff,
+ 0xa9, 0xdc, 0x70, 0x4c, 0xcd, 0xc4, 0x1b, 0xa3, 0x5a,
+ 0x87, 0x5d, 0xd8, 0xef, 0xb6, 0x48, 0xbb, 0x0c, 0x92,
+ 0x60, },
+ .test[4].outlen = 32, .test[4].data = { 0x47, 0x02, 0xd6, 0x1b,
+ 0xc5, 0xe5, 0xc2, 0x1b, 0x8d, 0x41, 0x97, 0x8b, 0xb1,
+ 0xe9, 0x78, 0x6d, 0x48, 0x6f, 0x78, 0x81, 0xc7, 0x98,
+ 0xcc, 0xf5, 0x28, 0xf1, 0x01, 0x7c, 0xe8, 0xf6, 0x09,
+ 0x78, },
+ },
+
+ /* AES-F8*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[0].outlen = 0
+ },
+
+ /* AES-XTS*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 32, .test[2].data = { 0xa0, 0x1a, 0x6f, 0x09,
+ 0xfa, 0xef, 0xd2, 0x72, 0xc3, 0x9b, 0xad, 0x35, 0x52,
+ 0xfc, 0xa1, 0xcb, 0x33, 0x69, 0x51, 0xc5, 0x23, 0xbe,
+ 0xac, 0xa5, 0x4a, 0xf2, 0xfc, 0x77, 0x71, 0x6f, 0x9a,
+ 0x86, },
+ .test[4].outlen = 32, .test[4].data = { 0x05, 0x45, 0x91, 0x86,
+ 0xf2, 0x2d, 0x97, 0x93, 0xf3, 0xa0, 0xbb, 0x29, 0xc7,
+ 0x9c, 0xc1, 0x4c, 0x3b, 0x8f, 0xdd, 0x9d, 0xda, 0xc7,
+ 0xb5, 0xaa, 0xc2, 0x7c, 0x2e, 0x71, 0xce, 0x7f, 0xce,
+ 0x0e, },
+ },
+
+ /* AES-CFB*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[0].outlen = 0
+ },
+
+ /* AES-OFB*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[0].outlen = 0
+ },
+
+ /* AES-CS1*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 31, .test[2].data = { 0x0a, 0x94, 0x0b, 0xb5,
+ 0x41, 0x6e, 0xf0, 0x45, 0xf1, 0xc3, 0x94, 0x58, 0xc6,
+ 0x53, 0xea, 0xae, 0xe7, 0x1e, 0xa5, 0x41, 0xd7, 0xae,
+ 0x4b, 0xeb, 0x60, 0xbe, 0xcc, 0x59, 0x3f, 0xb6, 0x63,
+ },
+ .test[3].outlen = 31, .test[3].data = { 0x00, 0x60, 0xbf, 0xfe,
+ 0x46, 0x83, 0x4b, 0xb8, 0xda, 0x5c, 0xf9, 0xa6, 0x1f,
+ 0xf2, 0x20, 0x2e, 0x84, 0xcb, 0x12, 0xa3, 0x59, 0x17,
+ 0xb0, 0x9e, 0x25, 0xa2, 0xa2, 0x3d, 0xf1, 0x9f, 0xdc,
+ },
+ .test[4].outlen = 31, .test[4].data = { 0x5a, 0x6e, 0x04, 0x57,
+ 0x08, 0xfb, 0x71, 0x96, 0xf0, 0x2e, 0x55, 0x3d, 0x02,
+ 0xc3, 0xa6, 0xcd, 0xfc, 0x25, 0x35, 0x31, 0x0b, 0xf5,
+ 0x6b, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0x8a, 0xa2, 0x5a, 0xdd, 0x77, 0x51,
+ },
+ },
+
+ /* AES-CS2*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 31, .test[2].data = { 0xae, 0xe7, 0x1e, 0xa5,
+ 0x41, 0xd7, 0xae, 0x4b, 0xeb, 0x60, 0xbe, 0xcc, 0x59,
+ 0x3f, 0xb6, 0x63, 0x0a, 0x94, 0x0b, 0xb5, 0x41, 0x6e,
+ 0xf0, 0x45, 0xf1, 0xc3, 0x94, 0x58, 0xc6, 0x53, 0xea,
+ },
+ .test[3].outlen = 31, .test[3].data = { 0x2e, 0x84, 0xcb, 0x12,
+ 0xa3, 0x59, 0x17, 0xb0, 0x9e, 0x25, 0xa2, 0xa2, 0x3d,
+ 0xf1, 0x9f, 0xdc, 0x00, 0x60, 0xbf, 0xfe, 0x46, 0x83,
+ 0x4b, 0xb8, 0xda, 0x5c, 0xf9, 0xa6, 0x1f, 0xf2, 0x20,
+ },
+ .test[4].outlen = 31, .test[4].data = { 0xcd, 0xfc, 0x25, 0x35,
+ 0x31, 0x0b, 0xf5, 0x6b, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0x8a, 0xa2, 0x5a,
+ 0xdd, 0x77, 0x51, 0x5a, 0x6e, 0x04, 0x57, 0x08, 0xfb,
+ 0x71, 0x96, 0xf0, 0x2e, 0x55, 0x3d, 0x02, 0xc3, 0xa6,
+ },
+ },
+
+ /* AES-CS3*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 31, .test[2].data = { 0xae, 0xe7, 0x1e, 0xa5,
+ 0x41, 0xd7, 0xae, 0x4b, 0xeb, 0x60, 0xbe, 0xcc, 0x59,
+ 0x3f, 0xb6, 0x63, 0x0a, 0x94, 0x0b, 0xb5, 0x41, 0x6e,
+ 0xf0, 0x45, 0xf1, 0xc3, 0x94, 0x58, 0xc6, 0x53, 0xea,
+ },
+ .test[3].outlen = 31, .test[3].data = { 0x2e, 0x84, 0xcb, 0x12,
+ 0xa3, 0x59, 0x17, 0xb0, 0x9e, 0x25, 0xa2, 0xa2, 0x3d,
+ 0xf1, 0x9f, 0xdc, 0x00, 0x60, 0xbf, 0xfe, 0x46, 0x83,
+ 0x4b, 0xb8, 0xda, 0x5c, 0xf9, 0xa6, 0x1f, 0xf2, 0x20,
+ },
+ .test[4].outlen = 31, .test[4].data = { 0xcd, 0xfc, 0x25, 0x35,
+ 0x31, 0x0b, 0xf5, 0x6b, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0x8a, 0xa2, 0x5a,
+ 0xdd, 0x77, 0x51, 0x5a, 0x6e, 0x04, 0x57, 0x08, 0xfb,
+ 0x71, 0x96, 0xf0, 0x2e, 0x55, 0x3d, 0x02, 0xc3, 0xa6,
+ },
+ },
+
+ /* MULTI2*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[0].outlen = 0
+ },
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[0].outlen = 0
+ },
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[0].outlen = 0
+ },
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[0].outlen = 0
+ },
+
+ /* 3DES_CBC*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[3].outlen = 16, .test[3].data = { 0x58, 0xed, 0x24, 0x8f,
+ 0x77, 0xf6, 0xb1, 0x9e, 0x47, 0xd9, 0xb7, 0x4a, 0x4f,
+ 0x5a, 0xe6, 0x6d, }
+ },
+
+ /* 3DES_ECB*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[3].outlen = 16, .test[3].data = { 0x89, 0x4b, 0xc3, 0x08,
+ 0x54, 0x26, 0xa4, 0x41, 0x89, 0x4b, 0xc3, 0x08, 0x54,
+ 0x26, 0xa4, 0x41, }
+ },
+
+ /* DES_CBC*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 16, .test[1].data = { 0xe1, 0xb2, 0x46, 0xe5,
+ 0xa7, 0xc7, 0x4c, 0xbc, 0xd5, 0xf0, 0x8e, 0x25, 0x3b,
+ 0xfa, 0x23, 0x80, }
+ },
+
+ /* DES_ECB*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 16, .test[1].data = { 0xa5, 0x17, 0x3a,
+ 0xd5, 0x95, 0x7b, 0x43, 0x70, 0xa5, 0x17, 0x3a, 0xd5,
+ 0x95, 0x7b, 0x43, 0x70, }
+ },
+
+ /* KASUMI_ECB*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0x04, 0x7d, 0x5d,
+ 0x2c, 0x8c, 0x2e, 0x91, 0xb3, 0x04, 0x7d, 0x5d, 0x2c,
+ 0x8c, 0x2e, 0x91, 0xb3, } },
+
+ /* KASUMI_F8*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0xfc, 0xf7, 0x45,
+ 0xee, 0x1d, 0xbb, 0xa4, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x45, 0xdc, 0x6b,
+ 0x2a, 0x1b, 0x50, 0x88, }
+ },
+
+ /* SNOW3G UEA2*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0x95, 0xd3, 0xc8,
+ 0x13, 0xc0, 0x20, 0x24, 0xa3, 0x76, 0x24, 0xd1, 0x98,
+ 0xb6, 0x67, 0x4d, 0x4c, }
+ },
+
+ /* ZUC UEA3*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0xda, 0xdf, 0xb6,
+ 0xa2, 0xac, 0x9d, 0xba, 0xfe, 0x18, 0x9c, 0x0c, 0x75,
+ 0x79, 0xc6, 0xe0, 0x4e, }
+ },
+
+ /* CHACHA20_STREAM*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[4].outlen = 16, .test[4].data = { 0x55, 0xdf, 0x91,
+ 0xe9, 0x27, 0x01, 0x37, 0x69, 0xdb, 0x38, 0xd4, 0x28,
+ 0x01, 0x79, 0x76, 0x64 }
+ },
+
+ /* CHACHA20_POLY1305 (AEAD)*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[4].outlen = 16, .test[4].data = { 0x89, 0xfb, 0x08,
+ 0x00, 0x29, 0x17, 0xa5, 0x40, 0xb7, 0x83, 0x3f, 0xf3,
+ 0x98, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x63 }
+ },
+
+ /* SM4_ECB 128*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0x1e, 0x96, 0x34,
+ 0xb7, 0x70, 0xf9, 0xae, 0xba, 0xa9, 0x34, 0x4f, 0x5a,
+ 0xff, 0x9f, 0x82, 0xa3 }
+ },
+
+ /* SM4_CBC 128*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0x8f, 0x78, 0x76,
+ 0x3e, 0xe0, 0x60, 0x13, 0xe0, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x2c, 0x42,
+ 0x8f, 0xd0, 0x52, 0x8d }
+ },
+
+ /* SM4_CFB 128*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0x8f, 0x78, 0x76,
+ 0x3e, 0xe0, 0x60, 0x13, 0xe0, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x2c, 0x42,
+ 0x8f, 0xd0, 0x52, 0x8d }
+ },
+
+ /* SM4_OFB 128*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0x8f, 0x78, 0x76, 0x3e, 0xe0,
+ 0x60, 0x13, 0xe0, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x2c, 0x42, 0x8f, 0xd0, 0x52,
+ 0x8d }
+ },
+
+ /* SM4_CTR 128*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0x8f, 0x78, 0x76, 0x3e, 0xe0,
+ 0x60, 0x13, 0xe0, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x2c, 0x42, 0x8f, 0xd0, 0x52,
+ 0x8d }
+ },
+
+ /* SM4_CCM 128*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0x8e, 0x25, 0x5a,
+ 0x13, 0xc7, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x95, 0xef, 0x14, 0x15, 0x11,
+ 0xd0, 0xb9, 0x60, 0x5b }
+ },
+
+ /* SM4_GCM 128*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0x97, 0x46, 0xde,
+ 0xfb, 0xc9, 0x6a, 0x85, 0x00, 0xff, 0x9c, 0x74, 0x4d,
+ 0xd1, 0xbb, 0xf9, 0x66 }
+ },
+
+ /* SM4_F8 128*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0x77, 0x30, 0xff,
+ 0x70, 0x46, 0xbc, 0xf4, 0xe3, 0x11, 0xf6, 0x27, 0xe2,
+ 0xff, 0xd7, 0xc4, 0x2e }
+ },
+
+ /* SM4_XTS 128*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0x05, 0x3f, 0xb6,
+ 0xe9, 0xb1, 0xff, 0x09, 0x4f, 0x9d, 0x69, 0x4d, 0xc2,
+ 0xb6, 0xa1, 0x15, 0xde }
+ },
+
+ /* SM4_CS1 128*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0x8f, 0x78, 0x76,
+ 0x3e, 0xe0, 0x60, 0x13, 0xe0, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x2c, 0x42,
+ 0x8f, 0xd0, 0x52, 0xa0 }
+ },
+
+ /* SM4_CS2 128*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0xa0, 0x1c, 0xfe,
+ 0x91, 0xaa, 0x7e, 0xf1, 0x75, 0x6a, 0xe8, 0xbc, 0xe1,
+ 0x55, 0x08, 0xda, 0x71 }
+ },
+
+ /* SM4_CS3 128*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 16, .test[2].data = { 0xa0, 0x1c, 0xfe,
+ 0x91, 0xaa, 0x7e, 0xf1, 0x75, 0x6a, 0xe8, 0xbc, 0xe1,
+ 0x55, 0x08, 0xda, 0x71 }
+ },
+
+ /* hashes ... note they use the 2nd keysize
+ * array so the indecies mean different sizes!!!
+ */
+
+ /* MD5 HASH/HMAC*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 16, .test[1].data = { 0x70, 0xbc, 0x8f, 0x4b,
+ 0x72, 0xa8, 0x69, 0x21, 0x46, 0x8b, 0xf8, 0xe8, 0x44,
+ 0x1d, 0xce, 0x51, }
+ },
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 16, .test[1].data = { 0xb6, 0x39, 0xc8, 0x73,
+ 0x16, 0x38, 0x61, 0x8b, 0x70, 0x79, 0x72, 0xaa, 0x6e,
+ 0x96, 0xcf, 0x90, },
+ .test[4].outlen = 16, .test[4].data = { 0xb7, 0x79, 0x68, 0xea,
+ 0x17, 0x32, 0x1e, 0x32, 0x13, 0x90, 0x6c, 0x2e, 0x9f,
+ 0xd5, 0xc8, 0xb3, },
+ .test[5].outlen = 16, .test[5].data = { 0x80, 0x3e, 0x0a, 0x2f,
+ 0x8a, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x8f, 0x8e, 0x12, 0x28, 0x86, 0x22,
+ 0x59, 0x6b, 0x05, },
+ },
+ /* SHA1*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 20, .test[1].data = { 0xde, 0x8a, 0x84, 0x7b,
+ 0xff, 0x8c, 0x34, 0x3d, 0x69, 0xb8, 0x53, 0xa2, 0x15,
+ 0xe6, 0xee, 0x77, 0x5e, 0xf2, 0xef, 0x96, }
+ },
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 20, .test[1].data = { 0xf8, 0x54, 0x60, 0x50,
+ 0x49, 0x56, 0xd1, 0xcd, 0x55, 0x5c, 0x5d, 0xcd, 0x24,
+ 0x33, 0xbf, 0xdc, 0x5c, 0x99, 0x54, 0xc8, },
+ .test[4].outlen = 20, .test[4].data = { 0x66, 0x3f, 0x3a, 0x3c,
+ 0x08, 0xb6, 0x87, 0xb2, 0xd3, 0x0c, 0x5a, 0xa7, 0xcc,
+ 0x5c, 0xc3, 0x99, 0xb2, 0xb4, 0x58, 0x55, },
+ .test[5].outlen = 20, .test[5].data = { 0x9a, 0x28, 0x54, 0x2f,
+ 0xaf, 0xa7, 0x0b, 0x37, 0xbe, 0x2d, 0x3e, 0xd9, 0xd4,
+ 0x70, 0xbc, 0xdc, 0x0b, 0x54, 0x20, 0x06, },
+ },
+ /* SHA224_HASH*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 28, .test[1].data = { 0xb3, 0x38, 0xc7, 0x6b,
+ 0xcf, 0xfa, 0x1a, 0x0b, 0x3e, 0xad, 0x8d, 0xe5, 0x8d,
+ 0xfb, 0xff, 0x47, 0xb6, 0x3a, 0xb1, 0x15, 0x0e, 0x10,
+ 0xd8, 0xf1, 0x7f, 0x2b, 0xaf, 0xdf, }
+ },
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 28, .test[1].data = { 0xf3, 0xb4, 0x33, 0x78,
+ 0x53, 0x4c, 0x0c, 0x4a, 0x1e, 0x31, 0xc2, 0xce, 0xda,
+ 0xc8, 0xfe, 0x74, 0x4a, 0xd2, 0x9b, 0x7c, 0x1d, 0x2f,
+ 0x5e, 0xa1, 0xaa, 0x31, 0xb9, 0xf5, },
+ .test[4].outlen = 28, .test[4].data = { 0x4b, 0x6b, 0x3f, 0x9a,
+ 0x66, 0x47, 0x45, 0xe2, 0x60, 0xc9, 0x53, 0x86, 0x7a,
+ 0x34, 0x65, 0x7d, 0xe2, 0x24, 0x06, 0xcc, 0xf9, 0x17,
+ 0x20, 0x5d, 0xc2, 0xb6, 0x97, 0x9a, },
+ .test[5].outlen = 28, .test[5].data = { 0x90, 0xb0, 0x6e, 0xee,
+ 0x21, 0x57, 0x38, 0xc7, 0x65, 0xbb, 0x9a, 0xf5, 0xb4,
+ 0x31, 0x0a, 0x0e, 0xe5, 0x64, 0xc4, 0x49, 0x9d, 0xbd,
+ 0xe9, 0xf7, 0xac, 0x9f, 0xf8, 0x05, },
+ },
+
+ /* SHA256_HASH*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 32, .test[1].data = { 0x66, 0x68, 0x7a, 0xad,
+ 0xf8, 0x62, 0xbd, 0x77, 0x6c, 0x8f, 0xc1, 0x8b, 0x8e,
+ 0x9f, 0x8e, 0x20, 0x08, 0x97, 0x14, 0x85, 0x6e, 0xe2,
+ 0x33, 0xb3, 0x90, 0x2a, 0x59, 0x1d, 0x0d, 0x5f, 0x29,
+ 0x25, }
+ },
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 32, .test[1].data = { 0x75, 0x40, 0x84, 0x49,
+ 0x54, 0x0a, 0xf9, 0x80, 0x99, 0xeb, 0x93, 0x6b, 0xf6,
+ 0xd3, 0xff, 0x41, 0x05, 0x47, 0xcc, 0x82, 0x62, 0x76,
+ 0x32, 0xf3, 0x43, 0x74, 0x70, 0x54, 0xe2, 0x3b, 0xc0,
+ 0x90, },
+ .test[4].outlen = 32, .test[4].data = { 0x41, 0x6c, 0x53, 0x92,
+ 0xb9, 0xf3, 0x6d, 0xf1, 0x88, 0xe9, 0x0e, 0xb1, 0x4d,
+ 0x17, 0xbf, 0x0d, 0xa1, 0x90, 0xbf, 0xdb, 0x7f, 0x1f,
+ 0x49, 0x56, 0xe6, 0xe5, 0x66, 0xa5, 0x69, 0xc8, 0xb1,
+ 0x5c, },
+ .test[5].outlen = 32, .test[5].data = { 0x49, 0x1f, 0x58, 0x3b,
+ 0x05, 0xe2, 0x3a, 0x72, 0x1d, 0x11, 0x6d, 0xc1, 0x08,
+ 0xa0, 0x3f, 0x30, 0x37, 0x98, 0x36, 0x8a, 0x49, 0x4c,
+ 0x21, 0x1d, 0x56, 0xa5, 0x2a, 0xf3, 0x68, 0x28, 0xb7,
+ 0x69, },
+ },
+ /* SHA384_HASH*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 48, .test[1].data = { 0xa3, 0x8f, 0xff, 0x4b,
+ 0xa2, 0x6c, 0x15, 0xe4, 0xac, 0x9c, 0xde, 0x8c, 0x03,
+ 0x10, 0x3a, 0xc8, 0x90, 0x80, 0xfd, 0x47, 0x54, 0x5f,
+ 0xde, 0x94, 0x46, 0xc8, 0xf1, 0x92, 0x72, 0x9e, 0xab,
+ 0x7b, 0xd0, 0x3a, 0x4d, 0x5c, 0x31, 0x87, 0xf7, 0x5f,
+ 0xe2, 0xa7, 0x1b, 0x0e, 0xe5, 0x0a, 0x4a, 0x40, }
+ },
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 48, .test[1].data = { 0x6c, 0xd8, 0x89, 0xa0,
+ 0xca, 0x54, 0xa6, 0x1d, 0x24, 0xc4, 0x1d, 0xa1, 0x77,
+ 0x50, 0xd6, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0x43, 0x23, 0x0d, 0xb1, 0xf5,
+ 0xf7, 0xfc, 0xc0, 0x8c, 0xf6, 0xdf, 0x3c, 0x61, 0xfc,
+ 0x8a, 0xb9, 0xda, 0x12, 0x75, 0x97, 0xac, 0x51, 0x88,
+ 0x59, 0x19, 0x44, 0x13, 0xc0, 0x78, 0xa5, 0xa8, },
+ .test[4].outlen = 48, .test[4].data = { 0x0c, 0x91, 0x36, 0x46,
+ 0xd9, 0x17, 0x81, 0x46, 0x1d, 0x42, 0xb1, 0x00, 0xaa,
+ 0xfa, 0x26, 0x92, 0x9f, 0x05, 0xc0, 0x91, 0x8e, 0x20,
+ 0xd7, 0x75, 0x9d, 0xd2, 0xc8, 0x9b, 0x02, 0x18, 0x20,
+ 0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa3, 0x32, 0xe3, 0x1e, 0xa4, 0x2b, 0xc3,
+ 0xc8, 0xb9, 0xb1, 0x53, 0x4e, 0x6a, 0x49, 0xd2, },
+ .test[5].outlen = 48, .test[5].data = { 0x84, 0x78, 0xd2, 0xf1,
+ 0x44, 0x95, 0x6a, 0x22, 0x2d, 0x08, 0x19, 0xe8, 0xea,
+ 0x61, 0xb4, 0x86, 0xe8, 0xc6, 0xb0, 0x40, 0x51, 0x28,
+ 0x22, 0x54, 0x48, 0xc0, 0x70, 0x09, 0x81, 0xf9, 0xf5,
+ 0x47, 0x9e, 0xb3, 0x2c, 0x69, 0x19, 0xd5, 0x8d, 0x03,
+ 0x5d, 0x24, 0xca, 0x90, 0xa6, 0x9d, 0x80, 0x2a, },
+ .test[6].outlen = 48, .test[6].data = { 0x0e, 0x68, 0x17, 0x31,
+ 0x01, 0xa8, 0x28, 0x0a, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x22, 0xa6, 0x89,
+ 0xf0, 0xc6, 0xcd, 0x4e, 0x8c, 0x19, 0x4c, 0x44, 0x3d,
+ 0xb5, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xfe, 0xea, 0xc7, 0x84, 0x0b, 0x57,
+ 0x0d, 0xd4, 0xe4, 0x8a, 0x3f, 0x68, 0x31, 0x20, 0xd9,
+ 0x1f, 0xc4, 0xa3, 0x76, 0xcf, 0xdd, 0x07, 0xa6, },
+ },
+ /* SHA512_HASH */
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 64, .test[1].data = { 0x50, 0x46, 0xad, 0xc1,
+ 0xdb, 0xa8, 0x38, 0x86, 0x7b, 0x2b, 0xbb, 0xfd, 0xd0,
+ 0xc3, 0x42, 0x3e, 0x58, 0xb5, 0x79, 0x70, 0xb5, 0x26,
+ 0x7a, 0x90, 0xf5, 0x79, 0x60, 0x92, 0x4a, 0x87, 0xf1,
+ 0x96, 0x0a, 0x6a, 0x85, 0xea, 0xa6, 0x42, 0xda, 0xc8,
+ 0x35, 0x42, 0x4b, 0x5d, 0x7c, 0x8d, 0x63, 0x7c, 0x00,
+ 0x40, 0x8c, 0x7a, 0x73, 0xda, 0x67, 0x2b, 0x7f, 0x49,
+ 0x85, 0x21, 0x42, 0x0b, 0x6d, 0xd3, }
+ },
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 64, .test[1].data = { 0xec, 0xfd, 0x83, 0x74,
+ 0xc8, 0xa9, 0x2f, 0xd7, 0x71, 0x94, 0xd1, 0x1e, 0xe7,
+ 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x5e, 0x11, 0x29, 0x58, 0xb8, 0x36, 0xc6,
+ 0x39, 0xbc, 0xd6, 0x88, 0x6e, 0xdb, 0xc8, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x30, 0x27, 0xaa, 0x69, 0xb9, 0x2a, 0xd4, 0x67, 0x06,
+ 0x5c, 0x82, 0x8e, 0x90, 0xe9, 0x3e, 0x55, 0x88, 0x7d,
+ 0xb2, 0x2b, 0x48, 0xa2, 0x28, 0x92, 0x6c, 0x0f, 0xf1,
+ 0x57, 0xb5, 0xd0, 0x06, 0x1d, 0xf3, },
+ .test[4].outlen = 64, .test[4].data = { 0x47, 0x88, 0x91, 0xe9,
+ 0x12, 0x3e, 0xfd, 0xdc, 0x26, 0x29, 0x08, 0xd6, 0x30,
+ 0x8f, 0xcc, 0xb6, 0x93, 0x30, 0x58, 0x69, 0x4e, 0x81,
+ 0xee, 0x9d, 0xb6, 0x0f, 0xc5, 0x54, 0xe6, 0x7c, 0x84,
+ 0xc5, 0xbc, 0x89, 0x99, 0xf0, 0xf3, 0x7f, 0x6f, 0x3f,
+ 0xf5, 0x04, 0x2c, 0xdf, 0x76, 0x72, 0x6a, 0xbe, 0x28,
+ 0x3b, 0xb8, 0x05, 0xb3, 0x47, 0x45, 0xf5, 0x7f, 0xb1,
+ 0x21, 0x2d, 0xe0, 0x8d, 0x1e, 0x29, },
+ .test[5].outlen = 64, .test[5].data = { 0x7e, 0x55, 0xda, 0x88,
+ 0x28, 0xc1, 0x6e, 0x9a, 0x6a, 0x99, 0xa0, 0x37, 0x68,
+ 0xf0, 0x28, 0x5e, 0xe2, 0xbe, 0x00, 0xac, 0x76, 0x89,
+ 0x76, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x98, 0x1b, 0x32, 0x1a, 0x14, 0xc4,
+ 0x2e, 0x9c, 0xe4, 0xf3, 0x3f, 0x5f, 0xa0, 0xae, 0x95,
+ 0x16, 0x0b, 0x14, 0xf5, 0xf5, 0x45, 0x29, 0xd8, 0xc9,
+ 0x43, 0xf2, 0xa9, 0xbc, 0xdc, 0x03, 0x81, 0x0d, 0x36,
+ 0x2f, 0xb1, 0x22, 0xe8, 0x13, 0xf8, },
+ .test[6].outlen = 64, .test[6].data = { 0x5d, 0xc4, 0x80, 0x90,
+ 0x6b, 0x00, 0x17, 0x04, 0x34, 0x63, 0x93, 0xf1, 0xad,
+ 0x9a, 0x3e, 0x13, 0x37, 0x6b, 0x86, 0xd7, 0xc4, 0x2b,
+ 0x22, 0x9c, 0x2e, 0xf2, 0x1d, 0xde, 0x35, 0x39, 0x03,
+ 0x3f, 0x2b, 0x3a, 0xc3, 0x49, 0xb3, 0x32, 0x86, 0x63,
+ 0x6b, 0x0f, 0x27, 0x95, 0x97, 0xe5, 0xe7, 0x2b, 0x9b,
+ 0x80, 0xea, 0x94, 0x4d, 0x84, 0x2e, 0x39, 0x44, 0x8f,
+ 0x56, 0xe3, 0xcd, 0xa7, 0x12, 0x3e, },
+ },
+ /* SHA512_224_HASH */
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 28, .test[1].data = { 0x9e, 0x7d, 0x60, 0x80,
+ 0xde, 0xf4, 0xe1, 0xcc, 0xf4, 0xae, 0xaa, 0xc6, 0xf7,
+ 0xfa, 0xd0, 0x08, 0xd0, 0x60, 0xa6, 0xcf, 0x87, 0x06,
+ 0x20, 0x38, 0xd6, 0x16, 0x67, 0x74, }
+ },
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 28, .test[1].data = { 0xff, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x27,
+ 0xdd, 0x2e, 0x39, 0xa0, 0x18, 0xa8, 0xaf, 0xde, 0x84,
+ 0x0b, 0x5d, 0x0f, 0x3d, 0xdc, 0xc6, 0x17, 0xd1, 0xb6,
+ 0x2f, 0x8c, 0xf8, 0x7e, 0x34, 0x34, },
+ .test[4].outlen = 28, .test[4].data = { 0x00, 0x19, 0xe2, 0x2d,
+ 0x44, 0x80, 0x2d, 0xd8, 0x1c, 0x57, 0xf5, 0x57, 0x92,
+ 0x08, 0x13, 0xe7, 0x9d, 0xbb, 0x2b, 0xc2, 0x8d, 0x77,
+ 0xc1, 0xff, 0x71, 0x4c, 0xf0, 0xa9, },
+ .test[5].outlen = 28, .test[5].data = { 0x6a, 0xc4, 0xa8, 0x73,
+ 0x21, 0x54, 0xb2, 0x82, 0xee, 0x89, 0x8d, 0x45, 0xd4,
+ 0xe3, 0x76, 0x3e, 0x04, 0x03, 0xc9, 0x71, 0xee, 0x01,
+ 0x25, 0xd2, 0x7b, 0xa1, 0x20, 0xc4, },
+ .test[6].outlen = 28, .test[6].data = { 0x0f, 0x98, 0x15, 0x9b,
+ 0x11, 0xca, 0x60, 0xc7, 0x82, 0x39, 0x1a, 0x50, 0x8c,
+ 0xe4, 0x79, 0xfa, 0xa8, 0x0e, 0xc7, 0x12, 0xfd, 0x8c,
+ 0x9c, 0x99, 0x7a, 0xe8, 0x7e, 0x92, },
+ },
+ /* SHA512_256_HASH*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 32, .test[1].data = { 0xaf, 0x13, 0xc0, 0x48,
+ 0x99, 0x12, 0x24, 0xa5, 0xe4, 0xc6, 0x64, 0x44, 0x6b,
+ 0x68, 0x8a, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xfb, 0x54, 0x56, 0xdb, 0x36,
+ 0x29, 0x60, 0x1b, 0x00, 0xec, 0x16, 0x0c, 0x74, 0xe5,
+ 0x54, }
+ },
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 32, .test[1].data = { 0x3a, 0x2c, 0xd0, 0x2b,
+ 0xfa, 0xa6, 0x72, 0xe4, 0xf1, 0xab, 0x0a, 0x3e, 0x70,
+ 0xe4, 0x88, 0x1a, 0x92, 0xe1, 0x3b, 0x64, 0x5a, 0x9b,
+ 0xed, 0xb3, 0x97, 0xc0, 0x17, 0x1f, 0xd4, 0x05, 0xf1,
+ 0x72, },
+ .test[4].outlen = 32, .test[4].data = { 0x6f, 0x2d, 0xae, 0xc6,
+ 0xe4, 0xa6, 0x5b, 0x52, 0x0f, 0x26, 0x16, 0xf6, 0xa9,
+ 0xc1, 0x23, 0xc2, 0xb3, 0x67, 0xfc, 0x69, 0xac, 0x73,
+ 0x87, 0xa2, 0x5b, 0x6c, 0x44, 0xad, 0xc5, 0x26, 0x2b,
+ 0x10, },
+ .test[5].outlen = 32, .test[5].data = { 0x63, 0xe7, 0xb8, 0xd1,
+ 0x76, 0x33, 0x56, 0x29, 0xba, 0x99, 0x86, 0x42, 0x0d,
+ 0x4f, 0xf7, 0x54, 0x8c, 0xb9, 0x39, 0xf2, 0x72, 0x1d,
+ 0x0e, 0x9d, 0x80, 0x67, 0xd9, 0xab, 0x15, 0xb0, 0x68,
+ 0x18, },
+ .test[6].outlen = 32, .test[6].data = { 0x64, 0x78, 0x56, 0xd7,
+ 0xaf, 0x5b, 0x56, 0x08, 0xf1, 0x44, 0xf7, 0x4f, 0xa1,
+ 0xa1, 0x13, 0x79, 0x6c, 0xb1, 0x31, 0x11, 0xf3, 0x75,
+ 0xf4, 0x8c, 0xb4, 0x9f, 0xbf, 0xb1, 0x60, 0x38, 0x3d,
+ 0x28, },
+ },
+
+ /* AESXCBC*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 16, .test[1].data = { 0x35, 0xd9, 0xdc, 0xdb,
+ 0x82, 0x9f, 0xec, 0x33, 0x52, 0xe7, 0xbf, 0x10, 0xb8,
+ 0x4b, 0xe4, 0xa5, },
+ .test[3].outlen = 16, .test[3].data = { 0x39, 0x6f, 0x99, 0xb5,
+ 0x43, 0x33, 0x67, 0x4e, 0xd4, 0x45, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x77,
+ 0xe4, 0xd4, 0x14, },
+ .test[4].outlen = 16, .test[4].data = { 0x73, 0xd4, 0x7c, 0x38,
+ 0x37, 0x4f, 0x73, 0xd0, 0x78, 0xa8, 0xc6, 0xec, 0x05,
+ 0x67, 0xca, 0x5e, },
+ },
+
+ /* AESCMAC*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 16, .test[1].data = { 0x15, 0xbe, 0x1b, 0xfd,
+ 0x8c, 0xbb, 0xaf, 0x8b, 0x51, 0x9a, 0x64, 0x3b, 0x1b,
+ 0x46, 0xc1, 0x8f, },
+ .test[3].outlen = 16, .test[3].data = { 0x4e, 0x02, 0xd6, 0xec,
+ 0x92, 0x75, 0x88, 0xb4, 0x3e, 0x83, 0xa7, 0xac, 0x32,
+ 0xb6, 0x2b, 0xdb, },
+ .test[4].outlen = 16, .test[4].data = { 0xa7, 0x37, 0x01, 0xbe,
+ 0xe8, 0xce, 0xed, 0x44, 0x49, 0x4a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x9e,
+ 0xd9, 0x31, 0x3e, },
+ },
+
+ /* KASUMIF9*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 4, .test[1].data = { 0x5b, 0x26, 0x81, 0x06
+ }
+ },
+
+ /* SNOW3G UIA2*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 4, .test[1].data = { 0x08, 0xed, 0x2c, 0x76,
+ }
+ },
+
+ /* ZUC UIA3*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 4, .test[1].data = { 0x6a, 0x2b, 0x4c, 0x3a,
+ }
+ },
+
+ /* POLY1305*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[4].outlen = 16, .test[4].data = { 0xef, 0x91, 0x06, 0x4e,
+ 0xce, 0x99, 0x9c, 0x4e, 0xfd, 0x05, 0x6a, 0x8c, 0xe6,
+ 0x18, 0x23, 0xad }
+ },
+
+ /* SSLMAC MD5*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 16, .test[1].data = { 0x0e, 0xf4, 0xca, 0x32,
+ 0x32, 0x40, 0x1d, 0x1b, 0xaa, 0xfd, 0x6d, 0xa8, 0x01,
+ 0x79, 0xed, 0xcd, },
+ },
+
+ /* SSLMAC_SHA1*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[2].outlen = 20, .test[2].data = { 0x05, 0x9d, 0x99, 0xb4,
+ 0xf3, 0x03, 0x1e, 0xc5, 0x24, 0xbf, 0xec, 0xdf, 0x64,
+ 0x8e, 0x37, 0x2e, 0xf0, 0xef, 0x93, 0xa0, },
+ },
+
+ /* CRC32*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[0].outlen = 0
+ },
+
+ /* TKIP-MIC*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[0].outlen = 8, .test[0].data = { 0x16, 0xfb, 0xa0,
+ 0x0e, 0xe2, 0xab, 0x6c, 0x97, }
+ },
+
+ /* SHA3-224*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 28, .test[1].data = { 0x73, 0xe0, 0x87,
+ 0xae, 0x12, 0x71, 0xb2, 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x85, 0x46, 0xc9,
+ 0x3a, 0xb4, 0x25, 0x14, 0xa6, 0x9e, 0xef, 0x25, 0x2b,
+ 0xfd, 0xd1, 0x37, 0x55, 0x74, 0x8a, 0x00, }
+ },
+
+ /* SHA3-256*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 32, .test[1].data = { 0x9e, 0x62, 0x91, 0x97,
+ 0x0c, 0xb4, 0x4d, 0xd9, 0x40, 0x08, 0xc7, 0x9b, 0xca,
+ 0xf9, 0xd8, 0x6f, 0x18, 0xb4, 0xb4, 0x9b, 0xa5, 0xb2,
+ 0xa0, 0x47, 0x81, 0xdb, 0x71, 0x99, 0xed, 0x3b, 0x9e,
+ 0x4e, }
+ },
+
+ /* SHA3-384*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 48, .test[1].data = { 0x4b, 0xda, 0xab,
+ 0xf7, 0x88, 0xd3, 0xad, 0x1a, 0xd8, 0x3d, 0x6d, 0x93,
+ 0xc7, 0xe4, 0x49, 0x37, 0xc2, 0xe6, 0x49, 0x6a, 0xf2,
+ 0x3b, 0xe3, 0x35, 0x4d, 0x75, 0x69, 0x87, 0xf4, 0x51,
+ 0x60, 0xfc, 0x40, 0x23, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x5e, 0xcd, 0xcb,
+ 0x3c, 0x7e, 0x31, 0xa6, 0x2f, 0x72, 0x6d, 0x70, 0x2c,
+ }
+ },
+
+ /* SHA3-512*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 64, .test[1].data = { 0xad, 0x56, 0xc3, 0x5c,
+ 0xab, 0x50, 0x63, 0xb9, 0xe7, 0xea, 0x56, 0x83, 0x14,
+ 0xec, 0x81, 0xc4, 0x0b, 0xa5, 0x77, 0xaa, 0xe6, 0x30,
+ 0xde, 0x90, 0x20, 0x04, 0x00, 0x9e, 0x88, 0xf1, 0x8d,
+ 0xa5, 0x7b, 0xbd, 0xfd, 0xaa, 0xa0, 0xfc, 0x18, 0x9c,
+ 0x66, 0xc8, 0xd8, 0x53, 0x24, 0x8b, 0x6b, 0x11, 0x88,
+ 0x44, 0xd5, 0x3f, 0x7d, 0x0b, 0xa1, 0x1d, 0xe0, 0xf3,
+ 0xbf, 0xaf, 0x4c, 0xdd, 0x9b, 0x3f, }
+ },
+
+ /* SHAKE128*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[4].outlen = 16, .test[4].data = { 0x24, 0xa7, 0xca,
+ 0x4b, 0x75, 0xe3, 0x89, 0x8d, 0x4f, 0x12, 0xe7, 0x4d,
+ 0xea, 0x8c, 0xbb, 0x65 }
+ },
+
+ /* SHAKE256*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[4].outlen = 32, .test[4].data = { 0xf5, 0x97, 0x7c,
+ 0x82, 0x83, 0x54, 0x6a, 0x63, 0x72, 0x3b, 0xc3, 0x1d,
+ 0x26, 0x19, 0x12, 0x4f,
+ 0x11, 0xdb, 0x46, 0x58, 0x64, 0x33, 0x36, 0x74, 0x1d,
+ 0xf8, 0x17, 0x57, 0xd5, 0xad, 0x30, 0x62 }
+ },
+
+ /* CSHAKE128*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 16, .test[1].data = { 0xe0, 0x6f, 0xd8,
+ 0x50, 0x57, 0x6f, 0xe4, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0x13, 0x42, 0xb5,
+ 0xf8, 0x13, 0xeb, 0x23 }
+ },
+
+ /* CSHAKE256*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 32, .test[1].data = { 0xf3, 0xf2, 0xb5,
+ 0x47, 0xf2, 0x16, 0xba, 0x6f, 0x49, 0x83, 0x3e, 0xad,
+ 0x1e, 0x46, 0x85, 0x54,
+ 0xd0, 0xd7, 0xf9, 0xc6, 0x7e, 0xe9, 0x27, 0xc6, 0xc3,
+ 0xc3, 0xdb, 0x91, 0xdb, 0x97, 0x04, 0x0f }
+ },
+
+ /* KMAC128*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 16, .test[1].data = { 0x6c, 0x3f, 0x29,
+ 0xfe, 0x01, 0x96, 0x59, 0x36, 0xb7, 0xae, 0xb7, 0xff,
+ 0x71, 0xe0, 0x3d, 0xff },
+ .test[4].outlen = 16, .test[4].data = { 0x58, 0xd9, 0x8d,
+ 0xe8, 0x1f, 0x64, 0xb4, 0xa3, 0x9f, 0x63, 0xaf, 0x21,
+ 0x99, 0x03, 0x97, 0x06 },
+ .test[5].outlen = 16, .test[5].data = { 0xf8, 0xf9, 0xb7,
+ 0xa4, 0x05, 0x3d, 0x90, 0x7c, 0xf2, 0xa1, 0x7c, 0x34,
+ 0x39, 0xc2, 0x87, 0x4b },
+ .test[6].outlen = 16, .test[6].data = { 0xef, 0x4a, 0xd5,
+ 0x1d, 0xd7, 0x83, 0x56, 0xd3, 0xa8, 0x3c, 0xf5, 0xf8,
+ 0xd1, 0x12, 0xf4, 0x44 }
+ },
+
+ /* KMAC256*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 32, .test[1].data = { 0x0d, 0x86, 0xfa,
+ 0x92, 0x92, 0xe4, 0x77, 0x24, 0x6a, 0xcc, 0x79, 0xa0,
+ 0x1e, 0xb4, 0xc3, 0xac,
+ 0xfc, 0x56, 0xbc, 0x63, 0xcc, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0xf6, 0xc8,
+ 0x99, 0xa5, 0x3a, 0x38, 0x14, 0xa2, 0x40 },
+ .test[4].outlen = 32, .test[4].data = { 0xad, 0x99, 0xed,
+ 0x20, 0x1f, 0xbe, 0x45, 0x07, 0x3d, 0xf4, 0xae, 0x9f,
+ 0xc2, 0xd8, 0x06, 0x18,
+ 0x31, 0x4e, 0x8c, 0xb6, 0x33, 0xe8, 0x31, 0x36, 0x00,
+ 0xdd, 0x42, 0x20, 0xda, 0x2b, 0xd5, 0x2b },
+ .test[5].outlen = 32, .test[5].data = { 0xf9, 0xc6, 0x2b,
+ 0x17, 0xa0, 0x04, 0xd9, 0xf2, 0x6c, 0xbf, 0x5d, 0xa5,
+ 0x9a, 0xd7, 0x36, 0x1d,
+ 0xad, 0x66, 0x6b, 0x3d, 0xb1, 0x52, 0xd3, 0x81, 0x39,
+ 0x20, 0xd4, 0xf0, 0x43, 0x72, 0x2c, 0xb7 },
+ .test[6].outlen = 32, .test[6].data = { 0xcc, 0x89, 0xe4,
+ 0x05, 0x58, 0x77, 0x38, 0x8b, 0x18, 0xa0, 0x7c, 0x8d,
+ 0x20, 0x99, 0xea, 0x6e,
+ 0x6b, 0xe9, 0xf7, 0x0c, 0xe1, 0xe5, 0xce, 0xbc, 0x55,
+ 0x4c, 0x80, 0xa5, 0xdc, 0xae, 0xf7, 0x94 }
+ },
+
+ /* KMAC128XOF*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 16, .test[1].data = { 0x84, 0x07, 0x89,
+ 0x29, 0xa7, 0xf4, 0x98, 0x91, 0xf5, 0x64, 0x61, 0x8d,
+ 0xa5, 0x93, 0x00, 0x31 },
+ .test[4].outlen = 16, .test[4].data = { 0xf0, 0xa4, 0x1b,
+ 0x98, 0x0f, 0xb3, 0xf2, 0xbd, 0xc3, 0xfc, 0x64, 0x1f,
+ 0x73, 0x1f, 0xd4, 0x74 },
+ .test[5].outlen = 16, .test[5].data = { 0xa5, 0xc5, 0xad,
+ 0x25, 0x59, 0xf1, 0x5d, 0xea, 0x5b, 0x18, 0x0a, 0x52,
+ 0xce, 0x6c, 0xc0, 0x88 },
+ .test[6].outlen = 16, .test[6].data = { 0x1a, 0x81, 0xdd,
+ 0x81, 0x47, 0x89, 0xf4, 0x15, 0xcc, 0x18, 0x05, 0x81,
+ 0xe3, 0x95, 0x21, 0xc3 }
+ },
+
+ /* KMAC256XOF*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 32, .test[1].data = { 0xff, 0x85, 0xe9,
+ 0x61, 0x67, 0x96, 0x35, 0x58, 0x33, 0x38, 0x2c, 0xe8,
+ 0x25, 0x77, 0xbe, 0x63,
+ 0xd5, 0x2c, 0xa7, 0xef, 0xce, 0x9b, 0x63, 0x71, 0xb2,
+ 0x09, 0x7c, 0xd8, 0x60, 0x4e, 0x5a, 0xfa },
+ .test[4].outlen = 32, .test[4].data = { 0x86, 0x89, 0xc2,
+ 0x4a, 0xe8, 0x18, 0x46, 0x10, 0x6b, 0xf2, 0x09, 0xd7,
+ 0x37, 0x83, 0xab, 0x77,
+ 0xb5, 0xce, 0x7c, 0x96, 0x9c, 0xfa, 0x0f, 0xa0, 0xd8,
+ 0xde, 0xb5, 0xb7, 0xc6, 0xcd, 0xa9, 0x8f },
+ .test[5].outlen = 32, .test[5].data = { 0x4d, 0x71, 0x81,
+ 0x5a, 0x5f, 0xac, 0x3b, 0x29, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0xb6, 0x56,
+ 0xf1, 0x76, 0xcf, 0xdc,
+ 0x51, 0x56, 0xd7, 0x3c, 0x47, 0xec, 0x6d, 0xea, 0xc6,
+ 0x3e, 0x54, 0xe7, 0x6f, 0xdc, 0xe8, 0x39 },
+ .test[6].outlen = 32, .test[6].data = { 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xe1,
+ 0x1e, 0xe7, 0x55, 0x0f, 0x62, 0x71, 0x29, 0xf3, 0x0a,
+ 0xb3, 0x30, 0x68, 0x06,
+ 0xea, 0xec, 0xe4, 0x37, 0x17, 0x37, 0x2d, 0x5d, 0x64,
+ 0x09, 0x70, 0x63, 0x94, 0x80, 0x9b, 0x80 }
+ },
+
+ /* HASH SM3*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 32, .test[1].data = { 0xe0, 0xba, 0xb8,
+ 0xf4, 0xd8, 0x17, 0x2b, 0xa2, 0x45, 0x19, 0x0d, 0x13,
+ 0xc9, 0x41, 0x17, 0xe9,
+ 0x3b, 0x82, 0x16, 0x6c, 0x25, 0xb2, 0xb6, 0x98, 0x83,
+ 0x35, 0x0c, 0x19, 0x2c, 0x90, 0x51, 0x40 },
+ .test[4].outlen = 32, .test[4].data = { 0xe0, 0xba, 0xb8,
+ 0xf4, 0xd8, 0x17, 0x2b, 0xa2, 0x45, 0x19, 0x0d, 0x13,
+ 0xc9, 0x41, 0x17, 0xe9,
+ 0x3b, 0x82, 0x16, 0x6c, 0x25, 0xb2, 0xb6, 0x98, 0x83,
+ 0x35, 0x0c, 0x19, 0x2c, 0x90, 0x51, 0x40 },
+ .test[5].outlen = 32, .test[5].data = { 0xe0, 0xba, 0xb8,
+ 0xf4, 0xd8, 0x17, 0x2b, 0xa2, 0x45, 0x19, 0x0d, 0x13,
+ 0xc9, 0x41, 0x17, 0xe9,
+ 0x3b, 0x82, 0x16, 0x6c, 0x25, 0xb2, 0xb6, 0x98, 0x83,
+ 0x35, 0x0c, 0x19, 0x2c, 0x90, 0x51, 0x40 },
+ .test[6].outlen = 32, .test[6].data = { 0xe0, 0xba, 0xb8,
+ 0xf4, 0xd8, 0x17, 0x2b, 0xa2, 0x45, 0x19, 0x0d, 0x13,
+ 0xc9, 0x41, 0x17, 0xe9,
+ 0x3b, 0x82, 0x16, 0x6c, 0x25, 0xb2, 0xb6, 0x98, 0x83,
+ 0x35, 0x0c, 0x19, 0x2c, 0x90, 0x51, 0x40 }
+ },
+
+ /* HMAC SM3*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 32, .test[1].data = { 0x68, 0xf0, 0x65,
+ 0xd8, 0xd8, 0xc9, 0xc2, 0x0e, 0x10, 0xfd, 0x52, 0x7c,
+ 0xf2, 0xd7, 0x42, 0xd3,
+ 0x08, 0x44, 0x22, 0xbc, 0xf0, 0x9d, 0xcc, 0x34, 0x7b,
+ 0x76, 0x13, 0x91, 0xba, 0xce, 0x4d, 0x17 },
+ .test[4].outlen = 32, .test[4].data = { 0xd8, 0xab, 0x2a,
+ 0x7b, 0x56, 0x21, 0xb1, 0x59, 0x64, 0xb2, 0xa3, 0xd6,
+ 0x72, 0xb3, 0x95, 0x81,
+ 0xa0, 0xcd, 0x96, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xbc, 0x8c, 0x16, 0x5b,
+ 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x2f, 0x71, 0x3f, 0x23, 0x19},
+ .test[5].outlen = 32, .test[5].data = { 0xa0, 0xd1, 0xd5,
+ 0xa0, 0x9e, 0x4c, 0xca, 0x8c, 0x7b, 0xe0, 0x8f, 0x70,
+ 0x92, 0x2e, 0x3f, 0x4c,
+ 0xa0, 0xca, 0xef, 0xa1, 0x86, 0x9d, 0xb2, 0xe1, 0xc5,
+ 0xfa, 0x9d, 0xfa, 0xbc, 0x11, 0xcb, 0x1f },
+ .test[6].outlen = 32, .test[6].data = { 0xa0, 0xd1, 0xd5,
+ 0xa0, 0x9e, 0x4c, 0xca, 0x8c, 0x7b, 0xe0, 0x8f, 0x70,
+ 0x92, 0x2e, 0x3f, 0x4c,
+ 0xa0, 0xca, 0xef, 0xa1, 0x86, 0x9d, 0xb2, 0xe1, 0xc5,
+ 0xfa, 0x9d, 0xfa, 0xbc, 0x11, 0xcb, 0x1f}
+ },
+
+ /* MAC_SM4_XCBC*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 16, .test[1].data = { 0x69, 0xaf, 0x45,
+ 0xe6, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x71, 0x7e, 0x44, 0x6c, 0xfe, 0x68,
+ 0xd4, 0xfe, 0x20, 0x8b },
+ .test[4].outlen = 16, .test[4].data = { 0x69, 0xaf, 0x45,
+ 0xe6, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x71, 0x7e, 0x44, 0x6c, 0xfe, 0x68,
+ 0xd4, 0xfe, 0x20, 0x8b },
+ .test[5].outlen = 16, .test[5].data = { 0x69, 0xaf, 0x45,
+ 0xe6, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x71, 0x7e, 0x44, 0x6c, 0xfe, 0x68,
+ 0xd4, 0xfe, 0x20, 0x8b },
+ .test[6].outlen = 16, .test[6].data = { 0x69, 0xaf, 0x45,
+ 0xe6, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x71, 0x7e, 0x44, 0x6c, 0xfe, 0x68,
+ 0xd4, 0xfe, 0x20, 0x8b }
+ },
+
+ /* MAC_SM4_CMAC*/
+ { .min_version = 0x65,
+ .test[1].outlen = 16, .test[1].data = { 0x36, 0xbe, 0xec,
+ 0x03, 0x9c, 0xc7, 0x0c, 0x28, 0x23, 0xdd, 0x71, 0x8b,
+ 0x3c, 0xbd, 0x7f, 0x37 },
+ .test[4].outlen = 16, .test[4].data = { 0x36, 0xbe, 0xec,
+ 0x03, 0x9c, 0xc7, 0x0c, 0x28, 0x23, 0xdd, 0x71, 0x8b,
+ 0x3c, 0xbd, 0x7f, 0x37 },
+ .test[5].outlen = 16, .test[5].data = { 0x36, 0xbe, 0xec,
+ 0x03, 0x9c, 0xc7, 0x0c, 0x28, 0x23, 0xdd, 0x71, 0x8b,
+ 0x3c, 0xbd, 0x7f, 0x37 },
+ .test[6].outlen = 16, .test[6].data = { 0x36, 0xbe, 0xec,
+ 0x03, 0x9c, 0xc7, 0x0c, 0x28, 0x23, 0xdd, 0x71, 0x8b,
+ 0x3c, 0xbd, 0x7f, 0x37 }
+ },
+
+};
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * This hack implements SG chaining in a way that works around some
+ * limitations of Linux -- the generic sg_chain function fails on ARM, and
+ * the scatterwalk_sg_chain function creates chains that cannot be DMA mapped
+ * on x86. So this one is halfway inbetween, and hopefully works in both
+ * environments.
+ *
+ * Unfortunately, if SG debugging is enabled the scatterwalk code will bail
+ * on these chains, but it will otherwise work properly.
+ */
+static inline void spacc_sg_chain(struct scatterlist *sg1, int num,
+ struct scatterlist *sg2)
+{
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_SG));
+ sg_chain(sg1, num, sg2);
+ sg1[num - 1].page_link |= 1;
+}
+
+/* Prepare the SG for DMA mapping. Returns the number of SG entries. */
+static int fixup_sg(struct scatterlist *sg, int nbytes)
+{
+ int sg_nents = 0;
+
+ while (nbytes > 0) {
+ if (sg && sg->length) {
+ ++sg_nents;
+
+ if (sg->length > nbytes)
+ return sg_nents;
+
+ nbytes -= sg->length;
+
+ sg = sg_next(sg);
+ if (!sg)
+ break;
+ /* WARNING: sg->length may be > nbytes */
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The Linux crypto system uses its own SG chaining
+ * method which is slightly incompatible with the
+ * generic SG chaining. In particular, dma_map_sg does
+ * not support this method. Turn them into proper
+ * chained SGs here (which dma_map_sg does
+ * support) as a workaround.
+ */
+ spacc_sg_chain(sg, 1, sg_chain_ptr(sg));
+ sg = sg_chain_ptr(sg);
+ if (!sg)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return sg_nents;
+}
+
+int spacc_sgs_to_ddt(struct device *dev,
+ struct scatterlist *sg1, int len1, int *ents1,
+ struct scatterlist *sg2, int len2, int *ents2,
+ struct scatterlist *sg3, int len3, int *ents3,
+ struct pdu_ddt *ddt, int dma_direction)
+{
+ struct scatterlist *sg_entry, *foo_sg[3];
+ int nents[3], onents[3], tents;
+ int i, j, k, rc, *vents[3];
+ unsigned int foo_len[3];
+
+ foo_sg[0] = sg1; foo_len[0] = len1; vents[0] = ents1;
+ foo_sg[1] = sg2; foo_len[1] = len2; vents[1] = ents2;
+ foo_sg[2] = sg3; foo_len[2] = len3; vents[2] = ents3;
+
+ /* map them all*/
+ tents = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
+ if (foo_sg[j]) {
+ onents[j] = fixup_sg(foo_sg[j], foo_len[j]);
+
+ *vents[j] = nents[j] = dma_map_sg(dev, foo_sg[j],
+ onents[j], dma_direction);
+ tents += nents[j];
+ if (nents[j] <= 0) {
+ for (k = 0; k < j; k++) {
+ if (foo_sg[k])
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, foo_sg[k],
+ nents[k],
+ dma_direction);
+ }
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* require ATOMIC operations */
+ rc = pdu_ddt_init(ddt, tents | 0x80000000);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ for (k = 0; k < 3; k++) {
+ if (foo_sg[k])
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, foo_sg[k], nents[k],
+ dma_direction);
+ }
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
+ if (foo_sg[j]) {
+ for_each_sg(foo_sg[j], sg_entry, nents[j], i) {
+ pdu_ddt_add(ddt, sg_dma_address(sg_entry),
+ min(foo_len[j], sg_dma_len(sg_entry)));
+ foo_len[j] -= sg_dma_len(sg_entry);
+ }
+ dma_sync_sg_for_device(dev, foo_sg[j], nents[j],
+ dma_direction);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return tents;
+}
+
+int modify_scatterlist(struct scatterlist *src, struct scatterlist *dst,
+ char *ppp_buf, int prev_remainder_len, int blk_sz,
+ char *buffer, int nbytes, int final)
+{
+ int err;
+ size_t len = nbytes;
+ int sg_total_len;
+ int remainder_len = (len + prev_remainder_len) % blk_sz;
+
+ buffer = kmalloc(len + prev_remainder_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (prev_remainder_len)
+ memcpy(buffer, ppp_buf, prev_remainder_len);
+
+ if (final) {
+ memset(ppp_buf, '\0', 128);
+ if (final == 1) {
+ sg_set_buf(dst, buffer, prev_remainder_len);
+ err = prev_remainder_len;
+ return err;
+ }
+ err = len + prev_remainder_len;
+ err = sg_copy_to_buffer(src,
+ sg_nents_for_len(src, len),
+ (buffer + prev_remainder_len), len);
+ if (err != len)
+ pr_debug("ERR: Failed to copy scatterlist: err:%d\n",
+ err);
+ sg_set_buf(dst, buffer, len+prev_remainder_len);
+ return len+prev_remainder_len;
+ }
+
+ err = sg_copy_to_buffer(src, sg_nents_for_len(src, len),
+ (buffer + prev_remainder_len), len);
+ if (err != len)
+ pr_debug("Failed to copy scatterlist to buffer\n");
+ if (remainder_len) {
+ memset(ppp_buf, '\0', 128);
+
+ if (len+prev_remainder_len > blk_sz)
+ memcpy(ppp_buf, buffer +
+ (len + prev_remainder_len - remainder_len),
+ remainder_len);
+ else
+ memcpy(ppp_buf, buffer, remainder_len);
+ }
+
+ sg_total_len = (len - remainder_len) + prev_remainder_len;
+ sg_set_buf(dst, buffer, sg_total_len);
+
+ return remainder_len;
+}
+
+int spacc_sg_to_ddt(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sg,
+ int nbytes, struct pdu_ddt *ddt, int dma_direction)
+{
+ struct scatterlist *sg_entry;
+ int nents, orig_nents;
+ int i, rc;
+
+ orig_nents = fixup_sg(sg, nbytes);
+ nents = dma_map_sg(dev, sg, orig_nents, dma_direction);
+
+ if (nents <= 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* require ATOMIC operations */
+ rc = pdu_ddt_init(ddt, nents | 0x80000000);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, sg, orig_nents, dma_direction);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ for_each_sg(sg, sg_entry, nents, i) {
+ pdu_ddt_add(ddt, sg_dma_address(sg_entry),
+ sg_dma_len(sg_entry));
+ }
+
+ dma_sync_sg_for_device(dev, sg, nents, dma_direction);
+
+ return orig_nents;
+}
+
+/*
+ * CTRL.MSG_BEGIN = 1 and CTRL.MSG_END = 1, no partial-packet processing
+ * CTRL.MSG_BEGIN = 1 and CTRL.MSG_END = 0, start of partial-packet processing
+ * CTRL.MSG_BEGIN = 0 and CTRL.MSG_END = 0, middle of partial-packet processing
+ * CTRL.MSG_BEGIN = 0 and CTRL.MSG_END = 1, end of partial-packet processing
+ */
+int spacc_partial_packet(struct spacc_device *spacc, int handle,
+ int packet_stat)
+{
+ int ret = CRYPTO_OK;
+ struct spacc_job *job = NULL;
+
+ if (handle < 0 || handle > SPACC_MAX_JOBS)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ job = &spacc->job[handle];
+ if (!job) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ } else {
+ switch (packet_stat) {
+ case NO_PARTIAL_PCK:
+ job->ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_MSG_BEGIN);
+ job->ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_MSG_END);
+ break;
+
+ case FIRST_PARTIAL_PCK:
+ job->ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_MSG_BEGIN);
+ job->ctrl &= ~SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_MSG_END);
+ break;
+
+ case MIDDLE_PARTIAL_PCK:
+ job->ctrl &= ~SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_MSG_BEGIN);
+ job->ctrl &= ~SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_MSG_END);
+ break;
+
+ case LAST_PARTIAL_PCK:
+ job->ctrl &= ~SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_MSG_BEGIN);
+ job->ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_MSG_END);
+ break;
+
+ default: /* NO_PARTIAL_PCK */
+ job->ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_MSG_BEGIN);
+ job->ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_MSG_END);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int spacc_set_operation(struct spacc_device *spacc, int handle, int op,
+ u32 prot, uint32_t icvcmd, uint32_t icvoff,
+ uint32_t icvsz, uint32_t sec_key)
+{
+ int ret = CRYPTO_OK;
+ struct spacc_job *job = NULL;
+
+ if (handle < 0 || handle > SPACC_MAX_JOBS)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ job = &spacc->job[handle];
+ if (!job) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ } else {
+ if (op == OP_ENCRYPT) {
+ job->op = OP_ENCRYPT;
+ job->ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_ENCRYPT);
+ } else {
+ job->op = OP_DECRYPT;
+ job->ctrl &= ~SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_ENCRYPT);
+ }
+
+ switch (prot) {
+ case ICV_HASH: /* HASH of plaintext */
+ job->ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_ICV_PT);
+ break;
+ case ICV_HASH_ENCRYPT:
+ /* HASH the plaintext and encrypt the lot */
+ /* ICV_PT and ICV_APPEND must be set too */
+ job->ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_ICV_ENC);
+ job->ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_ICV_PT);
+ /* This mode is not valid when BIT_ALIGN != 0 */
+ job->ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_ICV_APPEND);
+ break;
+ case ICV_ENCRYPT_HASH: /* HASH the ciphertext */
+ job->ctrl &= ~SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_ICV_PT);
+ job->ctrl &= ~SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_ICV_ENC);
+ break;
+ case ICV_IGNORE:
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ job->icv_len = icvsz;
