IMA-appraisal is mostly being used in the embedded or single purpose
closed system environments. In these environments, both the Kconfig
options and the userspace tools can be modified appropriately to limit
syscalls. For stock kernels, userspace applications need to continue to
work with older kernels as well as with newer kernels.
In this environment, the customer needs the ability to define a system
wide IMA runtime policy, such as requiring all kexec'ed images (or
firmware) to be signed, without being dependent on either the Kconfig
options or the userspace tools.
This patch set allows the customer to define a policy which requires
kexec'ed kernels to be signed.
Mimi Zohar (3):
ima: based on the "secure_boot" policy limit syscalls
kexec: call LSM hook for kexec_load syscall
ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
kernel/kexec.c | 11 +++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 9 +++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
security/security.c | 6 ++++++
6 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--
2.7.5
The original kexec_load syscall can not verify file signatures. This
patch differentiates between the kexec_load and kexec_file_load
syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 9 +++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 ++
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 35fe91aa1fc9..03c9c37ee345 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
#define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES 0x08
#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x10
#define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY 0x20
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 74d0bd7e76d7..754ece08e1c6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -444,6 +444,15 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
}
return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */
}
+
+ if (!file && read_id == READING_KEXEC_IMAGE) {
+ if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC) &&
+ (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
+ pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file syscall.\n");
+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index df3e45878a87..a9e96a884867 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -448,6 +448,8 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)
return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
else if (func == POLICY_CHECK)
return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
+ else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
+ return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC;
return 0;
}
--
2.7.5
In order for LSMs and IMA-appraisal to differentiate between the
kexec_load and kexec_file_load_syscalls, an LSM call needs to be added
to the original kexec_load syscall. From a technical perspective there
is no need for defining a new LSM hook, as the existing
security_kernel_kexec_load() works just fine. However, the name is
confusing. For this reason, instead of defining a new LSM hook, this
patch defines security_kexec_load() as a wrapper for the existing LSM
security_kernel_file_read() hook.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Changelog v1:
- Define and call security_kexec_load(), a wrapper for
security_kernel_read_file().
---
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
kernel/kexec.c | 11 +++++++++++
security/security.c | 6 ++++++
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 63030c85ee19..26f6d85903ed 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
+int security_kexec_load(void);
int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int flags);
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
@@ -922,6 +923,11 @@ static inline int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file,
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_kexec_load(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
const struct cred *old,
int flags)
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index aed8fb2564b3..6b44b0e9a60b 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
@@ -195,11 +196,21 @@ static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments,
static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments,
unsigned long flags)
{
+ int result;
+
/* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled)
return -EPERM;
/*
+ * Allow LSMs and IMA to differentiate between kexec_load and
+ * kexec_file_load syscalls.
+ */
+ result = security_kexec_load();
+ if (result < 0)
+ return result;
+
+ /*
* Verify we have a legal set of flags
* This leaves us room for future extensions.
*/
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 68f46d849abe..0f3390000156 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1044,6 +1044,12 @@ int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
+int security_kexec_load()
+{
+ return security_kernel_read_file(NULL, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kexec_load);
+
int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
--
2.7.5
The builtin "secure_boot" policy adds IMA appraisal rules requiring kernel
modules (finit_module syscall), direct firmware load, kexec kernel image
(kexec_file_load syscall), and the IMA policy to be signed, but did not
prevent the other syscalls/methods from working. Loading an equivalent
custom policy containing these same rules would have prevented the other
syscalls/methods from working.
This patch refactors the code to load custom policies, defining a new
function named ima_appraise_flag(). The new function is called either
when loading the builtin "secure_boot" or custom policies.
Fixes: 503ceaef8e2e ("ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 03cbba423e59..df3e45878a87 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -440,6 +440,17 @@ void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
}
+static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+ if (func == MODULE_CHECK)
+ return IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
+ else if (func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
+ return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
+ else if (func == POLICY_CHECK)
+ return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
*
@@ -478,9 +489,12 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
* Insert the appraise rules requiring file signatures, prior to
* any other appraise rules.
*/
- for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++) {
list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list,
&ima_default_rules);
+ temp_ima_appraise |=
+ ima_appraise_flag(secure_boot_rules[i].func);
+ }
for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
@@ -934,12 +948,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
}
if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
result = -EINVAL;
- else if (entry->func == MODULE_CHECK)
- temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
- else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
- temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
- else if (entry->func == POLICY_CHECK)
- temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
+ else if (entry->action == APPRAISE)
+ temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entry->func);
+
audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
audit_log_end(ab);
return result;
--
2.7.5