Schaufler, Casey ([email protected])

Number of posts: 72 (0.05 per day)
First post: 2018-08-16 02:01:21
Last post: 2022-08-18 18:55:08

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2022-08-18 18:55:08 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH 3/5] ->getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM...
2022-07-20 22:43:02 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v4 0/5] userfaultfd: add /dev/userfaultfd for fine grained access control
2022-02-22 22:27:07 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v2] hugetlb: clean up potential spectre issue warnings
2021-06-25 21:51:52 linux-kernel RE: [RFC PATCH 0/1] xattr: Allow user.* xattr on symlink/special files if caller has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
2021-03-22 16:20:44 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH 3/5] cifsd: add file operations
2020-05-18 21:44:57 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH] security: fix the default value of secid_to_secctx hook
2018-11-05 19:07:57 linux-kernel [PATCH v6 2/5] Smack: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
2018-11-05 19:07:51 linux-kernel [PATCH v6 0/5] LSM: Support ptrace sidechannel access checks
2018-11-05 19:07:12 linux-kernel [PATCH v6 1/5] AppArmor: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
2018-11-05 19:06:20 linux-kernel [PATCH v6 3/5] SELinux: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
2018-11-05 19:06:09 linux-kernel [PATCH v6 4/5] Capability: Complete PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
2018-11-05 19:06:03 linux-kernel [PATCH v6 5/5] sidechannel: Linux Security Module for sidechannel
2018-10-30 22:16:11 linux-kernel RE: [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of a process when modifying its dumpability
2018-10-30 22:03:34 linux-kernel RE: [Patch v4 16/18] x86/speculation: Enable STIBP to protect security sensitive tasks
2018-10-30 21:10:27 linux-kernel RE: [Patch v4 16/18] x86/speculation: Enable STIBP to protect security sensitive tasks
2018-10-30 20:58:11 linux-kernel RE: [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of a process when modifying its dumpability
2018-09-28 17:41:34 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v5 5/5] sidechannel: Linux Security Module for sidechannel
2018-09-27 23:20:31 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v5 5/5] sidechannel: Linux Security Module for sidechannel
2018-09-27 19:18:21 linux-kernel [PATCH 6/5] capability: Repair sidechannel test in ptrace
2018-09-27 16:27:51 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v5 3/5] SELinux: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
2018-09-26 22:54:45 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v5 2/5] Smack: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
2018-09-26 22:49:47 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v5 1/5] AppArmor: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
2018-09-26 22:26:20 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v5 4/5] Capability: Complete PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
2018-09-26 20:37:26 linux-kernel [PATCH v5 4/5] Capability: Complete PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
2018-09-26 20:36:53 linux-kernel [PATCH v5 3/5] SELinux: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
2018-09-26 20:36:47 linux-kernel [PATCH v5 2/5] Smack: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
2018-09-26 20:36:09 linux-kernel [PATCH v5 0/5] LSM: Support ptrace sidechannel access checks
2018-09-26 20:35:59 linux-kernel [PATCH v5 1/5] AppArmor: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
2018-09-26 20:35:30 linux-kernel [PATCH v5 5/5] sidechannel: Linux Security Module for sidechannel
2018-09-17 16:11:30 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v6 0/3] Harden spectrev2 userspace-userspace protection
2018-09-13 00:05:56 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v6 1/3] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak
2018-09-11 22:26:05 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak
2018-09-10 21:31:24 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak
2018-09-10 20:27:58 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak
2018-09-10 19:30:19 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak
2018-09-10 18:28:21 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak
2018-09-05 19:30:19 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace: Provide ___ptrace_may_access() that can be applied on arbitrary tasks
2018-09-05 15:39:40 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace: Provide ___ptrace_may_access() that can be applied on arbitrary tasks
2018-09-05 01:02:16 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace: Provide ___ptrace_may_access() that can be applied on arbitrary tasks
2018-09-04 18:12:21 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace: Provide ___ptrace_may_access() that can be applied on arbitrary tasks
2018-08-24 22:44:16 linux-kernel [PATCH v4 0/5] LSM: Add and use a hook for side-channel safety checks
2018-08-24 22:44:06 linux-kernel [PATCH v4 1/5] LSM: Introduce a hook for side-channel danger
2018-08-24 22:43:57 linux-kernel [PATCH v4 5/5] SELinux: Support SELinux determination of side-channel
2018-08-24 22:43:57 linux-kernel [PATCH v4 2/5] X86: Support LSM determination of side-channel
2018-08-24 22:43:57 linux-kernel [PATCH v4 4/5] Smack: Support determination of side-channel
2018-08-24 22:43:57 linux-kernel [PATCH v4 3/5] LSM: Security module checking for side-channel dangers
2018-08-22 17:49:28 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v3 3/5] LSM: Security module checking for side-channel dangers
2018-08-22 16:41:32 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v3 3/5] LSM: Security module checking for side-channel dangers
2018-08-21 23:51:45 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH v3 3/5] LSM: Security module checking for side-channel dangers
2018-08-21 16:47:35 linux-kernel RE: [PATCH RFC v2 2/5] X86: Support LSM determination of side-channel vulnerability
2018-08-21 00:07:33 linux-kernel [PATCH v3 3/5] LSM: Security module checking for side-channel dangers