+
+ switch (icvcmd) {
+ case IP_ICV_OFFSET:
+ job->icv_offset = icvoff;
+ job->ctrl &= ~SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_ICV_APPEND);
+ break;
+ case IP_ICV_APPEND:
+ job->ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_ICV_APPEND);
+ break;
+ case IP_ICV_IGNORE:
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (sec_key)
+ job->ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_SEC_KEY);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int spacc_set_auxinfo(struct spacc_device *spacc, int jobid,
+ uint32_t direction, uint32_t bitsize)
+{
+ int ret = CRYPTO_OK;
+ struct spacc_job *job;
+
+ if (jobid < 0 || jobid > SPACC_MAX_JOBS)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ job = &spacc->job[jobid];
+ if (!job) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ } else {
+ job->auxinfo_dir = direction;
+ job->auxinfo_bit_align = bitsize;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int _spacc_fifo_full(struct spacc_device *spacc, uint32_t prio)
+{
+ if (spacc->config.is_qos)
+ return readl(spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_FIFO_STAT) &
+ SPACC_FIFO_STAT_CMDX_FULL(prio);
+ else
+ return readl(spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_FIFO_STAT) &
+ SPACC_FIFO_STAT_CMD0_FULL;
+}
+
+/* When proc_sz != 0 it overrides the ddt_len value
+ * defined in the context referenced by 'job_idx'
+ */
+int spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt_ex(struct spacc_device *spacc, int use_jb,
+ int job_idx, struct pdu_ddt *src_ddt,
+ struct pdu_ddt *dst_ddt, u32 proc_sz,
+ uint32_t aad_offset, uint32_t pre_aad_sz,
+ u32 post_aad_sz, uint32_t iv_offset,
+ uint32_t prio)
+{
+ int ret = CRYPTO_OK, proc_len;
+ struct spacc_job *job;
+
+ if (job_idx < 0 || job_idx > SPACC_MAX_JOBS)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ switch (prio) {
+ case SPACC_SW_CTRL_PRIO_MED:
+ if (spacc->config.cmd1_fifo_depth == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case SPACC_SW_CTRL_PRIO_LOW:
+ if (spacc->config.cmd2_fifo_depth == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ job = &spacc->job[job_idx];
+ if (!job) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ } else {
+ /* process any jobs in the jb*/
+ if (use_jb && spacc_process_jb(spacc) != 0)
+ goto fifo_full;
+
+ if (_spacc_fifo_full(spacc, prio)) {
+ if (use_jb)
+ goto fifo_full;
+ else
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+
+ /* compute the length we must process, in decrypt mode
+ * with an ICV (hash, hmac or CCM modes)
+ * we must subtract the icv length from the buffer size
+ */
+ if (proc_sz == SPACC_AUTO_SIZE) {
+ if (job->op == OP_DECRYPT
+ &&
+ (job->hash_mode > 0 ||
+ job->enc_mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
+ job->enc_mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM)
+ &&
+ !(job->ctrl & SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_ICV_ENC))) {
+ proc_len = src_ddt->len - job->icv_len;
+ } else {
+ proc_len = src_ddt->len;
+ }
+ } else {
+ proc_len = proc_sz;
+ }
+
+ if (pre_aad_sz & SPACC_AADCOPY_FLAG) {
+ job->ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_AAD_COPY);
+ pre_aad_sz &= ~(SPACC_AADCOPY_FLAG);
+ } else {
+ job->ctrl &= ~SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_AAD_COPY);
+ }
+
+ job->pre_aad_sz = pre_aad_sz;
+ job->post_aad_sz = post_aad_sz;
+
+ if (spacc->config.dma_type == SPACC_DMA_DDT) {
+ pdu_io_cached_write(spacc->regmap +
+ SPACC_REG_SRC_PTR,
+ (uint32_t)src_ddt->phys,
+ &spacc->cache.src_ptr);
+ pdu_io_cached_write(spacc->regmap +
+ SPACC_REG_DST_PTR,
+ (uint32_t)dst_ddt->phys,
+ &spacc->cache.dst_ptr);
+ } else if (spacc->config.dma_type == SPACC_DMA_LINEAR) {
+ pdu_io_cached_write(spacc->regmap +
+ SPACC_REG_SRC_PTR,
+ (uint32_t)src_ddt->virt[0],
+ &spacc->cache.src_ptr);
+ pdu_io_cached_write(spacc->regmap +
+ SPACC_REG_DST_PTR,
+ (uint32_t)dst_ddt->virt[0],
+ &spacc->cache.dst_ptr);
+ } else {
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ pdu_io_cached_write(spacc->regmap +
+ SPACC_REG_PROC_LEN, proc_len -
+ job->post_aad_sz,
+ &spacc->cache.proc_len);
+ pdu_io_cached_write(spacc->regmap +
+ SPACC_REG_ICV_LEN, job->icv_len,
+ &spacc->cache.icv_len);
+ pdu_io_cached_write(spacc->regmap +
+ SPACC_REG_ICV_OFFSET,
+ job->icv_offset,
+ &spacc->cache.icv_offset);
+ pdu_io_cached_write(spacc->regmap +
+ SPACC_REG_PRE_AAD_LEN,
+ job->pre_aad_sz,
+ &spacc->cache.pre_aad);
+ pdu_io_cached_write(spacc->regmap +
+ SPACC_REG_POST_AAD_LEN,
+ job->post_aad_sz,
+ &spacc->cache.post_aad);
+ pdu_io_cached_write(spacc->regmap +
+ SPACC_REG_IV_OFFSET, iv_offset,
+ &spacc->cache.iv_offset);
+ pdu_io_cached_write(spacc->regmap +
+ SPACC_REG_OFFSET,
+ aad_offset, &spacc->cache.offset);
+ pdu_io_cached_write(spacc->regmap +
+ SPACC_REG_AUX_INFO,
+ AUX_DIR(job->auxinfo_dir) |
+ AUX_BIT_ALIGN(job->auxinfo_bit_align) |
+ AUX_CBC_CS(job->auxinfo_cs_mode),
+ &spacc->cache.aux);
+
+ if (job->first_use == 1) {
+ writel(job->ckey_sz |
+ SPACC_SET_KEY_CTX(job->ctx_idx),
+ spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_KEY_SZ);
+ writel(job->hkey_sz |
+ SPACC_SET_KEY_CTX(job->ctx_idx),
+ spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_KEY_SZ);
+ }
+
+ job->job_swid = spacc->job_next_swid;
+ spacc->job_lookup[job->job_swid] = job_idx;
+ spacc->job_next_swid = (spacc->job_next_swid + 1) %
+ SPACC_MAX_JOBS;
+ writel(SPACC_SW_CTRL_ID_SET(job->job_swid) |
+ SPACC_SW_CTRL_PRIO_SET(prio),
+ spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_SW_CTRL);
+ writel(job->ctrl, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_CTRL);
+
+ /* Clear an expansion key after the first call*/
+ if (job->first_use == 1) {
+ job->first_use = 0;
+ job->ctrl &= ~SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_KEY_EXP);
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ return ret;
+fifo_full:
+ /* try to add a job to the job buffers*/
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ i = spacc->jb_head + 1;
+ if (i == SPACC_MAX_JOB_BUFFERS)
+ i = 0;
+
+ if (i == spacc->jb_tail)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ spacc->job_buffer[spacc->jb_head] = (struct spacc_job_buffer) {
+ .active = 1,
+ .job_idx = job_idx,
+ .src = src_ddt,
+ .dst = dst_ddt,
+ .proc_sz = proc_sz,
+ .aad_offset = aad_offset,
+ .pre_aad_sz = pre_aad_sz,
+ .post_aad_sz = post_aad_sz,
+ .iv_offset = iv_offset,
+ .prio = prio
+ };
+
+ spacc->jb_head = i;
+
+ return CRYPTO_USED_JB;
+ }
+}
+
+int spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(struct spacc_device *spacc, int job_idx,
+ struct pdu_ddt *src_ddt, struct pdu_ddt *dst_ddt,
+ u32 proc_sz, u32 aad_offset, uint32_t pre_aad_sz,
+ uint32_t post_aad_sz, u32 iv_offset, uint32_t prio)
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned long lock_flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&spacc->lock, lock_flags);
+ ret = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt_ex(spacc, 1, job_idx, src_ddt,
+ dst_ddt, proc_sz, aad_offset,
+ pre_aad_sz, post_aad_sz, iv_offset,
+ prio);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&spacc->lock, lock_flags);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static inline uint32_t _spacc_get_stat_cnt(struct spacc_device *spacc)
+{
+ u32 fifo;
+
+ if (spacc->config.is_qos)
+ fifo = SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_CNT_GET_QOS(readl(spacc->regmap +
+ SPACC_REG_FIFO_STAT));
+ else
+ fifo = SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_CNT_GET(readl(spacc->regmap +
+ SPACC_REG_FIFO_STAT));
+
+ return fifo;
+}
+
+static int spacc_pop_packets_ex(struct spacc_device *spacc, int *num_popped,
+ unsigned long *lock_flag)
+{
+ int ret = -EINPROGRESS;
+ struct spacc_job *job = NULL;
+ u32 cmdstat, swid, spacc_errcode = SPACC_OK;
+ int jobs;
+
+ *num_popped = 0;
+
+ while ((jobs = _spacc_get_stat_cnt(spacc))) {
+ while (jobs-- > 0) {
+ /* write the pop register to get the next job */
+ writel(1, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_STAT_POP);
+ cmdstat = readl(spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_STATUS);
+
+ swid = SPACC_STATUS_SW_ID_GET(cmdstat);
+
+ if (spacc->job_lookup[swid] == SPACC_JOB_IDX_UNUSED) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto ERR;
+ }
+
+ /* find the associated job with popped swid */
+ if (swid < 0 || swid >= SPACC_MAX_JOBS)
+ job = NULL;
+ else
+ job = &spacc->job[spacc->job_lookup[swid]];
+
+ if (!job) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto ERR;
+ }
+
+ /* mark job as done */
+ job->job_done = 1;
+ spacc->job_lookup[swid] = SPACC_JOB_IDX_UNUSED;
+ spacc_errcode = SPACC_GET_STATUS_RET_CODE(cmdstat);
+
+ switch (spacc_errcode) {
+ case SPACC_ICVFAIL:
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ break;
+ case SPACC_MEMERR:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case SPACC_BLOCKERR:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case SPACC_SECERR:
+ ret = -EIO;
+ break;
+ case SPACC_OK:
+ ret = CRYPTO_OK;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_debug(" BUG: Hitting default case");
+ }
+
+ job->job_err = ret;
+
+ /*
+ * We're done touching the SPAcc hw, so release the
+ * lock across the job callback. It must be reacquired
+ * before continuing to the next iteration.
+ */
+
+ if (job->cb) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&spacc->lock,
+ *lock_flag);
+ job->cb(spacc, job->cbdata);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&spacc->lock, *lock_flag);
+ }
+
+ (*num_popped)++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!*num_popped)
+ pr_debug(" Failed to pop a single job\n");
+
+ERR:
+ spacc_process_jb(spacc);
+
+ /* reset the WD timer to the original value*/
+ if (spacc->op_mode == SPACC_OP_MODE_WD)
+ spacc_set_wd_count(spacc, spacc->config.wd_timer);
+
+ if (*num_popped && spacc->spacc_notify_jobs)
+ spacc->spacc_notify_jobs(spacc);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int spacc_pop_packets(struct spacc_device *spacc, int *num_popped)
+{
+ unsigned long lock_flag;
+ int err;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&spacc->lock, lock_flag);
+ err = spacc_pop_packets_ex(spacc, num_popped, &lock_flag);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&spacc->lock, lock_flag);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* test if done */
+static int spacc_packet_dequeue(struct spacc_device *spacc, int job_idx)
+{
+ int ret = CRYPTO_OK;
+ struct spacc_job *job = &spacc->job[job_idx];
+ unsigned long lock_flag;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&spacc->lock, lock_flag);
+
+ if (!job && !(job_idx == SPACC_JOB_IDX_UNUSED)) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ } else {
+ if (job->job_done) {
+ job->job_done = 0;
+ ret = job->job_err;
+ } else {
+ ret = -EINPROGRESS;
+ }
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&spacc->lock, lock_flag);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int spacc_isenabled(struct spacc_device *spacc, int mode, int keysize)
+{
+ int x;
+ static const int keysizes[2][7] = {
+ { 5, 8, 16, 24, 32, 0, 0 }, /* cipher key sizes */
+ { 8, 16, 20, 24, 32, 64, 128 }, /* hash key sizes */
+ };
+
+ if (mode < 0 || mode > CRYPTO_MODE_LAST)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* always return true for NULL */
+ if (mode == CRYPTO_MODE_NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (spacc->config.modes[mode] & 128) {
+ return 1;
+
+ } else {
+ if (mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_XTS ||
+ mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_XTS ||
+ mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_F8 ||
+ mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_F8)
+ return 1;
+
+ for (x = 0; x < 6; x++) {
+ if (keysizes[0][x] == keysize) {
+ if (spacc->config.modes[mode] & (1 << x))
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Releases a crypto context back into appropriate module's pool*/
+int spacc_close(struct spacc_device *dev, int handle)
+{
+ return spacc_job_release(dev, handle);
+}
+
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_AUTODETECT)
+static void check_modes(struct spacc_device *spacc, int x, int y, void *virt,
+ char *key, struct pdu_ddt *ddt)
+{
+ int proclen, aadlen, ivsize, h, err, enc, hash;
+
+ if (template[x] & (1 << y)) {
+ /* testing keysizes[y] with algo 'x' which
+ * should match the ENUMs above
+ */
+
+ if (template[x] & 128) {
+ enc = 0;
+ hash = x;
+ } else {
+ enc = x;
+ hash = 0;
+ }
+
+ h = spacc_open(spacc, enc, hash, -1, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ if (h < 0) {
+ spacc->config.modes[x] &= ~(1 << y);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ spacc_set_operation(spacc, h, OP_ENCRYPT, 0, IP_ICV_APPEND, 0,
+ 0, 0);
+
+ /* if this is a hash or mac*/
+ if (template[x] & 128) {
+ switch (x) {
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_CSHAKE128:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_CSHAKE256:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMAC128:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMAC256:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMACXOF128:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMACXOF256:
+ /* special initial bytes to encode
+ * length for cust strings
+ */
+ key[0] = 0x01;
+ key[1] = 0x70;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ spacc_write_context(spacc, h, SPACC_HASH_OPERATION,
+ key, keysizes[1][y] +
+ (x == CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_XCBC ? 32 : 0),
+ key, 16);
+ } else {
+ u32 keysize;
+
+ ivsize = 16;
+ keysize = keysizes[0][y];
+ switch (x) {
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_STREAM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM:
+ ivsize = 16;
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM:
+ ivsize = 12;
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_KASUMI_ECB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_KASUMI_F8:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_CBC:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_ECB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_DES_CBC:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_DES_ECB:
+ ivsize = 8;
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_XTS:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_XTS:
+ keysize <<= 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ spacc_write_context(spacc, h, SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION,
+ key, keysize, key, ivsize);
+ }
+
+ spacc_set_key_exp(spacc, h);
+
+ switch (x) {
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_ZUC_UEA3:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SNOW3G_UEA2:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SNOW3G_UIA2:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_ZUC_UIA3:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_KASUMI_F8:
+ spacc_set_auxinfo(spacc, h, 0, 0);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KASUMI_F9:
+ spacc_set_auxinfo(spacc, h, 0, 8);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ memset(virt, 0, 256);
+
+ /* 16AAD/16PT or 32AAD/0PT depending on
+ * whether we're in a hash or not mode
+ */
+ aadlen = 16;
+ proclen = 32;
+ if (!enc)
+ aadlen += 16;
+
+ switch (x) {
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS1:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS2:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS3:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS1:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS2:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS3:
+ proclen = 31;
+ fallthrough;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_XTS:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_XTS:
+ aadlen = 0;
+ }
+
+ err = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(spacc, h, ddt, ddt, proclen, 0,
+ aadlen, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (err == CRYPTO_OK) {
+ do {
+ err = spacc_packet_dequeue(spacc, h);
+ } while (err == -EINPROGRESS);
+ }
+ if (err != CRYPTO_OK || !testdata[x].test[y].outlen ||
+ memcmp(testdata[x].test[y].data, virt,
+ testdata[x].test[y].outlen)) {
+ spacc->config.modes[x] &= ~(1 << y);
+ }
+ spacc_close(spacc, h);
+ }
+}
+
+int spacc_autodetect(struct spacc_device *spacc)
+{
+ struct pdu_ddt ddt;
+ dma_addr_t dma;
+ void *virt;
+ int x, y;
+ unsigned char key[64];
+
+ /* allocate DMA memory ...*/
+ virt = dma_alloc_coherent(get_ddt_device(), 256, &dma, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!virt)
+ return -2;
+
+ if (pdu_ddt_init(&ddt, 1)) {
+ dma_free_coherent(get_ddt_device(), 256, virt, dma);
+ return -3;
+ }
+
+ pdu_ddt_add(&ddt, dma, 256);
+
+ for (x = 0; x < 64; x++)
+ key[x] = x;
+
+ for (x = 0; x < ARRAY_SIZE(template); x++) {
+ spacc->config.modes[x] = template[x];
+ if (template[x] && spacc->config.version >=
+ testdata[x].min_version) {
+ for (y = 0; y < (ARRAY_SIZE(keysizes[0])); y++)
+ check_modes(spacc, x, y, virt, key, &ddt);
+ }
+ }
+
+ pdu_ddt_free(&ddt);
+ dma_free_coherent(get_ddt_device(), 256, virt, dma);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static void spacc_static_modes(struct spacc_device *spacc, int x, int y)
+{
+ //Disable the algos that as not supported here
+ switch (x) {
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_F8:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CFB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_OFB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_ECB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_CBC:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_CFB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_OFB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_POLY1305:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_CRC32:
+ /* disable the modes */
+ spacc->config.modes[x] &= ~(1 << y);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Algos are enabled */
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+int spacc_static_config(struct spacc_device *spacc)
+{
+
+ int x, y;
+
+ for (x = 0; x < ARRAY_SIZE(template); x++) {
+ spacc->config.modes[x] = template[x];
+
+ for (y = 0; y < (ARRAY_SIZE(keysizes[0])); y++) {
+ /* List static modes */
+ spacc_static_modes(spacc, x, y);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+int spacc_clone_handle(struct spacc_device *spacc, int old_handle, void
+ *cbdata)
+{
+ int new_handle;
+
+ new_handle = spacc_job_request(spacc, spacc->job[old_handle].ctx_idx);
+ if (new_handle < 0)
+ return new_handle;
+
+ spacc->job[new_handle] = spacc->job[old_handle];
+ spacc->job[new_handle].job_used = new_handle;
+ spacc->job[new_handle].cbdata = cbdata;
+
+ return new_handle;
+}
+
+/* Allocates a job for spacc module context and initialize
+ * it with an appropriate type.
+ */
+int spacc_open(struct spacc_device *spacc, int enc, int hash, int ctxid, int
+ secure_mode, spacc_callback cb, void *cbdata)
+{
+ int ret = CRYPTO_OK;
+ int job_idx = 0;
+ struct spacc_job *job = NULL;
+ u32 ctrl = 0;
+
+ job_idx = spacc_job_request(spacc, ctxid);
+ if (job_idx < 0) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ } else {
+ job = &spacc->job[job_idx];
+
+ if (secure_mode && job->ctx_idx > spacc->config.num_sec_ctx) {
+ pr_debug("ERR: For secure contexts");
+ pr_debug("ERR: Job ctx ID is outside allowed range\n");
+ spacc_job_release(spacc, job_idx);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ job->auxinfo_cs_mode = 0;
+ job->auxinfo_bit_align = 0;
+ job->auxinfo_dir = 0;
+ job->icv_len = 0;
+
+ switch (enc) {
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_NULL:
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_ECB:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_AES);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_ECB);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CBC:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_AES);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_CBC);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS1:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_AES);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_CBC);
+ job->auxinfo_cs_mode = 1;
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS2:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_AES);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_CBC);
+ job->auxinfo_cs_mode = 2;
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS3:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_AES);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_CBC);
+ job->auxinfo_cs_mode = 3;
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CFB:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_AES);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_CFB);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_OFB:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_AES);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_OFB);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CTR:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_AES);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_CTR);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_AES);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_CCM);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_AES);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_GCM);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_F8:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_AES);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_F8);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_XTS:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_AES);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_XTS);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_ECB:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_MULTI2);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_ECB);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_CBC:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_MULTI2);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_CBC);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_OFB:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_MULTI2);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_OFB);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_CFB:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_MULTI2);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_CFB);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_CBC:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_DES_CBC:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_DES);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_CBC);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_ECB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_DES_ECB:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_DES);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_ECB);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_KASUMI_ECB:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_KASUMI);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_ECB);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_KASUMI_F8:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_KASUMI);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_F8);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SNOW3G_UEA2:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG,
+ C_SNOW3G_UEA2);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_ECB);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_ZUC_UEA3:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG,
+ C_ZUC_UEA3);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_ECB);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_STREAM:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG,
+ C_CHACHA20);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE,
+ CM_CHACHA_STREAM);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG,
+ C_CHACHA20);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE,
+ CM_CHACHA_AEAD);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_ECB:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_SM4);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_ECB);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CBC:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_SM4);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_CBC);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS1:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_SM4);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_CBC);
+ job->auxinfo_cs_mode = 1;
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS2:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_SM4);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_CBC);
+ job->auxinfo_cs_mode = 2;
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS3:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_SM4);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_CBC);
+ job->auxinfo_cs_mode = 3;
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CFB:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_SM4);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_CFB);
+ break;
+
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_OFB:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_SM4);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_OFB);
+ break;
+
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CTR:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_SM4);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_CTR);
+ break;
+
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_SM4);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_CCM);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_SM4);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_GCM);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_F8:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_SM4);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_F8);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_XTS:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG, C_SM4);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE, CM_XTS);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (hash) {
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_NULL:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_NULL);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA1:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_SHA1);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_HMAC);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_MD5:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_MD5);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_HMAC);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA224:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_SHA224);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_HMAC);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA256:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_SHA256);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_HMAC);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA384:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_SHA384);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_HMAC);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA512:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_SHA512);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_HMAC);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA512_224:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SHA512_224);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_HMAC);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA512_256:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SHA512_256);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_HMAC);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SSLMAC_MD5:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_MD5);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE,
+ HM_SSLMAC);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SSLMAC_SHA1:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_SHA1);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE,
+ HM_SSLMAC);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA1:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_SHA1);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_MD5:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_MD5);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA224:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_SHA224);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA256:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_SHA256);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA384:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_SHA384);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA512:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_SHA512);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA512_224:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SHA512_224);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA512_256:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SHA512_256);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA3_224:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SHA3_224);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA3_256:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SHA3_256);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA3_384:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SHA3_384);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA3_512:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SHA3_512);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHAKE128:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SHAKE128);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE,
+ HM_SHAKE_SHAKE);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHAKE256:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SHAKE256);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE,
+ HM_SHAKE_SHAKE);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_CSHAKE128:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SHAKE128);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE,
+ HM_SHAKE_CSHAKE);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_CSHAKE256:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SHAKE256);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE,
+ HM_SHAKE_CSHAKE);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMAC128:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SHAKE128);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE,
+ HM_SHAKE_KMAC);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMAC256:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SHAKE256);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE,
+ HM_SHAKE_KMAC); break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMACXOF128:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SHAKE128);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE,
+ HM_SHAKE_KMAC);
+ /* auxinfo_dir reused to indicate XOF */
+ job->auxinfo_dir = 1;
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMACXOF256:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SHAKE256);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE,
+ HM_SHAKE_KMAC);
+ /* auxinfo_dir reused to indicate XOF */
+ job->auxinfo_dir = 1;
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_XCBC:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_XCBC);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_CMAC:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_CMAC);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KASUMI_F9:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_KF9);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SNOW3G_UIA2:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SNOW3G_UIA2);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_ZUC_UIA3:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_ZUC_UIA3);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_POLY1305:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_POLY1305);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_CRC32:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_CRC32_I3E802_3);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_MICHAEL:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_MICHAEL);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SM3:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_SM3);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SM3:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG, H_SM3);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_HMAC);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SM4_XCBC:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SM4_XCBC_MAC);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SM4_CMAC:
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ H_SM4_CMAC);
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE, HM_RAW);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_MSG_BEGIN) |
+ SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_MSG_END);
+
+ if (ret != CRYPTO_OK) {
+ spacc_job_release(spacc, job_idx);
+ } else {
+ ret = job_idx;
+ job->first_use = 1;
+ job->enc_mode = enc;
+ job->hash_mode = hash;
+ job->ckey_sz = 0;
+ job->hkey_sz = 0;
+ job->job_done = 0;
+ job->job_swid = 0;
+ job->job_secure = !!secure_mode;
+
+ job->auxinfo_bit_align = 0;
+ job->job_err = -EINPROGRESS;
+ job->ctrl = ctrl |
+ SPACC_CTRL_SET(SPACC_CTRL_CTX_IDX,
+ job->ctx_idx);
+ job->cb = cb;
+ job->cbdata = cbdata;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int spacc_xof_stringsize_autodetect(struct spacc_device *spacc)
+{
+ struct pdu_ddt ddt;
+ dma_addr_t dma;
+ void *virt;
+ int ss, alg, i, stat;
+ unsigned long spacc_ctrl[2] = {0xF400B400, 0xF400D400};
+ unsigned char buf[256];
+ unsigned long buflen, rbuf;
+ unsigned char test_str[6] = {0x01, 0x20, 0x54, 0x45, 0x53, 0x54};
+ unsigned char md[2][16] = {{0xc3, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x88, 0xfa, 0x37, 0x4c,
+ 0x9b, 0x44, 0x74, 0xeb, 0x00, 0x5f, 0xe8, 0xca, 0x25},
+ {0x68, 0x77, 0x04, 0x11, 0xf8, 0xe3, 0xb0, 0x1e, 0x0d, 0xbf,
+ 0x71, 0x6a, 0xe9, 0x87, 0x1a, 0x0d}};
+
+ /* get memory*/
+ virt = dma_alloc_coherent(get_ddt_device(), 256, &dma, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!virt)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ if (pdu_ddt_init(&ddt, 1)) {
+ dma_free_coherent(get_ddt_device(), 256, virt, dma);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ pdu_ddt_add(&ddt, dma, 256);
+
+ /* populate registers for jobs*/
+ writel((uint32_t)ddt.phys, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_SRC_PTR);
+ writel((uint32_t)ddt.phys, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_DST_PTR);
+ writel(16, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_PROC_LEN);
+ writel(16, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_PRE_AAD_LEN);
+ writel(16, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_ICV_LEN);
+ writel(6, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_KEY_SZ);
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_SW_CTRL);
+
+ /* repeat for 2 algorithms, CSHAKE128 and KMAC128*/
+ for (alg = 0; (alg < 2) && (spacc->config.string_size == 0); alg++) {
+ /* repeat for 4 string_size sizes*/
+ for (ss = 0; ss < 4; ss++) {
+ buflen = (32UL << ss);
+ if (buflen > spacc->config.hash_page_size)
+ break;
+
+ /* clear I/O memory*/
+ memset(virt, 0, 256);
+
+ /* clear buf and then insert test string*/
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ memcpy(buf, test_str, sizeof(test_str));
+ memcpy(buf + (buflen >> 1), test_str,
+ sizeof(test_str));
+
+ /*write key context*/
+ pdu_to_dev_s(spacc->regmap + SPACC_CTX_HASH_KEY,
+ buf,
+ spacc->config.hash_page_size >> 2,
+ spacc->config.spacc_endian);
+
+ /*write ctrl*/
+ writel(spacc_ctrl[alg], spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_CTRL);
+
+ /*wait for job complete*/
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
+ rbuf = 0;
+ rbuf = readl(spacc->regmap +
+ SPACC_REG_FIFO_STAT) &
+ SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_EMPTY;
+ if (!rbuf) {
+ /*check result, if it matches,
+ * we have string_size
+ */
+ writel(1, spacc->regmap +
+ SPACC_REG_STAT_POP);
+ rbuf = 0;
+ rbuf = readl(spacc->regmap +
+ SPACC_REG_STATUS);
+ stat = SPACC_GET_STATUS_RET_CODE(rbuf);
+ if ((!memcmp(virt, md[alg], 16)) &&
+ stat == SPACC_OK) {
+ spacc->config.string_size = (16
+ << ss);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* reset registers*/
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_CTRL);
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN);
+ writel(0xFFFFFFFF, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_STAT);
+
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_SRC_PTR);
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_DST_PTR);
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_PROC_LEN);
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_ICV_LEN);
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_PRE_AAD_LEN);
+
+ pdu_ddt_free(&ddt);
+ dma_free_coherent(get_ddt_device(), 256, virt, dma);
+
+ return CRYPTO_OK;
+}
+
+/* free up the memory */
+void spacc_fini(struct spacc_device *spacc)
+{
+ vfree(spacc->ctx);
+ vfree(spacc->job);
+}
+
+int spacc_init(void *baseaddr, struct spacc_device *spacc,
+ struct pdu_info *info)
+{
+ unsigned long id;
+ char version_string[3][16] = { "SPACC", "SPACC-PDU" };
+ char idx_string[2][16] = { "(Normal Port)", "(Secure Port)" };
+ char dma_type_string[4][16] = {"Unknown", "Scattergather", "Linear",
+ "Unknown"};
+
+ if (!baseaddr) {
+ pr_debug("ERR: baseaddr is NULL\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!spacc) {
+ pr_debug("ERR: spacc is NULL\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ memset(spacc, 0, sizeof(*spacc));
+ spin_lock_init(&spacc->lock);
+ spin_lock_init(&spacc->ctx_lock);
+
+ /* assign the baseaddr*/
+ spacc->regmap = baseaddr;
+
+ /* version info*/
+ spacc->config.version = info->spacc_version.version;
+ spacc->config.pdu_version = (info->pdu_config.major << 4) |
+ info->pdu_config.minor;
+ spacc->config.project = info->spacc_version.project;
+ spacc->config.is_pdu = info->spacc_version.is_pdu;
+ spacc->config.is_qos = info->spacc_version.qos;
+
+ /* misc*/
+ spacc->config.is_partial = info->spacc_version.partial;
+ spacc->config.num_ctx = info->spacc_config.num_ctx;
+ spacc->config.ciph_page_size = 1U <<
+ info->spacc_config.ciph_ctx_page_size;
+ spacc->config.hash_page_size = 1U <<
+ info->spacc_config.hash_ctx_page_size;
+ spacc->config.dma_type = info->spacc_config.dma_type;
+ spacc->config.idx = info->spacc_version.vspacc_idx;
+ spacc->config.cmd0_fifo_depth = info->spacc_config.cmd0_fifo_depth;
+ spacc->config.cmd1_fifo_depth = info->spacc_config.cmd1_fifo_depth;
+ spacc->config.cmd2_fifo_depth = info->spacc_config.cmd2_fifo_depth;
+ spacc->config.stat_fifo_depth = info->spacc_config.stat_fifo_depth;
+ spacc->config.fifo_cnt = 1;
+ spacc->config.is_ivimport = info->spacc_version.ivimport;
+
+ /* ctrl register map*/
+ if (spacc->config.version <= 0x4E)
+ spacc->config.ctrl_map = spacc_ctrl_map[SPACC_CTRL_VER_0];
+ else if (spacc->config.version <= 0x60)
+ spacc->config.ctrl_map = spacc_ctrl_map[SPACC_CTRL_VER_1];
+ else
+ spacc->config.ctrl_map = spacc_ctrl_map[SPACC_CTRL_VER_2];
+
+ spacc->job_next_swid = 0;
+ spacc->wdcnt = 0;
+ spacc->config.wd_timer = SPACC_WD_TIMER_INIT;
+
+ /* version 4.10 uses IRQ,
+ * above uses WD and we don't support below 4.00
+ */
+ if (spacc->config.version < 0x40) {
+ pr_debug("ERR: Unsupported SPAcc version\n");
+ return -EIO;
