2011-06-16 15:56:12

by Vasily Kulikov

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v2] taskstats: don't allow duplicate entries in listener mode

Currently a single process may register exit handlers unlimited times.
It may lead to a bloated listeners chain and very slow process terminations.
E.g. after 10KK sent TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_REGISTER_CPUMASKs ~300 Mb of
kernel memory is stolen for the handlers chain and "time id" shows 2-7
seconds instead of normal 0.003. It makes it possible to exhaust all
kernel memory and to eat much of CPU time by triggerring numerous exits
on a single CPU.

The patch limits the number of times a single process may register
itself on a single CPU to one.

One little issue is kept unfixed - as taskstats_exit() is called before
exit_files() in do_exit(), the orphaned listener entry (if it was not
explicitly deregistered) is kept until the next someone's exit() and
implicit deregistration in send_cpu_listeners(). So, if a process
registered itself as a listener exits and the next spawned process gets
the same pid, it would inherit taskstats attributes.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
---
v2 - removed wrong "From" line.

kernel/taskstats.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
1 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/taskstats.c b/kernel/taskstats.c
index 9ffea36..fc0f220 100644
--- a/kernel/taskstats.c
+++ b/kernel/taskstats.c
@@ -285,16 +285,18 @@ ret:
static int add_del_listener(pid_t pid, const struct cpumask *mask, int isadd)
{
struct listener_list *listeners;
- struct listener *s, *tmp;
+ struct listener *s, *tmp, *s2;
unsigned int cpu;

if (!cpumask_subset(mask, cpu_possible_mask))
return -EINVAL;

+ s = NULL;
if (isadd == REGISTER) {
for_each_cpu(cpu, mask) {
- s = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct listener), GFP_KERNEL,
- cpu_to_node(cpu));
+ if (!s)
+ s = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct listener),
+ GFP_KERNEL, cpu_to_node(cpu));
if (!s)
goto cleanup;
s->pid = pid;
@@ -303,9 +305,16 @@ static int add_del_listener(pid_t pid, const struct cpumask *mask, int isadd)

listeners = &per_cpu(listener_array, cpu);
down_write(&listeners->sem);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(s2, tmp, &listeners->list, list) {
+ if (s2->pid == pid)
+ goto next_cpu;
+ }
list_add(&s->list, &listeners->list);
+ s = NULL;
+next_cpu:
up_write(&listeners->sem);
}
+ kfree(s);
return 0;
}

--
1.7.0.4


2011-06-21 22:50:14

by Andrew Morton

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] taskstats: don't allow duplicate entries in listener mode

On Thu, 16 Jun 2011 19:55:59 +0400
Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]> wrote:

> Currently a single process may register exit handlers unlimited times.
> It may lead to a bloated listeners chain and very slow process terminations.
> E.g. after 10KK sent TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_REGISTER_CPUMASKs ~300 Mb of
> kernel memory is stolen for the handlers chain and "time id" shows 2-7
> seconds instead of normal 0.003. It makes it possible to exhaust all
> kernel memory and to eat much of CPU time by triggerring numerous exits
> on a single CPU.
>
> The patch limits the number of times a single process may register
> itself on a single CPU to one.
>
> One little issue is kept unfixed - as taskstats_exit() is called before
> exit_files() in do_exit(), the orphaned listener entry (if it was not
> explicitly deregistered) is kept until the next someone's exit() and
> implicit deregistration in send_cpu_listeners(). So, if a process
> registered itself as a listener exits and the next spawned process gets
> the same pid, it would inherit taskstats attributes.

ow. That's an unprivileged operation, isn't it?

>
> diff --git a/kernel/taskstats.c b/kernel/taskstats.c
> index 9ffea36..fc0f220 100644
> --- a/kernel/taskstats.c
> +++ b/kernel/taskstats.c
> @@ -285,16 +285,18 @@ ret:
> static int add_del_listener(pid_t pid, const struct cpumask *mask, int isadd)
> {
> struct listener_list *listeners;
> - struct listener *s, *tmp;
> + struct listener *s, *tmp, *s2;
> unsigned int cpu;
>
> if (!cpumask_subset(mask, cpu_possible_mask))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + s = NULL;
> if (isadd == REGISTER) {
> for_each_cpu(cpu, mask) {
> - s = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct listener), GFP_KERNEL,
> - cpu_to_node(cpu));
> + if (!s)
> + s = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct listener),
> + GFP_KERNEL, cpu_to_node(cpu));
> if (!s)
> goto cleanup;
> s->pid = pid;
> @@ -303,9 +305,16 @@ static int add_del_listener(pid_t pid, const struct cpumask *mask, int isadd)
>
> listeners = &per_cpu(listener_array, cpu);
> down_write(&listeners->sem);
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(s2, tmp, &listeners->list, list) {
> + if (s2->pid == pid)
> + goto next_cpu;
> + }
> list_add(&s->list, &listeners->list);
> + s = NULL;
> +next_cpu:
> up_write(&listeners->sem);
> }
> + kfree(s);
> return 0;
> }
>

2011-06-22 06:54:12

by Vasily Kulikov

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] taskstats: don't allow duplicate entries in listener mode

On Tue, Jun 21, 2011 at 15:49 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Thu, 16 Jun 2011 19:55:59 +0400
> Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> > Currently a single process may register exit handlers unlimited times.
> > It may lead to a bloated listeners chain and very slow process terminations.
> > E.g. after 10KK sent TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_REGISTER_CPUMASKs ~300 Mb of
> > kernel memory is stolen for the handlers chain and "time id" shows 2-7
> > seconds instead of normal 0.003. It makes it possible to exhaust all
> > kernel memory and to eat much of CPU time by triggerring numerous exits
> > on a single CPU.
> >
> > The patch limits the number of times a single process may register
> > itself on a single CPU to one.
> >
> > One little issue is kept unfixed - as taskstats_exit() is called before
> > exit_files() in do_exit(), the orphaned listener entry (if it was not
> > explicitly deregistered) is kept until the next someone's exit() and
> > implicit deregistration in send_cpu_listeners(). So, if a process
> > registered itself as a listener exits and the next spawned process gets
> > the same pid, it would inherit taskstats attributes.
>
> ow. That's an unprivileged operation, isn't it?

Yes.


Thanks,

--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments