KP Singh ([email protected])

Number of posts: 118 (0.1 per day)
First post: 2020-12-08 22:02:07
Last post: 2024-04-15 21:47:38

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2024-04-15 21:47:38 linux-kernel Re: [kpsingh:static_calls] [security] 9e15595ed0: Kernel_panic-not_syncing:lsm_static_call_init-Ran_out_of_static_slots
2024-04-15 20:42:31 linux-kernel Re: [kpsingh:static_calls] [security] 9e15595ed0: Kernel_panic-not_syncing:lsm_static_call_init-Ran_out_of_static_slots
2024-04-15 15:47:56 linux-kernel Re: [kpsingh:static_calls] [security] 9e15595ed0: Kernel_panic-not_syncing:lsm_static_call_init-Ran_out_of_static_slots
2024-04-15 08:40:08 linux-kernel Re: [kpsingh:static_calls] [security] 9e15595ed0: Kernel_panic-not_syncing:lsm_static_call_init-Ran_out_of_static_slots
2023-06-12 15:28:47 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] Add a sysctl option to disable bpf offensive helpers.
2023-02-27 06:06:36 linux-kernel [PATCH v3 2/2] Documentation/hw-vuln: Document the interaction between IBRS and STIBP
2023-02-27 06:06:29 linux-kernel [PATCH v3 1/2] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS
2023-02-26 01:50:44 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS
2023-02-26 01:42:58 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] Documentation/hw-vuln: Document the interaction between IBRS and STIBP
2023-02-24 03:30:43 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] Documentation/hw-vuln: Document the interaction between IBRS and STIBP
2023-02-22 19:42:19 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS
2023-02-22 17:16:40 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS
2023-02-22 05:51:02 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS
2023-02-22 01:26:54 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] x86/bugs: Allow STIBP with IBRS
2023-02-21 19:35:52 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS
2023-02-21 18:52:27 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
2023-02-21 18:49:34 linux-kernel [PATCH v2 2/2] Documentation/hw-vuln: Document the interaction between IBRS and STIBP
2023-02-21 18:49:27 linux-kernel [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS
2023-02-20 23:45:58 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
2023-02-20 23:02:05 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
2023-02-20 19:40:13 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] x86/bugs: Allow STIBP with IBRS
2023-02-20 19:17:27 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] x86/bugs: Allow STIBP with IBRS
2023-02-20 19:12:54 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
2023-02-20 19:06:53 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] x86/bugs: Allow STIBP with IBRS
2023-02-20 18:58:44 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
2023-02-20 18:44:41 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
2023-02-20 18:34:16 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] x86/bugs: Allow STIBP with IBRS
2023-02-20 18:02:43 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
2023-02-20 12:34:28 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
2023-02-20 12:20:57 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
2023-02-20 12:01:49 linux-kernel [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
2023-01-20 01:48:02 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH V2] bpf: security enhancement by limiting the offensive eBPF helpers
2023-01-16 22:16:20 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] bpf: Add CONFIG_BPF_HELPER_STRICT
2022-12-12 22:23:14 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH v2] panic: Taint kernel if fault injection has been used
2022-12-12 21:52:16 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH v2] panic: Taint kernel if fault injection has been used
2022-12-11 08:14:12 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH v2] panic: Taint kernel if fault injection has been used
2022-11-21 15:53:43 linux-kernel Re: [RFC 0/1] BPF tracing for arm64 using fprobe
2022-11-21 15:48:35 linux-kernel Re: [RFC 0/1] BPF tracing for arm64 using fprobe
2022-11-21 14:26:31 linux-kernel Re: [RFC 0/1] BPF tracing for arm64 using fprobe
2022-11-16 20:15:24 linux-kernel Re: [PoC][PATCH] bpf: Call return value check function in the JITed code
2022-11-16 19:41:17 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/4] lsm: Clarify documentation of vm_enough_memory hook
2022-11-16 19:38:57 linux-kernel Re: [PoC][PATCH] bpf: Call return value check function in the JITed code
2022-11-04 13:59:37 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH bpf-next] selftests/bpf: fix build-id for liburandom_read.so
2022-11-04 13:41:19 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH bpf-next] Documentation: bpf: escape underscore in BPF type name prefix
2022-11-03 15:30:52 linux-kernel Re: [RESEND][RFC][PATCH 1/3] lsm: Clarify documentation of vm_enough_memory hook
2022-11-03 15:26:40 linux-kernel Re: [RESEND][RFC][PATCH 2/3] bpf-lsm: Limit values that can be returned by security modules
2022-10-27 11:44:42 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH] bpf: Check xattr name/value pair from bpf_lsm_inode_init_security()
2022-09-21 14:02:05 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH v18 02/13] btf: Export bpf_dynptr definition
2022-09-15 17:39:09 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH v17 11/12] selftests/bpf: Add test for bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() kfunc
2022-09-11 11:52:00 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH v17 07/12] bpf: Add bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() kfunc
2022-08-28 23:20:55 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] selftests/bpf: simplify cgroup_hierarchical_stats selftest