+ } else if (spacc->config.version < 0x4B) {
+ spacc->op_mode = SPACC_OP_MODE_IRQ;
+ } else {
+ spacc->op_mode = SPACC_OP_MODE_WD;
+ }
+
+ /* set threshold and enable irq
+ * on 4.11 and newer cores we can derive this
+ * from the HW reported depths.
+ */
+ if (spacc->config.stat_fifo_depth == 1)
+ spacc->config.ideal_stat_level = 1;
+ else if (spacc->config.stat_fifo_depth <= 4)
+ spacc->config.ideal_stat_level =
+ spacc->config.stat_fifo_depth - 1;
+ else if (spacc->config.stat_fifo_depth <= 8)
+ spacc->config.ideal_stat_level =
+ spacc->config.stat_fifo_depth - 2;
+ else
+ spacc->config.ideal_stat_level =
+ spacc->config.stat_fifo_depth - 4;
+
+ /* determine max PROClen value */
+ writel(0xFFFFFFFF, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_PROC_LEN);
+ spacc->config.max_msg_size = readl(spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_PROC_LEN);
+
+ /* read config info*/
+ if (spacc->config.is_pdu) {
+ pr_debug("PDU:\n");
+ pr_debug(" MAJOR : %u\n", info->pdu_config.major);
+ pr_debug(" MINOR : %u\n", info->pdu_config.minor);
+ }
+
+ id = readl(spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_ID);
+ pr_debug("SPACC ID: (%08lx)\n", (unsigned long)id);
+ pr_debug(" MAJOR : %x\n", info->spacc_version.major);
+ pr_debug(" MINOR : %x\n", info->spacc_version.minor);
+ pr_debug(" QOS : %x\n", info->spacc_version.qos);
+ pr_debug(" IVIMPORT : %x\n", spacc->config.is_ivimport);
+
+ if (spacc->config.version >= 0x48)
+ pr_debug(" TYPE : %lx (%s)\n", SPACC_ID_TYPE(id),
+ version_string[SPACC_ID_TYPE(id) & 3]);
+
+ pr_debug(" AUX : %x\n", info->spacc_version.qos);
+ pr_debug(" IDX : %lx %s\n", SPACC_ID_VIDX(id),
+ spacc->config.is_secure ?
+ (idx_string[spacc->config.is_secure_port & 1]) : "");
+ pr_debug(" PARTIAL : %x\n", info->spacc_version.partial);
+ pr_debug(" PROJECT : %x\n", info->spacc_version.project);
+
+ if (spacc->config.version >= 0x48)
+ id = readl(spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_CONFIG);
+ else
+ id = 0xFFFFFFFF;
+
+ pr_debug("SPACC CFG: (%08lx)\n", id);
+ pr_debug(" CTX CNT : %u\n", info->spacc_config.num_ctx);
+ pr_debug(" VSPACC CNT : %u\n", info->spacc_config.num_vspacc);
+ pr_debug(" CIPH SZ : %-3lu bytes\n", 1UL <<
+ info->spacc_config.ciph_ctx_page_size);
+ pr_debug(" HASH SZ : %-3lu bytes\n", 1UL <<
+ info->spacc_config.hash_ctx_page_size);
+ pr_debug(" DMA TYPE : %u (%s)\n", info->spacc_config.dma_type,
+ dma_type_string[info->spacc_config.dma_type & 3]);
+ pr_debug(" MAX PROCLEN: %lu bytes\n", (unsigned
+ long)spacc->config.max_msg_size);
+ pr_debug(" FIFO CONFIG :\n");
+ pr_debug(" CMD0 DEPTH: %d\n", spacc->config.cmd0_fifo_depth);
+ if (spacc->config.is_qos) {
+ pr_debug(" CMD1 DEPTH: %d\n",
+ spacc->config.cmd1_fifo_depth);
+ pr_debug(" CMD2 DEPTH: %d\n",
+ spacc->config.cmd2_fifo_depth);
+ }
+ pr_debug(" STAT DEPTH: %d\n", spacc->config.stat_fifo_depth);
+
+ if (spacc->config.dma_type == SPACC_DMA_DDT) {
+ writel(0x1234567F, baseaddr + SPACC_REG_DST_PTR);
+ writel(0xDEADBEEF, baseaddr + SPACC_REG_SRC_PTR);
+ if (((readl(baseaddr + SPACC_REG_DST_PTR)) !=
+ (0x1234567F & SPACC_DST_PTR_PTR)) ||
+ ((readl(baseaddr + SPACC_REG_SRC_PTR)) !=
+ (0xDEADBEEF & SPACC_SRC_PTR_PTR))) {
+ pr_debug("ERR: Failed to set pointers\n");
+ goto ERR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* zero the IRQ CTRL/EN register
+ * (to make sure we're in a sane state)
+ */
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_CTRL);
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN);
+ writel(0xFFFFFFFF, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_STAT);
+
+ /* init cache*/
+ memset(&spacc->cache, 0, sizeof(spacc->cache));
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_SRC_PTR);
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_DST_PTR);
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_PROC_LEN);
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_ICV_LEN);
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_ICV_OFFSET);
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_PRE_AAD_LEN);
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_POST_AAD_LEN);
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IV_OFFSET);
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_OFFSET);
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_AUX_INFO);
+
+ spacc->ctx = vmalloc(sizeof(struct spacc_ctx) * spacc->config.num_ctx);
+ if (!spacc->ctx)
+ goto ERR;
+
+ spacc->job = vmalloc(sizeof(struct spacc_job) * SPACC_MAX_JOBS);
+ if (!spacc->job)
+ goto ERR;
+
+ /* initialize job_idx and lookup table */
+ spacc_job_init_all(spacc);
+
+ /* initialize contexts */
+ spacc_ctx_init_all(spacc);
+
+ /* autodetect and set string size setting*/
+ if (spacc->config.version == 0x61 || spacc->config.version >= 0x65)
+ spacc_xof_stringsize_autodetect(spacc);
+
+ return CRYPTO_OK;
+ERR:
+ spacc_fini(spacc);
+ pr_debug("ERR: Crypto Failed\n");
+
+ return -EIO;
+}
+
+/* callback function to initialize tasklet running */
+void spacc_stat_process(struct spacc_device *spacc)
+{
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = container_of(spacc, struct spacc_priv,
+ spacc);
+
+ /* run tasklet to pop jobs off fifo */
+ tasklet_schedule(&priv->pop_jobs);
+}
+
+void spacc_cmd_process(struct spacc_device *spacc, int x)
+{
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = container_of(spacc, struct spacc_priv,
+ spacc);
+
+ /* run tasklet to pop jobs off fifo */
+ tasklet_schedule(&priv->pop_jobs);
+}
+
+void spacc_pop_jobs(unsigned long data)
+{
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = (struct spacc_priv *)data;
+ struct spacc_device *spacc = &priv->spacc;
+ int num = 0;
+
+ /* decrement the WD CNT here since
+ * now we're actually going to respond
+ * to the IRQ completely
+ */
+ if (spacc->wdcnt)
+ --(spacc->wdcnt);
+
+ spacc_pop_packets(spacc, &num);
+}
+
+int spacc_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+{
+ struct spacc_device *spacc;
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
+
+ /* free test vector memory*/
+ spacc = &priv->spacc;
+ spacc_fini(spacc);
+
+ tasklet_kill(&priv->pop_jobs);
+
+ /* devm functions do proper cleanup */
+ pdu_mem_deinit(&pdev->dev);
+ dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "removed!\n");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int spacc_set_key_exp(struct spacc_device *spacc, int job_idx)
+{
+ struct spacc_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+ struct spacc_job *job = NULL;
+
+ if (job_idx < 0 || job_idx > SPACC_MAX_JOBS) {
+ pr_debug("ERR: Invalid Job id specified (out of range)\n");
+ return -ENXIO;
+ }
+
+ job = &spacc->job[job_idx];
+ ctx = context_lookup_by_job(spacc, job_idx);
+
+ if (!ctx) {
+ pr_debug("ERR: Failed to find ctx id\n");
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ job->ctrl |= SPACC_CTRL_MASK(SPACC_CTRL_KEY_EXP);
+
+ return CRYPTO_OK;
+}
+
+int spacc_compute_xcbc_key(struct spacc_device *spacc, int mode_id,
+ int job_idx, const unsigned char *key,
+ int keylen, unsigned char *xcbc_out)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ dma_addr_t bufphys;
+ struct pdu_ddt ddt;
+ int err, i, handle, usecbc, ctx_idx;
+ unsigned char iv[16];
+
+ if (job_idx >= 0 && job_idx < SPACC_MAX_JOBS)
+ ctx_idx = spacc->job[job_idx].ctx_idx;
+ else
+ ctx_idx = -1;
+
+ if (mode_id == CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_XCBC) {
+ /* figure out if we can schedule the key */
+ if (spacc_isenabled(spacc, CRYPTO_MODE_AES_ECB, 16))
+ usecbc = 0;
+ else if (spacc_isenabled(spacc, CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CBC, 16))
+ usecbc = 1;
+ else
+ return -1;
+ } else if (mode_id == CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SM4_XCBC) {
+ /* figure out if we can schedule the key */
+ if (spacc_isenabled(spacc, CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_ECB, 16))
+ usecbc = 0;
+ else if (spacc_isenabled(spacc, CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CBC, 16))
+ usecbc = 1;
+ else
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
+ memset(&ddt, 0, sizeof(ddt));
+
+ buf = dma_alloc_coherent(get_ddt_device(), 64, &bufphys, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ handle = -1;
+
+ /* set to 1111...., 2222...., 333... */
+ for (i = 0; i < 48; i++)
+ buf[i] = (i >> 4) + 1;
+
+ /* build DDT */
+ err = pdu_ddt_init(&ddt, 1);
+ if (err)
+ goto xcbc_err;
+
+ pdu_ddt_add(&ddt, bufphys, 48);
+
+ /* open a handle in either CBC or ECB mode */
+ if (mode_id == CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_XCBC) {
+ handle = spacc_open(spacc, (usecbc ?
+ CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CBC : CRYPTO_MODE_AES_ECB),
+ CRYPTO_MODE_NULL, ctx_idx, 0, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if (handle < 0) {
+ err = handle;
+ goto xcbc_err;
+ }
+ } else if (mode_id == CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SM4_XCBC) {
+ handle = spacc_open(spacc, (usecbc ?
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CBC : CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_ECB),
+ CRYPTO_MODE_NULL, ctx_idx, 0, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if (handle < 0) {
+ err = handle;
+ goto xcbc_err;
+ }
+ }
+ spacc_set_operation(spacc, handle, OP_ENCRYPT, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+
+ if (usecbc) {
+ /* we can do the ECB work in CBC using three
+ * jobs with the IVreset to zero each time
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ spacc_write_context(spacc, handle,
+ SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION, key,
+ keylen, iv, 16);
+ err = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(spacc, handle, &ddt,
+ &ddt, 16, (i * 16) |
+ ((i * 16) << 16), 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (err != CRYPTO_OK)
+ goto xcbc_err;
+
+ do {
+ err = spacc_packet_dequeue(spacc, handle);
+ } while (err == -EINPROGRESS);
+ if (err != CRYPTO_OK)
+ goto xcbc_err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* do the 48 bytes as a single SPAcc job this is the ideal case
+ * but only possible
+ * if ECB was enabled in the core
+ */
+ spacc_write_context(spacc, handle, SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION,
+ key, keylen, iv, 16);
+ err = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(spacc, handle, &ddt, &ddt, 48,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (err != CRYPTO_OK)
+ goto xcbc_err;
+
+ do {
+ err = spacc_packet_dequeue(spacc, handle);
+ } while (err == -EINPROGRESS);
+ if (err != CRYPTO_OK)
+ goto xcbc_err;
+ }
+
+ /* now we can copy the key*/
+ memcpy(xcbc_out, buf, 48);
+ memset(buf, 0, 64);
+
+xcbc_err:
+ dma_free_coherent(get_ddt_device(), 64, buf, bufphys);
+ pdu_ddt_free(&ddt);
+ if (handle >= 0)
+ spacc_close(spacc, handle);
+
+ if (err)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.h b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3c08eac06531
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.h
@@ -0,0 +1,839 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+
+#ifndef SPACC_CORE_H_
+#define SPACC_CORE_H_
+
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+#include <linux/of_device.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include "spacc_hal.h"
+
+enum {
+ SPACC_DMA_UNDEF = 0,
+ SPACC_DMA_DDT = 1,
+ SPACC_DMA_LINEAR = 2
+};
+
+enum {
+ SPACC_OP_MODE_IRQ = 0,
+ SPACC_OP_MODE_WD = 1 /* watchdog */
+};
+
+#define OP_ENCRYPT 0
+#define OP_DECRYPT 1
+
+#define SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION 1
+#define SPACC_HASH_OPERATION 2
+
+#define SPACC_AADCOPY_FLAG 0x80000000
+
+#define SPACC_AUTO_SIZE (-1)
+
+#define SPACC_WD_LIMIT 0x80
+#define SPACC_WD_TIMER_INIT 0x40000
+
+/********* Register Offsets **********/
+#define SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN 0x00000L
+#define SPACC_REG_IRQ_STAT 0x00004L
+#define SPACC_REG_IRQ_CTRL 0x00008L
+#define SPACC_REG_FIFO_STAT 0x0000CL
+#define SPACC_REG_SDMA_BRST_SZ 0x00010L
+
+#define SPACC_REG_SRC_PTR 0x00020L
+#define SPACC_REG_DST_PTR 0x00024L
+#define SPACC_REG_OFFSET 0x00028L
+#define SPACC_REG_PRE_AAD_LEN 0x0002CL
+#define SPACC_REG_POST_AAD_LEN 0x00030L
+
+#define SPACC_REG_PROC_LEN 0x00034L
+#define SPACC_REG_ICV_LEN 0x00038L
+#define SPACC_REG_ICV_OFFSET 0x0003CL
+#define SPACC_REG_IV_OFFSET 0x00040L
+
+#define SPACC_REG_SW_CTRL 0x00044L
+#define SPACC_REG_AUX_INFO 0x00048L
+#define SPACC_REG_CTRL 0x0004CL
+
+#define SPACC_REG_STAT_POP 0x00050L
+#define SPACC_REG_STATUS 0x00054L
+
+#define SPACC_REG_STAT_WD_CTRL 0x00080L
+
+#define SPACC_REG_KEY_SZ 0x00100L
+
+#define SPACC_REG_VIRTUAL_RQST 0x00140L
+#define SPACC_REG_VIRTUAL_ALLOC 0x00144L
+#define SPACC_REG_VIRTUAL_PRIO 0x00148L
+
+#define SPACC_REG_ID 0x00180L
+#define SPACC_REG_CONFIG 0x00184L
+#define SPACC_REG_CONFIG2 0x00190L
+
+#define SPACC_REG_SECURE_CTRL 0x001C0L
+#define SPACC_REG_SECURE_RELEASE 0x001C4
+
+#define SPACC_REG_SK_LOAD 0x00200L
+#define SPACC_REG_SK_STAT 0x00204L
+#define SPACC_REG_SK_KEY 0x00240L
+
+#define SPACC_REG_VERSION_EXT_3 0x00194L
+
+/* out 8MB from base of SPACC */
+#define SPACC_REG_SKP 0x800000UL
+
+/********** Context Offsets **********/
+#define SPACC_CTX_CIPH_KEY 0x04000L
+#define SPACC_CTX_HASH_KEY 0x08000L
+
+/******** Sub-Context Offsets ********/
+#define SPACC_CTX_AES_KEY 0x00
+#define SPACC_CTX_AES_IV 0x20
+
+#define SPACC_CTX_DES_KEY 0x08
+#define SPACC_CTX_DES_IV 0x00
+
+/* use these to loop over CMDX macros */
+#define SPACC_CMDX_MAX 1
+#define SPACC_CMDX_MAX_QOS 3
+/********** IRQ_EN Bit Masks **********/
+
+#define _SPACC_IRQ_CMD0 0
+#define _SPACC_IRQ_STAT 4
+#define _SPACC_IRQ_STAT_WD 12
+#define _SPACC_IRQ_GLBL 31
+
+#define SPACC_IRQ_EN_CMD(x) (1UL << _SPACC_IRQ_CMD0 << (x))
+#define SPACC_IRQ_EN_STAT BIT(_SPACC_IRQ_STAT)
+#define SPACC_IRQ_EN_STAT_WD BIT(_SPACC_IRQ_STAT_WD)
+#define SPACC_IRQ_EN_GLBL BIT(_SPACC_IRQ_GLBL)
+
+/********* IRQ_STAT Bitmasks *********/
+
+#define SPACC_IRQ_STAT_CMDX(x) (1UL << _SPACC_IRQ_CMD0 << (x))
+#define SPACC_IRQ_STAT_STAT BIT(_SPACC_IRQ_STAT)
+#define SPACC_IRQ_STAT_STAT_WD BIT(_SPACC_IRQ_STAT_WD)
+
+#define SPACC_IRQ_STAT_CLEAR_STAT(spacc) writel(SPACC_IRQ_STAT_STAT, \
+ (spacc)->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_STAT)
+
+#define SPACC_IRQ_STAT_CLEAR_STAT_WD(spacc) writel(SPACC_IRQ_STAT_STAT_WD, \
+ (spacc)->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_STAT)
+
+#define SPACC_IRQ_STAT_CLEAR_CMDX(spacc, x) writel(SPACC_IRQ_STAT_CMDX(x), \
+ (spacc)->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_STAT)
+
+/********* IRQ_CTRL Bitmasks *********/
+/* CMD0 = 0; for QOS, CMD1 = 8, CMD2 = 16 */
+#define _SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_CMDX_CNT(x) (8 * (x))
+#define SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_CMDX_CNT_SET(x, n) \
+ (((n) & 0xFF) << _SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_CMDX_CNT(x))
+#define SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_CMDX_CNT_MASK(x) \
+ (0xFF << _SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_CMDX_CNT(x))
+
+/* STAT_CNT is at 16 and for QOS at 24 */
+#define _SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_STAT_CNT 16
+#define SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_STAT_CNT_SET(n) ((n) << _SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_STAT_CNT)
+#define SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_STAT_CNT_MASK (0x1FF << _SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_STAT_CNT)
+
+#define _SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_STAT_CNT_QOS 24
+#define SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_STAT_CNT_SET_QOS(n) \
+ ((n) << _SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_STAT_CNT_QOS)
+#define SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_STAT_CNT_MASK_QOS \
+ (0x7F << _SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_STAT_CNT_QOS)
+
+/******** FIFO_STAT Bitmasks *********/
+
+/* SPACC with QOS */
+#define SPACC_FIFO_STAT_CMDX_CNT_MASK(x) \
+ (0x7F << ((x) * 8))
+#define SPACC_FIFO_STAT_CMDX_CNT_GET(x, y) \
+ (((y) & SPACC_FIFO_STAT_CMDX_CNT_MASK(x)) >> ((x) * 8))
+#define SPACC_FIFO_STAT_CMDX_FULL(x) (1UL << (7 + (x) * 8))
+
+#define _SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_CNT_QOS 24
+#define SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_CNT_MASK_QOS \
+ (0x7F << _SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_CNT_QOS)
+#define SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_CNT_GET_QOS(y) \
+ (((y) & \
+ SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_CNT_MASK_QOS) >> _SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_CNT_QOS)
+
+/* SPACC without QOS */
+#define SPACC_FIFO_STAT_CMD0_CNT_MASK (0x1FF)
+#define SPACC_FIFO_STAT_CMD0_CNT_GET(y) ((y) & SPACC_FIFO_STAT_CMD0_CNT_MASK)
+#define _SPACC_FIFO_STAT_CMD0_FULL 15
+#define SPACC_FIFO_STAT_CMD0_FULL BIT(_SPACC_FIFO_STAT_CMD0_FULL)
+
+#define _SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_CNT 16
+#define SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_CNT_MASK (0x1FF << _SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_CNT)
+#define SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_CNT_GET(y) \
+ (((y) & SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_CNT_MASK) >> _SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_CNT)
+
+/* both */
+#define _SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_EMPTY 31
+#define SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_EMPTY BIT(_SPACC_FIFO_STAT_STAT_EMPTY)
+
+/********* SRC/DST_PTR Bitmasks **********/
+
+#define SPACC_SRC_PTR_PTR 0xFFFFFFF8
+#define SPACC_DST_PTR_PTR 0xFFFFFFF8
+
+/********** OFFSET Bitmasks **********/
+
+#define SPACC_OFFSET_SRC_O 0
+#define SPACC_OFFSET_SRC_W 16
+#define SPACC_OFFSET_DST_O 16
+#define SPACC_OFFSET_DST_W 16
+
+#define SPACC_MIN_CHUNK_SIZE 1024
+#define SPACC_MAX_CHUNK_SIZE 16384
+
+/********* PKT_LEN Bitmasks **********/
+
+#ifndef _SPACC_PKT_LEN_PROC_LEN
+#define _SPACC_PKT_LEN_PROC_LEN 0
+#endif
+#ifndef _SPACC_PKT_LEN_AAD_LEN
+#define _SPACC_PKT_LEN_AAD_LEN 16
+#endif
+
+/********* SW_CTRL Bitmasks ***********/
+
+#define _SPACC_SW_CTRL_ID_0 0
+#define SPACC_SW_CTRL_ID_W 8
+#define SPACC_SW_CTRL_ID_MASK (0xFF << _SPACC_SW_CTRL_ID_0)
+#define SPACC_SW_CTRL_ID_GET(y) \
+ (((y) & SPACC_SW_CTRL_ID_MASK) >> _SPACC_SW_CTRL_ID_0)
+#define SPACC_SW_CTRL_ID_SET(id) \
+ (((id) & SPACC_SW_CTRL_ID_MASK) >> _SPACC_SW_CTRL_ID_0)
+
+#define _SPACC_SW_CTRL_PRIO 30
+#define SPACC_SW_CTRL_PRIO_MASK 0x3
+#define SPACC_SW_CTRL_PRIO_SET(prio) \
+ (((prio) & SPACC_SW_CTRL_PRIO_MASK) << _SPACC_SW_CTRL_PRIO)
+
+/* Priorities */
+#define SPACC_SW_CTRL_PRIO_HI 0
+#define SPACC_SW_CTRL_PRIO_MED 1
+#define SPACC_SW_CTRL_PRIO_LOW 2
+
+/*********** SECURE_CTRL bitmasks *********/
+#define _SPACC_SECURE_CTRL_MS_SRC 0
+#define _SPACC_SECURE_CTRL_MS_DST 1
+#define _SPACC_SECURE_CTRL_MS_DDT 2
+#define _SPACC_SECURE_CTRL_LOCK 31
+
+#define SPACC_SECURE_CTRL_MS_SRC BIT(_SPACC_SECURE_CTRL_MS_SRC)
+#define SPACC_SECURE_CTRL_MS_DST BIT(_SPACC_SECURE_CTRL_MS_DST)
+#define SPACC_SECURE_CTRL_MS_DDT BIT(_SPACC_SECURE_CTRL_MS_DDT)
+#define SPACC_SECURE_CTRL_LOCK BIT(_SPACC_SECURE_CTRL_LOCK)
+
+/********* SKP bits **************/
+#define _SPACC_SK_LOAD_CTX_IDX 0
+#define _SPACC_SK_LOAD_ALG 8
+#define _SPACC_SK_LOAD_MODE 12
+#define _SPACC_SK_LOAD_SIZE 16
+#define _SPACC_SK_LOAD_ENC_EN 30
+#define _SPACC_SK_LOAD_DEC_EN 31
+#define _SPACC_SK_STAT_BUSY 0
+
+#define SPACC_SK_LOAD_ENC_EN BIT(_SPACC_SK_LOAD_ENC_EN)
+#define SPACC_SK_LOAD_DEC_EN BIT(_SPACC_SK_LOAD_DEC_EN)
+#define SPACC_SK_STAT_BUSY BIT(_SPACC_SK_STAT_BUSY)
+
+/*********** CTRL Bitmasks ***********/
+/* These CTRL field locations vary with SPACC version
+ * and if they are used, they should be set accordingly
+ */
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG 0
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG 4
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE 8
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE 12
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_MSG_BEGIN 14
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_MSG_END 15
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_CTX_IDX 16
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_ENCRYPT 24
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_AAD_COPY 25
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_ICV_PT 26
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_ICV_ENC 27
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_ICV_APPEND 28
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_KEY_EXP 29
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_SEC_KEY 31
+
+/* CTRL bitmasks for 4.15+ cores */
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG_415 0
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG_415 3
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE_415 8
+#define _SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE_415 12
+
+/********* Virtual Spacc Priority Bitmasks **********/
+#define _SPACC_VPRIO_MODE 0
+#define _SPACC_VPRIO_WEIGHT 8
+
+/********* AUX INFO Bitmasks *********/
+#define _SPACC_AUX_INFO_DIR 0
+#define _SPACC_AUX_INFO_BIT_ALIGN 1
+#define _SPACC_AUX_INFO_CBC_CS 16
+
+/********* STAT_POP Bitmasks *********/
+#define _SPACC_STAT_POP_POP 0
+#define SPACC_STAT_POP_POP BIT(_SPACC_STAT_POP_POP)
+
+/********** STATUS Bitmasks **********/
+#define _SPACC_STATUS_SW_ID 0
+#define _SPACC_STATUS_RET_CODE 24
+#define _SPACC_STATUS_SEC_CMD 31
+#define SPACC_GET_STATUS_RET_CODE(s) \
+ (((s) >> _SPACC_STATUS_RET_CODE) & 0x7)
+
+#define SPACC_STATUS_SW_ID_MASK (0xFF << _SPACC_STATUS_SW_ID)
+#define SPACC_STATUS_SW_ID_GET(y) \
+ (((y) & SPACC_STATUS_SW_ID_MASK) >> _SPACC_STATUS_SW_ID)
+
+/********** KEY_SZ Bitmasks **********/
+#define _SPACC_KEY_SZ_SIZE 0
+#define _SPACC_KEY_SZ_CTX_IDX 8
+#define _SPACC_KEY_SZ_CIPHER 31
+
+#define SPACC_KEY_SZ_CIPHER BIT(_SPACC_KEY_SZ_CIPHER)
+
+#define SPACC_SET_CIPHER_KEY_SZ(z) \
+ (((z) << _SPACC_KEY_SZ_SIZE) | (1UL << _SPACC_KEY_SZ_CIPHER))
+#define SPACC_SET_HASH_KEY_SZ(z) ((z) << _SPACC_KEY_SZ_SIZE)
+#define SPACC_SET_KEY_CTX(ctx) ((ctx) << _SPACC_KEY_SZ_CTX_IDX)
+
+/*****************************************************************************/
+
+#define AUX_DIR(a) ((a) << _SPACC_AUX_INFO_DIR)
+#define AUX_BIT_ALIGN(a) ((a) << _SPACC_AUX_INFO_BIT_ALIGN)
+#define AUX_CBC_CS(a) ((a) << _SPACC_AUX_INFO_CBC_CS)
+
+#define VPRIO_SET(mode, weight) \
+ (((mode) << _SPACC_VPRIO_MODE) | ((weight) << _SPACC_VPRIO_WEIGHT))
+
+#ifndef MAX_DDT_ENTRIES
+/* add one for null at end of list */
+#define MAX_DDT_ENTRIES \
+ ((SPACC_MAX_MSG_MALLOC_SIZE / SPACC_MAX_PARTICLE_SIZE) + 1)
+#endif
+
+#define DDT_ENTRY_SIZE (sizeof(ddt_entry) * MAX_DDT_ENTRIES)
+
+#ifndef SPACC_MAX_JOBS
+#define SPACC_MAX_JOBS BIT(SPACC_SW_CTRL_ID_W)
+#endif
+
+#if SPACC_MAX_JOBS > 256
+# error SPACC_MAX_JOBS cannot exceed 256.
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SPACC_MAX_JOB_BUFFERS
+#define SPACC_MAX_JOB_BUFFERS 192
+#endif
+
+#define CRYPTO_USED_JB 256
+
+/* max DDT particle size */
+#ifndef SPACC_MAX_PARTICLE_SIZE
+#define SPACC_MAX_PARTICLE_SIZE 4096
+#endif
+
+/* max message size from HW configuration */
+/* usually defined in ICD as (2 exponent 16) -1 */
+#ifndef _SPACC_MAX_MSG_MALLOC_SIZE
+#define _SPACC_MAX_MSG_MALLOC_SIZE 16
+#endif
+#define SPACC_MAX_MSG_MALLOC_SIZE BIT(_SPACC_MAX_MSG_MALLOC_SIZE)
+
+#ifndef SPACC_MAX_MSG_SIZE
+#define SPACC_MAX_MSG_SIZE (SPACC_MAX_MSG_MALLOC_SIZE - 1)
+#endif
+
+#define SPACC_LOOP_WAIT 1000000
+#define SPACC_CTR_IV_MAX8 ((u32)0xFF)
+#define SPACC_CTR_IV_MAX16 ((u32)0xFFFF)
+#define SPACC_CTR_IV_MAX32 ((u32)0xFFFFFFFF)
+#define SPACC_CTR_IV_MAX64 ((u64)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* cipher algos */
+enum ecipher {
+ C_NULL = 0,
+ C_DES = 1,
+ C_AES = 2,
+ C_RC4 = 3,
+ C_MULTI2 = 4,
+ C_KASUMI = 5,
+ C_SNOW3G_UEA2 = 6,
+ C_ZUC_UEA3 = 7,
+ C_CHACHA20 = 8,
+ C_SM4 = 9,
+ C_MAX = 10
+};
+
+/* ctrl reg cipher modes */
+enum eciphermode {
+ CM_ECB = 0,
+ CM_CBC = 1,
+ CM_CTR = 2,
+ CM_CCM = 3,
+ CM_GCM = 5,
+ CM_OFB = 7,
+ CM_CFB = 8,
+ CM_F8 = 9,
+ CM_XTS = 10,
+ CM_MAX = 11
+};
+
+enum echachaciphermode {
+ CM_CHACHA_STREAM = 2,
+ CM_CHACHA_AEAD = 5
+};
+
+enum ehash {
+ H_NULL = 0,
+ H_MD5 = 1,
+ H_SHA1 = 2,
+ H_SHA224 = 3,
+ H_SHA256 = 4,
+ H_SHA384 = 5,
+ H_SHA512 = 6,
+ H_XCBC = 7,
+ H_CMAC = 8,
+ H_KF9 = 9,
+ H_SNOW3G_UIA2 = 10,
+ H_CRC32_I3E802_3 = 11,
+ H_ZUC_UIA3 = 12,
+ H_SHA512_224 = 13,
+ H_SHA512_256 = 14,
+ H_MICHAEL = 15,
+ H_SHA3_224 = 16,
+ H_SHA3_256 = 17,
+ H_SHA3_384 = 18,
+ H_SHA3_512 = 19,
+ H_SHAKE128 = 20,
+ H_SHAKE256 = 21,
+ H_POLY1305 = 22,
+ H_SM3 = 23,
+ H_SM4_XCBC_MAC = 24,
+ H_SM4_CMAC = 25,
+ H_MAX = 26
+};
+
+enum ehashmode {
+ HM_RAW = 0,
+ HM_SSLMAC = 1,
+ HM_HMAC = 2,
+ HM_MAX = 3
+};
+
+enum eshakehashmode {
+ HM_SHAKE_SHAKE = 0,
+ HM_SHAKE_CSHAKE = 1,
+ HM_SHAKE_KMAC = 2
+};
+
+enum spacc_ret_code {
+ SPACC_OK = 0,
+ SPACC_ICVFAIL = 1,
+ SPACC_MEMERR = 2,
+ SPACC_BLOCKERR = 3,
+ SPACC_SECERR = 4
+};
+
+enum eicvpos {
+ IP_ICV_OFFSET = 0,
+ IP_ICV_APPEND = 1,
+ IP_ICV_IGNORE = 2,
+ IP_MAX = 3
+};
+
+enum {
+ /* HASH of plaintext */
+ ICV_HASH = 0,
+ /* HASH the plaintext and encrypt the plaintext and ICV */
+ ICV_HASH_ENCRYPT = 1,
+ /* HASH the ciphertext */
+ ICV_ENCRYPT_HASH = 2,
+ ICV_IGNORE = 3,
+ IM_MAX = 4
+};
+
+enum {
+ NO_PARTIAL_PCK = 0,
+ FIRST_PARTIAL_PCK = 1,
+ MIDDLE_PARTIAL_PCK = 2,
+ LAST_PARTIAL_PCK = 3
+};
+
+enum crypto_modes {
+ CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_AES_ECB,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CBC,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CTR,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_AES_F8,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_AES_XTS,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CFB,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_AES_OFB,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS1,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS2,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS3,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_ECB,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_CBC,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_OFB,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_CFB,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_CBC,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_ECB,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_DES_CBC,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_DES_ECB,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_KASUMI_ECB,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_KASUMI_F8,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SNOW3G_UEA2,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_ZUC_UEA3,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_STREAM,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_ECB,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CBC,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CFB,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_OFB,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CTR,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_F8,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_XTS,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS1,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS2,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS3,
+
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_MD5,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_MD5,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA1,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA1,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA224,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA224,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA256,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA256,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA384,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA384,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA512,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA512,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA512_224,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA512_224,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA512_256,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA512_256,
+
+ CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_XCBC,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_CMAC,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KASUMI_F9,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SNOW3G_UIA2,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_ZUC_UIA3,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_POLY1305,
+
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SSLMAC_MD5,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_SSLMAC_SHA1,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_CRC32,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_MICHAEL,
+
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA3_224,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA3_256,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA3_384,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHA3_512,
+
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHAKE128,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SHAKE256,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_CSHAKE128,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_CSHAKE256,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMAC128,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMAC256,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMACXOF128,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMACXOF256,
+
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_SM3,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SM3,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SM4_XCBC,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SM4_CMAC,
+
+ CRYPTO_MODE_LAST
+};
+
+/* job descriptor */
+typedef void (*spacc_callback)(void *spacc_dev, void *data);
+
+struct spacc_job {
+ unsigned long
+ enc_mode,/* Encryption Algorithm mode */
+ hash_mode,/* HASH Algorithm mode */
+ icv_len,
+ icv_offset,
+ op, /* Operation */
+ ctrl,/* CTRL shadow register */
+ /* context just initialized or taken,
+ * and this is the first use.
+ */
+ first_use,
+ pre_aad_sz, post_aad_sz, /* size of AAD for the latest packet*/
+ hkey_sz,
+ ckey_sz;
+
+ /* Direction and bit alignment parameters for the AUX_INFO reg */
+ unsigned int auxinfo_dir, auxinfo_bit_align;
+ unsigned int auxinfo_cs_mode; /* AUX info setting for CBC-CS */
+
+ u32 ctx_idx;
+ unsigned int job_used, job_swid, job_done, job_err, job_secure;
+ spacc_callback cb;
+ void *cbdata;
+
+};
+
+#define SPACC_CTX_IDX_UNUSED 0xFFFFFFFF
+#define SPACC_JOB_IDX_UNUSED 0xFFFFFFFF
+
+struct spacc_ctx {
+ /* Memory context to store cipher keys*/
+ u32 *ciph_key;
+ /* Memory context to store hash keys*/
+ u32 *hash_key;
+ /* reference count of jobs using this context */
+ int ref_cnt;
+ /* number of contexts following related to this one */
+ int ncontig;
+};
+
+#define SPACC_CTRL_MASK(field) \
+ (1UL << spacc->config.ctrl_map[(field)])
+#define SPACC_CTRL_SET(field, value) \
+ ((value) << spacc->config.ctrl_map[(field)])
+
+enum {
+ SPACC_CTRL_VER_0,
+ SPACC_CTRL_VER_1,
+ SPACC_CTRL_VER_2,
+ SPACC_CTRL_VER_SIZE
+};
+
+enum {
+ SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_ALG,
+ SPACC_CTRL_CIPH_MODE,
+ SPACC_CTRL_HASH_ALG,
+ SPACC_CTRL_HASH_MODE,
+ SPACC_CTRL_ENCRYPT,
+ SPACC_CTRL_CTX_IDX,
+ SPACC_CTRL_SEC_KEY,
+ SPACC_CTRL_AAD_COPY,
+ SPACC_CTRL_ICV_PT,
+ SPACC_CTRL_ICV_ENC,
+ SPACC_CTRL_ICV_APPEND,
+ SPACC_CTRL_KEY_EXP,
+ SPACC_CTRL_MSG_BEGIN,
+ SPACC_CTRL_MSG_END,
+ SPACC_CTRL_MAPSIZE
+};
+
+struct spacc_device {
+ void *regmap;
+ int zero_key;
+
+ /* hardware configuration */
+ struct {
+ unsigned int version,
+ pdu_version,
+ project;
+ uint32_t max_msg_size; /* max PROCLEN value */
+
+ unsigned char modes[CRYPTO_MODE_LAST];
+
+ int num_ctx, /* # of contexts */
+ num_sec_ctx, /* # of SKP contexts*/
+ sec_ctx_page_size, /* page size of SKP context in bytes*/
+ ciph_page_size, /* cipher context page size in bytes*/
+ hash_page_size, /* hash context page size in bytes*/
+ string_size,
+ is_qos, /* QOS spacc? */
+ is_pdu, /* PDU spacc? */
+ is_secure,
+ is_secure_port, /* Are we on the secure port? */
+ is_partial, /* Is partial processing enabled? */
+ is_ivimport, /* is ivimport enabled? */
+ dma_type, /* Which type of DMA linear or scattergather */
+ idx, /* Which virtual spacc IDX is this? */
+ priority, /* Weighted priority of the virtual spacc */
+ cmd0_fifo_depth, /* CMD FIFO depths */
+ cmd1_fifo_depth,
+ cmd2_fifo_depth,
+ stat_fifo_depth, /* depth of STATUS FIFO */
+ fifo_cnt,
+ ideal_stat_level,
+ spacc_endian;
+
+ uint32_t wd_timer;
+ u64 oldtimer, timer;
+
+ const u8 *ctrl_map; /* map of ctrl register field offsets */
+ } config;
+
+ struct spacc_job_buffer {
+ int active;
+ int job_idx;
+ struct pdu_ddt *src, *dst;
+ u32 proc_sz, aad_offset, pre_aad_sz,
+ post_aad_sz, iv_offset, prio;
+ } job_buffer[SPACC_MAX_JOB_BUFFERS];
+
+ int jb_head, jb_tail;
+
+ int op_mode, /* operating mode and watchdog functionality */
+ wdcnt; /* number of pending WD IRQs*/
+
+ /* SW_ID value which will be used for next job. */
+ unsigned int job_next_swid;
+
+ struct spacc_ctx *ctx; /* This size changes per configured device */
+ struct spacc_job *job; /* allocate memory for [SPACC_MAX_JOBS]; */
+ int job_lookup[SPACC_MAX_JOBS]; /* correlate SW_ID back to job index */
+
+ spinlock_t lock; /* lock for register access */
+ spinlock_t ctx_lock; /* lock for context manager */
+
+ /* callback functions for IRQ processing */
+ void (*irq_cb_cmdx)(struct spacc_device *spacc, int x);
+ void (*irq_cb_stat)(struct spacc_device *spacc);
+ void (*irq_cb_stat_wd)(struct spacc_device *spacc);
+
+ /* this is called after jobs have been popped off the STATUS FIFO
+ * useful so you can be told when there might be space available in the
+ * CMD FIFO
+ */
+ void (*spacc_notify_jobs)(struct spacc_device *spacc);
+
+ /* cache*/
+ struct {
+ u32 src_ptr,
+ dst_ptr,
+ proc_len,
+ icv_len,
+ icv_offset,
+ pre_aad,
+ post_aad,
+ iv_offset,
+ offset,
+ aux;
+ } cache;
+
+ struct device *dptr;
+};
+
+struct elpspacc_irq_ioctl {
+ u32 spacc_epn, spacc_virt, /* identify which spacc */
+ command, /* what operation */
+ irq_mode,
+ wd_value,
+ stat_value,
+ cmd_value;
+};
+
+enum {
+ SPACC_IRQ_MODE_WD = 1, /* use WD*/
+ SPACC_IRQ_MODE_STEP = 2 /* older use CMD/STAT stepping */
+};
+
+enum {
+ SPACC_IRQ_CMD_GET = 0,
+ SPACC_IRQ_CMD_SET = 1
+};
+
+struct spacc_priv {
+ struct spacc_device spacc;
+ struct semaphore core_running;
+ struct tasklet_struct pop_jobs;
+ spinlock_t hw_lock;
+ unsigned long max_msg_len;
+};
+
+
+int spacc_open(struct spacc_device *spacc, int enc, int hash, int ctx,
+ int secure_mode, spacc_callback cb, void *cbdata);
+int spacc_clone_handle(struct spacc_device *spacc, int old_handle,
+ void *cbdata);
+int spacc_close(struct spacc_device *spacc, int job_idx);
+int spacc_partial_packet(struct spacc_device *spacc, int handle,
+ int packet_stat);
+int spacc_set_operation(struct spacc_device *spacc, int job_idx, int op,
+ u32 prot, uint32_t icvcmd, uint32_t icvoff,
+ uint32_t icvsz, uint32_t sec_key);
+int spacc_set_key_exp(struct spacc_device *spacc, int job_idx);
+
+int spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt_ex(struct spacc_device *spacc, int use_jb,
+ int job_idx, struct pdu_ddt *src_ddt, struct pdu_ddt *dst_ddt,
+ u32 proc_sz, uint32_t aad_offset, uint32_t pre_aad_sz,
+ u32 post_aad_sz, uint32_t iv_offset, uint32_t prio);
+int spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(struct spacc_device *spacc, int job_idx,
+ struct pdu_ddt *src_ddt, struct pdu_ddt *dst_ddt,
+ uint32_t proc_sz, u32 aad_offset, uint32_t pre_aad_sz,
+ uint32_t post_aad_sz, u32 iv_offset, uint32_t prio);
+
+/* IRQ handling functions */
+void spacc_irq_cmdx_enable(struct spacc_device *spacc, int cmdx, int cmdx_cnt);
+void spacc_irq_cmdx_disable(struct spacc_device *spacc, int cmdx);
+void spacc_irq_stat_enable(struct spacc_device *spacc, int stat_cnt);
+void spacc_irq_stat_disable(struct spacc_device *spacc);
+void spacc_irq_stat_wd_enable(struct spacc_device *spacc);
+void spacc_irq_stat_wd_disable(struct spacc_device *spacc);
+void spacc_irq_glbl_enable(struct spacc_device *spacc);
+void spacc_irq_glbl_disable(struct spacc_device *spacc);
+uint32_t spacc_process_irq(struct spacc_device *spacc);
+void spacc_set_wd_count(struct spacc_device *spacc, uint32_t val);
+irqreturn_t spacc_irq_handler(int irq, void *dev);
+int modify_scatterlist(struct scatterlist *src, struct scatterlist *dst,
+ char *ppp_buf, int prev_remainder_len, int blk_sz,
+ char *buffer, int nbytes, int final);
+int spacc_sgs_to_ddt(struct device *dev,
+ struct scatterlist *sg1, int len1, int *ents1,
+ struct scatterlist *sg2, int len2, int *ents2,
+ struct scatterlist *sg3, int len3, int *ents3,
+ struct pdu_ddt *ddt, int dma_direction);
+int spacc_sg_to_ddt(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sg,
+ int nbytes, struct pdu_ddt *ddt, int dma_direction);
+
+/* Context Manager */
+void spacc_ctx_init_all(struct spacc_device *spacc);
+
+/* SPAcc specific manipulation of context memory */
+int spacc_write_context(struct spacc_device *spacc, int job_idx, int op,
+ const unsigned char *key, int ksz,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int ivsz);
+
+int spacc_read_context(struct spacc_device *spacc, int job_idx, int op,
+ unsigned char *key, int ksz, unsigned char *iv,
+ int ivsz);
+
+/* Job Manager */
+void spacc_job_init_all(struct spacc_device *spacc);
+int spacc_job_request(struct spacc_device *dev, int job_idx);
+int spacc_job_release(struct spacc_device *dev, int job_idx);
+int spacc_handle_release(struct spacc_device *spacc, int job_idx);
+
+/* Helper functions */
+struct spacc_ctx *context_lookup_by_job(struct spacc_device *spacc,
+ int job_idx);
+int spacc_isenabled(struct spacc_device *spacc, int mode, int keysize);
+int spacc_compute_xcbc_key(struct spacc_device *spacc, int mode_id,
+ int job_idx, const unsigned char *key,
+ int keylen, unsigned char *xcbc_out);
+
+int spacc_process_jb(struct spacc_device *spacc);
+int spacc_remove(struct platform_device *pdev);
+int spacc_static_config(struct spacc_device *spacc);
+int spacc_autodetect(struct spacc_device *spacc);
+void spacc_pop_jobs(unsigned long data);
+void spacc_fini(struct spacc_device *spacc);
+int spacc_init(void *baseaddr, struct spacc_device *spacc,
+ struct pdu_info *info);
+int spacc_pop_packets(struct spacc_device *spacc, int *num_popped);
+void spacc_stat_process(struct spacc_device *spacc);
+void spacc_cmd_process(struct spacc_device *spacc, int x);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.c b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..404d1341e56f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.c
@@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/of_device.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+#include "spacc_device.h"
+
+static struct platform_device *spacc_pdev[ELP_CAPI_MAX_DEV + 1];
+
+/*VSPACC_PRIORITY.WEIGHT bits 11:8*/
+#define VSPACC_PRIORITY_MAX 15
+
+int spacc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev,
+ const struct of_device_id snps_spacc_id[])
+{
+ void *baseaddr;
+ struct resource *mem;
+ int spacc_priority = -1;
+ int spacc_idx = -1;
+ int spacc_endian = 0;
+ int x = 0, err, oldmode, irq_num;
+ struct spacc_priv *priv;
+ struct pdu_info info;
+ const struct of_device_id *match, *id;
+ u64 oldtimer = 100000, timer = 100000;
+
+ if (pdev->dev.of_node) {
+ id = of_match_node(snps_spacc_id, pdev->dev.of_node);
+ if (!id) {
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "DT node did not match\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize DDT DMA pools based on this device's resources */
+ if (pdu_mem_init(&pdev->dev)) {
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Could not initialize DMA pools\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ match = of_match_device(of_match_ptr(snps_spacc_id), &pdev->dev);
+ if (!match) {
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "SPAcc dtb missing");
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ mem = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
+ if (!mem) {
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "no memory resource for spacc\n");
+ err = -ENXIO;
+ goto free_ddt_mem_pool;
+ }
+
+ priv = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!priv) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_ddt_mem_pool;
+ }
+
+ /* Read spacc priority and index and save inside priv.spacc.config */
+ if (of_property_read_u32(pdev->dev.of_node, "spacc_priority",
+ &spacc_priority)) {
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "No vspacc priority specified\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_ddt_mem_pool;
+ }
+
+ if (spacc_priority < 0 && spacc_priority > VSPACC_PRIORITY_MAX) {
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Invalid vspacc priority\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_ddt_mem_pool;
+ }
+ priv->spacc.config.priority = spacc_priority;
+
+ if (of_property_read_u32(pdev->dev.of_node, "spacc_index",
+ &spacc_idx)) {
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "No vspacc index specified\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_ddt_mem_pool;
+ }
+ priv->spacc.config.idx = spacc_idx;
+
+ if (of_property_read_u32(pdev->dev.of_node, "spacc_endian",
+ &spacc_endian)) {
+ dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "No spacc_endian specified\n");
+ dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "Default spacc Endianness (0==little)\n");
+ spacc_endian = 0;
+ }
+ priv->spacc.config.spacc_endian = spacc_endian;
+
+ if (of_property_read_u64(pdev->dev.of_node, "oldtimer",
+ &oldtimer)) {
+ dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "No oldtimer specified\n");
+ dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "Default oldtimer (100000)\n");
+ oldtimer = 100000;
+ }
+ priv->spacc.config.oldtimer = oldtimer;
+
+ if (of_property_read_u64(pdev->dev.of_node, "timer", &timer)) {
+ dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "No timer specified\n");
+ dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "Default timer (100000)\n");
+ timer = 100000;
+ }
+ priv->spacc.config.timer = timer;
+
+ baseaddr = devm_ioremap_resource(&pdev->dev, mem);
+ if (IS_ERR(baseaddr)) {
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "unable to map iomem\n");
+ err = PTR_ERR(baseaddr);
+ goto free_ddt_mem_pool;
+ }
+
+ pdu_get_version(baseaddr, &info);
+ if (pdev->dev.platform_data) {
+ struct pdu_info *parent_info = pdev->dev.platform_data;
+
+ memcpy(&info.pdu_config, &parent_info->pdu_config,
+ sizeof(info.pdu_config));
+ }
+
+ dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "EPN %04X : virt [%d]\n",
+ info.spacc_version.project,
+ info.spacc_version.vspacc_idx);
+
+ /* Validate virtual spacc index with vspacc count read from
+ * VERSION_EXT.VSPACC_CNT. Thus vspacc count=3, gives valid index 0,1,2
+ */
+ if (spacc_idx != info.spacc_version.vspacc_idx) {
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "DTS vspacc_idx mismatch read value\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_ddt_mem_pool;
+ }
+
+ if (spacc_idx < 0 || spacc_idx > (info.spacc_config.num_vspacc - 1)) {
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Invalid vspacc index specified\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_ddt_mem_pool;
+ }
+
+ err = spacc_init(baseaddr, &priv->spacc, &info);
+ if (err != CRYPTO_OK) {
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to initialize device %d\n", x);
+ err = -ENXIO;
+ goto free_ddt_mem_pool;
+ }
+
+ spin_lock_init(&priv->hw_lock);
+ spacc_irq_glbl_disable(&priv->spacc);
+ tasklet_init(&priv->pop_jobs, spacc_pop_jobs, (unsigned long)priv);
+
+ priv->spacc.dptr = &pdev->dev;
+ platform_set_drvdata(pdev, priv);
+
+ irq_num = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
+ if (irq_num < 0) {
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "no irq resource for spacc\n");
+ err = -ENXIO;
+ goto free_ddt_mem_pool;
+ }
+
+ /* Determine configured maximum message length. */
+ priv->max_msg_len = priv->spacc.config.max_msg_size;
+
+ if (devm_request_irq(&pdev->dev, irq_num, spacc_irq_handler,
+ IRQF_SHARED, dev_name(&pdev->dev),
+ &pdev->dev)) {
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to request IRQ\n");
+ err = -EBUSY;
+ goto err_tasklet_kill;
+ }
+
+ priv->spacc.irq_cb_stat = spacc_stat_process;
+ priv->spacc.irq_cb_cmdx = spacc_cmd_process;
+ oldmode = priv->spacc.op_mode;
+ priv->spacc.op_mode = SPACC_OP_MODE_IRQ;
+
+ spacc_irq_stat_enable(&priv->spacc, 1);
+ spacc_irq_cmdx_enable(&priv->spacc, 0, 1);
+ spacc_irq_stat_wd_disable(&priv->spacc);
+ spacc_irq_glbl_enable(&priv->spacc);
+
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_AUTODETECT)
+ err = spacc_autodetect(&priv->spacc);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ spacc_irq_glbl_disable(&priv->spacc);
+ goto err_tasklet_kill;
+ }
+#else
+ err = spacc_static_config(&priv->spacc);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ spacc_irq_glbl_disable(&priv->spacc);
+ goto err_tasklet_kill;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ priv->spacc.op_mode = oldmode;
+
+ if (priv->spacc.op_mode == SPACC_OP_MODE_IRQ) {
+ priv->spacc.irq_cb_stat = spacc_stat_process;
+ priv->spacc.irq_cb_cmdx = spacc_cmd_process;
+
+ spacc_irq_stat_enable(&priv->spacc, 1);
+ spacc_irq_cmdx_enable(&priv->spacc, 0, 1);
+ spacc_irq_glbl_enable(&priv->spacc);
+ } else {
+ priv->spacc.irq_cb_stat = spacc_stat_process;
+ priv->spacc.irq_cb_stat_wd = spacc_stat_process;
+
+ spacc_irq_stat_enable(&priv->spacc,
+ priv->spacc.config.ideal_stat_level);
+
+ spacc_irq_cmdx_disable(&priv->spacc, 0);
+ spacc_irq_stat_wd_enable(&priv->spacc);
+ spacc_irq_glbl_enable(&priv->spacc);
+
+ /* enable the wd by setting the wd_timer = 100000 */
+ spacc_set_wd_count(&priv->spacc,
+ priv->spacc.config.wd_timer =
+ priv->spacc.config.timer);
+ }
+
+ /* unlock normal*/
+ if (priv->spacc.config.is_secure_port) {
+ u32 t;
+
+ t = readl(baseaddr + SPACC_REG_SECURE_CTRL);
+ t &= ~(1UL << 31);
+ writel(t, baseaddr + SPACC_REG_SECURE_CTRL);
+ }
+
+ /* unlock device by default*/
+ writel(0, baseaddr + SPACC_REG_SECURE_CTRL);
+
+ return err;
+
+err_tasklet_kill:
+ tasklet_kill(&priv->pop_jobs);
+ spacc_fini(&priv->spacc);
+
+free_ddt_mem_pool:
+ pdu_mem_deinit(&pdev->dev);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void spacc_unregister_algs(void)
+{
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_HASH)
+ spacc_unregister_hash_algs();
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_AEAD)
+ spacc_unregister_aead_algs();
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_CIPHER)
+ spacc_unregister_cipher_algs();
+#endif
+}
+
+static const struct of_device_id snps_spacc_id[] = {
+ {.compatible = "snps-dwc-spacc" },
+ { /*sentinel */ }
+};
+
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, snps_spacc_id);
+
+static int spacc_crypto_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = spacc_probe(pdev, snps_spacc_id);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ spacc_pdev[0] = pdev;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_HASH)
+ rc = probe_hashes(pdev);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto err;
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_CIPHER)
+ rc = probe_ciphers(pdev);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto err;
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_AEAD)
+ rc = probe_aeads(pdev);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto err;
+#endif
+
+ return 0;
+err:
+ spacc_unregister_algs();
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int spacc_crypto_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+{
+ spacc_unregister_algs();
+ spacc_remove(pdev);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct platform_driver spacc_driver = {
+ .probe = spacc_crypto_probe,
+ .remove = spacc_crypto_remove,
+ .driver = {
+ .name = "spacc",
+ .of_match_table = of_match_ptr(snps_spacc_id),
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ },
+};
+
+module_platform_driver(spacc_driver);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Synopsys, Inc.");
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.h b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..befbdce7e0ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.h
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef SPACC_DEVICE_H_
+#define SPACC_DEVICE_H_
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/ctr.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <linux/of.h>
+#include "spacc_core.h"
+
+#define MODE_TAB_AEAD(_name, _ciph, _hash, _hashlen, _ivlen, _blocklen) \
+ .name = _name, .aead = { .ciph = _ciph, .hash = _hash }, \
+ .hashlen = _hashlen, .ivlen = _ivlen, .blocklen = _blocklen
+
+/* Helper macros for initializing the hash/cipher tables. */
+#define MODE_TAB_COMMON(_name, _id_name, _blocklen) \
+ .name = _name, .id = CRYPTO_MODE_##_id_name, .blocklen = _blocklen
+
+#define MODE_TAB_HASH(_name, _id_name, _hashlen, _blocklen) \
+ MODE_TAB_COMMON(_name, _id_name, _blocklen), \
+ .hashlen = _hashlen, .testlen = _hashlen
+
+#define MODE_TAB_CIPH(_name, _id_name, _ivlen, _blocklen) \
+ MODE_TAB_COMMON(_name, _id_name, _blocklen), \
+ .ivlen = _ivlen
+
+#define MODE_TAB_HASH_XCBC 0x8000
+
+/* Max # of SPAcc devices to look at in our CAPI driver...*/
+#define ELP_CAPI_MAX_DEV 8
+
+#define SPACC_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64
+#define SPACC_MAX_KEY_SIZE 32
+#define SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE 16
+
+#define SPACC_DMA_ALIGN 4
+#define SPACC_DMA_BOUNDARY 0x10000
+
+/* flag means the IV is computed from setkey and crypt*/
+#define SPACC_MANGLE_IV_FLAG 0x8000
+
+/* we're doing a CTR mangle (for RFC3686/IPsec)*/
+#define SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC3686 0x0100
+
+/* we're doing GCM */
+#define SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4106 0x0200
+
+/* we're doing GMAC */
+#define SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4543 0x0300
+
+/* we're doing CCM */
+#define SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4309 0x0400
+
+/* we're doing SM4 GCM/CCM */
+#define SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC8998 0x0500
+
+#define CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CTR_RFC3686 (CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CTR \
+ | SPACC_MANGLE_IV_FLAG \
+ | SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC3686)
+#define CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM_RFC4106 (CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM \
+ | SPACC_MANGLE_IV_FLAG \
+ | SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4106)
+#define CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM_RFC4543 (CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM \
+ | SPACC_MANGLE_IV_FLAG \
+ | SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4543)
+#define CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 (CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM \
+ | SPACC_MANGLE_IV_FLAG \
+ | SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4309)
+#define CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM_RFC8998 (CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM)
+#define CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM_RFC8998 (CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM)
+
+struct spacc_crypto_ctx {
+ struct device *dev;
+
+ spinlock_t lock;
+ struct list_head jobs;
+ int handle, mode, auth_size, key_len;
+ unsigned char *cipher_key;
+
+ /*
+ * Indicates that the H/W context has been setup and can be used for
+ * crypto; otherwise, the software fallback will be used.
+ */
+ bool ctx_valid;
+ unsigned int flag_ppp;
+
+ /* salt used for rfc3686/givencrypt mode */
+ unsigned char csalt[16];
+ u8 ipad[128] __aligned(sizeof(u32));
+ u8 digest_ctx_buf[128] __aligned(sizeof(u32));
+ u8 ppp_buffer[128] __aligned(sizeof(u32));
+
+ /* Save keylen from setkey */
+ int keylen;
+ u8 key[256];
+ int zero_key;
+ struct scatterlist *ppp_sgl;
+
+ union{
+ struct crypto_ahash *hash;
+ struct crypto_aead *aead;
+ struct crypto_skcipher *cipher;
+ } fb;
+};
+
+struct spacc_crypto_reqctx {
+ struct pdu_ddt src, dst;
+ void *digest_buf, *iv_buf;
+ dma_addr_t digest_dma, iv_dma;
+ int fulliv_nents, ptext_nents, iv_nents, assoc_nents, src_nents,
+ dst_nents;
+ int total_nents, single_shot, small_pck, cur_part_pck, final_part_pck;
+ int encrypt_op, mode;
+ unsigned int head_sg, tail_sg, rem_len, rem_nents, first_ppp_chunk;
+ unsigned int crypt_len;
+
+ struct aead_cb_data {
+ int new_handle;
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx;
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx;
+ struct aead_request *req;
+ struct spacc_device *spacc;
+ } cb;
+
+ struct ahash_cb_data {
+ int new_handle;
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx;
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx;
+ struct ahash_request *req;
+ struct spacc_device *spacc;
+ } acb;
+
+ struct cipher_cb_data {
+ int new_handle;
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx;
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx;
+ struct skcipher_request *req;
+ struct spacc_device *spacc;
+ } ccb;
+
+ /* The fallback request must be the last member of this struct. */
+ union {
+ struct ahash_request hash_req;
+ struct skcipher_request cipher_req;
+ struct aead_request aead_req;
+ } fb;
+};
+
+struct mode_tab {
+ char *name;
+
+ int valid;
+
+ /* mode ID used in hash/cipher mode but not aead*/
+ int id;
+
+ /* ciph/hash mode used in aead */
+ struct {
+ int ciph, hash;
+ } aead;
+
+ unsigned int hashlen, ivlen, blocklen, keylen[3], keylen_mask, testlen,
+ chunksize, walksize, min_keysize, max_keysize;
+
+ bool sw_fb;
+
+ union {
+ unsigned char hash_test[SPACC_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ unsigned char ciph_test[3][2 * SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE];
+ };
+};
+
+struct spacc_alg {
+ struct mode_tab *mode;
+ unsigned int keylen_mask;
+
+ struct device *dev[ELP_CAPI_MAX_DEV + 1];
+
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct crypto_alg *calg;
+ struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
+
+ union {
+ struct ahash_alg hash;
+ struct aead_alg aead;
+ struct skcipher_alg skcipher;
+ } alg;
+};
+
+static inline const struct spacc_alg *spacc_tfm_ahash(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ const struct crypto_alg *calg = tfm->__crt_alg;
+
+ if ((calg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH)
+ return container_of(calg, struct spacc_alg, alg.hash.halg.base);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline const struct spacc_alg *spacc_tfm_skcipher(struct crypto_tfm
+ *tfm)
+{
+ const struct crypto_alg *calg = tfm->__crt_alg;
+
+ if ((calg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) ==
+ CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER)
+ return container_of(calg, struct spacc_alg, alg.skcipher.base);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline const struct spacc_alg *spacc_tfm_aead(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ const struct crypto_alg *calg = tfm->__crt_alg;
+
+ if ((calg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD)
+ return container_of(calg, struct spacc_alg, alg.aead.base);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int probe_hashes(struct platform_device *spacc_pdev);
+int spacc_unregister_hash_algs(void);
+
+int probe_aeads(struct platform_device *spacc_pdev);
+int spacc_unregister_aead_algs(void);
+
+int probe_ciphers(struct platform_device *spacc_pdev);
+int spacc_unregister_cipher_algs(void);
+
+int spacc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev,
+ const struct of_device_id snps_spacc_id[]);
+
+irqreturn_t spacc_irq_handler(int irq, void *dev);
+#endif
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.c b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..87da658f3ac7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/dmapool.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+#include "spacc_hal.h"
+
+static struct dma_pool *ddt_pool, *ddt16_pool, *ddt4_pool;
+static struct device *ddt_device;
+
+#define PDU_REG_SPACC_VERSION 0x00180UL
+#define PDU_REG_SPACC_CONFIG 0x00184UL
+#define PDU_REG_SPACC_CONFIG2 0x00190UL
+#define PDU_REG_SPACC_IV_OFFSET 0x00040UL
+#define PDU_REG_PDU_CONFIG 0x00188UL
+#define PDU_REG_SECURE_LOCK 0x001C0UL
+
+int pdu_get_version(void *dev, struct pdu_info *inf)
+{
+ unsigned long tmp;
+
+ if (!inf)
+ return -1;
+
+ memset(inf, 0, sizeof(*inf));
+ tmp = readl(dev + PDU_REG_SPACC_VERSION);
+
+ /* Read the SPAcc version block this tells us the revision,
+ * project, and a few other feature bits
+ */
+ /* layout for v6.5+ */
+ inf->spacc_version = (struct spacc_version_block) {
+ .minor = SPACC_ID_MINOR(tmp),
+ .major = SPACC_ID_MAJOR(tmp),
+ .version = (SPACC_ID_MAJOR(tmp) << 4) |
+ SPACC_ID_MINOR(tmp),
+ .qos = SPACC_ID_QOS(tmp),
+ .is_spacc = SPACC_ID_TYPE(tmp) == SPACC_TYPE_SPACCQOS,
+ .is_pdu = SPACC_ID_TYPE(tmp) == SPACC_TYPE_PDU,
+ .aux = SPACC_ID_AUX(tmp),
+ .vspacc_idx = SPACC_ID_VIDX(tmp),
+ .partial = SPACC_ID_PARTIAL(tmp),
+ .project = SPACC_ID_PROJECT(tmp),
+ };
+
+ /* try to autodetect */
+ writel(0x80000000, dev + PDU_REG_SPACC_IV_OFFSET);
+
+ if (readl(dev + PDU_REG_SPACC_IV_OFFSET) == 0x80000000)
+ inf->spacc_version.ivimport = 1;
+ else
+ inf->spacc_version.ivimport = 0;
+
+
+ /* Read the SPAcc config block (v6.5+) which tells us how many */
+ /* contexts there are and context page sizes */
+ /* this register only available in v6.5 and up */
+ tmp = readl(dev + PDU_REG_SPACC_CONFIG);
+ inf->spacc_config = (struct
+ spacc_config_block){SPACC_CFG_CTX_CNT(tmp),
+ SPACC_CFG_VSPACC_CNT(tmp),
+ SPACC_CFG_CIPH_CTX_SZ(tmp),
+ SPACC_CFG_HASH_CTX_SZ(tmp),
+ SPACC_CFG_DMA_TYPE(tmp), 0, 0, 0, 0};
+
+ /* CONFIG2 only present in v6.5+ cores */
+ tmp = readl(dev + PDU_REG_SPACC_CONFIG2);
+ if (inf->spacc_version.qos) {
+ inf->spacc_config.cmd0_fifo_depth =
+ SPACC_CFG_CMD0_FIFO_QOS(tmp);
+ inf->spacc_config.cmd1_fifo_depth =
+ SPACC_CFG_CMD1_FIFO(tmp);
+ inf->spacc_config.cmd2_fifo_depth =
+
+ SPACC_CFG_CMD2_FIFO(tmp);
+ inf->spacc_config.stat_fifo_depth =
+ SPACC_CFG_STAT_FIFO_QOS(tmp);
+ } else {
+ inf->spacc_config.cmd0_fifo_depth =
+ SPACC_CFG_CMD0_FIFO(tmp);
+ inf->spacc_config.stat_fifo_depth =
+ SPACC_CFG_STAT_FIFO(tmp);
+ }
+
+ /* only read PDU config if it's actually a PDU engine */
+ if (inf->spacc_version.is_pdu) {
+ tmp = readl(dev + PDU_REG_PDU_CONFIG);
+ inf->pdu_config = (struct pdu_config_block)
+ {SPACC_PDU_CFG_MINOR(tmp),
+ SPACC_PDU_CFG_MAJOR(tmp)};
+
+ /* unlock all cores by default */
+ writel(0, dev + PDU_REG_SECURE_LOCK);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void pdu_to_dev(void *addr_, uint32_t *src, unsigned long nword)
+{
+ unsigned char *addr = addr_;
+
+ while (nword--) {
+ writel(*src++, addr);
+ addr += 4;
+ }
+}
+
+void pdu_from_dev(u32 *dst, void *addr_, unsigned long nword)
+{
+ unsigned char *addr = addr_;
+
+ while (nword--) {
+ *dst++ = readl(addr);
+ addr += 4;
+ }
+}
+
+static void pdu_to_dev_big(void *addr_, const unsigned char *src,
+ unsigned long nword)
+{
+ unsigned char *addr = addr_;
+ unsigned long v;
+
+ while (nword--) {
+ v = 0;
+ v = (v << 8) | ((unsigned long)*src++);
+ v = (v << 8) | ((unsigned long)*src++);
+ v = (v << 8) | ((unsigned long)*src++);
+ v = (v << 8) | ((unsigned long)*src++);
+ writel(v, addr);
+ addr += 4;
+ }
+}
+
+static void pdu_from_dev_big(unsigned char *dst, void *addr_,
+ unsigned long nword)
+{
+ unsigned char *addr = addr_;
+ unsigned long v;
+
+ while (nword--) {
+ v = readl(addr);
+ addr += 4;
+ *dst++ = (v >> 24) & 0xFF; v <<= 8;
+ *dst++ = (v >> 24) & 0xFF; v <<= 8;
+ *dst++ = (v >> 24) & 0xFF; v <<= 8;
+ *dst++ = (v >> 24) & 0xFF; v <<= 8;
+ }
+}
+
+static void pdu_to_dev_little(void *addr_, const unsigned char *src,
+ unsigned long nword)
+{
+ unsigned char *addr = addr_;
+ unsigned long v;
+
+ while (nword--) {
+ v = 0;
+ v = (v >> 8) | ((unsigned long)*src++ << 24UL);
+ v = (v >> 8) | ((unsigned long)*src++ << 24UL);
+ v = (v >> 8) | ((unsigned long)*src++ << 24UL);
+ v = (v >> 8) | ((unsigned long)*src++ << 24UL);
+ writel(v, addr);
+ addr += 4;
+ }
+}
+
+static void pdu_from_dev_little(unsigned char *dst, void *addr_, unsigned long
+ nword)
+{
+ unsigned char *addr = addr_;
+ unsigned long v;
+
+ while (nword--) {
+ v = readl(addr);
+ addr += 4;
+ *dst++ = v & 0xFF; v >>= 8;
+ *dst++ = v & 0xFF; v >>= 8;
+ *dst++ = v & 0xFF; v >>= 8;
+ *dst++ = v & 0xFF; v >>= 8;
+ }
+}
+
+void pdu_to_dev_s(void *addr, const unsigned char *src, unsigned long nword,
+ int endian)
+{
+ if (endian)
+ pdu_to_dev_big(addr, src, nword);
+ else
+ pdu_to_dev_little(addr, src, nword);
+}
+
+void pdu_from_dev_s(unsigned char *dst, void *addr, unsigned long nword, int
+ endian)
+{
+ if (endian)
+ pdu_from_dev_big(dst, addr, nword);
+ else
+ pdu_from_dev_little(dst, addr, nword);
+}
+
+void pdu_io_cached_write(void *addr, unsigned long val, uint32_t *cache)
+{
+ if (*cache == val) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_DEBUG_TRACE_IO
+ pr_debug("PDU: write %.8lx -> %p (cached)\n", val, addr);
+#endif
+ return;
+ }
+
+ *cache = val;
+ writel(val, addr);
+}
+
+struct device *get_ddt_device(void)
+{
+ return ddt_device;
+}
+
+/* Platform specific DDT routines */
+
+/*
+ * create a DMA pool for DDT entries this should help from splitting
+ * pages for DDTs which by default are 520 bytes long meaning we would
+ * otherwise waste 3576 bytes per DDT allocated...
+ * we also maintain a smaller table of 4 entries common for simple jobs
+ * which uses 480 fewer bytes of DMA memory.
+ * and for good measure another table for 16 entries saving 384 bytes
+ */
+int pdu_mem_init(void *device)
+{
+ if (ddt_device) {
+ /* Already setup */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ddt_device = device;
+
+ ddt_pool = dma_pool_create("elpddt", device, (PDU_MAX_DDT + 1) * 8, 8,
+ 0); /* max of 64 DDT entries*/
+
+ if (!ddt_pool)
+ return -1;
+
+#if PDU_MAX_DDT > 16
+ /* max of 16 DDT entries */
+ ddt16_pool = dma_pool_create("elpddt16", device, (16 + 1) * 8, 8, 0);
+ if (!ddt16_pool) {
+ dma_pool_destroy(ddt_pool);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#else
+ ddt16_pool = ddt_pool;
+#endif
+ /* max of 4 DDT entries */
+ ddt4_pool = dma_pool_create("elpddt4", device, (4 + 1) * 8, 8, 0);
+ if (!ddt4_pool) {
+ dma_pool_destroy(ddt_pool);
+#if PDU_MAX_DDT > 16
+ dma_pool_destroy(ddt16_pool);
+#endif
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* destroy the pool */
+void pdu_mem_deinit(void *device)
+{
+ /* For now, just skip deinit except for matching device */
+ if (device != ddt_device)
+ return;
+
+ dma_pool_destroy(ddt_pool);
+
+#if PDU_MAX_DDT > 16
+ dma_pool_destroy(ddt16_pool);
+#endif
+ dma_pool_destroy(ddt4_pool);
+
+ ddt_device = NULL;
+}
+
+int pdu_ddt_init(struct pdu_ddt *ddt, unsigned long limit)
+{
+ /* set the MSB if we want to use an ATOMIC
+ * allocation required for top half processing
+ */
+ int flag = (limit & 0x80000000);
+
+ limit &= 0x7FFFFFFF;
+
+ if (limit + 1 >= SIZE_MAX / 8) {
+ /* Too big to even compute DDT size */
+ return -1;
+ } else if (limit > PDU_MAX_DDT) {
+ size_t len = 8 * ((size_t)limit + 1);
+
+ ddt->virt = dma_alloc_coherent(ddt_device, len, &ddt->phys,
+ flag ? GFP_ATOMIC : GFP_KERNEL);
+ } else if (limit > 16) {
+ ddt->virt = dma_pool_alloc(ddt_pool, flag ? GFP_ATOMIC :
+ GFP_KERNEL, &ddt->phys);
+ } else if (limit > 4) {
+ ddt->virt = dma_pool_alloc(ddt16_pool, flag ? GFP_ATOMIC :
+ GFP_KERNEL, &ddt->phys);
+ } else {
+ ddt->virt = dma_pool_alloc(ddt4_pool, flag ? GFP_ATOMIC :
+ GFP_KERNEL, &ddt->phys);
+ }
+ ddt->idx = 0;
+ ddt->len = 0;
+ ddt->limit = limit;
+
+ if (!ddt->virt)
+ return -1;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_DEBUG_TRACE_DDT
+ pr_debug(" DDT[%.8lx]: allocated %lu fragments\n",
+ (unsigned long)ddt->phys, limit);
+#endif
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int pdu_ddt_add(struct pdu_ddt *ddt, dma_addr_t phys, unsigned long size)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_DEBUG_TRACE_DDT
+ pr_debug(" DDT[%.8lx]: 0x%.8lx size %lu\n",
+ (unsigned long)ddt->phys,
+ (unsigned long)phys, size);
+#endif
+
+ if (ddt->idx == ddt->limit)
+ return -1;
+
+ ddt->virt[ddt->idx * 2 + 0] = (uint32_t)phys;
+ ddt->virt[ddt->idx * 2 + 1] = size;
+ ddt->virt[ddt->idx * 2 + 2] = 0;
+ ddt->virt[ddt->idx * 2 + 3] = 0;
+ ddt->len += size;
+ ++(ddt->idx);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int pdu_ddt_free(struct pdu_ddt *ddt)
+{
+ if (ddt->virt) {
+ if (ddt->limit > PDU_MAX_DDT) {
+ size_t len = 8 * ((size_t)ddt->limit + 1);
+
+ dma_free_coherent(ddt_device, len, ddt->virt,
+ ddt->phys);
+ } else if (ddt->limit > 16) {
+ dma_pool_free(ddt_pool, ddt->virt, ddt->phys);
+ } else if (ddt->limit > 4) {
+ dma_pool_free(ddt16_pool, ddt->virt, ddt->phys);
+ } else {
+ dma_pool_free(ddt4_pool, ddt->virt, ddt->phys);
+ }
+ ddt->virt = NULL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.h b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ce327ba513de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef SPACC_HAL_H
+#define SPACC_HAL_H
+
+/* Maximum number of DDT entries allowed*/
+#ifndef PDU_MAX_DDT
+#define PDU_MAX_DDT 64
+#endif
+
+/* Platform Generic */
+#define PDU_IRQ_EN_GLBL BIT(31)
+#define PDU_IRQ_EN_VSPACC(x) (1UL << (x))
+#define PDU_IRQ_EN_RNG BIT(16)
+
+#ifndef SPACC_ID_MINOR
+ #define SPACC_ID_MINOR(x) ((x) & 0x0F)
+ #define SPACC_ID_MAJOR(x) (((x) >> 4) & 0x0F)
+ #define SPACC_ID_QOS(x) (((x) >> 8) & 0x01)
+ #define SPACC_ID_TYPE(x) (((x) >> 9) & 0x03)
+ #define SPACC_ID_AUX(x) (((x) >> 11) & 0x01)
+ #define SPACC_ID_VIDX(x) (((x) >> 12) & 0x07)
+ #define SPACC_ID_PARTIAL(x) (((x) >> 15) & 0x01)
+ #define SPACC_ID_PROJECT(x) ((x) >> 16)
+
+ #define SPACC_TYPE_SPACCQOS 0
+ #define SPACC_TYPE_PDU 1
+
+ #define SPACC_CFG_CTX_CNT(x) ((x) & 0x7F)
+ #define SPACC_CFG_RC4_CTX_CNT(x) (((x) >> 8) & 0x7F)
+ #define SPACC_CFG_VSPACC_CNT(x) (((x) >> 16) & 0x0F)
+ #define SPACC_CFG_CIPH_CTX_SZ(x) (((x) >> 20) & 0x07)
+ #define SPACC_CFG_HASH_CTX_SZ(x) (((x) >> 24) & 0x0F)
+ #define SPACC_CFG_DMA_TYPE(x) (((x) >> 28) & 0x03)
+
+ #define SPACC_CFG_CMD0_FIFO_QOS(x) (((x) >> 0) & 0x7F)
+ #define SPACC_CFG_CMD0_FIFO(x) (((x) >> 0) & 0x1FF)
+ #define SPACC_CFG_CMD1_FIFO(x) (((x) >> 8) & 0x7F)
+ #define SPACC_CFG_CMD2_FIFO(x) (((x) >> 16) & 0x7F)
+ #define SPACC_CFG_STAT_FIFO_QOS(x) (((x) >> 24) & 0x7F)
+ #define SPACC_CFG_STAT_FIFO(x) (((x) >> 16) & 0x1FF)
+
+ #define SPACC_PDU_CFG_MINOR(x) ((x) & 0x0F)
+ #define SPACC_PDU_CFG_MAJOR(x) (((x) >> 4) & 0x0F)
+
+ #define PDU_SECURE_LOCK_SPACC(x) (x)
+ #define PDU_SECURE_LOCK_CFG BIT(30)
+ #define PDU_SECURE_LOCK_GLBL BIT(31)
+#endif /* SPACC_ID_MINOR */
+
+#define CRYPTO_OK (0)
+
+struct spacc_version_block {
+ unsigned int minor,
+ major,
+ version,
+ qos,
+ is_spacc,
+ is_pdu,
+ aux,
+ vspacc_idx,
+ partial,
+ project,
+ ivimport;
+};
+
+struct spacc_config_block {
+ unsigned int num_ctx,
+ num_vspacc,
+ ciph_ctx_page_size,
+ hash_ctx_page_size,
+ dma_type,
+ cmd0_fifo_depth,
+ cmd1_fifo_depth,
+ cmd2_fifo_depth,
+ stat_fifo_depth;
+};
+
+struct pdu_config_block {
+ unsigned int minor,
+ major;
+};
+
+struct pdu_info {
+ u32 clockrate;
+ struct spacc_version_block spacc_version;
+ struct spacc_config_block spacc_config;
+ struct pdu_config_block pdu_config;
+};
+
+struct pdu_ddt {
+ dma_addr_t phys;
+ u32 *virt; //PK: lets make these to 64 bit pointers
+ u32 *virt_orig;
+ unsigned long idx, limit, len;
+};
+
+void pdu_io_cached_write(void *addr, unsigned long val, uint32_t *cache);
+void pdu_to_dev(void *addr, uint32_t *src, unsigned long nword);
+void pdu_from_dev(u32 *dst, void *addr, unsigned long nword);
+void pdu_from_dev_s(unsigned char *dst, void *addr, unsigned long nword,
+ int endian);
+void pdu_to_dev_s(void *addr, const unsigned char *src, unsigned long nword,
+ int endian);
+struct device *get_ddt_device(void);
+int pdu_mem_init(void *device);
+void pdu_mem_deinit(void *device);
+int pdu_ddt_init(struct pdu_ddt *ddt, unsigned long limit);
+int pdu_ddt_add(struct pdu_ddt *ddt, dma_addr_t phys, unsigned long size);
+int pdu_ddt_free(struct pdu_ddt *ddt);
+int pdu_get_version(void *dev, struct pdu_info *inf);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_interrupt.c b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_interrupt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5025a224fa88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_interrupt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+#include "spacc_core.h"
+
+/* Read the IRQ status register and process as needed */
+
+
+void spacc_disable_int (struct spacc_device *spacc);
+
+uint32_t spacc_process_irq(struct spacc_device *spacc)
+{
+ u32 temp;
+ int x, cmd_max;
+ unsigned long lock_flag;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&spacc->lock, lock_flag);
+
+ temp = readl(spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_STAT);
+
+ /* clear interrupt pin and run registered callback */
+ if (temp & SPACC_IRQ_STAT_STAT) {
+ SPACC_IRQ_STAT_CLEAR_STAT(spacc);
+ if (spacc->op_mode == SPACC_OP_MODE_IRQ) {
+ spacc->config.fifo_cnt <<= 2;
+ if (spacc->config.fifo_cnt >=
+ spacc->config.stat_fifo_depth)
+ spacc->config.fifo_cnt =
+ spacc->config.stat_fifo_depth;
+
+ /* update fifo count to allow more stati to pile up*/
+ spacc_irq_stat_enable(spacc, spacc->config.fifo_cnt);
+ /* reenable CMD0 empty interrupt*/
+ spacc_irq_cmdx_enable(spacc, 0, 0);
+ } else if (spacc->op_mode == SPACC_OP_MODE_WD) {
+ }
+ if (spacc->irq_cb_stat)
+ spacc->irq_cb_stat(spacc);
+ }
+
+ /* Watchdog IRQ */
+ if (spacc->op_mode == SPACC_OP_MODE_WD) {
+ if (temp & SPACC_IRQ_STAT_STAT_WD) {
+ if (++spacc->wdcnt == SPACC_WD_LIMIT) {
+ /* this happens when you get too many IRQs that
+ * go unanswered
+ */
+ spacc_irq_stat_wd_disable(spacc);
+ /* we set the STAT CNT to 1 so that every job
+ * generates an IRQ now
+ */
+ spacc_irq_stat_enable(spacc, 1);
+ spacc->op_mode = SPACC_OP_MODE_IRQ;
+ } else if (spacc->config.wd_timer < (0xFFFFFFUL >> 4)) {
+ /* if the timer isn't too high lets bump it up
+ * a bit so as to give the IRQ a chance to
+ * reply
+ */
+ spacc_set_wd_count(spacc,
+ spacc->config.wd_timer << 4);
+ }
+
+ SPACC_IRQ_STAT_CLEAR_STAT_WD(spacc);
+ if (spacc->irq_cb_stat_wd)
+ spacc->irq_cb_stat_wd(spacc);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (spacc->op_mode == SPACC_OP_MODE_IRQ) {
+ cmd_max = (spacc->config.is_qos ? SPACC_CMDX_MAX_QOS :
+ SPACC_CMDX_MAX);
+ for (x = 0; x < cmd_max; x++) {
+ if (temp & SPACC_IRQ_STAT_CMDX(x)) {
+ spacc->config.fifo_cnt = 1;
+ /* disable CMD0 interrupt since STAT=1 */
+ spacc_irq_cmdx_disable(spacc, x);
+ spacc_irq_stat_enable(spacc,
+ spacc->config.fifo_cnt);
+
+ SPACC_IRQ_STAT_CLEAR_CMDX(spacc, x);
+ /* run registered callback */
+ if (spacc->irq_cb_cmdx)
+ spacc->irq_cb_cmdx(spacc, x);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&spacc->lock, lock_flag);
+
+ return temp;
+}
+
+void spacc_set_wd_count(struct spacc_device *spacc, uint32_t val)
+{
+ writel(val, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_STAT_WD_CTRL);
+}
+
+/* cmdx and cmdx_cnt depend on HW config */
+/* cmdx can be 0, 1 or 2 */
+/* cmdx_cnt must be 2^6 or less */
+void spacc_irq_cmdx_enable(struct spacc_device *spacc, int cmdx, int cmdx_cnt)
+{
+ u32 temp;
+
+ /* read the reg, clear the bit range and set the new value */
+ temp = readl(spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_CTRL) &
+ (~SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_CMDX_CNT_MASK(cmdx));
+ temp |= SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_CMDX_CNT_SET(cmdx, cmdx_cnt);
+ writel(temp | SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_CMDX_CNT_SET(cmdx, cmdx_cnt),
+ spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_CTRL);
+
+ writel(readl(spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN) |
+ SPACC_IRQ_EN_CMD(cmdx),
+ spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN);
+}
+
+void spacc_irq_cmdx_disable(struct spacc_device *spacc, int cmdx)
+{
+ writel(readl(spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN) &
+ (~SPACC_IRQ_EN_CMD(cmdx)),
+ spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN);
+}
+
+void spacc_irq_stat_enable(struct spacc_device *spacc, int stat_cnt)
+{
+ u32 temp;
+
+ temp = readl(spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_CTRL);
+ if (spacc->config.is_qos) {
+ temp &= (~SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_STAT_CNT_MASK_QOS);
+ temp |= SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_STAT_CNT_SET_QOS(stat_cnt);
+ } else {
+ temp &= (~SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_STAT_CNT_MASK);
+ temp |= SPACC_IRQ_CTRL_STAT_CNT_SET(stat_cnt);
+ }
+
+ writel(temp, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_CTRL);
+ writel(readl(spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN) |
+ SPACC_IRQ_EN_STAT,
+ spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN);
+}
+
+void spacc_irq_stat_disable(struct spacc_device *spacc)
+{
+ writel(readl(spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN) &
+ (~SPACC_IRQ_EN_STAT),
+ spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN);
+}
+
+void spacc_irq_stat_wd_enable(struct spacc_device *spacc)
+{
+ writel(readl(spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN) |
+ SPACC_IRQ_EN_STAT_WD,
+ spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN);
+}
+
+void spacc_irq_stat_wd_disable(struct spacc_device *spacc)
+{
+ writel(readl(spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN) &
+ (~SPACC_IRQ_EN_STAT_WD),
+ spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN);
+}
+
+void spacc_irq_glbl_enable(struct spacc_device *spacc)
+{
+ writel(readl(spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN) |
+ SPACC_IRQ_EN_GLBL,
+ spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN);
+}
+
+void spacc_irq_glbl_disable(struct spacc_device *spacc)
+{
+ writel(readl(spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN) &
+ (~SPACC_IRQ_EN_GLBL),
+ spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN);
+}
+
+void spacc_disable_int (struct spacc_device *spacc)
+{
+ writel(0, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_IRQ_EN);
+}
+
+/* a function to run callbacks in the IRQ handler */
+irqreturn_t spacc_irq_handler(int irq, void *dev)
+{
+ struct spacc_priv *priv =
+ platform_get_drvdata(to_platform_device(dev));
+ struct spacc_device *spacc = &priv->spacc;
+
+ if (spacc->config.oldtimer != spacc->config.timer) {
+ spacc_set_wd_count(&priv->spacc,
+ priv->spacc.config.wd_timer =
+ spacc->config.timer);
+
+ spacc->config.oldtimer = spacc->config.timer;
+ }
+
+ /* check irq flags and process as required */
+ if (!spacc_process_irq(spacc))
+ return IRQ_NONE;
+
+ return IRQ_HANDLED;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5708ec6881d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c
@@ -0,0 +1,670 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include "spacc_core.h"
+
+#define MIN(x, y) (((x) < (y)) ? (x) : (y))
+
+/* prevent reading passed the end of the buffer */
+static void read_from_buf(unsigned char *dst, unsigned char *src,
+ int off, int n, int max)
+{
+ if (!dst)
+ return;
+
+ while (off < max && n) {
+ *dst++ = src[off++];
+ --n;
+ }
+}
+
+static void write_to_buf(unsigned char *dst, const unsigned char *src,
+ int off, int n, int len)
+{
+ if (!src)
+ return;
+
+ while (n && (off < len)) {
+ dst[off++] = *src++;
+ --n;
+ }
+}
+
+/* ctx_id is requested */
+/* This function is not meant to be called directly,
+ * it should be called from the job manager
+ */
+static int spacc_ctx_request(struct spacc_device *spacc,
+ int ctx_id, int ncontig)
+{
+ int ret;
+ int x, y, count;
+ unsigned long lock_flag;
+
+ if (!spacc)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (ctx_id > spacc->config.num_ctx)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (ncontig < 1 || ncontig > spacc->config.num_ctx)
+ return -1;
+
+ ret = CRYPTO_OK;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&spacc->ctx_lock, lock_flag);
+ /* allocating scheme, look for contiguous contexts. Free contexts have
+ * a ref_cnt of 0.
+ */
+
+ /* if specific ctx_id is requested,
+ * test the ncontig and then bump the ref_cnt
+ */
+ if (ctx_id != -1) {
+ if ((&spacc->ctx[ctx_id])->ncontig != ncontig - 1)
+ ret = -1;
+ } else {
+ /* check to see if ncontig are free */
+ /* loop over all available contexts to find the first
+ * ncontig empty ones
+ */
+ for (x = 0; x <= (spacc->config.num_ctx - ncontig); ) {
+ count = ncontig;
+ while (count) {
+ if ((&spacc->ctx[x + count - 1])->ref_cnt != 0) {
+ /* incr x to past failed count
+ * location
+ */
+ x = x + count;
+ break;
+ }
+ count--;
+ }
+ if (count != 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ /* test next x */
+ } else {
+ ctx_id = x;
+ ret = CRYPTO_OK;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret == CRYPTO_OK) {
+ /* ctx_id is good so mark used */
+ for (y = 0; y < ncontig; y++)
+ (&spacc->ctx[ctx_id + y])->ref_cnt++;
+
+ (&spacc->ctx[ctx_id])->ncontig = ncontig - 1;
+ } else {
+ ctx_id = -1;
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&spacc->ctx_lock, lock_flag);
+
+ return ctx_id;
+}
+
+static int spacc_ctx_release(struct spacc_device *spacc, int ctx_id)
+{
+ unsigned long lock_flag;
+ int ncontig;
+ int y;
+
+
+ if (ctx_id < 0 || ctx_id > spacc->config.num_ctx)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&spacc->ctx_lock, lock_flag);
+ /* release the base context and contiguous block */
+ ncontig = (&spacc->ctx[ctx_id])->ncontig;
+ for (y = 0; y <= ncontig; y++) {
+ if ((&spacc->ctx[ctx_id + y])->ref_cnt > 0)
+ (&spacc->ctx[ctx_id + y])->ref_cnt--;
+ }
+
+ if ((&spacc->ctx[ctx_id])->ref_cnt == 0) {
+ (&spacc->ctx[ctx_id])->ncontig = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_SECURE_MODE
+ /* TODO: This driver works in harmony with "normal" kernel
+ * processes so we release the context all the time
+ * normally this would be done from a "secure" kernel process
+ * (trustzone/etc). This hack is so that SPACC.0
+ * cores can both use the same context space.
+ */
+ writel(ctx_id, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_SECURE_RELEASE);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&spacc->ctx_lock, lock_flag);
+
+ return CRYPTO_OK;
+}
+
+/* Job manager */
+/* This will reset all job data, pointers, etc */
+void spacc_job_init_all(struct spacc_device *spacc)
+{
+ int x;
+ struct spacc_job *job;
+
+ for (x = 0; x < (SPACC_MAX_JOBS); x++) {
+ job = &spacc->job[x];
+ memset(job, 0, sizeof(struct spacc_job));
+ job->job_swid = SPACC_JOB_IDX_UNUSED;
+ job->job_used = SPACC_JOB_IDX_UNUSED;
+ spacc->job_lookup[x] = SPACC_JOB_IDX_UNUSED;
+ }
+}
+
+/* get a new job id and use a specific ctx_idx or -1 for a new one */
+int spacc_job_request(struct spacc_device *spacc, int ctx_idx)
+{
+ int x, ret;
+ unsigned long lock_flag;
+ struct spacc_job *job;
+
+ if (!spacc)
+ return -1;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&spacc->lock, lock_flag);
+ /* find the first available job id */
+ for (x = 0; x < SPACC_MAX_JOBS; x++) {
+ job = &spacc->job[x];
+ if (job->job_used == SPACC_JOB_IDX_UNUSED) {
+ job->job_used = x;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (x == SPACC_MAX_JOBS) {
+ ret = -1;
+ } else {
+ /* associate a single context to go with job */
+ ret = spacc_ctx_request(spacc, ctx_idx, 1);
+ if (ret != -1) {
+ job->ctx_idx = ret;
+ ret = x;
+ }
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&spacc->lock, lock_flag);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int spacc_job_release(struct spacc_device *spacc, int job_idx)
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned long lock_flag;
+ struct spacc_job *job;
+
+ if (!spacc)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (job_idx < 0 || job_idx >= SPACC_MAX_JOBS)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&spacc->lock, lock_flag);
+
+ job = &spacc->job[job_idx];
+ /* release context that goes with job */
+ ret = spacc_ctx_release(spacc, job->ctx_idx);
+ job->ctx_idx = SPACC_CTX_IDX_UNUSED;
+ job->job_used = SPACC_JOB_IDX_UNUSED;
+ job->cb = NULL; /* disable any callback*/
+
+ /* NOTE: this leaves ctrl data in memory */
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&spacc->lock, lock_flag);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int spacc_handle_release(struct spacc_device *spacc, int job_idx)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned long lock_flag;
+ struct spacc_job *job;
+
+ if (!spacc)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (job_idx < 0 || job_idx >= SPACC_MAX_JOBS)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&spacc->lock, lock_flag);
+
+ job = &spacc->job[job_idx];
+ job->job_used = SPACC_JOB_IDX_UNUSED;
+ job->cb = NULL; /* disable any callback*/
+
+ /* NOTE: this leaves ctrl data in memory */
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&spacc->lock, lock_flag);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Return a context structure for a job idx or null if invalid */
+struct spacc_ctx *context_lookup_by_job(struct spacc_device *spacc, int
+ job_idx)
+{
+ if (job_idx < 0 || job_idx >= SPACC_MAX_JOBS)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return &spacc->ctx[(&spacc->job[job_idx])->ctx_idx];
+}
+
+int spacc_process_jb(struct spacc_device *spacc)
+{
+ /* are there jobs in the buffer? */
+ while (spacc->jb_head != spacc->jb_tail) {
+ int x, y;
+
+ x = spacc->jb_tail;
+ if (spacc->job_buffer[x].active) {
+ y = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt_ex(spacc, 0,
+ spacc->job_buffer[x].job_idx,
+ spacc->job_buffer[x].src,
+ spacc->job_buffer[x].dst,
+ spacc->job_buffer[x].proc_sz,
+ spacc->job_buffer[x].aad_offset,
+ spacc->job_buffer[x].pre_aad_sz,
+ spacc->job_buffer[x].post_aad_sz,
+ spacc->job_buffer[x].iv_offset,
+ spacc->job_buffer[x].prio);
+
+ if (y != -EBUSY)
+ spacc->job_buffer[x].active = 0;
+ else
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ x = (x + 1);
+ if (x == SPACC_MAX_JOB_BUFFERS)
+ x = 0;
+
+ spacc->jb_tail = x;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Write appropriate context data which depends on operation and mode */
+int spacc_write_context(struct spacc_device *spacc, int job_idx, int op,
+ const unsigned char *key, int ksz,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int ivsz)
+{
+ int buflen;
+ int ret = CRYPTO_OK;
+ unsigned char buf[300];
+ struct spacc_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+ struct spacc_job *job = NULL;
+
+ if (job_idx < 0 || job_idx > SPACC_MAX_JOBS)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ job = &spacc->job[job_idx];
+ ctx = context_lookup_by_job(spacc, job_idx);
+
+ if (!job || !ctx)
+ ret = -EIO;
+ else {
+ switch (op) {
+ case SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION:
+ /* get page size and then read so we can do a
+ * read-modify-write cycle
+ */
+ buflen = MIN(sizeof(buf),
+ (unsigned int)spacc->config.ciph_page_size);
+
+ pdu_from_dev_s(buf, ctx->ciph_key, buflen >> 2,
+ spacc->config.spacc_endian);
+
+ switch (job->enc_mode) {
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_ECB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CBC:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CFB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_OFB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CTR:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS1:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS2:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS3:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_ECB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CBC:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS1:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS2:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS3:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CFB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_OFB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CTR:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM:
+ write_to_buf(buf, key, 0, ksz, buflen);
+ if (iv) {
+ unsigned char one[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 1 };
+ unsigned long enc1, enc2;
+
+ enc1 = CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM;
+ enc2 = CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM;
+
+ write_to_buf(buf, iv, 32, ivsz, buflen);
+ if (ivsz == 12 &&
+ (job->enc_mode == enc1 ||
+ job->enc_mode == enc2))
+ write_to_buf(buf, one,
+ 11 * 4, 4,
+ buflen);
+ }
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_F8:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_F8:
+ if (key) {
+ write_to_buf(buf, key + ksz, 0,
+ ksz, buflen);
+ write_to_buf(buf, key, 48,
+ ksz, buflen);
+ }
+ write_to_buf(buf, iv, 32, 16, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_XTS:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_XTS:
+ if (key) {
+ write_to_buf(buf, key, 0,
+ ksz >> 1, buflen);
+ write_to_buf(buf, key + (ksz >> 1),
+ 48, ksz >> 1, buflen);
+ /* divide by two since that's
+ * what we program the hardware
+ */
+ ksz = ksz >> 1;
+ }
+ write_to_buf(buf, iv, 32, 16, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_ECB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_CBC:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_OFB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_CFB:
+ write_to_buf(buf, key, 0, ksz, buflen);
+ write_to_buf(buf, iv, 0x28, ivsz, buflen);
+ if (ivsz <= 8) {
+ /*default to 128 rounds*/
+ unsigned char rounds[4] = {
+ 0, 0, 0, 128};
+
+ write_to_buf(buf, rounds, 0x30,
+ 4, buflen);
+ }
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_CBC:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_ECB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_DES_CBC:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_DES_ECB:
+ write_to_buf(buf, iv, 0, 8, buflen);
+ write_to_buf(buf, key, 8, ksz, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_KASUMI_ECB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_KASUMI_F8:
+ write_to_buf(buf, iv, 16, 8, buflen);
+ write_to_buf(buf, key, 0, 16, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SNOW3G_UEA2:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_ZUC_UEA3:
+ write_to_buf(buf, key, 0, 32, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_STREAM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+ write_to_buf(buf, key, 0, ksz, buflen);
+ write_to_buf(buf, iv, 32, ivsz, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_NULL:
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (key) {
+ job->ckey_sz = SPACC_SET_CIPHER_KEY_SZ(ksz);
+ job->first_use = 1;
+ }
+ pdu_to_dev_s(ctx->ciph_key, buf, buflen >> 2,
+ spacc->config.spacc_endian);
+ break;
+
+ case SPACC_HASH_OPERATION:
+ /* get page size and then read so we can do a
+ * read-modify-write cycle
+ */
+ buflen = MIN(sizeof(buf),
+ (u32)spacc->config.hash_page_size);
+ pdu_from_dev_s(buf, ctx->hash_key, buflen >> 2,
+ spacc->config.spacc_endian);
+
+ switch (job->hash_mode) {
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_XCBC:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SM4_XCBC:
+ if (key) {
+ write_to_buf(buf, key + (ksz - 32), 32,
+ 32, buflen);
+ write_to_buf(buf, key, 0, (ksz - 32),
+ buflen);
+ job->hkey_sz =
+ SPACC_SET_HASH_KEY_SZ(ksz - 32);
+ }
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_CRC32:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SNOW3G_UIA2:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_ZUC_UIA3:
+ if (key) {
+ write_to_buf(buf, key, 0, ksz, buflen);
+ job->hkey_sz =
+ SPACC_SET_HASH_KEY_SZ(ksz);
+ }
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_POLY1305:
+ write_to_buf(buf, key, 0, ksz, buflen);
+ write_to_buf(buf, iv, 32, ivsz, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_CSHAKE128:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_CSHAKE256:
+ /* use "iv" and "key" to */
+ /* pass s-string and n-string */
+ write_to_buf(buf, iv, 0, ivsz, buflen);
+ write_to_buf(buf, key,
+ spacc->config.string_size, ksz, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMAC128:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMAC256:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMACXOF128:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_KMACXOF256:
+ /* use "iv" and "key" to pass s-string & key */
+ write_to_buf(buf, iv, 0, ivsz, buflen);
+ write_to_buf(buf, key,
+ spacc->config.string_size, ksz, buflen);
+ job->hkey_sz = SPACC_SET_HASH_KEY_SZ(ksz);
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (key) {
+ job->hkey_sz =
+ SPACC_SET_HASH_KEY_SZ(ksz);
+ write_to_buf(buf, key, 0, ksz, buflen);
+ }
+ }
+ pdu_to_dev_s(ctx->hash_key, buf, buflen >> 2,
+ spacc->config.spacc_endian);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int spacc_read_context(struct spacc_device *spacc, int job_idx, int op,
+ unsigned char *key, int ksz, unsigned char *iv,
+ int ivsz)
+{
+ int ret = CRYPTO_OK;
+ struct spacc_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+ struct spacc_job *job = NULL;
+ unsigned char buf[300];
+ int buflen;
+
+ if (job_idx < 0 || job_idx > SPACC_MAX_JOBS)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ job = &spacc->job[job_idx];
+ ctx = context_lookup_by_job(spacc, job_idx);
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ ret = -EIO;
+ else {
+ switch (op) {
+ case SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION:
+ buflen = MIN(sizeof(buf),
+ (u32)spacc->config.ciph_page_size);
+ pdu_from_dev_s(buf, ctx->ciph_key, buflen >> 2,
+ spacc->config.spacc_endian);
+
+ switch (job->enc_mode) {
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_ECB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CBC:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CFB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_OFB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CTR:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS1:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS2:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS3:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_ECB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CBC:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS1:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS2:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS3:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CFB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_OFB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CTR:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM:
+ read_from_buf(key, buf, 0, ksz, buflen);
+ read_from_buf(iv, buf, 32, 16, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_STREAM:
+ read_from_buf(key, buf, 0, ksz, buflen);
+ read_from_buf(iv, buf, 32, 16, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_F8:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_F8:
+ if (key) {
+ read_from_buf(key + ksz, buf, 0, ksz,
+ buflen);
+ read_from_buf(key, buf, 48, ksz,
+ buflen);
+ }
+ read_from_buf(iv, buf, 32, 16, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_XTS:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_XTS:
+ if (key) {
+ read_from_buf(key, buf, 0, ksz >> 1,
+ buflen);
+ read_from_buf(key + (ksz >> 1), buf, 48,
+ ksz >> 1, buflen);
+ }
+ read_from_buf(iv, buf, 32, 16, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_ECB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_CBC:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_OFB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MULTI2_CFB:
+ read_from_buf(key, buf, 0, ksz, buflen);
+ /* Number of rounds at the end of the IV */
+ read_from_buf(iv, buf, 0x28, ivsz, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_CBC:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_ECB:
+ read_from_buf(iv, buf, 0, 8, buflen);
+ read_from_buf(key, buf, 8, 24, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_DES_CBC:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_DES_ECB:
+ read_from_buf(iv, buf, 0, 8, buflen);
+ read_from_buf(key, buf, 8, 8, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_KASUMI_ECB:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_KASUMI_F8:
+ read_from_buf(iv, buf, 16, 8, buflen);
+ read_from_buf(key, buf, 0, 16, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_SNOW3G_UEA2:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_ZUC_UEA3:
+ read_from_buf(key, buf, 0, 32, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_NULL:
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SPACC_HASH_OPERATION:
+ buflen = MIN(sizeof(buf),
+ (u32)spacc->config.hash_page_size);
+ pdu_from_dev_s(buf, ctx->hash_key, buflen >> 2,
+ spacc->config.spacc_endian);
+ switch (job->hash_mode) {
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_XCBC:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SM4_XCBC:
+ if (key && ksz <= 64) {
+ read_from_buf(key + (ksz - 32), buf, 32,
+ 32, buflen);
+ read_from_buf(key, buf, 0, ksz - 32,
+ buflen);
+ }
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_HASH_CRC32:
+ read_from_buf(iv, buf, 0, ivsz, buflen);
+ break;
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SNOW3G_UIA2:
+ case CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_ZUC_UIA3:
+ read_from_buf(key, buf, 0, 32, buflen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ read_from_buf(key, buf, 0, ksz, buflen);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Context manager */
+/* This will reset all reference counts, pointers, etc */
+void spacc_ctx_init_all(struct spacc_device *spacc)
+{
+ int x;
+ struct spacc_ctx *ctx;
+ unsigned long lock_flag;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&spacc->ctx_lock, lock_flag);
+ /* initialize contexts */
+ for (x = 0; x < spacc->config.num_ctx; x++) {
+ ctx = &spacc->ctx[x];
+
+ /* sets everything including ref_cnt and ncontig to 0 */
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+ ctx->ciph_key = spacc->regmap + SPACC_CTX_CIPH_KEY + (x *
+ spacc->config.ciph_page_size);
+ ctx->hash_key = spacc->regmap + SPACC_CTX_HASH_KEY + (x *
+ spacc->config.hash_page_size);
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&spacc->ctx_lock, lock_flag);
+}
+
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_skcipher.c b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_skcipher.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8311fab0453a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_skcipher.c
@@ -0,0 +1,754 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <crypto/ctr.h>
+#include <crypto/des.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/des.h>
+#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+
+#include "spacc_device.h"
+#include "spacc_core.h"
+
+static LIST_HEAD(spacc_cipher_alg_list);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(spacc_cipher_alg_mutex);
+
+struct mode_tab possible_ciphers[] = {
+ /* {keylen, MODE_TAB_CIPH(name, id, iv_len, blk_len)} */
+
+ /* SM4 */
+ { MODE_TAB_CIPH("cbc(sm4)", SM4_CBC, 16, 16), .keylen[0] = 16,
+ .chunksize = 16, .walksize = 16, .min_keysize = 16, .max_keysize = 16 },
+ { MODE_TAB_CIPH("ecb(sm4)", SM4_ECB, 0, 16), .keylen[0] = 16,
+ .chunksize = 16, .walksize = 16, .min_keysize = 16, .max_keysize = 16 },
+ { MODE_TAB_CIPH("ofb(sm4)", SM4_OFB, 16, 1), .keylen[0] = 16,
+ .chunksize = 16, .walksize = 16, .min_keysize = 16, .max_keysize = 16 },
+ { MODE_TAB_CIPH("cfb(sm4)", SM4_CFB, 16, 1), .keylen[0] = 16,
+ .chunksize = 16, .walksize = 16, .min_keysize = 16, .max_keysize = 16 },
+ { MODE_TAB_CIPH("ctr(sm4)", SM4_CTR, 16, 1), .keylen[0] = 16,
+ .chunksize = 16, .walksize = 16, .min_keysize = 16, .max_keysize = 16 },
+ { MODE_TAB_CIPH("xts(sm4)", SM4_XTS, 16, 16), .keylen[0] = 32,
+ .chunksize = 16, .walksize = 16, .min_keysize = 32, .max_keysize = 32 },
+ { MODE_TAB_CIPH("cts(cbc(sm4))", SM4_CS3, 16, 16), .keylen[0] = 16,
+ .chunksize = 16, .walksize = 16, .min_keysize = 16, .max_keysize = 16 },
+
+ /* AES */
+ { MODE_TAB_CIPH("cbc(aes)", AES_CBC, 16, 16), .keylen = { 16, 24, 32 },
+ .chunksize = 16, .walksize = 16, .min_keysize = 16, .max_keysize = 32 },
+ { MODE_TAB_CIPH("ecb(aes)", AES_ECB, 0, 16), .keylen = { 16, 24, 32 },
+ .chunksize = 16, .walksize = 16, .min_keysize = 16, .max_keysize = 32 },
+ { MODE_TAB_CIPH("xts(aes)", AES_XTS, 16, 16), .keylen = { 32, 64 },
+ .chunksize = 16, .walksize = 16, .min_keysize = 32, .max_keysize = 64 },
+ { MODE_TAB_CIPH("cts(cbc(aes))", AES_CS3, 16, 16), .keylen = { 16, 24,
+ 32 }, .chunksize = 16, .walksize = 16, .min_keysize = 16,
+ .max_keysize = 32 },
+ { MODE_TAB_CIPH("ctr(aes)", AES_CTR, 16, 1), .keylen = { 16, 24, 32
+ }, .chunksize = 16, .walksize = 16, .min_keysize = 16,
+ .max_keysize = 32 },
+
+ /* CHACHA20 */
+ { MODE_TAB_CIPH("chacha20", CHACHA20_STREAM, 16, 1), .keylen[0] = 32,
+ .chunksize = 64, .walksize = 64, .min_keysize = 32, .max_keysize = 32 },
+
+ /* DES */
+ { MODE_TAB_CIPH("ecb(des)", DES_ECB, 0, 8), .keylen[0] = 8,
+ .chunksize = 8, .walksize = 8, .min_keysize = 8, .max_keysize = 8},
+ { MODE_TAB_CIPH("cbc(des)", DES_CBC, 8, 8), .keylen[0] = 8,
+ .chunksize = 8, .walksize = 8, .min_keysize = 8, .max_keysize = 8},
+ { MODE_TAB_CIPH("ecb(des3_ede)", 3DES_ECB, 0, 8), .keylen[0] = 24,
+ .chunksize = 8, .walksize = 8, .min_keysize = 24, .max_keysize = 24 },
+ { MODE_TAB_CIPH("cbc(des3_ede)", 3DES_CBC, 8, 8), .keylen[0] = 24,
+ .chunksize = 8, .walksize = 8, .min_keysize = 24, .max_keysize = 24 },
+};
+
+static int spacc_skcipher_fallback(unsigned char *name,
+ struct skcipher_request *req,
+ int enc_dec)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct crypto_skcipher *reqtfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(reqtfm);
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
+
+ tctx->fb.cipher = crypto_alloc_skcipher(name,
+ CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER,
+ CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
+
+ crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(reqtfm,
+ sizeof(struct spacc_crypto_reqctx) +
+ crypto_skcipher_reqsize(tctx->fb.cipher));
+
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tctx->fb.cipher, tctx->cipher_key,
+ tctx->key_len);
+
+ skcipher_request_set_tfm(&ctx->fb.cipher_req, tctx->fb.cipher);
+
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(&ctx->fb.cipher_req, req->src, req->dst,
+ req->cryptlen, req->iv);
+
+ if (enc_dec)
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(&ctx->fb.cipher_req);
+ else
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(&ctx->fb.cipher_req);
+
+ crypto_free_skcipher(tctx->fb.cipher);
+ tctx->fb.cipher = NULL;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void spacc_cipher_cleanup_dma(struct device *dev,
+ struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
+
+ if (req->dst != req->src) {
+ if (ctx->dst_nents) {
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->dst, ctx->dst_nents,
+ DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+ pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->dst);
+ }
+ if (ctx->src_nents) {
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->src, ctx->src_nents,
+ DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->src);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (ctx->src_nents) {
+ dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->src, ctx->src_nents,
+ DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->src);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void spacc_cipher_cb(void *spacc, void *tfm)
+{
+ struct cipher_cb_data *cb = tfm;
+ int err = -1;
+ int total_len;
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = skcipher_request_ctx(cb->req);
+
+ u32 status_reg = readl(cb->spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_STATUS);
+ u32 status_ret = (status_reg >> 24) & 0x03;
+
+ if (ctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_DES_CBC ||
+ ctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_CBC) {
+ spacc_read_context(cb->spacc, cb->tctx->handle,
+ SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION, NULL, 0,
+ cb->req->iv, 8);
+ } else if (ctx->mode != CRYPTO_MODE_DES_ECB &&
+ ctx->mode != CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_ECB &&
+ ctx->mode != CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_ECB &&
+ ctx->mode != CRYPTO_MODE_AES_ECB &&
+ ctx->mode != CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_XTS &&
+ ctx->mode != CRYPTO_MODE_KASUMI_ECB) {
+ if (status_ret == 0x3) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto REQ_DST_CP_SKIP;
+ }
+ spacc_read_context(cb->spacc, cb->tctx->handle,
+ SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION, NULL, 0,
+ cb->req->iv, 16);
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->mode != CRYPTO_MODE_DES_ECB &&
+ ctx->mode != CRYPTO_MODE_DES_CBC &&
+ ctx->mode != CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_ECB &&
+ ctx->mode != CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_CBC) {
+ if (status_ret == 0x03) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto REQ_DST_CP_SKIP;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_ECB && status_ret == 0x03) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto REQ_DST_CP_SKIP;
+ }
+
+ total_len = cb->req->cryptlen;
+ if (ctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_XTS && total_len != 16) {
+ if (status_ret == 0x03) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto REQ_DST_CP_SKIP;
+ }
+ }
+
+ dma_sync_sg_for_cpu(cb->tctx->dev, cb->req->dst, ctx->dst_nents,
+ DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+
+ err = cb->spacc->job[cb->new_handle].job_err;
+REQ_DST_CP_SKIP:
+ spacc_cipher_cleanup_dma(cb->tctx->dev, cb->req);
+ spacc_close(cb->spacc, cb->new_handle);
+
+ /* call complete */
+ skcipher_request_complete(cb->req, err);
+}
+
+static int spacc_cipher_init_dma(struct device *dev,
+ struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = spacc_sg_to_ddt(dev, req->src, req->cryptlen, &ctx->src,
+ DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->src);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ ctx->src_nents = rc;
+
+ rc = spacc_sg_to_ddt(dev, req->dst, req->cryptlen, &ctx->dst,
+ DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->dst);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ ctx->dst_nents = rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int spacc_cipher_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ const struct spacc_alg *salg = spacc_tfm_skcipher(tfm);
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ tctx->keylen = 0;
+ tctx->cipher_key = NULL;
+ tctx->handle = -1;
+ tctx->ctx_valid = false;
+ tctx->dev = get_device(salg->dev[0]);
+
+ crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(__crypto_skcipher_cast(tfm),
+ sizeof(struct spacc_crypto_reqctx));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void spacc_cipher_cra_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
+
+ if (tctx->cipher_key) {
+ kfree(NULL);
+ tctx->cipher_key = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (tctx->handle >= 0)
+ spacc_close(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle);
+
+ put_device(tctx->dev);
+}
+
+
+static int check_keylen(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ const struct spacc_alg *salg = spacc_tfm_skcipher(&tfm->base);
+ int mode = salg->mode->id;
+
+
+ if (mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CBC ||
+ mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_ECB ||
+ mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_OFB ||
+ mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CFB ||
+ mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CTR ||
+ mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_XTS) {
+ if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 32)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CBC ||
+ mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_ECB ||
+ mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CTR ||
+ mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS3) {
+ if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen != 32)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_XTS) {
+ if (keylen != 32 && keylen != 64 && keylen != 48)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_STREAM) {
+ if (keylen != 32)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == CRYPTO_MODE_DES_ECB ||
+ mode == CRYPTO_MODE_DES_CBC ||
+ mode == CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_ECB ||
+ mode == CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_CBC) {
+ if (keylen != 8 && keylen != 24)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int spacc_cipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ int x = 0, return_value = 0, rc = 0, err;
+ const struct spacc_alg *salg = spacc_tfm_skcipher(&tfm->base);
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+ err = check_keylen(tfm, key, keylen);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ ctx->mode = salg->mode->id;
+ tctx->key_len = keylen;
+ tctx->cipher_key = kmalloc(keylen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ memcpy(tctx->cipher_key, key, keylen);
+
+ if (tctx->handle >= 0) {
+ spacc_close(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle);
+ put_device(tctx->dev);
+ tctx->handle = -1;
+ tctx->dev = NULL;
+ }
+
+ priv = NULL;
+
+ for (x = 0; x < ELP_CAPI_MAX_DEV && salg->dev[x]; x++) {
+ priv = dev_get_drvdata(salg->dev[x]);
+ tctx->dev = get_device(salg->dev[x]);
+ return_value = spacc_isenabled(&priv->spacc, salg->mode->id,
+ keylen);
+ if (return_value)
+ tctx->handle = spacc_open(&priv->spacc, salg->mode->id,
+ CRYPTO_MODE_NULL, -1, 0,
+ spacc_cipher_cb, tfm);
+ if (tctx->handle >= 0) {
+ dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "passed to open SPAcc context\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ put_device(salg->dev[x]);
+ }
+
+ if (tctx->handle < 0) {
+ dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "failed to open SPAcc context\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Weak key Implementation for DES_ECB */
+ if (salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_DES_ECB) {
+ err = verify_skcipher_des_key(tfm, key);
+ if (err)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_F8 ||
+ salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_F8) {
+ /* f8 mode requires an IV of 128-bits and a key-salt mask,
+ * equivalent in size to the key.
+ * AES-F8 or SM4-F8 mode has a SALTKEY prepended to the base
+ * key.
+ */
+ rc = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
+ SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION, key, 16,
+ NULL, 0);
+ } else {
+ rc = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
+ SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION, key, keylen,
+ NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "failed with SPAcc write context\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int spacc_cipher_process(struct skcipher_request *req, int enc_dec)
+{
+ int rc = 0, ret = 0, i = 0, j = 0;
+ u8 ivc1[16];
+ unsigned char chacha20_iv[16];
+ unsigned char *name;
+ unsigned int len = 0;
+ u32 num_iv = 0, diff;
+ u64 num_iv64 = 0, diff64;
+ struct crypto_skcipher *reqtfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(reqtfm);
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
+ const struct spacc_alg *salg = spacc_tfm_skcipher(&reqtfm->base);
+ struct spacc_device *device_h = &priv->spacc;
+
+ len = ctx->crypt_len / 16;
+
+ if (req->cryptlen == 0) {
+ if (salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS3 ||
+ salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_XTS ||
+ salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_XTS ||
+ salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS3) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Given IV - <1st 4-bytes as counter value>
+ * <last 12-bytes as nonce>
+ * Reversing the order of nonce & counter as,
+ * <1st 12-bytes as nonce>
+ * <last 4-bytes as counter>
+ * and then write to HW context,
+ * ex:
+ * Given IV - 2a000000000000000000000000000002
+ * Reverse order - 0000000000000000000000020000002a
+ */
+ if (salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_STREAM) {
+ for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
+ chacha20_iv[j] = req->iv[i];
+ j++;
+ }
+
+ j = j + 3;
+
+ for (i = 0; i <= 3; i++) {
+ chacha20_iv[j] = req->iv[i];
+ j--;
+ }
+ memcpy(req->iv, chacha20_iv, 16);
+ }
+
+ if (salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CFB) {
+ if (req->cryptlen % 16 != 0) {
+ name = salg->calg->cra_name;
+ ret = spacc_skcipher_fallback(name, req, enc_dec);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_XTS ||
+ salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS3 ||
+ salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_XTS ||
+ salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CS3) {
+ if (req->cryptlen == 16) {
+ name = salg->calg->cra_name;
+ ret = spacc_skcipher_fallback(name, req, enc_dec);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CTR ||
+ salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CTR) {
+ /* copy the IV to local buffer */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ ivc1[i] = req->iv[i];
+
+ /* 32-bit counter width */
+ if (readl(device_h->regmap + SPACC_REG_VERSION_EXT_3) & (0x2)) {
+ for (i = 12; i < 16; i++) {
+ num_iv <<= 8;
+ num_iv |= ivc1[i];
+ }
+
+ diff = SPACC_CTR_IV_MAX32 - num_iv;
+
+ if (len > diff) {
+ name = salg->calg->cra_name;
+ ret = spacc_skcipher_fallback(name,
+ req, enc_dec);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ } else if (readl(device_h->regmap + SPACC_REG_VERSION_EXT_3)
+ & (0x3)) { /* 64-bit counter width */
+
+ for (i = 8; i < 16; i++) {
+ num_iv64 <<= 8;
+ num_iv64 |= ivc1[i];
+ }
+
+ diff64 = SPACC_CTR_IV_MAX64 - num_iv64;
+
+ if (len > diff64) {
+ name = salg->calg->cra_name;
+ ret = spacc_skcipher_fallback(name,
+ req, enc_dec);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ } else if (readl(device_h->regmap + SPACC_REG_VERSION_EXT_3)
+ & (0x1)) { /* 16-bit counter width */
+
+ for (i = 14; i < 16; i++) {
+ num_iv <<= 8;
+ num_iv |= ivc1[i];
+ }
+
+ diff = SPACC_CTR_IV_MAX16 - num_iv;
+
+ if (len > diff) {
+ name = salg->calg->cra_name;
+ ret = spacc_skcipher_fallback(name,
+ req, enc_dec);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ } else if (readl(device_h->regmap + SPACC_REG_VERSION_EXT_3)
+ & (0x0)) { /* 8-bit counter width */
+
+ for (i = 15; i < 16; i++) {
+ num_iv <<= 8;
+ num_iv |= ivc1[i];
+ }
+
+ diff = SPACC_CTR_IV_MAX8 - num_iv;
+
+ if (len > diff) {
+ name = salg->calg->cra_name;
+ ret = spacc_skcipher_fallback(name,
+ req, enc_dec);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_DES_CBC ||
+ salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_CBC) {
+ rc = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
+ SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION, NULL, 0,
+ req->iv, 8);
+ } else if (salg->mode->id != CRYPTO_MODE_DES_ECB &&
+ salg->mode->id != CRYPTO_MODE_3DES_ECB &&
+ salg->mode->id != CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_ECB &&
+ salg->mode->id != CRYPTO_MODE_AES_ECB &&
+ salg->mode->id != CRYPTO_MODE_KASUMI_ECB) {
+ rc = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
+ SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION, NULL, 0,
+ req->iv, 16);
+ }
+
+ if (rc < 0)
+ pr_err("ERR: spacc_write_context\n");
+
+ /* Initialize the DMA */
+ rc = spacc_cipher_init_dma(tctx->dev, req);
+
+ ctx->ccb.new_handle = spacc_clone_handle(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
+ &ctx->ccb);
+ if (ctx->ccb.new_handle < 0) {
+ spacc_cipher_cleanup_dma(tctx->dev, req);
+ dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "failed to clone handle\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* copying the data to clone handle */
+ ctx->ccb.tctx = tctx;
+ ctx->ccb.ctx = ctx;
+ ctx->ccb.req = req;
+ ctx->ccb.spacc = &priv->spacc;
+
+ if (salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CS3) {
+ int handle = ctx->ccb.new_handle;
+
+ if (handle < 0 || handle > SPACC_MAX_JOBS)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ device_h->job[handle].auxinfo_cs_mode = 3;
+ }
+
+ if (enc_dec) { /* for decrypt */
+ rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc, ctx->ccb.new_handle, 1,
+ ICV_IGNORE, IP_ICV_IGNORE, 0, 0, 0);
+ spacc_set_key_exp(&priv->spacc, ctx->ccb.new_handle);
+ } else { /* for encrypt */
+ rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc, ctx->ccb.new_handle, 0,
+ ICV_IGNORE, IP_ICV_IGNORE, 0, 0, 0);
+ }
+
+ rc = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(&priv->spacc, ctx->ccb.new_handle,
+ &ctx->src, &ctx->dst, req->cryptlen,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ spacc_cipher_cleanup_dma(tctx->dev, req);
+ spacc_close(&priv->spacc, ctx->ccb.new_handle);
+
+ if (rc != -EBUSY && rc < 0) {
+ dev_err(tctx->dev,
+ "failed to enqueue job, ERR: %d\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+ } else if (!(req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG)) {
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+ }
+
+ priv->spacc.job[tctx->handle].first_use = 0;
+ priv->spacc.job[tctx->handle].ctrl &=
+ ~(1UL << priv->spacc.config.ctrl_map[SPACC_CTRL_KEY_EXP]);
+
+ return -EINPROGRESS;
+}
+
+static int spacc_cipher_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+ int rv = 0;
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
+
+ ctx->crypt_len = req->cryptlen;
+
+ /* 2nd argument of spacc_cipher_process()
+ * -> [enc_dec - 0(encrypt), 1(decrypt)]
+ */
+ rv = spacc_cipher_process(req, 0);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static int spacc_cipher_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+ int rv = 0;
+ struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
+
+ ctx->crypt_len = req->cryptlen;
+
+ /* 2nd argument of spacc_cipher_process()
+ * -> [enc_dec - 0(encrypt), 1(decrypt)]
+ */
+ rv = spacc_cipher_process(req, 1);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+struct skcipher_alg spacc_skcipher_alg = {
+ .setkey = spacc_cipher_setkey,
+ .encrypt = spacc_cipher_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = spacc_cipher_decrypt,
+ /*
+ * @chunksize: Equal to the block size except for stream ciphers such as
+ * CTR where it is set to the underlying block size.
+ * @walksize: Equal to the chunk size except in cases where the
+ * algorithm is considerably more efficient if it can operate on
+ * multiple chunks in parallel. Should be a multiple of chunksize.
+ */
+ .min_keysize = 16,
+ .max_keysize = 64,
+ .ivsize = 16,
+ .chunksize = 16,
+ .walksize = 16,
+ .base = {
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER |
+ CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
+ CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY |
+ CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+ .cra_blocksize = 16,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct spacc_crypto_ctx),
+ .cra_priority = 300,
+ .cra_init = spacc_cipher_cra_init,
+ .cra_exit = spacc_cipher_cra_exit,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ },
+};
+
+static void spacc_init_calg(struct crypto_alg *calg,
+ const struct mode_tab *mode)
+{
+ snprintf(calg->cra_name, sizeof(calg->cra_name), "%s", mode->name);
+ snprintf(calg->cra_driver_name, sizeof(calg->cra_driver_name),
+ "spacc-%s", mode->name);
+ calg->cra_blocksize = mode->blocklen;
+}
+
+static int spacc_register_cipher(struct spacc_alg *salg,
+ unsigned int algo_idx)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ salg->calg = &salg->alg.skcipher.base;
+ salg->alg.skcipher = spacc_skcipher_alg;
+
+ /* this function will assign mode->name to calg->cra_name &
+ * calg->cra_driver_name
+ */
+ spacc_init_calg(salg->calg, salg->mode);
+ salg->alg.skcipher.ivsize = salg->mode->ivlen;
+ salg->alg.skcipher.base.cra_blocksize = salg->mode->blocklen;
+
+ salg->alg.skcipher.chunksize = possible_ciphers[algo_idx].chunksize;
+ salg->alg.skcipher.walksize = possible_ciphers[algo_idx].walksize;
+ salg->alg.skcipher.min_keysize = possible_ciphers[algo_idx].min_keysize;
+ salg->alg.skcipher.max_keysize = possible_ciphers[algo_idx].max_keysize;
+
+ rc = crypto_register_skcipher(&salg->alg.skcipher);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ mutex_lock(&spacc_cipher_alg_mutex);
+ list_add(&salg->list, &spacc_cipher_alg_list);
+ mutex_unlock(&spacc_cipher_alg_mutex);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int probe_ciphers(struct platform_device *spacc_pdev)
+{
+ struct spacc_alg *salg;
+ int rc;
+ int registered = 0;
+ unsigned int i, y;
+ struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&spacc_pdev->dev);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(possible_ciphers); i++)
+ possible_ciphers[i].valid = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(possible_ciphers) &&
+ (possible_ciphers[i].valid == 0); i++) {
+ for (y = 0; y < 3; y++) {
+ if (spacc_isenabled(&priv->spacc,
+ possible_ciphers[i].id & 0xFF,
+ possible_ciphers[i].keylen[y])) {
+ salg = kmalloc(sizeof(*salg), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!salg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ salg->mode = &possible_ciphers[i];
+
+ /* Copy all dev's over to the salg dev */
+ salg->dev[0] = &spacc_pdev->dev;
+ salg->dev[1] = NULL;
+
+ if (possible_ciphers[i].valid == 0) {
+ rc = spacc_register_cipher(salg, i);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(salg);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ dev_dbg(&spacc_pdev->dev, "registered %s\n",
+ possible_ciphers[i].name);
+ registered++;
+ possible_ciphers[i].valid = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return registered;
+}
+
+int spacc_unregister_cipher_algs(void)
+{
+ struct spacc_alg *salg, *tmp;
+
+ mutex_lock(&spacc_cipher_alg_mutex);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(salg, tmp, &spacc_cipher_alg_list, list) {
+ crypto_unregister_alg(salg->calg);
+ list_del(&salg->list);
+ kfree(salg);
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&spacc_cipher_alg_mutex);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
--
2.25.1


2024-03-29 17:56:33

by Easwar Hariharan

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/4] Add SPAcc driver to Linux kernel

Partial review comments below, more to come. Please, in the future, split the patches up more so reviewers
don't have to review ~9k lines in 1 email.

On 3/28/2024 11:26 AM, Pavitrakumar M wrote:
> Signed-off-by: shwetar <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Pavitrakumar M <[email protected]>
> Acked-by: Ruud Derwig <[email protected]>
> ---
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c | 1382 ++++++++++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c | 1183 ++++++++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.c | 2917 ++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.h | 839 ++++++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.c | 324 +++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.h | 236 ++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.c | 365 +++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.h | 113 +
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_interrupt.c | 204 ++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c | 670 +++++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_skcipher.c | 754 +++++
> 11 files changed, 8987 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.h
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.h
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.h
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_interrupt.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_skcipher.c
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..f4b1ae9a4ef1
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,1382 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +
> +#include <crypto/aes.h>
> +#include <crypto/sm4.h>
> +#include <crypto/gcm.h>
> +#include <crypto/aead.h>
> +#include <crypto/authenc.h>
> +#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
> +#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
> +#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
> +#include <linux/platform_device.h>
> +
> +#include "spacc_device.h"
> +#include "spacc_core.h"
> +
> +static LIST_HEAD(spacc_aead_alg_list);
> +static DEFINE_MUTEX(spacc_aead_alg_mutex);
> +
> +#define SPACC_B0_LEN 16
> +#define SET_IV_IN_SRCBUF 0x80000000
> +#define SET_IV_IN_CONTEXT 0x0
> +#define IV_PTEXT_BUF_SZ 8192
> +#define XTRA_BUF_LEN 4096
> +#define IV_B0_LEN (XTRA_BUF_LEN + SPACC_B0_LEN +\
> + SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE)
> +
> +struct spacc_iv_buf {
> + unsigned char iv[SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE];
> + unsigned char fulliv[SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + SPACC_B0_LEN + XTRA_BUF_LEN];

So the value here is identical to IV_B0_LEN defined above, is there a semantic or documentation
reason we are adding these up again? It feels natural to me to have a fulliv buffer of size IV_B0_LEN,
but I'm new to crypto, and maybe I'm missing something?

Also I'm wondering why there is a mix of *LEN, *SZ, and *SIZE in the defines.

> + unsigned char ptext[IV_PTEXT_BUF_SZ];
> + struct scatterlist sg[2], fullsg[2], ptextsg[2];
> +};
> +
> +static struct kmem_cache *spacc_iv_pool;
> +
> +static void spacc_init_aead_alg(struct crypto_alg *calg,
> + const struct mode_tab *mode)
> +{
> + snprintf(calg->cra_name, sizeof(mode->name), "%s", mode->name);
> + snprintf(calg->cra_driver_name, sizeof(calg->cra_driver_name),
> + "spacc-%s", mode->name);
> + calg->cra_blocksize = mode->blocklen;
> +}
> +
> +static struct mode_tab possible_aeads[] = {
> + { MODE_TAB_AEAD("rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)",
> + CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305, CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
> + 16, 12, 1), .keylen = { 16, 24, 32 }
> + },
> + { MODE_TAB_AEAD("gcm(aes)",
> + CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM, CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
> + 16, 12, 1), .keylen = { 16, 24, 32 }
> + },
> + { MODE_TAB_AEAD("gcm(sm4)",
> + CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM, CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
> + 16, 12, 1), .keylen = { 16 }
> + },
> + { MODE_TAB_AEAD("ccm(aes)",
> + CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM, CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
> + 16, 16, 1), .keylen = { 16, 24, 32 }
> + },
> + { MODE_TAB_AEAD("ccm(sm4)",
> + CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM, CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
> + 16, 16, 1), .keylen = { 16, 24, 32 }
> + },
> +};
> +
> +static int ccm_16byte_aligned_len(int in_len)
> +{
> + int len;
> + int computed_mod;
> +
> + if (in_len > 0) {
> + computed_mod = in_len % 16;
> + if (computed_mod)
> + len = in_len - computed_mod + 16;
> + else
> + len = in_len;
> + } else {
> + len = in_len;
> + }
> +
> + return len;
> +}
> +
> +/* taken from crypto/ccm.c */
> +static int spacc_aead_format_adata(u8 *adata, unsigned int a)
> +{
> + int len = 0;
> +
> + /* add control info for associated data
> + * RFC 3610 and NIST Special Publication 800-38C
> + */
> + if (a < 65280) {
> + *(__be16 *)adata = cpu_to_be16(a);
> + len = 2;
> + } else {
> + *(__be16 *)adata = cpu_to_be16(0xfffe);
> + *(__be32 *)&adata[2] = cpu_to_be32(a);
> + len = 6;
> + }
> +
> + return len;
> +}
> +
> +
> +/* taken from crypto/ccm.c */
> +static int spacc_aead_set_msg_len(u8 *block, unsigned int msglen, int csize)
> +{
> + __be32 data;
> +
> + memset(block, 0, csize);
> + block += csize;
> +
> + if (csize >= 4)
> + csize = 4;
> + else if (msglen > (unsigned int)(1 << (8 * csize)))
> + return -EOVERFLOW;
> +
> + data = cpu_to_be32(msglen);
> + memcpy(block - csize, (u8 *)&data + 4 - csize, csize);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int spacc_aead_init_dma(struct device *dev, struct aead_request *req,
> + u64 seq, uint32_t icvlen,
> + int encrypt, int *alen)
> +{
> + struct crypto_aead *reqtfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
> + struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(reqtfm);
> + struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
> +
> + gfp_t mflags = GFP_ATOMIC;
> + struct spacc_iv_buf *iv;
> + int ccm_aad_16b_len = 0;
> + int rc, B0len;
> + int payload_len, fullsg_buf_len;
> + unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(reqtfm);
> +
> + /* always have 1 byte of IV */
> + if (!ivsize)
> + ivsize = 1;
> +
> + if (req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP)
> + mflags = GFP_KERNEL;
> +
> + ctx->iv_buf = kmem_cache_alloc(spacc_iv_pool, mflags);
> + if (!ctx->iv_buf)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + iv = ctx->iv_buf;
> +
> + sg_init_table(iv->sg, ARRAY_SIZE(iv->sg));
> + sg_init_table(iv->fullsg, ARRAY_SIZE(iv->fullsg));
> + sg_init_table(iv->ptextsg, ARRAY_SIZE(iv->ptextsg));
> +
> + B0len = 0;
> + ctx->ptext_nents = 0;
> + ctx->fulliv_nents = 0;
> +
> + memset(iv->iv, 0, SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE);
> + memset(iv->fulliv, 0, IV_B0_LEN);
> + memset(iv->ptext, 0, IV_PTEXT_BUF_SZ);
> +
> + /* copy the IV out for AAD */
> + memcpy(iv->iv, req->iv, ivsize);
> +
> + /* now we need to figure out the cipher IV which may or
> + * may not be "req->iv" depending on the mode we are

...depending on the mode we are *in*

> + */
> + if (tctx->mode & SPACC_MANGLE_IV_FLAG) {
> + switch (tctx->mode & 0x7F00) {
> + case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC3686:
> + case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4106:
> + case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4543:
> + {
> + unsigned char *p = iv->fulliv;
> + /* we're in RFC3686 mode so the last
> + * 4 bytes of the key are the SALT
> + */
> + memcpy(p, tctx->csalt, 4);
> + memcpy(p + 4, req->iv, ivsize);
> +
> + p[12] = 0;
> + p[13] = 0;
> + p[14] = 0;
> + p[15] = 1;
> + }
> + break;
> + case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4309:
> + {
> + unsigned char *p = iv->fulliv;
> + int L, M;
> + u32 lm = req->cryptlen;
> +
> + /* CCM mode */
> + /* p[0..15] is the CTR IV */
> + /* p[16..31] is the CBC-MAC B0 block*/
> + B0len = SPACC_B0_LEN;
> + /* IPsec requires L=4*/
> + L = 4;
> + M = tctx->auth_size;
> +
> + /* CTR block */
> + p[0] = L - 1;
> + memcpy(p + 1, tctx->csalt, 3);
> + memcpy(p + 4, req->iv, ivsize);
> + p[12] = 0;
> + p[13] = 0;
> + p[14] = 0;
> + p[15] = 1;
> +
> + /* store B0 block at p[16..31] */
> + p[16] = (1 << 6) | (((M - 2) >> 1) << 3)
> + | (L - 1);
> + memcpy(p + 1 + 16, tctx->csalt, 3);
> + memcpy(p + 4 + 16, req->iv, ivsize);
> +
> + /* now store length */
> + p[16 + 12 + 0] = (lm >> 24) & 0xFF;
> + p[16 + 12 + 1] = (lm >> 16) & 0xFF;
> + p[16 + 12 + 2] = (lm >> 8) & 0xFF;
> + p[16 + 12 + 3] = (lm) & 0xFF;
> +
> + /*now store the pre-formatted AAD */
> + p[32] = (req->assoclen >> 8) & 0xFF;
> + p[33] = (req->assoclen) & 0xFF;
> + /* we added 2 byte header to the AAD */
> + B0len += 2;
> + }
> + break;
> + }
> + } else if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM) {
> + unsigned char *p = iv->fulliv;
> + int L, M;
> +
> + u32 lm = (encrypt) ?
> + req->cryptlen :
> + req->cryptlen - tctx->auth_size;
> +
> + /* CCM mode */
> + /* p[0..15] is the CTR IV */
> + /* p[16..31] is the CBC-MAC B0 block*/
> + B0len = SPACC_B0_LEN;
> +
> + /* IPsec requires L=4 */
> + L = req->iv[0] + 1;
> + M = tctx->auth_size;
> +
> + /* CTR block */
> + memcpy(p, req->iv, ivsize);
> + memcpy(p + 16, req->iv, ivsize);
> +
> + /* Store B0 block at p[16..31] */
> + p[16] |= (8 * ((M - 2) / 2));
> +
> + /* set adata if assoclen > 0 */
> + if (req->assoclen)
> + p[16] |= 64;
> +
> + /* now store length, this is L size starts from 16-L
> + * to 16 of B0
> + */
> + spacc_aead_set_msg_len(p + 16 + 16 - L, lm, L);
> +
> + if (req->assoclen) {
> +
> + /* store pre-formatted AAD:
> + * AAD_LEN + AAD + PAD
> + */
> + *alen = spacc_aead_format_adata(&p[32], req->assoclen);
> +
> + ccm_aad_16b_len =
> + ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->assoclen + *alen);
> +
> + /* Adding the rest of AAD from req->src */
> + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(p + 32 + *alen,
> + req->src, 0,
> + req->assoclen, 0);
> +
> + /* Copy AAD to req->dst */
> + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(p + 32 + *alen, req->dst,
> + 0, req->assoclen, 1);
> +
> + }
> +
> + /* Adding PT/CT from req->src to ptext here */
> + if (req->cryptlen)
> + memset(iv->ptext, 0,
> + ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->cryptlen));
> +
> + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(iv->ptext, req->src,
> + req->assoclen,
> + req->cryptlen, 0);
> +
> +
> + } else {
> +
> + /* default is to copy the iv over since the
> + * cipher and protocol IV are the same
> + */
> + memcpy(iv->fulliv, req->iv, ivsize);
> +
> + }
> +
> + /* this is part of the AAD */
> + sg_set_buf(iv->sg, iv->iv, ivsize);
> +
> + /* GCM and CCM don't include the IV in the AAD */
> + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM_RFC4106 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM_RFC8998 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_NULL) {

Is this better constructed as a switch..case? You could even consolidate the
sg creation and submission to the SPACC engine below into a common case with
some indirection for the differing parameters...

> +
> + ctx->iv_nents = 0;
> + payload_len = req->cryptlen + icvlen + req->assoclen;
> + fullsg_buf_len = SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len;
> +
> + /* this is the actual IV getting fed to the core
> + * (via IV IMPORT)
> + */
> +
> + sg_set_buf(iv->fullsg, iv->fulliv, fullsg_buf_len);
> +
> + rc = spacc_sgs_to_ddt(dev,
> + iv->fullsg, fullsg_buf_len,
> + &ctx->fulliv_nents, NULL, 0,
> + &ctx->iv_nents, req->src,
> + payload_len, &ctx->src_nents,
> + &ctx->src, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +
> + } else if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM) {
> +
> +
> + ctx->iv_nents = 0;
> +
> + if (encrypt)
> + payload_len =
> + ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->cryptlen + icvlen);
> + else
> + payload_len =
> + ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->cryptlen);
> +
> + fullsg_buf_len = SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len;
> +
> +
> + /* this is the actual IV getting fed to the core (via IV IMPORT)
> + * This has CTR IV + B0 + AAD(B1, B2, ...)
> + */
> + sg_set_buf(iv->fullsg, iv->fulliv, fullsg_buf_len);
> + sg_set_buf(iv->ptextsg, iv->ptext, payload_len);
> +
> + rc = spacc_sgs_to_ddt(dev,
> + iv->fullsg, fullsg_buf_len,
> + &ctx->fulliv_nents, NULL, 0,
> + &ctx->iv_nents, iv->ptextsg,
> + payload_len, &ctx->ptext_nents,
> + &ctx->src, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +
> + } else {
> + payload_len = req->cryptlen + icvlen + req->assoclen;
> + fullsg_buf_len = SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len;
> +
> + /* this is the actual IV getting fed to the core (via IV IMPORT)
> + * This has CTR IV + B0 + AAD(B1, B2, ...)
> + */
> + sg_set_buf(iv->fullsg, iv->fulliv, fullsg_buf_len);
> +
> + rc = spacc_sgs_to_ddt(dev, iv->fullsg, fullsg_buf_len,
> + &ctx->fulliv_nents, iv->sg,
> + ivsize, &ctx->iv_nents,
> + req->src, payload_len, &ctx->src_nents,
> + &ctx->src, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> + }
> +
> + if (rc < 0)
> + goto err_free_iv;

...and that would allow this result check to be next to the spacc_sgs_to_ddt call that it gets
its value from

> +
> + /* Putting in req->dst is good since it won't overwrite anything
> + * even in case of CCM this is fine condition
> + */
> + if (req->dst != req->src) {
> + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM) {

Similar comment to above, looks like this could be better structured as a switch-case.

> + /* If req->dst buffer len is not-positive,
> + * then skip setting up of DMA
> + */
> + if (req->dst->length <= 0) {
> + ctx->dst_nents = 0;
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + if (encrypt)
> + payload_len = req->cryptlen + icvlen +
> + req->assoclen;
> + else
> + payload_len = req->cryptlen - tctx->auth_size +
> + req->assoclen;

No check for payload_len == 0 after these operations here, unlike in the else case that
returns -EBADMSG. Is this intentional?

> +
> + /* For corner cases where PTlen=AADlen=0, we set default
> + * to 16
> + */
> + rc = spacc_sg_to_ddt(dev, req->dst,
> + payload_len > 0 ? payload_len : 16,
> + &ctx->dst, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> + if (rc < 0)
> + goto err_free_src;
> +
> + ctx->dst_nents = rc;
> + } else {
> +
> + /* If req->dst buffer len is not-positive,
> + * then skip setting up of DMA
> + */
> + if (req->dst->length <= 0) {
> + ctx->dst_nents = 0;
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + if (encrypt)
> + payload_len = SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + req->cryptlen
> + + icvlen + req->assoclen;
> + else {
> + payload_len = req->cryptlen - tctx->auth_size +
> + req->assoclen;
> + if (payload_len == 0)
> + return -EBADMSG;

Should this be checking for <= 0?

> + }
> +
> +
> + rc = spacc_sg_to_ddt(dev, req->dst, payload_len,
> + &ctx->dst, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> + if (rc < 0)
> + goto err_free_src;
> +
> + ctx->dst_nents = rc;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +
> +err_free_src:
> + if (ctx->fulliv_nents)
> + dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->fullsg, ctx->fulliv_nents,
> + DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +
> + if (ctx->iv_nents)
> + dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->sg, ctx->iv_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +
> + if (ctx->ptext_nents)
> + dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->ptextsg, ctx->ptext_nents,
> + DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +
> + dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->src, ctx->src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> + pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->src);
> +
> +err_free_iv:
> + kmem_cache_free(spacc_iv_pool, ctx->iv_buf);
> +
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static void spacc_aead_cleanup_dma(struct device *dev, struct aead_request *req)
> +{
> + struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
> + struct spacc_iv_buf *iv = ctx->iv_buf;
> +
> + if (req->src != req->dst) {
> + if (req->dst->length > 0) {
> + dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->dst, ctx->dst_nents,
> + DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> + pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->dst);
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if (ctx->fulliv_nents)
> + dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->fullsg, ctx->fulliv_nents,
> + DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +
> + if (ctx->ptext_nents)
> + dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->ptextsg, ctx->ptext_nents,
> + DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +
> + if (ctx->iv_nents)
> + dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->sg, ctx->iv_nents,
> + DMA_TO_DEVICE);

The ordering of unmapping ptext and iv sgs differs from the err_free_src() cleanup above. If it
isn't intentional, maybe we can share some code here to prevent inadvertent ordering violations?

> +
> + if (req->src->length > 0) {
> + dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->src, ctx->src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> + pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->src);
> + }
> +
> + kmem_cache_free(spacc_iv_pool, ctx->iv_buf);
> +}
> +
> +static bool spacc_keylen_ok(const struct spacc_alg *salg, unsigned int keylen)
> +{
> + unsigned int i, mask = salg->keylen_mask;
> +
> + BUG_ON(mask > (1ul << ARRAY_SIZE(salg->mode->keylen)) - 1);

Do we really need to panic the kernel here? If we do, maybe we can write a comment explaining why this
should be fatal.

> +
> + for (i = 0; mask; i++, mask >>= 1) {
> + if (mask & 1 && salg->mode->keylen[i] == keylen)
> + return true;
> + }
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +

<snip>

> +

> +static int spacc_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned
> + int keylen)
> +{
> + struct spacc_crypto_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
> + const struct spacc_alg *salg = spacc_tfm_aead(&tfm->base);
> + struct spacc_priv *priv;
> + struct rtattr *rta = (void *)key;
> + struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param;
> + unsigned int x, authkeylen, enckeylen;
> + const unsigned char *authkey, *enckey;
> + unsigned char xcbc[64];
> +
> + int err = -EINVAL;
> + int singlekey = 0;
> +
> + /* are keylens valid? */
> + ctx->ctx_valid = false;
> +
> + switch (ctx->mode & 0xFF) {
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM:
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM:
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_NULL:
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM:
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM:
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
> + authkey = key;
> + authkeylen = 0;
> + enckey = key;
> + enckeylen = keylen;
> + ctx->keylen = keylen;
> + singlekey = 1;
> + goto skipover;
> + }
> +
> + if (!RTA_OK(rta, keylen))
> + goto badkey;
> +
> + if (rta->rta_type != CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM)
> + goto badkey;
> +
> + if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) < sizeof(*param))
> + goto badkey;

Can these 3 checks be combined or is this some idiomatic code to individually validate
these? If you can combine them, you can return -EINVAL here and for keylen < enckeylen
below, and keep the pattern of do something...check...return errorcode of the rest
of the function and get rid of the badkey label.

> +
> + param = RTA_DATA(rta);
> + enckeylen = be32_to_cpu(param->enckeylen);
> +
> + key += RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
> + keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
> +
> + if (keylen < enckeylen)
> + goto badkey;
> +
> + authkeylen = keylen - enckeylen;
> +
> + /* enckey is at &key[authkeylen] and
> + * authkey is at &key[0]
> + */
> + authkey = &key[0];
> + enckey = &key[authkeylen];
> +
> +skipover:
> + /* detect RFC3686/4106 and trim from enckeylen(and copy salt..) */
> + if (ctx->mode & SPACC_MANGLE_IV_FLAG) {
> + switch (ctx->mode & 0x7F00) {
> + case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC3686:
> + case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4106:
> + case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4543:
> + memcpy(ctx->csalt, enckey + enckeylen - 4, 4);
> + enckeylen -= 4;
> + break;
> + case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4309:
> + memcpy(ctx->csalt, enckey + enckeylen - 3, 3);
> + enckeylen -= 3;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if (!singlekey) {
> + if (authkeylen > salg->mode->hashlen) {
> + dev_warn(ctx->dev, "Auth key size of %u is not valid\n",
> + authkeylen);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if (!spacc_keylen_ok(salg, enckeylen)) {
> + dev_warn(ctx->dev, "Enc key size of %u is not valid\n",
> + enckeylen);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + /* if we're already open close the handle since
> + * the size may have changed
> + */
> + if (ctx->handle != -1) {
> + priv = dev_get_drvdata(ctx->dev);
> + spacc_close(&priv->spacc, ctx->handle);
> + put_device(ctx->dev);
> + ctx->handle = -1;
> + }
> +
> + /* Open a handle and
> + * search all devices for an open handle
> + */
> + priv = NULL;
> + for (x = 0; x < ELP_CAPI_MAX_DEV && salg->dev[x]; x++) {
> + priv = dev_get_drvdata(salg->dev[x]);
> +
> + /* increase reference */
> + ctx->dev = get_device(salg->dev[x]);
> +
> + /* check if its a valid mode ... */
> + if (spacc_isenabled(&priv->spacc, salg->mode->aead.ciph & 0xFF,
> + enckeylen) &&
> + spacc_isenabled(&priv->spacc,
> + salg->mode->aead.hash & 0xFF, authkeylen)) {
> + /* try to open spacc handle */
> + ctx->handle = spacc_open(&priv->spacc,
> + salg->mode->aead.ciph & 0xFF,
> + salg->mode->aead.hash & 0xFF,
> + -1, 0, spacc_aead_cb, tfm);
> + }
> +
> + if (ctx->handle < 0)
> + put_device(salg->dev[x]);
> + else
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + if (ctx->handle < 0) {
> + dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Failed to open SPAcc context\n");
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> +
> + /* setup XCBC key */
> + if (salg->mode->aead.hash == CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_XCBC) {
> + err = spacc_compute_xcbc_key(&priv->spacc,
> + salg->mode->aead.hash,
> + ctx->handle, authkey,
> + authkeylen, xcbc);
> + if (err < 0) {
> + dev_warn(ctx->dev, "Failed to compute XCBC key: %d\n",
> + err);
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> + authkey = xcbc;
> + authkeylen = 48;
> + }
> +
> + /* handle zero key/zero len DEC condition for SM4/AES GCM mode */
> + ctx->zero_key = 0;
> + if (!key[0]) {
> + int i, val = 0;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < keylen ; i++)
> + val += key[i];
> +
> + if (val == 0)
> + ctx->zero_key = 1;
> + }
> +
> + err = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, ctx->handle,
> + SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION, enckey,
> + enckeylen, NULL, 0);
> +
> + if (err) {
> + dev_warn(ctx->dev,
> + "Could not write ciphering context: %d\n", err);
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> +
> + if (!singlekey) {
> + err = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, ctx->handle,
> + SPACC_HASH_OPERATION, authkey,
> + authkeylen, NULL, 0);
> + if (err) {
> + dev_warn(ctx->dev,
> + "Could not write hashing context: %d\n", err);
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /* set expand key */
> + spacc_set_key_exp(&priv->spacc, ctx->handle);
> + ctx->ctx_valid = true;
> +
> + memset(xcbc, 0, sizeof(xcbc));
> +
> + /* copy key to ctx for fallback */
> + memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen);
> +
> + return 0;
> +
> +badkey:
> + return err;
> +}
> +

<snip>

> +
> +static int spacc_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, u64 seq, int
> + encrypt)
> +{
> + int rc;
> + int B0len;
> + int alen;
> + u32 dstoff;
> + int icvremove;
> + int ivaadsize;
> + int ptaadsize;
> + int iv_to_context;
> + int spacc_proc_len;
> + u32 spacc_icv_offset;
> + int spacc_pre_aad_size;
> + int ccm_aad_16b_len;
> + struct crypto_aead *reqtfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
> + int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(reqtfm);
> + struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(reqtfm);
> + struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
> + struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
> + u32 msg_len = req->cryptlen - tctx->auth_size;
> + u32 l;
> +
> + ctx->encrypt_op = encrypt;
> + alen = 0;
> + ccm_aad_16b_len = 0;
> +
> + if (tctx->handle < 0 || !tctx->ctx_valid || (req->cryptlen +
> + req->assoclen) > priv->max_msg_len)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /* IV is programmed to context by default */
> + iv_to_context = SET_IV_IN_CONTEXT;
> +
> + if (encrypt) {
> + switch (tctx->mode & 0xFF) {
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM:
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM:
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
> + /* For cryptlen = 0 */
> + if (req->cryptlen + req->assoclen == 0)
> + return spacc_aead_fallback(req, tctx, encrypt);
> + break;
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM:
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM:
> + l = req->iv[0] + 1;
> +
> + /* 2 <= L <= 8, so 1 <= L' <= 7. */
> + if (req->iv[0] < 1 || req->iv[0] > 7)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /* verify that msglen can in fact be represented
> + * in L bytes
> + */
> + if (l < 4 && msg_len >> (8 * l))
> + return -EOVERFLOW;
> +
> + break;
> + default:
> + pr_debug("Unsupported algo");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> + } else {
> + int ret;
> +
> + /* Handle the decryption */
> + switch (tctx->mode & 0xFF) {
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM:
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM:
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
> + /* For assoclen = 0 */
> + if (req->assoclen == 0 && (req->cryptlen - tctx->auth_size == 0)) {
> + ret = spacc_aead_fallback(req, tctx, encrypt);
> + return ret;
> + }
> + break;
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM:
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM:
> + /* 2 <= L <= 8, so 1 <= L' <= 7. */
> + if (req->iv[0] < 1 || req->iv[0] > 7)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + default:
> + pr_debug("Unsupported algo");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + icvremove = (encrypt) ? 0 : tctx->auth_size;
> +
> + rc = spacc_aead_init_dma(tctx->dev, req, seq, (encrypt) ?
> + tctx->auth_size : 0, encrypt, &alen);
> + if (rc < 0)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (req->assoclen)
> + ccm_aad_16b_len = ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->assoclen + alen);
> +
> + /* Note: This won't work if IV_IMPORT has been disabled */
> + ctx->cb.new_handle = spacc_clone_handle(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
> + &ctx->cb);
> + if (ctx->cb.new_handle < 0) {
> + spacc_aead_cleanup_dma(tctx->dev, req);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + ctx->cb.tctx = tctx;
> + ctx->cb.ctx = ctx;
> + ctx->cb.req = req;
> + ctx->cb.spacc = &priv->spacc;
> +
> + /* Write IV to the spacc-context
> + * IV can be written to context or as part of the input src buffer
> + * IV in case of CCM is going in the input src buff.
> + * IV for GCM is written to the context.
> + */
> + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM_RFC4106 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM_RFC8998 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_NULL) {
> + iv_to_context = SET_IV_IN_CONTEXT;
> + rc = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, ctx->cb.new_handle,
> + SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION, NULL, 0,
> + req->iv, ivsize);
> + }

We are either assuming success here, or the return value doesn't matter. Intentional?

> +
> + /* CCM and GCM don't include the IV in the AAD */
> + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM_RFC4106 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM_RFC8998 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_NULL) {
> + ivaadsize = 0;
> + } else {
> + ivaadsize = ivsize;
> + }
> +
> + /* CCM requires an extra block of AAD */
> + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM)
> + B0len = SPACC_B0_LEN;
> + else
> + B0len = 0;
> +
> + /* GMAC mode uses AAD for the entire message.
> + * So does NULL cipher
> + */
> + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM_RFC4543 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_NULL) {
> + if (req->cryptlen >= icvremove)
> + ptaadsize = req->cryptlen - icvremove;
> + } else {
> + ptaadsize = 0;
> + }
> +
> + /* Calculate and set the below, important parameters
> + * spacc icv offset - spacc_icv_offset
> + * destination offset - dstoff
> + * IV to context - This is set for CCM, not set for GCM
> + */
> + if (req->dst == req->src) {
> + dstoff = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len +
> + req->assoclen + ivaadsize));
> +
> + if (req->assoclen + req->cryptlen >= icvremove)
> + spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE +
> + B0len + req->assoclen +
> + ivaadsize + req->cryptlen -
> + icvremove));
> + else
> + spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE +
> + B0len + req->assoclen +
> + ivaadsize + req->cryptlen));
> +
> + /* CCM case */
> + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM) {
> + iv_to_context = SET_IV_IN_SRCBUF;
> + dstoff = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len +
> + ccm_aad_16b_len + ivaadsize));
> +
> + if (encrypt)
> + spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
> + + B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len
> + + ivaadsize
> + + ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->cryptlen)
> + - icvremove));
> + else
> + spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
> + + B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len + ivaadsize
> + + req->cryptlen - icvremove));
> + }
> +
> + } else {
> + dstoff = ((uint32_t)(req->assoclen + ivaadsize));
> +
> + if (req->assoclen + req->cryptlen >= icvremove)
> + spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
> + + B0len + req->assoclen
> + + ivaadsize + req->cryptlen
> + - icvremove));
> + else
> + spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
> + + B0len + req->assoclen
> + + ivaadsize + req->cryptlen));
> +
> + /* CCM case */
> + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM) {
> + iv_to_context = SET_IV_IN_SRCBUF;
> + dstoff = ((uint32_t)(req->assoclen + ivaadsize));
> +
> + if (encrypt)
> + spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
> + + B0len
> + + ccm_aad_16b_len + ivaadsize
> + + ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->cryptlen)
> + - icvremove));
> + else
> + spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
> + + B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len + ivaadsize
> + + req->cryptlen - icvremove));
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /* Calculate and set the below, important parameters
> + * spacc proc_len - spacc_proc_len
> + * pre-AAD size - spacc_pre_aad_size
> + */
> + if (encrypt) {
> + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM_RFC8998) {
> + rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc,
> + ctx->cb.new_handle,
> + encrypt ? OP_ENCRYPT : OP_DECRYPT,
> + ICV_ENCRYPT_HASH, IP_ICV_APPEND,
> + spacc_icv_offset,
> + tctx->auth_size, 0);
> +
> + spacc_proc_len = B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len
> + + req->cryptlen + ivaadsize
> + - icvremove;
> + spacc_pre_aad_size = B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len
> + + ivaadsize + ptaadsize;
> +
> + } else {
> + rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc,
> + ctx->cb.new_handle,
> + encrypt ? OP_ENCRYPT : OP_DECRYPT,
> + ICV_ENCRYPT_HASH, IP_ICV_APPEND,
> + spacc_icv_offset,
> + tctx->auth_size, 0);
> +
> + spacc_proc_len = B0len + req->assoclen
> + + req->cryptlen - icvremove
> + + ivaadsize;
> + spacc_pre_aad_size = B0len + req->assoclen
> + + ivaadsize + ptaadsize;
> + }
> + } else {
> + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
> + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM_RFC8998) {
> + rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc,
> + ctx->cb.new_handle,
> + encrypt ? OP_ENCRYPT : OP_DECRYPT,
> + ICV_ENCRYPT_HASH, IP_ICV_OFFSET,
> + spacc_icv_offset,
> + tctx->auth_size, 0);
> +
> + spacc_proc_len = B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len
> + + req->cryptlen + ivaadsize
> + - icvremove;
> + spacc_pre_aad_size = B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len
> + + ivaadsize + ptaadsize;
> +
> + } else {
> + rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc,
> + ctx->cb.new_handle,
> + encrypt ? OP_ENCRYPT : OP_DECRYPT,
> + ICV_ENCRYPT_HASH, IP_ICV_APPEND,
> + req->cryptlen - icvremove +
> + SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len +
> + req->assoclen + ivaadsize,
> + tctx->auth_size, 0);
> +
> + spacc_proc_len = B0len + req->assoclen
> + + req->cryptlen - icvremove
> + + ivaadsize;
> + spacc_pre_aad_size = B0len + req->assoclen
> + + ivaadsize + ptaadsize;
> + }
> + }

There's a bunch of (almost) copy-paste in the call to spacc_set_operation() above, combined with ignoring
the return value. Can we restructure a bit so the repetition is minimized?

> +
> + rc = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(&priv->spacc, ctx->cb.new_handle,
> + &ctx->src,
> + (req->dst == req->src) ? &ctx->src :
> + &ctx->dst, spacc_proc_len,
> + (dstoff << SPACC_OFFSET_DST_O) |
> + SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE,
> + spacc_pre_aad_size,
> + 0, iv_to_context, 0);
> +
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + spacc_aead_cleanup_dma(tctx->dev, req);
> + spacc_close(&priv->spacc, ctx->cb.new_handle);
> +
> + if (rc != -EBUSY) {
> + dev_err(tctx->dev, " failed to enqueue job, ERR: %d\n",
> + rc);
> + }
> +
> + if (!(req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG))
> + return -EBUSY;
> +
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + /* At this point the job is in flight to the engine ... remove first use
> + * so subsequent calls don't expand the key again... ideally we would
> + * pump a dummy job through the engine to pre-expand the key so that by
> + * time setkey was done we wouldn't have to do this
> + */
> + priv->spacc.job[tctx->handle].first_use = 0;

Does this need some locking, given the comment?

> + priv->spacc.job[tctx->handle].ctrl &= ~(1UL
> + << priv->spacc.config.ctrl_map[SPACC_CTRL_KEY_EXP]);
> +
> + return -EINPROGRESS;
> +}
> +

<snip>

> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..53c76ee16c53
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,1183 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +
> +#include <linux/dmapool.h>
> +#include <crypto/sm3.h>
> +#include <crypto/sha1.h>
> +#include <crypto/sha2.h>
> +#include <crypto/sha3.h>
> +#include <crypto/md5.h>
> +#include <crypto/aes.h>
> +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
> +#include <linux/platform_device.h>
> +#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
> +
> +#include "spacc_device.h"
> +#include "spacc_core.h"
> +
> +#define PPP_BUF_SZ 128
> +
> +struct sdesc {
> + struct shash_desc shash;
> + char ctx[];
> +};
> +
> +struct my_list {
> + struct list_head list;
> + char *buffer;
> +};
> +

Unless my is an acronym, maybe a better name? :) Maybe sg_list_iter or such, given its role
in iterating through the sg list below?

> +static struct dma_pool *spacc_hash_pool;
> +static LIST_HEAD(spacc_hash_alg_list);
> +static LIST_HEAD(head_sglbuf);
> +static DEFINE_MUTEX(spacc_hash_alg_mutex);
> +

<snip>

> +
> +static void sgl_node_delete(void)
> +{
> + /* go through the list and free the memory. */
> + struct my_list *cursor, *temp;
> +
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(cursor, temp, &head_sglbuf, list) {
> + kfree(cursor->buffer);
> + list_del(&cursor->list);
> + kfree(cursor);
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static void sg_node_create_add(char *sg_buf)
> +{
> + struct my_list *temp_node = NULL;
> +
> + /*Creating Node*/
> + temp_node = kmalloc(sizeof(struct my_list), GFP_KERNEL);
> +
> + /*Assgin the data that is received*/
> + temp_node->buffer = sg_buf;
> +
> + /*Init the list within the struct*/
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&temp_node->list);
> +
> + /*Add Node to Linked List*/
> + list_add_tail(&temp_node->list, &head_sglbuf);
> +}
> +
> +static int spacc_ctx_clone_handle(struct ahash_request *req)
> +{
> + struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
> + struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
> + struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
> + struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
> +
> + ctx->acb.new_handle = spacc_clone_handle(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
> + &ctx->acb);
> +
> + if (ctx->acb.new_handle < 0) {
> + spacc_hash_cleanup_dma(tctx->dev, req);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> +
> + ctx->acb.tctx = tctx;
> + ctx->acb.ctx = ctx;
> + ctx->acb.req = req;
> + ctx->acb.spacc = &priv->spacc;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +

<snip>

> +
> +static int spacc_hash_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
> + unsigned int keylen)
> +{
> + int x, rc;
> + const struct spacc_alg *salg = spacc_tfm_ahash(&tfm->base);
> + struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
> + struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
> + unsigned int digest_size, block_size;
> + char hash_alg[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
> +
> + block_size = crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(&tfm->base);
> + digest_size = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
> +
> + /*
> + * If keylen > hash block len, the key is supposed to be hashed so that
> + * it is less than the block length. This is kind of a useless
> + * property of HMAC as you can just use that hash as the key directly.
> + * We will just not use the hardware in this case to avoid the issue.
> + * This test was meant for hashes but it works for cmac/xcbc since we
> + * only intend to support 128-bit keys...
> + */
> +
> + if (keylen > block_size && salg->mode->id != CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_CMAC) {
> + dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Exceeds keylen: %u\n", keylen);
> + dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Req. keylen hashing %s\n",
> + salg->calg->cra_name);
> +
> + memset(hash_alg, 0x00, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
> + switch (salg->mode->id) {
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA224:
> + rc = do_shash("sha224", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
> + NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
> + break;
> +
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA256:
> + rc = do_shash("sha256", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
> + NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
> + break;
> +
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA384:
> + rc = do_shash("sha384", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
> + NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
> + break;
> +
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA512:
> + rc = do_shash("sha512", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
> + NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
> + break;
> +
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_MD5:
> + rc = do_shash("md5", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
> + NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
> + break;
> +
> + case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA1:
> + rc = do_shash("sha1", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
> + NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
> + break;
> +
> + default:
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + pr_err("ERR: %d computing shash for %s\n",
> + rc, hash_alg);
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> +
> + keylen = digest_size;
> + dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "updated keylen: %u\n", keylen);
> + } else {
> + memcpy(tctx->ipad, key, keylen);
> + }
> +
> + tctx->ctx_valid = false;
> +
> + if (salg->mode->sw_fb) {
> + rc = crypto_ahash_setkey(tctx->fb.hash, key, keylen);
> + if (rc < 0)
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + /* close handle since key size may have changed */
> + if (tctx->handle >= 0) {
> + spacc_close(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle);
> + put_device(tctx->dev);
> + tctx->handle = -1;
> + tctx->dev = NULL;
> + }
> +
> + priv = NULL;
> + for (x = 0; x < ELP_CAPI_MAX_DEV && salg->dev[x]; x++) {
> + priv = dev_get_drvdata(salg->dev[x]);
> + tctx->dev = get_device(salg->dev[x]);
> + if (spacc_isenabled(&priv->spacc, salg->mode->id, keylen)) {
> + tctx->handle = spacc_open(&priv->spacc,
> + CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
> + salg->mode->id, -1,
> + 0, spacc_digest_cb, tfm);
> +
> + } else
> + pr_debug(" Keylen: %d not enabled for algo: %d",
> + keylen, salg->mode->id);
> +

Please run scripts/checkpatch.pl through all the patches, it will point out things like the unbalanced
braces here.

> + if (tctx->handle >= 0)
> + break;
> +
> + put_device(salg->dev[x]);
> + }
> +
> + if (tctx->handle < 0) {
> + pr_err("ERR: Failed to open SPAcc context\n");
> + dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Failed to open SPAcc context\n");
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> +
> + rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle, OP_ENCRYPT,
> + ICV_HASH, IP_ICV_OFFSET, 0, 0, 0);
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + spacc_close(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle);
> + tctx->handle = -1;
> + put_device(tctx->dev);
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> +
> + if (salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_XCBC ||
> + salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SM4_XCBC) {
> + rc = spacc_compute_xcbc_key(&priv->spacc, salg->mode->id,
> + tctx->handle, tctx->ipad,
> + keylen, tctx->ipad);
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + dev_warn(tctx->dev,
> + "Failed to compute XCBC key: %d\n", rc);
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> + rc = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
> + SPACC_HASH_OPERATION, tctx->ipad,
> + 32 + keylen, NULL, 0);
> + } else {
> + rc = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
> + SPACC_HASH_OPERATION, tctx->ipad,
> + keylen, NULL, 0);
> + }
> +
> + memset(tctx->ipad, 0, sizeof(tctx->ipad));
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + pr_err("ERR: Failed to write SPAcc context\n");
> + dev_warn(tctx->dev, "Failed to write SPAcc context %d: %d\n",
> + tctx->handle, rc);
> +
> + /* Non-fatal; we continue with the software fallback. */
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + tctx->ctx_valid = true;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +

<snip>

Thanks,
Easwar


2024-03-29 18:01:39

by Easwar Hariharan

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 2/4] Add SPACC Kconfig and Makefile

On 3/28/2024 11:26 AM, Pavitrakumar M wrote:
> Signed-off-by: shwetar <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Pavitrakumar M <[email protected]>
> Acked-by: Ruud Derwig <[email protected]>
> ---
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Kconfig | 95 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Makefile | 16 ++++++
> 2 files changed, 111 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Kconfig
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Makefile
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Kconfig
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..9eb41a295f9d
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/Kconfig
> @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
> +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +
> +config CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC
> + tristate "Support for dw_spacc Security protocol accelerators"
> + depends on HAS_DMA
> + default m
> +
> + help
> + This enables support for the HASH/CRYP/AEAD hw accelerator which can be found
> + on dw_spacc IP.

<snip>

Thanks for addressing this from v0. For this patch:

Reviewed-by: Easwar Hariharan <[email protected]>

Thanks,
Easwar

2024-03-30 00:42:01

by kernel test robot

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 4/4] Enable Driver compilation in crypto Kconfig and Makefile file

Hi Pavitrakumar,

kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:

[auto build test WARNING on 6a8dbd71a70620c42d4fa82509204ba18231f28d]

url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Pavitrakumar-M/Add-SPAcc-driver-to-Linux-kernel/20240329-023010
base: 6a8dbd71a70620c42d4fa82509204ba18231f28d
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240328182652.3587727-5-pavitrakumarm%40vayavyalabs.com
patch subject: [PATCH v1 4/4] Enable Driver compilation in crypto Kconfig and Makefile file
config: mips-randconfig-r122-20240330 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240330/[email protected]/config)
compiler: clang version 19.0.0git (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 79ba323bdd0843275019e16b6e9b35133677c514)
reproduce: (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240330/[email protected]/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/

sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c:135:46: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) @@ expected void volatile [noderef] __iomem *mem @@ got void * @@
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c:135:46: sparse: expected void volatile [noderef] __iomem *mem
drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c:135:46: sparse: got void *

vim +135 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c

b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 107
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 108 static int spacc_ctx_release(struct spacc_device *spacc, int ctx_id)
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 109 {
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 110 unsigned long lock_flag;
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 111 int ncontig;
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 112 int y;
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 113
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 114
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 115 if (ctx_id < 0 || ctx_id > spacc->config.num_ctx)
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 116 return -EINVAL;
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 117
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 118 spin_lock_irqsave(&spacc->ctx_lock, lock_flag);
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 119 /* release the base context and contiguous block */
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 120 ncontig = (&spacc->ctx[ctx_id])->ncontig;
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 121 for (y = 0; y <= ncontig; y++) {
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 122 if ((&spacc->ctx[ctx_id + y])->ref_cnt > 0)
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 123 (&spacc->ctx[ctx_id + y])->ref_cnt--;
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 124 }
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 125
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 126 if ((&spacc->ctx[ctx_id])->ref_cnt == 0) {
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 127 (&spacc->ctx[ctx_id])->ncontig = 0;
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 128 #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SPACC_SECURE_MODE
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 129 /* TODO: This driver works in harmony with "normal" kernel
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 130 * processes so we release the context all the time
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 131 * normally this would be done from a "secure" kernel process
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 132 * (trustzone/etc). This hack is so that SPACC.0
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 133 * cores can both use the same context space.
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 134 */
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 @135 writel(ctx_id, spacc->regmap + SPACC_REG_SECURE_RELEASE);
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 136 #endif
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 137 }
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 138
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 139 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&spacc->ctx_lock, lock_flag);
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 140
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 141 return CRYPTO_OK;
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 142 }
b37587c90bca57 Pavitrakumar M 2024-03-28 143

--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

2024-04-01 07:22:08

by Pavitrakumar M

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/4] Add SPAcc driver to Linux kernel

Hi Easwar,
My comments are embedded below. Also should I wait for more comments
from you or
should I go ahead and push v2 with the below fixes ?

Warm regards,
PK

On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 11:26 PM Easwar Hariharan
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Partial review comments below, more to come. Please, in the future, split the patches up more so reviewers
> don't have to review ~9k lines in 1 email.
>
> On 3/28/2024 11:26 AM, Pavitrakumar M wrote:
> > Signed-off-by: shwetar <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Pavitrakumar M <[email protected]>
> > Acked-by: Ruud Derwig <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c | 1382 ++++++++++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c | 1183 ++++++++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.c | 2917 ++++++++++++++++++++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.h | 839 ++++++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.c | 324 +++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.h | 236 ++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.c | 365 +++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.h | 113 +
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_interrupt.c | 204 ++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c | 670 +++++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_skcipher.c | 754 +++++
> > 11 files changed, 8987 insertions(+)
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.c
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.h
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.c
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.h
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.c
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.h
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_interrupt.c
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_skcipher.c
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..f4b1ae9a4ef1
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,1382 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +
> > +#include <crypto/aes.h>
> > +#include <crypto/sm4.h>
> > +#include <crypto/gcm.h>
> > +#include <crypto/aead.h>
> > +#include <crypto/authenc.h>
> > +#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
> > +#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
> > +#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
> > +#include <linux/platform_device.h>
> > +
> > +#include "spacc_device.h"
> > +#include "spacc_core.h"
> > +
> > +static LIST_HEAD(spacc_aead_alg_list);
> > +static DEFINE_MUTEX(spacc_aead_alg_mutex);
> > +
> > +#define SPACC_B0_LEN 16
> > +#define SET_IV_IN_SRCBUF 0x80000000
> > +#define SET_IV_IN_CONTEXT 0x0
> > +#define IV_PTEXT_BUF_SZ 8192
> > +#define XTRA_BUF_LEN 4096
> > +#define IV_B0_LEN (XTRA_BUF_LEN + SPACC_B0_LEN +\
> > + SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE)
> > +
> > +struct spacc_iv_buf {
> > + unsigned char iv[SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE];
> > + unsigned char fulliv[SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + SPACC_B0_LEN + XTRA_BUF_LEN];
>
> So the value here is identical to IV_B0_LEN defined above, is there a semantic or documentation
> reason we are adding these up again? It feels natural to me to have a fulliv buffer of size IV_B0_LEN,
> but I'm new to crypto, and maybe I'm missing something?
>
> Also I'm wondering why there is a mix of *LEN, *SZ, and *SIZE in the defines.
>
PK: Will fix that

> > + unsigned char ptext[IV_PTEXT_BUF_SZ];
> > + struct scatterlist sg[2], fullsg[2], ptextsg[2];
> > +};
> > +
> > +static struct kmem_cache *spacc_iv_pool;
> > +
> > +static void spacc_init_aead_alg(struct crypto_alg *calg,
> > + const struct mode_tab *mode)
> > +{
> > + snprintf(calg->cra_name, sizeof(mode->name), "%s", mode->name);
> > + snprintf(calg->cra_driver_name, sizeof(calg->cra_driver_name),
> > + "spacc-%s", mode->name);
> > + calg->cra_blocksize = mode->blocklen;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static struct mode_tab possible_aeads[] = {
> > + { MODE_TAB_AEAD("rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)",
> > + CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305, CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
> > + 16, 12, 1), .keylen = { 16, 24, 32 }
> > + },
> > + { MODE_TAB_AEAD("gcm(aes)",
> > + CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM, CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
> > + 16, 12, 1), .keylen = { 16, 24, 32 }
> > + },
> > + { MODE_TAB_AEAD("gcm(sm4)",
> > + CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM, CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
> > + 16, 12, 1), .keylen = { 16 }
> > + },
> > + { MODE_TAB_AEAD("ccm(aes)",
> > + CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM, CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
> > + 16, 16, 1), .keylen = { 16, 24, 32 }
> > + },
> > + { MODE_TAB_AEAD("ccm(sm4)",
> > + CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM, CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
> > + 16, 16, 1), .keylen = { 16, 24, 32 }
> > + },
> > +};
> > +
> > +static int ccm_16byte_aligned_len(int in_len)
> > +{
> > + int len;
> > + int computed_mod;
> > +
> > + if (in_len > 0) {
> > + computed_mod = in_len % 16;
> > + if (computed_mod)
> > + len = in_len - computed_mod + 16;
> > + else
> > + len = in_len;
> > + } else {
> > + len = in_len;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return len;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* taken from crypto/ccm.c */
> > +static int spacc_aead_format_adata(u8 *adata, unsigned int a)
> > +{
> > + int len = 0;
> > +
> > + /* add control info for associated data
> > + * RFC 3610 and NIST Special Publication 800-38C
> > + */
> > + if (a < 65280) {
> > + *(__be16 *)adata = cpu_to_be16(a);
> > + len = 2;
> > + } else {
> > + *(__be16 *)adata = cpu_to_be16(0xfffe);
> > + *(__be32 *)&adata[2] = cpu_to_be32(a);
> > + len = 6;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return len;
> > +}
> > +
> > +
> > +/* taken from crypto/ccm.c */
> > +static int spacc_aead_set_msg_len(u8 *block, unsigned int msglen, int csize)
> > +{
> > + __be32 data;
> > +
> > + memset(block, 0, csize);
> > + block += csize;
> > +
> > + if (csize >= 4)
> > + csize = 4;
> > + else if (msglen > (unsigned int)(1 << (8 * csize)))
> > + return -EOVERFLOW;
> > +
> > + data = cpu_to_be32(msglen);
> > + memcpy(block - csize, (u8 *)&data + 4 - csize, csize);
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int spacc_aead_init_dma(struct device *dev, struct aead_request *req,
> > + u64 seq, uint32_t icvlen,
> > + int encrypt, int *alen)
> > +{
> > + struct crypto_aead *reqtfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
> > + struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(reqtfm);
> > + struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
> > +
> > + gfp_t mflags = GFP_ATOMIC;
> > + struct spacc_iv_buf *iv;
> > + int ccm_aad_16b_len = 0;
> > + int rc, B0len;
> > + int payload_len, fullsg_buf_len;
> > + unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(reqtfm);
> > +
> > + /* always have 1 byte of IV */
> > + if (!ivsize)
> > + ivsize = 1;
> > +
> > + if (req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP)
> > + mflags = GFP_KERNEL;
> > +
> > + ctx->iv_buf = kmem_cache_alloc(spacc_iv_pool, mflags);
> > + if (!ctx->iv_buf)
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> > + iv = ctx->iv_buf;
> > +
> > + sg_init_table(iv->sg, ARRAY_SIZE(iv->sg));
> > + sg_init_table(iv->fullsg, ARRAY_SIZE(iv->fullsg));
> > + sg_init_table(iv->ptextsg, ARRAY_SIZE(iv->ptextsg));
> > +
> > + B0len = 0;
> > + ctx->ptext_nents = 0;
> > + ctx->fulliv_nents = 0;
> > +
> > + memset(iv->iv, 0, SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE);
> > + memset(iv->fulliv, 0, IV_B0_LEN);
> > + memset(iv->ptext, 0, IV_PTEXT_BUF_SZ);
> > +
> > + /* copy the IV out for AAD */
> > + memcpy(iv->iv, req->iv, ivsize);
> > +
> > + /* now we need to figure out the cipher IV which may or
> > + * may not be "req->iv" depending on the mode we are
>
> ...depending on the mode we are *in*
>
PK: will fix that

> > + */
> > + if (tctx->mode & SPACC_MANGLE_IV_FLAG) {
> > + switch (tctx->mode & 0x7F00) {
> > + case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC3686:
> > + case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4106:
> > + case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4543:
> > + {
> > + unsigned char *p = iv->fulliv;
> > + /* we're in RFC3686 mode so the last
> > + * 4 bytes of the key are the SALT
> > + */
> > + memcpy(p, tctx->csalt, 4);
> > + memcpy(p + 4, req->iv, ivsize);
> > +
> > + p[12] = 0;
> > + p[13] = 0;
> > + p[14] = 0;
> > + p[15] = 1;
> > + }
> > + break;
> > + case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4309:
> > + {
> > + unsigned char *p = iv->fulliv;
> > + int L, M;
> > + u32 lm = req->cryptlen;
> > +
> > + /* CCM mode */
> > + /* p[0..15] is the CTR IV */
> > + /* p[16..31] is the CBC-MAC B0 block*/
> > + B0len = SPACC_B0_LEN;
> > + /* IPsec requires L=4*/
> > + L = 4;
> > + M = tctx->auth_size;
> > +
> > + /* CTR block */
> > + p[0] = L - 1;
> > + memcpy(p + 1, tctx->csalt, 3);
> > + memcpy(p + 4, req->iv, ivsize);
> > + p[12] = 0;
> > + p[13] = 0;
> > + p[14] = 0;
> > + p[15] = 1;
> > +
> > + /* store B0 block at p[16..31] */
> > + p[16] = (1 << 6) | (((M - 2) >> 1) << 3)
> > + | (L - 1);
> > + memcpy(p + 1 + 16, tctx->csalt, 3);
> > + memcpy(p + 4 + 16, req->iv, ivsize);
> > +
> > + /* now store length */
> > + p[16 + 12 + 0] = (lm >> 24) & 0xFF;
> > + p[16 + 12 + 1] = (lm >> 16) & 0xFF;
> > + p[16 + 12 + 2] = (lm >> 8) & 0xFF;
> > + p[16 + 12 + 3] = (lm) & 0xFF;
> > +
> > + /*now store the pre-formatted AAD */
> > + p[32] = (req->assoclen >> 8) & 0xFF;
> > + p[33] = (req->assoclen) & 0xFF;
> > + /* we added 2 byte header to the AAD */
> > + B0len += 2;
> > + }
> > + break;
> > + }
> > + } else if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM) {
> > + unsigned char *p = iv->fulliv;
> > + int L, M;
> > +
> > + u32 lm = (encrypt) ?
> > + req->cryptlen :
> > + req->cryptlen - tctx->auth_size;
> > +
> > + /* CCM mode */
> > + /* p[0..15] is the CTR IV */
> > + /* p[16..31] is the CBC-MAC B0 block*/
> > + B0len = SPACC_B0_LEN;
> > +
> > + /* IPsec requires L=4 */
> > + L = req->iv[0] + 1;
> > + M = tctx->auth_size;
> > +
> > + /* CTR block */
> > + memcpy(p, req->iv, ivsize);
> > + memcpy(p + 16, req->iv, ivsize);
> > +
> > + /* Store B0 block at p[16..31] */
> > + p[16] |= (8 * ((M - 2) / 2));
> > +
> > + /* set adata if assoclen > 0 */
> > + if (req->assoclen)
> > + p[16] |= 64;
> > +
> > + /* now store length, this is L size starts from 16-L
> > + * to 16 of B0
> > + */
> > + spacc_aead_set_msg_len(p + 16 + 16 - L, lm, L);
> > +
> > + if (req->assoclen) {
> > +
> > + /* store pre-formatted AAD:
> > + * AAD_LEN + AAD + PAD
> > + */
> > + *alen = spacc_aead_format_adata(&p[32], req->assoclen);
> > +
> > + ccm_aad_16b_len =
> > + ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->assoclen + *alen);
> > +
> > + /* Adding the rest of AAD from req->src */
> > + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(p + 32 + *alen,
> > + req->src, 0,
> > + req->assoclen, 0);
> > +
> > + /* Copy AAD to req->dst */
> > + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(p + 32 + *alen, req->dst,
> > + 0, req->assoclen, 1);
> > +
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* Adding PT/CT from req->src to ptext here */
> > + if (req->cryptlen)
> > + memset(iv->ptext, 0,
> > + ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->cryptlen));
> > +
> > + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(iv->ptext, req->src,
> > + req->assoclen,
> > + req->cryptlen, 0);
> > +
> > +
> > + } else {
> > +
> > + /* default is to copy the iv over since the
> > + * cipher and protocol IV are the same
> > + */
> > + memcpy(iv->fulliv, req->iv, ivsize);
> > +
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* this is part of the AAD */
> > + sg_set_buf(iv->sg, iv->iv, ivsize);
> > +
> > + /* GCM and CCM don't include the IV in the AAD */
> > + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM_RFC4106 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM_RFC8998 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_NULL) {
>
> Is this better constructed as a switch..case? You could even consolidate the
> sg creation and submission to the SPACC engine below into a common case with
> some indirection for the differing parameters...
>
PK: Sure, will refactor and fix that

> > +
> > + ctx->iv_nents = 0;
> > + payload_len = req->cryptlen + icvlen + req->assoclen;
> > + fullsg_buf_len = SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len;
> > +
> > + /* this is the actual IV getting fed to the core
> > + * (via IV IMPORT)
> > + */
> > +
> > + sg_set_buf(iv->fullsg, iv->fulliv, fullsg_buf_len);
> > +
> > + rc = spacc_sgs_to_ddt(dev,
> > + iv->fullsg, fullsg_buf_len,
> > + &ctx->fulliv_nents, NULL, 0,
> > + &ctx->iv_nents, req->src,
> > + payload_len, &ctx->src_nents,
> > + &ctx->src, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> > +
> > + } else if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM) {
> > +
> > +
> > + ctx->iv_nents = 0;
> > +
> > + if (encrypt)
> > + payload_len =
> > + ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->cryptlen + icvlen);
> > + else
> > + payload_len =
> > + ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->cryptlen);
> > +
> > + fullsg_buf_len = SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len;
> > +
> > +
> > + /* this is the actual IV getting fed to the core (via IV IMPORT)
> > + * This has CTR IV + B0 + AAD(B1, B2, ...)
> > + */
> > + sg_set_buf(iv->fullsg, iv->fulliv, fullsg_buf_len);
> > + sg_set_buf(iv->ptextsg, iv->ptext, payload_len);
> > +
> > + rc = spacc_sgs_to_ddt(dev,
> > + iv->fullsg, fullsg_buf_len,
> > + &ctx->fulliv_nents, NULL, 0,
> > + &ctx->iv_nents, iv->ptextsg,
> > + payload_len, &ctx->ptext_nents,
> > + &ctx->src, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> > +
> > + } else {
> > + payload_len = req->cryptlen + icvlen + req->assoclen;
> > + fullsg_buf_len = SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len;
> > +
> > + /* this is the actual IV getting fed to the core (via IV IMPORT)
> > + * This has CTR IV + B0 + AAD(B1, B2, ...)
> > + */
> > + sg_set_buf(iv->fullsg, iv->fulliv, fullsg_buf_len);
> > +
> > + rc = spacc_sgs_to_ddt(dev, iv->fullsg, fullsg_buf_len,
> > + &ctx->fulliv_nents, iv->sg,
> > + ivsize, &ctx->iv_nents,
> > + req->src, payload_len, &ctx->src_nents,
> > + &ctx->src, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (rc < 0)
> > + goto err_free_iv;
>
> ...and that would allow this result check to be next to the spacc_sgs_to_ddt call that it gets
> its value from
>
PK: That check is applicable to all "spacc_sgs_to_ddt" calls in if-elseif-else;
but I do see your point for code readability/control issues.
Will fix this.

> > +
> > + /* Putting in req->dst is good since it won't overwrite anything
> > + * even in case of CCM this is fine condition
> > + */
> > + if (req->dst != req->src) {
> > + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM) {
>
> Similar comment to above, looks like this could be better structured as a switch-case.
>
PK: Sure, will fix this.

> > + /* If req->dst buffer len is not-positive,
> > + * then skip setting up of DMA
> > + */
> > + if (req->dst->length <= 0) {
> > + ctx->dst_nents = 0;
> > + return 0;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (encrypt)
> > + payload_len = req->cryptlen + icvlen +
> > + req->assoclen;
> > + else
> > + payload_len = req->cryptlen - tctx->auth_size +
> > + req->assoclen;
>
> No check for payload_len == 0 after these operations here, unlike in the else case that
> returns -EBADMSG. Is this intentional?
>
PK: Yes that check is not needed in case of Encryption, so we dont have that.

> > +
> > + /* For corner cases where PTlen=AADlen=0, we set default
> > + * to 16
> > + */
> > + rc = spacc_sg_to_ddt(dev, req->dst,
> > + payload_len > 0 ? payload_len : 16,
> > + &ctx->dst, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> > + if (rc < 0)
> > + goto err_free_src;
> > +
> > + ctx->dst_nents = rc;
> > + } else {
> > +
> > + /* If req->dst buffer len is not-positive,
> > + * then skip setting up of DMA
> > + */
> > + if (req->dst->length <= 0) {
> > + ctx->dst_nents = 0;
> > + return 0;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (encrypt)
> > + payload_len = SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + req->cryptlen
> > + + icvlen + req->assoclen;
> > + else {
> > + payload_len = req->cryptlen - tctx->auth_size +
> > + req->assoclen;
> > + if (payload_len == 0)
> > + return -EBADMSG;
>
> Should this be checking for <= 0?
PK: Sure, will fix that

>
> > + }
> > +
> > +
> > + rc = spacc_sg_to_ddt(dev, req->dst, payload_len,
> > + &ctx->dst, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> > + if (rc < 0)
> > + goto err_free_src;
> > +
> > + ctx->dst_nents = rc;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > +err_free_src:
> > + if (ctx->fulliv_nents)
> > + dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->fullsg, ctx->fulliv_nents,
> > + DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> > +
> > + if (ctx->iv_nents)
> > + dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->sg, ctx->iv_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> > +
> > + if (ctx->ptext_nents)
> > + dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->ptextsg, ctx->ptext_nents,
> > + DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> > +
> > + dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->src, ctx->src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> > + pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->src);
> > +
> > +err_free_iv:
> > + kmem_cache_free(spacc_iv_pool, ctx->iv_buf);
> > +
> > + return rc;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void spacc_aead_cleanup_dma(struct device *dev, struct aead_request *req)
> > +{
> > + struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
> > + struct spacc_iv_buf *iv = ctx->iv_buf;
> > +
> > + if (req->src != req->dst) {
> > + if (req->dst->length > 0) {
> > + dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->dst, ctx->dst_nents,
> > + DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> > + pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->dst);
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (ctx->fulliv_nents)
> > + dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->fullsg, ctx->fulliv_nents,
> > + DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> > +
> > + if (ctx->ptext_nents)
> > + dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->ptextsg, ctx->ptext_nents,
> > + DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> > +
> > + if (ctx->iv_nents)
> > + dma_unmap_sg(dev, iv->sg, ctx->iv_nents,
> > + DMA_TO_DEVICE);
>
> The ordering of unmapping ptext and iv sgs differs from the err_free_src() cleanup above. If it
> isn't intentional, maybe we can share some code here to prevent inadvertent ordering violations?
>
PK: That is not a problem since there is no dependency, but I will fix
that so its uniform across.

> > +
> > + if (req->src->length > 0) {
> > + dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->src, ctx->src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> > + pdu_ddt_free(&ctx->src);
> > + }
> > +
> > + kmem_cache_free(spacc_iv_pool, ctx->iv_buf);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static bool spacc_keylen_ok(const struct spacc_alg *salg, unsigned int keylen)
> > +{
> > + unsigned int i, mask = salg->keylen_mask;
> > +
> > + BUG_ON(mask > (1ul << ARRAY_SIZE(salg->mode->keylen)) - 1);
>
> Do we really need to panic the kernel here? If we do, maybe we can write a comment explaining why this
> should be fatal.
>
PK: Agreed, I think returning EINVAL is better than panicking. Will fix that.

> > +
> > + for (i = 0; mask; i++, mask >>= 1) {
> > + if (mask & 1 && salg->mode->keylen[i] == keylen)
> > + return true;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return false;
> > +}
> > +
>
> <snip>
>
> > +
>
> > +static int spacc_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned
> > + int keylen)
> > +{
> > + struct spacc_crypto_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
> > + const struct spacc_alg *salg = spacc_tfm_aead(&tfm->base);
> > + struct spacc_priv *priv;
> > + struct rtattr *rta = (void *)key;
> > + struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param;
> > + unsigned int x, authkeylen, enckeylen;
> > + const unsigned char *authkey, *enckey;
> > + unsigned char xcbc[64];
> > +
> > + int err = -EINVAL;
> > + int singlekey = 0;
> > +
> > + /* are keylens valid? */
> > + ctx->ctx_valid = false;
> > +
> > + switch (ctx->mode & 0xFF) {
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM:
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM:
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_NULL:
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM:
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM:
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
> > + authkey = key;
> > + authkeylen = 0;
> > + enckey = key;
> > + enckeylen = keylen;
> > + ctx->keylen = keylen;
> > + singlekey = 1;
> > + goto skipover;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (!RTA_OK(rta, keylen))
> > + goto badkey;
> > +
> > + if (rta->rta_type != CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM)
> > + goto badkey;
> > +
> > + if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) < sizeof(*param))
> > + goto badkey;
>
> Can these 3 checks be combined or is this some idiomatic code to individually validate
> these? If you can combine them, you can return -EINVAL here and for keylen < enckeylen
> below, and keep the pattern of do something...check...return errorcode of the rest
> of the function and get rid of the badkey label.
>
PK: Sure, will combine that so I can do away with that badkey and
return -EINVAL.

> > +
> > + param = RTA_DATA(rta);
> > + enckeylen = be32_to_cpu(param->enckeylen);
> > +
> > + key += RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
> > + keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
> > +
> > + if (keylen < enckeylen)
> > + goto badkey;
> > +
> > + authkeylen = keylen - enckeylen;
> > +
> > + /* enckey is at &key[authkeylen] and
> > + * authkey is at &key[0]
> > + */
> > + authkey = &key[0];
> > + enckey = &key[authkeylen];
> > +
> > +skipover:
> > + /* detect RFC3686/4106 and trim from enckeylen(and copy salt..) */
> > + if (ctx->mode & SPACC_MANGLE_IV_FLAG) {
> > + switch (ctx->mode & 0x7F00) {
> > + case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC3686:
> > + case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4106:
> > + case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4543:
> > + memcpy(ctx->csalt, enckey + enckeylen - 4, 4);
> > + enckeylen -= 4;
> > + break;
> > + case SPACC_MANGLE_IV_RFC4309:
> > + memcpy(ctx->csalt, enckey + enckeylen - 3, 3);
> > + enckeylen -= 3;
> > + break;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (!singlekey) {
> > + if (authkeylen > salg->mode->hashlen) {
> > + dev_warn(ctx->dev, "Auth key size of %u is not valid\n",
> > + authkeylen);
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (!spacc_keylen_ok(salg, enckeylen)) {
> > + dev_warn(ctx->dev, "Enc key size of %u is not valid\n",
> > + enckeylen);
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* if we're already open close the handle since
> > + * the size may have changed
> > + */
> > + if (ctx->handle != -1) {
> > + priv = dev_get_drvdata(ctx->dev);
> > + spacc_close(&priv->spacc, ctx->handle);
> > + put_device(ctx->dev);
> > + ctx->handle = -1;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* Open a handle and
> > + * search all devices for an open handle
> > + */
> > + priv = NULL;
> > + for (x = 0; x < ELP_CAPI_MAX_DEV && salg->dev[x]; x++) {
> > + priv = dev_get_drvdata(salg->dev[x]);
> > +
> > + /* increase reference */
> > + ctx->dev = get_device(salg->dev[x]);
> > +
> > + /* check if its a valid mode ... */
> > + if (spacc_isenabled(&priv->spacc, salg->mode->aead.ciph & 0xFF,
> > + enckeylen) &&
> > + spacc_isenabled(&priv->spacc,
> > + salg->mode->aead.hash & 0xFF, authkeylen)) {
> > + /* try to open spacc handle */
> > + ctx->handle = spacc_open(&priv->spacc,
> > + salg->mode->aead.ciph & 0xFF,
> > + salg->mode->aead.hash & 0xFF,
> > + -1, 0, spacc_aead_cb, tfm);
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (ctx->handle < 0)
> > + put_device(salg->dev[x]);
> > + else
> > + break;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (ctx->handle < 0) {
> > + dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Failed to open SPAcc context\n");
> > + return -EIO;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* setup XCBC key */
> > + if (salg->mode->aead.hash == CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_XCBC) {
> > + err = spacc_compute_xcbc_key(&priv->spacc,
> > + salg->mode->aead.hash,
> > + ctx->handle, authkey,
> > + authkeylen, xcbc);
> > + if (err < 0) {
> > + dev_warn(ctx->dev, "Failed to compute XCBC key: %d\n",
> > + err);
> > + return -EIO;
> > + }
> > + authkey = xcbc;
> > + authkeylen = 48;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* handle zero key/zero len DEC condition for SM4/AES GCM mode */
> > + ctx->zero_key = 0;
> > + if (!key[0]) {
> > + int i, val = 0;
> > +
> > + for (i = 0; i < keylen ; i++)
> > + val += key[i];
> > +
> > + if (val == 0)
> > + ctx->zero_key = 1;
> > + }
> > +
> > + err = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, ctx->handle,
> > + SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION, enckey,
> > + enckeylen, NULL, 0);
> > +
> > + if (err) {
> > + dev_warn(ctx->dev,
> > + "Could not write ciphering context: %d\n", err);
> > + return -EIO;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (!singlekey) {
> > + err = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, ctx->handle,
> > + SPACC_HASH_OPERATION, authkey,
> > + authkeylen, NULL, 0);
> > + if (err) {
> > + dev_warn(ctx->dev,
> > + "Could not write hashing context: %d\n", err);
> > + return -EIO;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* set expand key */
> > + spacc_set_key_exp(&priv->spacc, ctx->handle);
> > + ctx->ctx_valid = true;
> > +
> > + memset(xcbc, 0, sizeof(xcbc));
> > +
> > + /* copy key to ctx for fallback */
> > + memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen);
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > +badkey:
> > + return err;
> > +}
> > +
>
> <snip>
>
> > +
> > +static int spacc_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, u64 seq, int
> > + encrypt)
> > +{
> > + int rc;
> > + int B0len;
> > + int alen;
> > + u32 dstoff;
> > + int icvremove;
> > + int ivaadsize;
> > + int ptaadsize;
> > + int iv_to_context;
> > + int spacc_proc_len;
> > + u32 spacc_icv_offset;
> > + int spacc_pre_aad_size;
> > + int ccm_aad_16b_len;
> > + struct crypto_aead *reqtfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
> > + int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(reqtfm);
> > + struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(reqtfm);
> > + struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
> > + struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
> > + u32 msg_len = req->cryptlen - tctx->auth_size;
> > + u32 l;
> > +
> > + ctx->encrypt_op = encrypt;
> > + alen = 0;
> > + ccm_aad_16b_len = 0;
> > +
> > + if (tctx->handle < 0 || !tctx->ctx_valid || (req->cryptlen +
> > + req->assoclen) > priv->max_msg_len)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + /* IV is programmed to context by default */
> > + iv_to_context = SET_IV_IN_CONTEXT;
> > +
> > + if (encrypt) {
> > + switch (tctx->mode & 0xFF) {
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM:
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM:
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
> > + /* For cryptlen = 0 */
> > + if (req->cryptlen + req->assoclen == 0)
> > + return spacc_aead_fallback(req, tctx, encrypt);
> > + break;
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM:
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM:
> > + l = req->iv[0] + 1;
> > +
> > + /* 2 <= L <= 8, so 1 <= L' <= 7. */
> > + if (req->iv[0] < 1 || req->iv[0] > 7)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + /* verify that msglen can in fact be represented
> > + * in L bytes
> > + */
> > + if (l < 4 && msg_len >> (8 * l))
> > + return -EOVERFLOW;
> > +
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + pr_debug("Unsupported algo");
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > + } else {
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + /* Handle the decryption */
> > + switch (tctx->mode & 0xFF) {
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM:
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM:
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
> > + /* For assoclen = 0 */
> > + if (req->assoclen == 0 && (req->cryptlen - tctx->auth_size == 0)) {
> > + ret = spacc_aead_fallback(req, tctx, encrypt);
> > + return ret;
> > + }
> > + break;
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM:
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM:
> > + /* 2 <= L <= 8, so 1 <= L' <= 7. */
> > + if (req->iv[0] < 1 || req->iv[0] > 7)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + pr_debug("Unsupported algo");
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + icvremove = (encrypt) ? 0 : tctx->auth_size;
> > +
> > + rc = spacc_aead_init_dma(tctx->dev, req, seq, (encrypt) ?
> > + tctx->auth_size : 0, encrypt, &alen);
> > + if (rc < 0)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + if (req->assoclen)
> > + ccm_aad_16b_len = ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->assoclen + alen);
> > +
> > + /* Note: This won't work if IV_IMPORT has been disabled */
> > + ctx->cb.new_handle = spacc_clone_handle(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
> > + &ctx->cb);
> > + if (ctx->cb.new_handle < 0) {
> > + spacc_aead_cleanup_dma(tctx->dev, req);
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + ctx->cb.tctx = tctx;
> > + ctx->cb.ctx = ctx;
> > + ctx->cb.req = req;
> > + ctx->cb.spacc = &priv->spacc;
> > +
> > + /* Write IV to the spacc-context
> > + * IV can be written to context or as part of the input src buffer
> > + * IV in case of CCM is going in the input src buff.
> > + * IV for GCM is written to the context.
> > + */
> > + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM_RFC4106 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM_RFC8998 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_NULL) {
> > + iv_to_context = SET_IV_IN_CONTEXT;
> > + rc = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, ctx->cb.new_handle,
> > + SPACC_CRYPTO_OPERATION, NULL, 0,
> > + req->iv, ivsize);
> > + }
>
> We are either assuming success here, or the return value doesn't matter. Intentional?
>
PK: Better to have that check in place. Will fix that.

> > +
> > + /* CCM and GCM don't include the IV in the AAD */
> > + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM_RFC4106 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_GCM_RFC8998 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_NULL) {
> > + ivaadsize = 0;
> > + } else {
> > + ivaadsize = ivsize;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* CCM requires an extra block of AAD */
> > + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM)
> > + B0len = SPACC_B0_LEN;
> > + else
> > + B0len = 0;
> > +
> > + /* GMAC mode uses AAD for the entire message.
> > + * So does NULL cipher
> > + */
> > + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_GCM_RFC4543 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_NULL) {
> > + if (req->cryptlen >= icvremove)
> > + ptaadsize = req->cryptlen - icvremove;
> > + } else {
> > + ptaadsize = 0;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* Calculate and set the below, important parameters
> > + * spacc icv offset - spacc_icv_offset
> > + * destination offset - dstoff
> > + * IV to context - This is set for CCM, not set for GCM
> > + */
> > + if (req->dst == req->src) {
> > + dstoff = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len +
> > + req->assoclen + ivaadsize));
> > +
> > + if (req->assoclen + req->cryptlen >= icvremove)
> > + spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE +
> > + B0len + req->assoclen +
> > + ivaadsize + req->cryptlen -
> > + icvremove));
> > + else
> > + spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE +
> > + B0len + req->assoclen +
> > + ivaadsize + req->cryptlen));
> > +
> > + /* CCM case */
> > + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM) {
> > + iv_to_context = SET_IV_IN_SRCBUF;
> > + dstoff = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len +
> > + ccm_aad_16b_len + ivaadsize));
> > +
> > + if (encrypt)
> > + spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
> > + + B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len
> > + + ivaadsize
> > + + ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->cryptlen)
> > + - icvremove));
> > + else
> > + spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
> > + + B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len + ivaadsize
> > + + req->cryptlen - icvremove));
> > + }
> > +
> > + } else {
> > + dstoff = ((uint32_t)(req->assoclen + ivaadsize));
> > +
> > + if (req->assoclen + req->cryptlen >= icvremove)
> > + spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
> > + + B0len + req->assoclen
> > + + ivaadsize + req->cryptlen
> > + - icvremove));
> > + else
> > + spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
> > + + B0len + req->assoclen
> > + + ivaadsize + req->cryptlen));
> > +
> > + /* CCM case */
> > + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM) {
> > + iv_to_context = SET_IV_IN_SRCBUF;
> > + dstoff = ((uint32_t)(req->assoclen + ivaadsize));
> > +
> > + if (encrypt)
> > + spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
> > + + B0len
> > + + ccm_aad_16b_len + ivaadsize
> > + + ccm_16byte_aligned_len(req->cryptlen)
> > + - icvremove));
> > + else
> > + spacc_icv_offset = ((uint32_t)(SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE
> > + + B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len + ivaadsize
> > + + req->cryptlen - icvremove));
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* Calculate and set the below, important parameters
> > + * spacc proc_len - spacc_proc_len
> > + * pre-AAD size - spacc_pre_aad_size
> > + */
> > + if (encrypt) {
> > + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM_RFC8998) {
> > + rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc,
> > + ctx->cb.new_handle,
> > + encrypt ? OP_ENCRYPT : OP_DECRYPT,
> > + ICV_ENCRYPT_HASH, IP_ICV_APPEND,
> > + spacc_icv_offset,
> > + tctx->auth_size, 0);
> > +
> > + spacc_proc_len = B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len
> > + + req->cryptlen + ivaadsize
> > + - icvremove;
> > + spacc_pre_aad_size = B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len
> > + + ivaadsize + ptaadsize;
> > +
> > + } else {
> > + rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc,
> > + ctx->cb.new_handle,
> > + encrypt ? OP_ENCRYPT : OP_DECRYPT,
> > + ICV_ENCRYPT_HASH, IP_ICV_APPEND,
> > + spacc_icv_offset,
> > + tctx->auth_size, 0);
> > +
> > + spacc_proc_len = B0len + req->assoclen
> > + + req->cryptlen - icvremove
> > + + ivaadsize;
> > + spacc_pre_aad_size = B0len + req->assoclen
> > + + ivaadsize + ptaadsize;
> > + }
> > + } else {
> > + if (tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_AES_CCM_RFC4309 ||
> > + tctx->mode == CRYPTO_MODE_SM4_CCM_RFC8998) {
> > + rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc,
> > + ctx->cb.new_handle,
> > + encrypt ? OP_ENCRYPT : OP_DECRYPT,
> > + ICV_ENCRYPT_HASH, IP_ICV_OFFSET,
> > + spacc_icv_offset,
> > + tctx->auth_size, 0);
> > +
> > + spacc_proc_len = B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len
> > + + req->cryptlen + ivaadsize
> > + - icvremove;
> > + spacc_pre_aad_size = B0len + ccm_aad_16b_len
> > + + ivaadsize + ptaadsize;
> > +
> > + } else {
> > + rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc,
> > + ctx->cb.new_handle,
> > + encrypt ? OP_ENCRYPT : OP_DECRYPT,
> > + ICV_ENCRYPT_HASH, IP_ICV_APPEND,
> > + req->cryptlen - icvremove +
> > + SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE + B0len +
> > + req->assoclen + ivaadsize,
> > + tctx->auth_size, 0);
> > +
> > + spacc_proc_len = B0len + req->assoclen
> > + + req->cryptlen - icvremove
> > + + ivaadsize;
> > + spacc_pre_aad_size = B0len + req->assoclen
> > + + ivaadsize + ptaadsize;
> > + }
> > + }
>
> There's a bunch of (almost) copy-paste in the call to spacc_set_operation() above, combined with ignoring
> the return value. Can we restructure a bit so the repetition is minimized?
>
PK: There are subtle differences, but I see your point. Looks very
much a copy. Will refactor that.

> > +
> > + rc = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(&priv->spacc, ctx->cb.new_handle,
> > + &ctx->src,
> > + (req->dst == req->src) ? &ctx->src :
> > + &ctx->dst, spacc_proc_len,
> > + (dstoff << SPACC_OFFSET_DST_O) |
> > + SPACC_MAX_IV_SIZE,
> > + spacc_pre_aad_size,
> > + 0, iv_to_context, 0);
> > +
> > + if (rc < 0) {
> > + spacc_aead_cleanup_dma(tctx->dev, req);
> > + spacc_close(&priv->spacc, ctx->cb.new_handle);
> > +
> > + if (rc != -EBUSY) {
> > + dev_err(tctx->dev, " failed to enqueue job, ERR: %d\n",
> > + rc);
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (!(req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG))
> > + return -EBUSY;
> > +
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* At this point the job is in flight to the engine ... remove first use
> > + * so subsequent calls don't expand the key again... ideally we would
> > + * pump a dummy job through the engine to pre-expand the key so that by
> > + * time setkey was done we wouldn't have to do this
> > + */
> > + priv->spacc.job[tctx->handle].first_use = 0;
>
> Does this need some locking, given the comment?
>
PK: Sure. So far we have not seen the need, but will check.

> > + priv->spacc.job[tctx->handle].ctrl &= ~(1UL
> > + << priv->spacc.config.ctrl_map[SPACC_CTRL_KEY_EXP]);
> > +
> > + return -EINPROGRESS;
> > +}
> > +
>
> <snip>
>
> > diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..53c76ee16c53
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,1183 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +
> > +#include <linux/dmapool.h>
> > +#include <crypto/sm3.h>
> > +#include <crypto/sha1.h>
> > +#include <crypto/sha2.h>
> > +#include <crypto/sha3.h>
> > +#include <crypto/md5.h>
> > +#include <crypto/aes.h>
> > +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
> > +#include <linux/platform_device.h>
> > +#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
> > +
> > +#include "spacc_device.h"
> > +#include "spacc_core.h"
> > +
> > +#define PPP_BUF_SZ 128
> > +
> > +struct sdesc {
> > + struct shash_desc shash;
> > + char ctx[];
> > +};
> > +
> > +struct my_list {
> > + struct list_head list;
> > + char *buffer;
> > +};
> > +
>
> Unless my is an acronym, maybe a better name? :) Maybe sg_list_iter or such, given its role
> in iterating through the sg list below?
>
PK: Sure :0) seems to have escaped the eyeballs .. will fix that.

> > +static struct dma_pool *spacc_hash_pool;
> > +static LIST_HEAD(spacc_hash_alg_list);
> > +static LIST_HEAD(head_sglbuf);
> > +static DEFINE_MUTEX(spacc_hash_alg_mutex);
> > +
>
> <snip>
>
> > +
> > +static void sgl_node_delete(void)
> > +{
> > + /* go through the list and free the memory. */
> > + struct my_list *cursor, *temp;
> > +
> > + list_for_each_entry_safe(cursor, temp, &head_sglbuf, list) {
> > + kfree(cursor->buffer);
> > + list_del(&cursor->list);
> > + kfree(cursor);
> > + }
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void sg_node_create_add(char *sg_buf)
> > +{
> > + struct my_list *temp_node = NULL;
> > +
> > + /*Creating Node*/
> > + temp_node = kmalloc(sizeof(struct my_list), GFP_KERNEL);
> > +
> > + /*Assgin the data that is received*/
> > + temp_node->buffer = sg_buf;
> > +
> > + /*Init the list within the struct*/
> > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&temp_node->list);
> > +
> > + /*Add Node to Linked List*/
> > + list_add_tail(&temp_node->list, &head_sglbuf);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int spacc_ctx_clone_handle(struct ahash_request *req)
> > +{
> > + struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
> > + struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
> > + struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
> > + struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
> > +
> > + ctx->acb.new_handle = spacc_clone_handle(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
> > + &ctx->acb);
> > +
> > + if (ctx->acb.new_handle < 0) {
> > + spacc_hash_cleanup_dma(tctx->dev, req);
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> > + }
> > +
> > + ctx->acb.tctx = tctx;
> > + ctx->acb.ctx = ctx;
> > + ctx->acb.req = req;
> > + ctx->acb.spacc = &priv->spacc;
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +
>
> <snip>
>
> > +
> > +static int spacc_hash_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
> > + unsigned int keylen)
> > +{
> > + int x, rc;
> > + const struct spacc_alg *salg = spacc_tfm_ahash(&tfm->base);
> > + struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
> > + struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
> > + unsigned int digest_size, block_size;
> > + char hash_alg[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
> > +
> > + block_size = crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(&tfm->base);
> > + digest_size = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * If keylen > hash block len, the key is supposed to be hashed so that
> > + * it is less than the block length. This is kind of a useless
> > + * property of HMAC as you can just use that hash as the key directly.
> > + * We will just not use the hardware in this case to avoid the issue.
> > + * This test was meant for hashes but it works for cmac/xcbc since we
> > + * only intend to support 128-bit keys...
> > + */
> > +
> > + if (keylen > block_size && salg->mode->id != CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_CMAC) {
> > + dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Exceeds keylen: %u\n", keylen);
> > + dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Req. keylen hashing %s\n",
> > + salg->calg->cra_name);
> > +
> > + memset(hash_alg, 0x00, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
> > + switch (salg->mode->id) {
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA224:
> > + rc = do_shash("sha224", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
> > + NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
> > + break;
> > +
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA256:
> > + rc = do_shash("sha256", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
> > + NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
> > + break;
> > +
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA384:
> > + rc = do_shash("sha384", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
> > + NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
> > + break;
> > +
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA512:
> > + rc = do_shash("sha512", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
> > + NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
> > + break;
> > +
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_MD5:
> > + rc = do_shash("md5", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
> > + NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
> > + break;
> > +
> > + case CRYPTO_MODE_HMAC_SHA1:
> > + rc = do_shash("sha1", tctx->ipad, key, keylen,
> > + NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
> > + break;
> > +
> > + default:
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (rc < 0) {
> > + pr_err("ERR: %d computing shash for %s\n",
> > + rc, hash_alg);
> > + return -EIO;
> > + }
> > +
> > + keylen = digest_size;
> > + dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "updated keylen: %u\n", keylen);
> > + } else {
> > + memcpy(tctx->ipad, key, keylen);
> > + }
> > +
> > + tctx->ctx_valid = false;
> > +
> > + if (salg->mode->sw_fb) {
> > + rc = crypto_ahash_setkey(tctx->fb.hash, key, keylen);
> > + if (rc < 0)
> > + return rc;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* close handle since key size may have changed */
> > + if (tctx->handle >= 0) {
> > + spacc_close(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle);
> > + put_device(tctx->dev);
> > + tctx->handle = -1;
> > + tctx->dev = NULL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + priv = NULL;
> > + for (x = 0; x < ELP_CAPI_MAX_DEV && salg->dev[x]; x++) {
> > + priv = dev_get_drvdata(salg->dev[x]);
> > + tctx->dev = get_device(salg->dev[x]);
> > + if (spacc_isenabled(&priv->spacc, salg->mode->id, keylen)) {
> > + tctx->handle = spacc_open(&priv->spacc,
> > + CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
> > + salg->mode->id, -1,
> > + 0, spacc_digest_cb, tfm);
> > +
> > + } else
> > + pr_debug(" Keylen: %d not enabled for algo: %d",
> > + keylen, salg->mode->id);
> > +
>
> Please run scripts/checkpatch.pl through all the patches, it will point out things like the unbalanced
> braces here.
>
PK: Yes, thats part of the process before pushing patches that we follow.
Checkpatch didnt complain. But sure will fix things for readability.


> > + if (tctx->handle >= 0)
> > + break;
> > +
> > + put_device(salg->dev[x]);
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (tctx->handle < 0) {
> > + pr_err("ERR: Failed to open SPAcc context\n");
> > + dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Failed to open SPAcc context\n");
> > + return -EIO;
> > + }
> > +
> > + rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle, OP_ENCRYPT,
> > + ICV_HASH, IP_ICV_OFFSET, 0, 0, 0);
> > + if (rc < 0) {
> > + spacc_close(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle);
> > + tctx->handle = -1;
> > + put_device(tctx->dev);
> > + return -EIO;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_XCBC ||
> > + salg->mode->id == CRYPTO_MODE_MAC_SM4_XCBC) {
> > + rc = spacc_compute_xcbc_key(&priv->spacc, salg->mode->id,
> > + tctx->handle, tctx->ipad,
> > + keylen, tctx->ipad);
> > + if (rc < 0) {
> > + dev_warn(tctx->dev,
> > + "Failed to compute XCBC key: %d\n", rc);
> > + return -EIO;
> > + }
> > + rc = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
> > + SPACC_HASH_OPERATION, tctx->ipad,
> > + 32 + keylen, NULL, 0);
> > + } else {
> > + rc = spacc_write_context(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
> > + SPACC_HASH_OPERATION, tctx->ipad,
> > + keylen, NULL, 0);
> > + }
> > +
> > + memset(tctx->ipad, 0, sizeof(tctx->ipad));
> > + if (rc < 0) {
> > + pr_err("ERR: Failed to write SPAcc context\n");
> > + dev_warn(tctx->dev, "Failed to write SPAcc context %d: %d\n",
> > + tctx->handle, rc);
> > +
> > + /* Non-fatal; we continue with the software fallback. */
> > + return 0;
> > + }
> > +
> > + tctx->ctx_valid = true;
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
>
> <snip>
>
> Thanks,
> Easwar
>

2024-04-01 16:34:13

by Easwar Hariharan

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/4] Add SPAcc driver to Linux kernel

On 4/1/2024 12:21 AM, Pavitrakumar Managutte wrote:
> Hi Easwar,
> My comments are embedded below. Also should I wait for more comments
> from you or
> should I go ahead and push v2 with the below fixes ?
>
> Warm regards,
> PK
>

<snip>

Please see more comments below, and go ahead and push a v2. If possible, split
the series into more patches. I leave it to you to group them by file or logical
functionality, so long as each individual commit compiles neatly so as to not break
future git bisects.


On 3/28/2024 11:26 AM, Pavitrakumar M wrote:
> Signed-off-by: shwetar <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Pavitrakumar M <[email protected]>
> Acked-by: Ruud Derwig <[email protected]>
> ---
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c | 1382 ++++++++++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c | 1183 ++++++++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.c | 2917 ++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.h | 839 ++++++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.c | 324 +++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.h | 236 ++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.c | 365 +++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.h | 113 +
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_interrupt.c | 204 ++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c | 670 +++++
> drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_skcipher.c | 754 +++++
> 11 files changed, 8987 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.h
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.h
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.h
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_interrupt.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_skcipher.c
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..53c76ee16c53
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,1183 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +

<snip>

> +
> +static int spacc_hash_init(struct ahash_request *req)
> +{
> + int x = 0, rc = 0;
> + struct crypto_ahash *reqtfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
> + struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(reqtfm);
> + struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
> + const struct spacc_alg *salg = spacc_tfm_ahash(&reqtfm->base);
> + struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
> +
> +
> + ctx->digest_buf = NULL;
> +
> + ctx->single_shot = 0;
> + ctx->total_nents = 0;
> + ctx->cur_part_pck = 0;
> + ctx->final_part_pck = 0;
> + ctx->rem_len = 0;
> + ctx->rem_nents = 0;
> + ctx->first_ppp_chunk = 1;
> + ctx->small_pck = 1;
> + tctx->ppp_sgl = NULL;
> +
> + if (tctx->handle < 0 || !tctx->ctx_valid) {
> + priv = NULL;
> + dev_dbg(tctx->dev, "%s: open SPAcc context\n", __func__);
> +
> + for (x = 0; x < ELP_CAPI_MAX_DEV && salg->dev[x]; x++) {
> + priv = dev_get_drvdata(salg->dev[x]);
> + tctx->dev = get_device(salg->dev[x]);
> + if (spacc_isenabled(&priv->spacc, salg->mode->id, 0)) {
> + tctx->handle = spacc_open(&priv->spacc,
> + CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
> + salg->mode->id, -1, 0,
> + spacc_digest_cb, reqtfm);
> + }
> +
> + if (tctx->handle >= 0)
> + break;
> +
> + put_device(salg->dev[x]);
> + }
> +
> + if (tctx->handle < 0) {
> + dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Failed to open SPAcc context\n");
> + goto fallback;
> + }
> +
> + rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
> + OP_ENCRYPT, ICV_HASH, IP_ICV_OFFSET,
> + 0, 0, 0);
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + spacc_close(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle);
> + dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Failed to open SPAcc context\n");
> + tctx->handle = -1;
> + put_device(tctx->dev);
> + goto fallback;
> + }
> + tctx->ctx_valid = true;
> + } else {
> + ;/* do nothing */
> + }

Do we need this else?

> +
> + /* alloc ppp_sgl */
> + tctx->ppp_sgl = kmalloc(sizeof(*(tctx->ppp_sgl)) * 2, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!tctx->ppp_sgl)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + sg_init_table(tctx->ppp_sgl, 2);
> +
> + return 0;
> +fallback:
> +
> + ctx->fb.hash_req.base = req->base;
> + ahash_request_set_tfm(&ctx->fb.hash_req, tctx->fb.hash);
> +
> + return crypto_ahash_init(&ctx->fb.hash_req);
> +}
> +
> +static int spacc_hash_final_part_pck(struct ahash_request *req)
> +{
> + struct crypto_ahash *reqtfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
> + struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(reqtfm);
> + struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
> + struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
> +
> + int rc;
> +
> + ctx->final_part_pck = 1;
> +
> + /* In all the final calls the data is same as prev update and
> + * hence we can skip this init dma part and just enQ ddt
> + * No use in calling initdata, just process remaining bytes in ppp_sgl
> + * and be done with it.
> + */
> +
> + rc = spacc_hash_init_dma(tctx->dev, req, 1);
> +
> + if (rc < 0)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + if (rc == 0) {
> + ;/* small packet */
> + }

Please cleanup these do-nothing comment code paths throughout.

> +
> + /* enqueue ddt for the remaining bytes of data, everything else
> + * would have been processed already, req->nbytes need not be
> + * processed
> + * Since this will hit only for small pkts, hence the condition
> + * ctx->rem_len-req->nbytes for the small pkt len
> + */
> + if (ctx->rem_len)
> + rc = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(&priv->spacc,
> + ctx->acb.new_handle, &ctx->src, &ctx->dst,
> + tctx->ppp_sgl[0].length,
> + 0, tctx->ppp_sgl[0].length, 0, 0, 0);
> + else {
> + /* zero msg handling */
> + rc = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(&priv->spacc,
> + ctx->acb.new_handle,
> + &ctx->src, &ctx->dst, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
> + }
> +
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + spacc_hash_cleanup_dma(tctx->dev, req);
> + spacc_close(&priv->spacc, ctx->acb.new_handle);
> +
> + if (rc != -EBUSY) {
> + dev_err(tctx->dev, "ERR: Failed to enqueue job: %d\n", rc);
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + if (!(req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG))
> + return -EBUSY;
> + }
> +
> + return -EINPROGRESS;
> +}
> +

<snip>

Thanks,
Easwar

2024-04-02 05:03:00

by Pavitrakumar M

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/4] Add SPAcc driver to Linux kernel

Sure Easwar,
Thanks for the feedback. I will try to split the patches into
smaller, more manageable ones.

Warm regards,
PK

On Mon, Apr 1, 2024 at 10:04 PM Easwar Hariharan
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On 4/1/2024 12:21 AM, Pavitrakumar Managutte wrote:
> > Hi Easwar,
> > My comments are embedded below. Also should I wait for more comments
> > from you or
> > should I go ahead and push v2 with the below fixes ?
> >
> > Warm regards,
> > PK
> >
>
> <snip>
>
> Please see more comments below, and go ahead and push a v2. If possible, split
> the series into more patches. I leave it to you to group them by file or logical
> functionality, so long as each individual commit compiles neatly so as to not break
> future git bisects.
>
>
> On 3/28/2024 11:26 AM, Pavitrakumar M wrote:
> > Signed-off-by: shwetar <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Pavitrakumar M <[email protected]>
> > Acked-by: Ruud Derwig <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c | 1382 ++++++++++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c | 1183 ++++++++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.c | 2917 ++++++++++++++++++++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.h | 839 ++++++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.c | 324 +++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.h | 236 ++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.c | 365 +++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.h | 113 +
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_interrupt.c | 204 ++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c | 670 +++++
> > drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_skcipher.c | 754 +++++
> > 11 files changed, 8987 insertions(+)
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_aead.c
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.c
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_core.h
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.c
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_device.h
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.c
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_hal.h
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_interrupt.c
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_manager.c
> > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_skcipher.c
> > diff --git a/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..53c76ee16c53
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/drivers/crypto/dwc-spacc/spacc_ahash.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,1183 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +
>
> <snip>
>
> > +
> > +static int spacc_hash_init(struct ahash_request *req)
> > +{
> > + int x = 0, rc = 0;
> > + struct crypto_ahash *reqtfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
> > + struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(reqtfm);
> > + struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
> > + const struct spacc_alg *salg = spacc_tfm_ahash(&reqtfm->base);
> > + struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
> > +
> > +
> > + ctx->digest_buf = NULL;
> > +
> > + ctx->single_shot = 0;
> > + ctx->total_nents = 0;
> > + ctx->cur_part_pck = 0;
> > + ctx->final_part_pck = 0;
> > + ctx->rem_len = 0;
> > + ctx->rem_nents = 0;
> > + ctx->first_ppp_chunk = 1;
> > + ctx->small_pck = 1;
> > + tctx->ppp_sgl = NULL;
> > +
> > + if (tctx->handle < 0 || !tctx->ctx_valid) {
> > + priv = NULL;
> > + dev_dbg(tctx->dev, "%s: open SPAcc context\n", __func__);
> > +
> > + for (x = 0; x < ELP_CAPI_MAX_DEV && salg->dev[x]; x++) {
> > + priv = dev_get_drvdata(salg->dev[x]);
> > + tctx->dev = get_device(salg->dev[x]);
> > + if (spacc_isenabled(&priv->spacc, salg->mode->id, 0)) {
> > + tctx->handle = spacc_open(&priv->spacc,
> > + CRYPTO_MODE_NULL,
> > + salg->mode->id, -1, 0,
> > + spacc_digest_cb, reqtfm);
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (tctx->handle >= 0)
> > + break;
> > +
> > + put_device(salg->dev[x]);
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (tctx->handle < 0) {
> > + dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Failed to open SPAcc context\n");
> > + goto fallback;
> > + }
> > +
> > + rc = spacc_set_operation(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle,
> > + OP_ENCRYPT, ICV_HASH, IP_ICV_OFFSET,
> > + 0, 0, 0);
> > + if (rc < 0) {
> > + spacc_close(&priv->spacc, tctx->handle);
> > + dev_dbg(salg->dev[0], "Failed to open SPAcc context\n");
> > + tctx->handle = -1;
> > + put_device(tctx->dev);
> > + goto fallback;
> > + }
> > + tctx->ctx_valid = true;
> > + } else {
> > + ;/* do nothing */
> > + }
>
> Do we need this else?
>
> > +
> > + /* alloc ppp_sgl */
> > + tctx->ppp_sgl = kmalloc(sizeof(*(tctx->ppp_sgl)) * 2, GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!tctx->ppp_sgl)
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> > + sg_init_table(tctx->ppp_sgl, 2);
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +fallback:
> > +
> > + ctx->fb.hash_req.base = req->base;
> > + ahash_request_set_tfm(&ctx->fb.hash_req, tctx->fb.hash);
> > +
> > + return crypto_ahash_init(&ctx->fb.hash_req);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int spacc_hash_final_part_pck(struct ahash_request *req)
> > +{
> > + struct crypto_ahash *reqtfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
> > + struct spacc_crypto_ctx *tctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(reqtfm);
> > + struct spacc_crypto_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
> > + struct spacc_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(tctx->dev);
> > +
> > + int rc;
> > +
> > + ctx->final_part_pck = 1;
> > +
> > + /* In all the final calls the data is same as prev update and
> > + * hence we can skip this init dma part and just enQ ddt
> > + * No use in calling initdata, just process remaining bytes in ppp_sgl
> > + * and be done with it.
> > + */
> > +
> > + rc = spacc_hash_init_dma(tctx->dev, req, 1);
> > +
> > + if (rc < 0)
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> > + if (rc == 0) {
> > + ;/* small packet */
> > + }
>
> Please cleanup these do-nothing comment code paths throughout.
>
> > +
> > + /* enqueue ddt for the remaining bytes of data, everything else
> > + * would have been processed already, req->nbytes need not be
> > + * processed
> > + * Since this will hit only for small pkts, hence the condition
> > + * ctx->rem_len-req->nbytes for the small pkt len
> > + */
> > + if (ctx->rem_len)
> > + rc = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(&priv->spacc,
> > + ctx->acb.new_handle, &ctx->src, &ctx->dst,
> > + tctx->ppp_sgl[0].length,
> > + 0, tctx->ppp_sgl[0].length, 0, 0, 0);
> > + else {
> > + /* zero msg handling */
> > + rc = spacc_packet_enqueue_ddt(&priv->spacc,
> > + ctx->acb.new_handle,
> > + &ctx->src, &ctx->dst, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (rc < 0) {
> > + spacc_hash_cleanup_dma(tctx->dev, req);
> > + spacc_close(&priv->spacc, ctx->acb.new_handle);
> > +
> > + if (rc != -EBUSY) {
> > + dev_err(tctx->dev, "ERR: Failed to enqueue job: %d\n", rc);
> > + return rc;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (!(req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG))
> > + return -EBUSY;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return -EINPROGRESS;
> > +}
> > +
>
> <snip>
>
> Thanks,
> Easwar

2024-04-05 07:08:48

by Herbert Xu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/4] Add spacc crypto driver support

On Thu, Mar 28, 2024 at 11:56:48PM +0530, Pavitrakumar M wrote:
> Add the driver for SPAcc(Security Protocol Accelerator), which is a
> crypto acceleration IP from Synopsys. The SPAcc supports many cipher,
> hash, aead algorithms and various modes.The driver currently supports
> below,
>
> aead:
> - ccm(sm4)
> - ccm(aes)
> - gcm(sm4)
> - gcm(aes)
> - rfc8998(gcm(sm4))
> - rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)
>
> cipher:
> - cbc(sm4)
> - ecb(sm4)
> - ofb(sm4)
> - cfb(sm4)
> - ctr(sm4)
> - cbc(aes)
> - ecb(aes)
> - ctr(aes)
> - xts(aes)
> - cts(cbc(aes))
> - cbc(des)
> - ecb(des)
> - cbc(des3_ede)
> - ecb(des3_ede)
> - chacha20
> - xts(sm4)
> - cts(cbc(sm4))
> - ecb(kasumi)
> - f8(kasumi)
> - snow3g_uea2
> - cs1(cbc(aes))
> - cs2(cbc(aes))
> - cs1(cbc(sm4))
> - cs2(cbc(sm4))
> - f8(sm4)
>
> hash:
> - michael_mic
> - sm3
> - hmac(sm3)
> - sha3-512
> - sha3-384
> - sha3-256
> - sha3-224
> - hmac(sha512)
> - hmac(sha384)
> - hmac(sha256)
> - hmac(sha224)
> - sha512
> - sha384
> - sha256
> - sha224
> - sha1
> - hmac(sha1)
> - md5
> - hmac(md5)
> - cmac(sm4)
> - xcbc(aes)
> - cmac(aes)
> - xcbc(sm4)
> - sha512-224
> - hmac(sha512-224)
> - sha512-256
> - hmac(sha512-256)
> - mac(kasumi_f9)
> - mac(snow3g)
> - mac(zuc)
> - sslmac(sha1)
> - shake128
> - shake256
> - cshake128
> - cshake256
> - kcmac128
> - kcmac256
> - kcmacxof128
> - kcmacxof256
> - sslmac(md5)

We don't add hardware implementations without software counterparts.
So please prune your list of algorithms according to this rule.

Thanks,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

2024-04-11 05:32:00

by Pavitrakumar M

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/4] Add spacc crypto driver support

Sure Herbert,
I have removed all those that dont have software implementation and
pushing v2 patch.

wwr,
PK

On Fri, Apr 5, 2024 at 12:38 PM Herbert Xu <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Mar 28, 2024 at 11:56:48PM +0530, Pavitrakumar M wrote:
> > Add the driver for SPAcc(Security Protocol Accelerator), which is a
> > crypto acceleration IP from Synopsys. The SPAcc supports many cipher,
> > hash, aead algorithms and various modes.The driver currently supports
> > below,
> >
> > aead:
> > - ccm(sm4)
> > - ccm(aes)
> > - gcm(sm4)
> > - gcm(aes)
> > - rfc8998(gcm(sm4))
> > - rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)
> >
> > cipher:
> > - cbc(sm4)
> > - ecb(sm4)
> > - ofb(sm4)
> > - cfb(sm4)
> > - ctr(sm4)
> > - cbc(aes)
> > - ecb(aes)
> > - ctr(aes)
> > - xts(aes)
> > - cts(cbc(aes))
> > - cbc(des)
> > - ecb(des)
> > - cbc(des3_ede)
> > - ecb(des3_ede)
> > - chacha20
> > - xts(sm4)
> > - cts(cbc(sm4))
> > - ecb(kasumi)
> > - f8(kasumi)
> > - snow3g_uea2
> > - cs1(cbc(aes))
> > - cs2(cbc(aes))
> > - cs1(cbc(sm4))
> > - cs2(cbc(sm4))
> > - f8(sm4)
> >
> > hash:
> > - michael_mic
> > - sm3
> > - hmac(sm3)
> > - sha3-512
> > - sha3-384
> > - sha3-256
> > - sha3-224
> > - hmac(sha512)
> > - hmac(sha384)
> > - hmac(sha256)
> > - hmac(sha224)
> > - sha512
> > - sha384
> > - sha256
> > - sha224
> > - sha1
> > - hmac(sha1)
> > - md5
> > - hmac(md5)
> > - cmac(sm4)
> > - xcbc(aes)
> > - cmac(aes)
> > - xcbc(sm4)
> > - sha512-224
> > - hmac(sha512-224)
> > - sha512-256
> > - hmac(sha512-256)
> > - mac(kasumi_f9)
> > - mac(snow3g)
> > - mac(zuc)
> > - sslmac(sha1)
> > - shake128
> > - shake256
> > - cshake128
> > - cshake256
> > - kcmac128
> > - kcmac256
> > - kcmacxof128
> > - kcmacxof256
> > - sslmac(md5)
>
> We don't add hardware implementations without software counterparts.
> So please prune your list of algorithms according to this rule.
>
> Thanks,
> --
> Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
> PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt