I'm announcing the release of the 5.10.33 kernel.
All users of the 5.10 kernel series must upgrade.
The updated 5.10.y git tree can be found at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git linux-5.10.y
and can be browsed at the normal kernel.org git web browser:
https://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git;a=summary
thanks,
greg k-h
------------
Makefile | 2
arch/arm/boot/dts/omap3.dtsi | 3
arch/arm64/boot/dts/allwinner/sun50i-a64-pine64-lts.dts | 2
arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c | 6
arch/csky/Kconfig | 2
arch/csky/include/asm/page.h | 2
arch/ia64/mm/discontig.c | 6
arch/s390/kernel/entry.S | 1
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 2
arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c | 61 -
arch/x86/kernel/crash.c | 2
block/ioctl.c | 2
drivers/dma/tegra20-apb-dma.c | 4
drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dpdma.c | 31
drivers/gpio/gpio-omap.c | 9
drivers/hid/hid-alps.c | 1
drivers/hid/hid-cp2112.c | 22
drivers/hid/hid-google-hammer.c | 2
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h | 1
drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c | 2
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn66xx_regs.h | 2
drivers/net/geneve.c | 6
drivers/net/usb/hso.c | 2
drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c | 12
drivers/pinctrl/core.c | 14
drivers/pinctrl/intel/pinctrl-lewisburg.c | 6
drivers/soc/qcom/qcom-geni-se.c | 3
drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c | 3
drivers/vdpa/mlx5/core/mr.c | 4
drivers/vhost/vdpa.c | 6
include/linux/bpf.h | 5
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 3
include/linux/platform_data/gpio-omap.h | 3
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 774 ++++++++++++----
kernel/locking/qrwlock.c | 7
scripts/Makefile.kasan | 12
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 2
tools/arch/ia64/include/asm/barrier.h | 3
tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c | 2
tools/perf/util/map.c | 7
40 files changed, 744 insertions(+), 295 deletions(-)
Ali Saidi (1):
locking/qrwlock: Fix ordering in queued_write_lock_slowpath()
Andre Przywara (1):
arm64: dts: allwinner: Revert SD card CD GPIO for Pine64-LTS
Andrei Matei (1):
bpf: Allow variable-offset stack access
Andy Shevchenko (1):
pinctrl: core: Show pin numbers for the controllers with base = 0
Arnd Bergmann (1):
kasan: fix hwasan build for gcc
Christoph Hellwig (1):
block: return -EBUSY when there are open partitions in blkdev_reread_part
Daniel Borkmann (2):
bpf: Refactor and streamline bounds check into helper
bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask
Dinghao Liu (1):
dmaengine: tegra20: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error
Douglas Gilbert (1):
HID cp2112: fix support for multiple gpiochips
Eli Cohen (1):
vdpa/mlx5: Set err = -ENOMEM in case dma_map_sg_attrs fails
Greg Kroah-Hartman (1):
Linux 5.10.33
James Bottomley (1):
KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM reservation for seal/unseal
Jia-Ju Bai (1):
HID: alps: fix error return code in alps_input_configured()
Jiapeng Zhong (1):
HID: wacom: Assign boolean values to a bool variable
Jim Mattson (1):
perf/x86/kvm: Fix Broadwell Xeon stepping in isolation_ucodes[]
Jisheng Zhang (1):
arm64: kprobes: Restore local irqflag if kprobes is cancelled
Johan Hovold (1):
net: hso: fix NULL-deref on disconnect regression
John Paul Adrian Glaubitz (1):
ia64: tools: remove duplicate definition of ia64_mf() on ia64
Kan Liang (1):
perf/x86/intel/uncore: Remove uncore extra PCI dev HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3
Laurent Pinchart (2):
dmaengine: xilinx: dpdma: Fix descriptor issuing on video group
dmaengine: xilinx: dpdma: Fix race condition in done IRQ
Leo Yan (1):
perf auxtrace: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Michael Brown (1):
xen-netback: Check for hotplug-status existence before watching
Mike Galbraith (1):
x86/crash: Fix crash_setup_memmap_entries() out-of-bounds access
Oliver Neukum (1):
USB: CDC-ACM: fix poison/unpoison imbalance
Phillip Potter (1):
net: geneve: check skb is large enough for IPv4/IPv6 header
Randy Dunlap (2):
csky: change a Kconfig symbol name to fix e1000 build error
ia64: fix discontig.c section mismatches
Shawn Guo (1):
soc: qcom: geni: shield geni_icc_get() for ACPI boot
Shou-Chieh Hsu (1):
HID: google: add don USB id
Tony Lindgren (2):
gpio: omap: Save and restore sysconfig
ARM: dts: Fix swapped mmc order for omap3
Vasily Gorbik (1):
s390/entry: save the caller of psw_idle
Wan Jiabing (1):
cavium/liquidio: Fix duplicate argument
Xie Yongji (1):
vhost-vdpa: protect concurrent access to vhost device iotlb
Yonghong Song (1):
bpf: Permits pointers on stack for helper calls
Yuanyuan Zhong (1):
pinctrl: lewisburg: Update number of pins in community
Zhen Lei (1):
perf map: Fix error return code in maps__clone()
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index cad90171b4b9..fd5c8b5c013b 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 5
PATCHLEVEL = 10
-SUBLEVEL = 32
+SUBLEVEL = 33
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Dare mighty things
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/omap3.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/omap3.dtsi
index 9dcae1f2bc99..c5b9da0d7e6c 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/omap3.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/omap3.dtsi
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ aliases {
i2c0 = &i2c1;
i2c1 = &i2c2;
i2c2 = &i2c3;
+ mmc0 = &mmc1;
+ mmc1 = &mmc2;
+ mmc2 = &mmc3;
serial0 = &uart1;
serial1 = &uart2;
serial2 = &uart3;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/allwinner/sun50i-a64-pine64-lts.dts b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/allwinner/sun50i-a64-pine64-lts.dts
index a1f621b388fe..358df6d926af 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/allwinner/sun50i-a64-pine64-lts.dts
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/allwinner/sun50i-a64-pine64-lts.dts
@@ -10,5 +10,5 @@ / {
};
&mmc0 {
- cd-gpios = <&pio 5 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>; /* PF6 push-push switch */
+ broken-cd; /* card detect is broken on *some* boards */
};
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c
index f11a1a1f7026..798c3e78b84b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c
@@ -286,10 +286,12 @@ int __kprobes kprobe_fault_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int fsr)
if (!instruction_pointer(regs))
BUG();
- if (kcb->kprobe_status == KPROBE_REENTER)
+ if (kcb->kprobe_status == KPROBE_REENTER) {
restore_previous_kprobe(kcb);
- else
+ } else {
+ kprobes_restore_local_irqflag(kcb, regs);
reset_current_kprobe();
+ }
break;
case KPROBE_HIT_ACTIVE:
diff --git a/arch/csky/Kconfig b/arch/csky/Kconfig
index 268fad5f51cf..7bf0a617e94c 100644
--- a/arch/csky/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/csky/Kconfig
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ config FORCE_MAX_ZONEORDER
int "Maximum zone order"
default "11"
-config RAM_BASE
+config DRAM_BASE
hex "DRAM start addr (the same with memory-section in dts)"
default 0x0
diff --git a/arch/csky/include/asm/page.h b/arch/csky/include/asm/page.h
index 9b98bf31d57c..16878240ef9a 100644
--- a/arch/csky/include/asm/page.h
+++ b/arch/csky/include/asm/page.h
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
#define SSEG_SIZE 0x20000000
#define LOWMEM_LIMIT (SSEG_SIZE * 2)
-#define PHYS_OFFSET_OFFSET (CONFIG_RAM_BASE & (SSEG_SIZE - 1))
+#define PHYS_OFFSET_OFFSET (CONFIG_DRAM_BASE & (SSEG_SIZE - 1))
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
diff --git a/arch/ia64/mm/discontig.c b/arch/ia64/mm/discontig.c
index dbe829fc5298..4d0813419013 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/mm/discontig.c
+++ b/arch/ia64/mm/discontig.c
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static int __init build_node_maps(unsigned long start, unsigned long len,
* acpi_boot_init() (which builds the node_to_cpu_mask array) hasn't been
* called yet. Note that node 0 will also count all non-existent cpus.
*/
-static int __meminit early_nr_cpus_node(int node)
+static int early_nr_cpus_node(int node)
{
int cpu, n = 0;
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static int __meminit early_nr_cpus_node(int node)
* compute_pernodesize - compute size of pernode data
* @node: the node id.
*/
-static unsigned long __meminit compute_pernodesize(int node)
+static unsigned long compute_pernodesize(int node)
{
unsigned long pernodesize = 0, cpus;
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static void __init reserve_pernode_space(void)
}
}
-static void __meminit scatter_node_data(void)
+static void scatter_node_data(void)
{
pg_data_t **dst;
int node;
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S b/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S
index 71203324ff42..81c458e996d9 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S
@@ -994,6 +994,7 @@ ENDPROC(ext_int_handler)
* Load idle PSW.
*/
ENTRY(psw_idle)
+ stg %r14,(__SF_GPRS+8*8)(%r15)
stg %r3,__SF_EMPTY(%r15)
larl %r1,.Lpsw_idle_exit
stg %r1,__SF_EMPTY+8(%r15)
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
index e7dc13fe5e29..0b9975200ae3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
@@ -4387,7 +4387,7 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_desc isolation_ucodes[] = {
INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D, 3, 0x07000009),
INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D, 4, 0x0f000009),
INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D, 5, 0x0e000002),
- INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, 2, 0x0b000014),
+ INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, 1, 0x0b000014),
INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 3, 0x00000021),
INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 4, 0x00000000),
INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 5, 0x00000000),
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c
index 7bdb1821215d..3112186a4f4b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c
@@ -1159,7 +1159,6 @@ enum {
SNBEP_PCI_QPI_PORT0_FILTER,
SNBEP_PCI_QPI_PORT1_FILTER,
BDX_PCI_QPI_PORT2_FILTER,
- HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3,
};
static int snbep_qpi_hw_config(struct intel_uncore_box *box, struct perf_event *event)
@@ -2816,22 +2815,33 @@ static struct intel_uncore_type *hswep_msr_uncores[] = {
NULL,
};
-void hswep_uncore_cpu_init(void)
+#define HSWEP_PCU_DID 0x2fc0
+#define HSWEP_PCU_CAPID4_OFFET 0x94
+#define hswep_get_chop(_cap) (((_cap) >> 6) & 0x3)
+
+static bool hswep_has_limit_sbox(unsigned int device)
{
- int pkg = boot_cpu_data.logical_proc_id;
+ struct pci_dev *dev = pci_get_device(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, device, NULL);
+ u32 capid4;
+
+ if (!dev)
+ return false;
+
+ pci_read_config_dword(dev, HSWEP_PCU_CAPID4_OFFET, &capid4);
+ if (!hswep_get_chop(capid4))
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
+void hswep_uncore_cpu_init(void)
+{
if (hswep_uncore_cbox.num_boxes > boot_cpu_data.x86_max_cores)
hswep_uncore_cbox.num_boxes = boot_cpu_data.x86_max_cores;
/* Detect 6-8 core systems with only two SBOXes */
- if (uncore_extra_pci_dev[pkg].dev[HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3]) {
- u32 capid4;
-
- pci_read_config_dword(uncore_extra_pci_dev[pkg].dev[HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3],
- 0x94, &capid4);
- if (((capid4 >> 6) & 0x3) == 0)
- hswep_uncore_sbox.num_boxes = 2;
- }
+ if (hswep_has_limit_sbox(HSWEP_PCU_DID))
+ hswep_uncore_sbox.num_boxes = 2;
uncore_msr_uncores = hswep_msr_uncores;
}
@@ -3094,11 +3104,6 @@ static const struct pci_device_id hswep_uncore_pci_ids[] = {
.driver_data = UNCORE_PCI_DEV_DATA(UNCORE_EXTRA_PCI_DEV,
SNBEP_PCI_QPI_PORT1_FILTER),
},
- { /* PCU.3 (for Capability registers) */
- PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x2fc0),
- .driver_data = UNCORE_PCI_DEV_DATA(UNCORE_EXTRA_PCI_DEV,
- HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3),
- },
{ /* end: all zeroes */ }
};
@@ -3190,27 +3195,18 @@ static struct event_constraint bdx_uncore_pcu_constraints[] = {
EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END
};
+#define BDX_PCU_DID 0x6fc0
+
void bdx_uncore_cpu_init(void)
{
- int pkg = topology_phys_to_logical_pkg(boot_cpu_data.phys_proc_id);
-
if (bdx_uncore_cbox.num_boxes > boot_cpu_data.x86_max_cores)
bdx_uncore_cbox.num_boxes = boot_cpu_data.x86_max_cores;
uncore_msr_uncores = bdx_msr_uncores;
- /* BDX-DE doesn't have SBOX */
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 86) {
- uncore_msr_uncores[BDX_MSR_UNCORE_SBOX] = NULL;
/* Detect systems with no SBOXes */
- } else if (uncore_extra_pci_dev[pkg].dev[HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3]) {
- struct pci_dev *pdev;
- u32 capid4;
-
- pdev = uncore_extra_pci_dev[pkg].dev[HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3];
- pci_read_config_dword(pdev, 0x94, &capid4);
- if (((capid4 >> 6) & 0x3) == 0)
- bdx_msr_uncores[BDX_MSR_UNCORE_SBOX] = NULL;
- }
+ if ((boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 86) || hswep_has_limit_sbox(BDX_PCU_DID))
+ uncore_msr_uncores[BDX_MSR_UNCORE_SBOX] = NULL;
+
hswep_uncore_pcu.constraints = bdx_uncore_pcu_constraints;
}
@@ -3431,11 +3427,6 @@ static const struct pci_device_id bdx_uncore_pci_ids[] = {
.driver_data = UNCORE_PCI_DEV_DATA(UNCORE_EXTRA_PCI_DEV,
BDX_PCI_QPI_PORT2_FILTER),
},
- { /* PCU.3 (for Capability registers) */
- PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x6fc0),
- .driver_data = UNCORE_PCI_DEV_DATA(UNCORE_EXTRA_PCI_DEV,
- HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3),
- },
{ /* end: all zeroes */ }
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
index a8f3af257e26..b1deacbeb266 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ int crash_setup_memmap_entries(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params)
struct crash_memmap_data cmd;
struct crash_mem *cmem;
- cmem = vzalloc(sizeof(struct crash_mem));
+ cmem = vzalloc(struct_size(cmem, ranges, 1));
if (!cmem)
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/block/ioctl.c b/block/ioctl.c
index 3be4d0e2a96c..ed240e170e14 100644
--- a/block/ioctl.c
+++ b/block/ioctl.c
@@ -98,6 +98,8 @@ static int blkdev_reread_part(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode)
return -EINVAL;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
+ if (bdev->bd_part_count)
+ return -EBUSY;
/*
* Reopen the device to revalidate the driver state and force a
diff --git a/drivers/dma/tegra20-apb-dma.c b/drivers/dma/tegra20-apb-dma.c
index 71827d9b0aa1..b7260749e8ee 100644
--- a/drivers/dma/tegra20-apb-dma.c
+++ b/drivers/dma/tegra20-apb-dma.c
@@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ static void tegra_dma_issue_pending(struct dma_chan *dc)
goto end;
}
if (!tdc->busy) {
- err = pm_runtime_get_sync(tdc->tdma->dev);
+ err = pm_runtime_resume_and_get(tdc->tdma->dev);
if (err < 0) {
dev_err(tdc2dev(tdc), "Failed to enable DMA\n");
goto end;
@@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ static void tegra_dma_synchronize(struct dma_chan *dc)
struct tegra_dma_channel *tdc = to_tegra_dma_chan(dc);
int err;
- err = pm_runtime_get_sync(tdc->tdma->dev);
+ err = pm_runtime_resume_and_get(tdc->tdma->dev);
if (err < 0) {
dev_err(tdc2dev(tdc), "Failed to synchronize DMA: %d\n", err);
return;
diff --git a/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dpdma.c b/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dpdma.c
index 55df63dead8d..70b29bd079c9 100644
--- a/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dpdma.c
+++ b/drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dpdma.c
@@ -839,6 +839,7 @@ static void xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer(struct xilinx_dpdma_chan *chan)
struct xilinx_dpdma_tx_desc *desc;
struct virt_dma_desc *vdesc;
u32 reg, channels;
+ bool first_frame;
lockdep_assert_held(&chan->lock);
@@ -852,14 +853,6 @@ static void xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer(struct xilinx_dpdma_chan *chan)
chan->running = true;
}
- if (chan->video_group)
- channels = xilinx_dpdma_chan_video_group_ready(chan);
- else
- channels = BIT(chan->id);
-
- if (!channels)
- return;
-
vdesc = vchan_next_desc(&chan->vchan);
if (!vdesc)
return;
@@ -884,13 +877,26 @@ static void xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer(struct xilinx_dpdma_chan *chan)
FIELD_PREP(XILINX_DPDMA_CH_DESC_START_ADDRE_MASK,
upper_32_bits(sw_desc->dma_addr)));
- if (chan->first_frame)
+ first_frame = chan->first_frame;
+ chan->first_frame = false;
+
+ if (chan->video_group) {
+ channels = xilinx_dpdma_chan_video_group_ready(chan);
+ /*
+ * Trigger the transfer only when all channels in the group are
+ * ready.
+ */
+ if (!channels)
+ return;
+ } else {
+ channels = BIT(chan->id);
+ }
+
+ if (first_frame)
reg = XILINX_DPDMA_GBL_TRIG_MASK(channels);
else
reg = XILINX_DPDMA_GBL_RETRIG_MASK(channels);
- chan->first_frame = false;
-
dpdma_write(xdev->reg, XILINX_DPDMA_GBL, reg);
}
@@ -1042,13 +1048,14 @@ static int xilinx_dpdma_chan_stop(struct xilinx_dpdma_chan *chan)
*/
static void xilinx_dpdma_chan_done_irq(struct xilinx_dpdma_chan *chan)
{
- struct xilinx_dpdma_tx_desc *active = chan->desc.active;
+ struct xilinx_dpdma_tx_desc *active;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&chan->lock, flags);
xilinx_dpdma_debugfs_desc_done_irq(chan);
+ active = chan->desc.active;
if (active)
vchan_cyclic_callback(&active->vdesc);
else
diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-omap.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-omap.c
index f7ceb2b11afc..a7e8ed5191a8 100644
--- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-omap.c
+++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-omap.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#define OMAP4_GPIO_DEBOUNCINGTIME_MASK 0xFF
struct gpio_regs {
+ u32 sysconfig;
u32 irqenable1;
u32 irqenable2;
u32 wake_en;
@@ -1072,6 +1073,7 @@ static void omap_gpio_init_context(struct gpio_bank *p)
const struct omap_gpio_reg_offs *regs = p->regs;
void __iomem *base = p->base;
+ p->context.sysconfig = readl_relaxed(base + regs->sysconfig);
p->context.ctrl = readl_relaxed(base + regs->ctrl);
p->context.oe = readl_relaxed(base + regs->direction);
p->context.wake_en = readl_relaxed(base + regs->wkup_en);
@@ -1091,6 +1093,7 @@ static void omap_gpio_restore_context(struct gpio_bank *bank)
const struct omap_gpio_reg_offs *regs = bank->regs;
void __iomem *base = bank->base;
+ writel_relaxed(bank->context.sysconfig, base + regs->sysconfig);
writel_relaxed(bank->context.wake_en, base + regs->wkup_en);
writel_relaxed(bank->context.ctrl, base + regs->ctrl);
writel_relaxed(bank->context.leveldetect0, base + regs->leveldetect0);
@@ -1118,6 +1121,10 @@ static void omap_gpio_idle(struct gpio_bank *bank, bool may_lose_context)
bank->saved_datain = readl_relaxed(base + bank->regs->datain);
+ /* Save syconfig, it's runtime value can be different from init value */
+ if (bank->loses_context)
+ bank->context.sysconfig = readl_relaxed(base + bank->regs->sysconfig);
+
if (!bank->enabled_non_wakeup_gpios)
goto update_gpio_context_count;
@@ -1282,6 +1289,7 @@ static int gpio_omap_cpu_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb,
static const struct omap_gpio_reg_offs omap2_gpio_regs = {
.revision = OMAP24XX_GPIO_REVISION,
+ .sysconfig = OMAP24XX_GPIO_SYSCONFIG,
.direction = OMAP24XX_GPIO_OE,
.datain = OMAP24XX_GPIO_DATAIN,
.dataout = OMAP24XX_GPIO_DATAOUT,
@@ -1305,6 +1313,7 @@ static const struct omap_gpio_reg_offs omap2_gpio_regs = {
static const struct omap_gpio_reg_offs omap4_gpio_regs = {
.revision = OMAP4_GPIO_REVISION,
+ .sysconfig = OMAP4_GPIO_SYSCONFIG,
.direction = OMAP4_GPIO_OE,
.datain = OMAP4_GPIO_DATAIN,
.dataout = OMAP4_GPIO_DATAOUT,
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-alps.c b/drivers/hid/hid-alps.c
index 3feaece13ade..6b665931147d 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-alps.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-alps.c
@@ -761,6 +761,7 @@ static int alps_input_configured(struct hid_device *hdev, struct hid_input *hi)
if (input_register_device(data->input2)) {
input_free_device(input2);
+ ret = -ENOENT;
goto exit;
}
}
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-cp2112.c b/drivers/hid/hid-cp2112.c
index 21e15627a461..477baa30889c 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-cp2112.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-cp2112.c
@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ struct cp2112_device {
atomic_t read_avail;
atomic_t xfer_avail;
struct gpio_chip gc;
+ struct irq_chip irq;
u8 *in_out_buffer;
struct mutex lock;
@@ -1175,16 +1176,6 @@ static int cp2112_gpio_irq_type(struct irq_data *d, unsigned int type)
return 0;
}
-static struct irq_chip cp2112_gpio_irqchip = {
- .name = "cp2112-gpio",
- .irq_startup = cp2112_gpio_irq_startup,
- .irq_shutdown = cp2112_gpio_irq_shutdown,
- .irq_ack = cp2112_gpio_irq_ack,
- .irq_mask = cp2112_gpio_irq_mask,
- .irq_unmask = cp2112_gpio_irq_unmask,
- .irq_set_type = cp2112_gpio_irq_type,
-};
-
static int __maybe_unused cp2112_allocate_irq(struct cp2112_device *dev,
int pin)
{
@@ -1339,8 +1330,17 @@ static int cp2112_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, const struct hid_device_id *id)
dev->gc.can_sleep = 1;
dev->gc.parent = &hdev->dev;
+ dev->irq.name = "cp2112-gpio";
+ dev->irq.irq_startup = cp2112_gpio_irq_startup;
+ dev->irq.irq_shutdown = cp2112_gpio_irq_shutdown;
+ dev->irq.irq_ack = cp2112_gpio_irq_ack;
+ dev->irq.irq_mask = cp2112_gpio_irq_mask;
+ dev->irq.irq_unmask = cp2112_gpio_irq_unmask;
+ dev->irq.irq_set_type = cp2112_gpio_irq_type;
+ dev->irq.flags = IRQCHIP_MASK_ON_SUSPEND;
+
girq = &dev->gc.irq;
- girq->chip = &cp2112_gpio_irqchip;
+ girq->chip = &dev->irq;
/* The event comes from the outside so no parent handler */
girq->parent_handler = NULL;
girq->num_parents = 0;
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-google-hammer.c b/drivers/hid/hid-google-hammer.c
index 85a054f1ce38..2a176f77b32e 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-google-hammer.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-google-hammer.c
@@ -526,6 +526,8 @@ static void hammer_remove(struct hid_device *hdev)
}
static const struct hid_device_id hammer_devices[] = {
+ { HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_GENERIC,
+ USB_VENDOR_ID_GOOGLE, USB_DEVICE_ID_GOOGLE_DON) },
{ HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_GENERIC,
USB_VENDOR_ID_GOOGLE, USB_DEVICE_ID_GOOGLE_HAMMER) },
{ HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_GENERIC,
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
index 06813f297dcc..b93ce0d475e0 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
@@ -486,6 +486,7 @@
#define USB_DEVICE_ID_GOOGLE_MASTERBALL 0x503c
#define USB_DEVICE_ID_GOOGLE_MAGNEMITE 0x503d
#define USB_DEVICE_ID_GOOGLE_MOONBALL 0x5044
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_GOOGLE_DON 0x5050
#define USB_VENDOR_ID_GOTOP 0x08f2
#define USB_DEVICE_ID_SUPER_Q2 0x007f
diff --git a/drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c b/drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c
index 6cda5935fc09..2d70dc4bea65 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c
@@ -2533,7 +2533,7 @@ static void wacom_wac_finger_slot(struct wacom_wac *wacom_wac,
!wacom_wac->shared->is_touch_on) {
if (!wacom_wac->shared->touch_down)
return;
- prox = 0;
+ prox = false;
}
wacom_wac->hid_data.num_received++;
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn66xx_regs.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn66xx_regs.h
index b248966837b4..7aad40b2aa73 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn66xx_regs.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn66xx_regs.h
@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@
| CN6XXX_INTR_M0UNWI_ERR \
| CN6XXX_INTR_M1UPB0_ERR \
| CN6XXX_INTR_M1UPWI_ERR \
- | CN6XXX_INTR_M1UPB0_ERR \
+ | CN6XXX_INTR_M1UNB0_ERR \
| CN6XXX_INTR_M1UNWI_ERR \
| CN6XXX_INTR_INSTR_DB_OF_ERR \
| CN6XXX_INTR_SLIST_DB_OF_ERR \
diff --git a/drivers/net/geneve.c b/drivers/net/geneve.c
index abd37f26af68..11864ac101b8 100644
--- a/drivers/net/geneve.c
+++ b/drivers/net/geneve.c
@@ -890,6 +890,9 @@ static int geneve_xmit_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
__be16 sport;
int err;
+ if (!pskb_network_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
sport = udp_flow_src_port(geneve->net, skb, 1, USHRT_MAX, true);
rt = geneve_get_v4_rt(skb, dev, gs4, &fl4, info,
geneve->cfg.info.key.tp_dst, sport);
@@ -984,6 +987,9 @@ static int geneve6_xmit_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
__be16 sport;
int err;
+ if (!pskb_network_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
sport = udp_flow_src_port(geneve->net, skb, 1, USHRT_MAX, true);
dst = geneve_get_v6_dst(skb, dev, gs6, &fl6, info,
geneve->cfg.info.key.tp_dst, sport);
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/hso.c b/drivers/net/usb/hso.c
index d18642a8144c..4909405803d5 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/hso.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/hso.c
@@ -3104,7 +3104,7 @@ static void hso_free_interface(struct usb_interface *interface)
cancel_work_sync(&serial_table[i]->async_put_intf);
cancel_work_sync(&serial_table[i]->async_get_intf);
hso_serial_tty_unregister(serial);
- kref_put(&serial_table[i]->ref, hso_serial_ref_free);
+ kref_put(&serial->parent->ref, hso_serial_ref_free);
}
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
index 6f10e0998f1c..94d19158efc1 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
@@ -824,11 +824,15 @@ static void connect(struct backend_info *be)
xenvif_carrier_on(be->vif);
unregister_hotplug_status_watch(be);
- err = xenbus_watch_pathfmt(dev, &be->hotplug_status_watch, NULL,
- hotplug_status_changed,
- "%s/%s", dev->nodename, "hotplug-status");
- if (!err)
+ if (xenbus_exists(XBT_NIL, dev->nodename, "hotplug-status")) {
+ err = xenbus_watch_pathfmt(dev, &be->hotplug_status_watch,
+ NULL, hotplug_status_changed,
+ "%s/%s", dev->nodename,
+ "hotplug-status");
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
be->have_hotplug_status_watch = 1;
+ }
netif_tx_wake_all_queues(be->vif->dev);
diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/core.c b/drivers/pinctrl/core.c
index 9fc4433fece4..20b477cd5a30 100644
--- a/drivers/pinctrl/core.c
+++ b/drivers/pinctrl/core.c
@@ -1604,8 +1604,8 @@ static int pinctrl_pins_show(struct seq_file *s, void *what)
unsigned i, pin;
#ifdef CONFIG_GPIOLIB
struct pinctrl_gpio_range *range;
- unsigned int gpio_num;
struct gpio_chip *chip;
+ int gpio_num;
#endif
seq_printf(s, "registered pins: %d\n", pctldev->desc->npins);
@@ -1625,7 +1625,7 @@ static int pinctrl_pins_show(struct seq_file *s, void *what)
seq_printf(s, "pin %d (%s) ", pin, desc->name);
#ifdef CONFIG_GPIOLIB
- gpio_num = 0;
+ gpio_num = -1;
list_for_each_entry(range, &pctldev->gpio_ranges, node) {
if ((pin >= range->pin_base) &&
(pin < (range->pin_base + range->npins))) {
@@ -1633,10 +1633,12 @@ static int pinctrl_pins_show(struct seq_file *s, void *what)
break;
}
}
- chip = gpio_to_chip(gpio_num);
- if (chip && chip->gpiodev && chip->gpiodev->base)
- seq_printf(s, "%u:%s ", gpio_num -
- chip->gpiodev->base, chip->label);
+ if (gpio_num >= 0)
+ chip = gpio_to_chip(gpio_num);
+ else
+ chip = NULL;
+ if (chip)
+ seq_printf(s, "%u:%s ", gpio_num - chip->gpiodev->base, chip->label);
else
seq_puts(s, "0:? ");
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/intel/pinctrl-lewisburg.c b/drivers/pinctrl/intel/pinctrl-lewisburg.c
index 7fdf4257df1e..ad4b446d588e 100644
--- a/drivers/pinctrl/intel/pinctrl-lewisburg.c
+++ b/drivers/pinctrl/intel/pinctrl-lewisburg.c
@@ -299,9 +299,9 @@ static const struct pinctrl_pin_desc lbg_pins[] = {
static const struct intel_community lbg_communities[] = {
LBG_COMMUNITY(0, 0, 71),
LBG_COMMUNITY(1, 72, 132),
- LBG_COMMUNITY(3, 133, 144),
- LBG_COMMUNITY(4, 145, 180),
- LBG_COMMUNITY(5, 181, 246),
+ LBG_COMMUNITY(3, 133, 143),
+ LBG_COMMUNITY(4, 144, 178),
+ LBG_COMMUNITY(5, 179, 246),
};
static const struct intel_pinctrl_soc_data lbg_soc_data = {
diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/qcom-geni-se.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/qcom-geni-se.c
index be76fddbf524..0dbca679bd32 100644
--- a/drivers/soc/qcom/qcom-geni-se.c
+++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/qcom-geni-se.c
@@ -741,6 +741,9 @@ int geni_icc_get(struct geni_se *se, const char *icc_ddr)
int i, err;
const char *icc_names[] = {"qup-core", "qup-config", icc_ddr};
+ if (has_acpi_companion(se->dev))
+ return 0;
+
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(se->icc_paths); i++) {
if (!icc_names[i])
continue;
diff --git a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c
index e79359326411..bc035ba6e010 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c
@@ -1637,12 +1637,13 @@ static int acm_resume(struct usb_interface *intf)
struct urb *urb;
int rv = 0;
- acm_unpoison_urbs(acm);
spin_lock_irq(&acm->write_lock);
if (--acm->susp_count)
goto out;
+ acm_unpoison_urbs(acm);
+
if (tty_port_initialized(&acm->port)) {
rv = usb_submit_urb(acm->ctrlurb, GFP_ATOMIC);
diff --git a/drivers/vdpa/mlx5/core/mr.c b/drivers/vdpa/mlx5/core/mr.c
index d300f799efcd..aa656f57bf5b 100644
--- a/drivers/vdpa/mlx5/core/mr.c
+++ b/drivers/vdpa/mlx5/core/mr.c
@@ -273,8 +273,10 @@ static int map_direct_mr(struct mlx5_vdpa_dev *mvdev, struct mlx5_vdpa_direct_mr
mr->log_size = log_entity_size;
mr->nsg = nsg;
mr->nent = dma_map_sg_attrs(dma, mr->sg_head.sgl, mr->nsg, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL, 0);
- if (!mr->nent)
+ if (!mr->nent) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_map;
+ }
err = create_direct_mr(mvdev, mr);
if (err)
diff --git a/drivers/vhost/vdpa.c b/drivers/vhost/vdpa.c
index fc5707ada024..84e5949bc861 100644
--- a/drivers/vhost/vdpa.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/vdpa.c
@@ -749,9 +749,11 @@ static int vhost_vdpa_process_iotlb_msg(struct vhost_dev *dev,
const struct vdpa_config_ops *ops = vdpa->config;
int r = 0;
+ mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
+
r = vhost_dev_check_owner(dev);
if (r)
- return r;
+ goto unlock;
switch (msg->type) {
case VHOST_IOTLB_UPDATE:
@@ -772,6 +774,8 @@ static int vhost_vdpa_process_iotlb_msg(struct vhost_dev *dev,
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
+unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
return r;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index b416bba3a62b..8ad819132dde 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -1259,6 +1259,11 @@ static inline bool bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(void)
return perfmon_capable();
}
+static inline bool bpf_allow_uninit_stack(void)
+{
+ return perfmon_capable();
+}
+
static inline bool bpf_allow_ptr_to_map_access(void)
{
return perfmon_capable();
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index e83ef6f6bf43..85bac3191e12 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ struct bpf_func_state {
* 0 = main function, 1 = first callee.
*/
u32 frameno;
- /* subprog number == index within subprog_stack_depth
+ /* subprog number == index within subprog_info
* zero == main subprog
*/
u32 subprogno;
@@ -390,6 +390,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {
u32 used_map_cnt; /* number of used maps */
u32 id_gen; /* used to generate unique reg IDs */
bool allow_ptr_leaks;
+ bool allow_uninit_stack;
bool allow_ptr_to_map_access;
bool bpf_capable;
bool bypass_spec_v1;
diff --git a/include/linux/platform_data/gpio-omap.h b/include/linux/platform_data/gpio-omap.h
index 8b30b14b47d3..f377817ce75c 100644
--- a/include/linux/platform_data/gpio-omap.h
+++ b/include/linux/platform_data/gpio-omap.h
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
* omap2+ specific GPIO registers
*/
#define OMAP24XX_GPIO_REVISION 0x0000
+#define OMAP24XX_GPIO_SYSCONFIG 0x0010
#define OMAP24XX_GPIO_IRQSTATUS1 0x0018
#define OMAP24XX_GPIO_IRQSTATUS2 0x0028
#define OMAP24XX_GPIO_IRQENABLE2 0x002c
@@ -108,6 +109,7 @@
#define OMAP24XX_GPIO_SETDATAOUT 0x0094
#define OMAP4_GPIO_REVISION 0x0000
+#define OMAP4_GPIO_SYSCONFIG 0x0010
#define OMAP4_GPIO_EOI 0x0020
#define OMAP4_GPIO_IRQSTATUSRAW0 0x0024
#define OMAP4_GPIO_IRQSTATUSRAW1 0x0028
@@ -148,6 +150,7 @@
#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
struct omap_gpio_reg_offs {
u16 revision;
+ u16 sysconfig;
u16 direction;
u16 datain;
u16 dataout;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 3370f0d476e9..b9180509917e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2268,12 +2268,14 @@ static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state,
state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_SPILL;
}
-/* check_stack_read/write functions track spill/fill of registers,
+/* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers,
* stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access()
*/
-static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct bpf_func_state *state, /* func where register points to */
- int off, int size, int value_regno, int insn_idx)
+static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ /* stack frame we're writing to */
+ struct bpf_func_state *state,
+ int off, int size, int value_regno,
+ int insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */
int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err;
@@ -2399,9 +2401,175 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return 0;
}
-static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct bpf_func_state *reg_state /* func where register points to */,
- int off, int size, int value_regno)
+/* Write the stack: 'stack[ptr_regno + off] = value_regno'. 'ptr_regno' is
+ * known to contain a variable offset.
+ * This function checks whether the write is permitted and conservatively
+ * tracks the effects of the write, considering that each stack slot in the
+ * dynamic range is potentially written to.
+ *
+ * 'off' includes 'regno->off'.
+ * 'value_regno' can be -1, meaning that an unknown value is being written to
+ * the stack.
+ *
+ * Spilled pointers in range are not marked as written because we don't know
+ * what's going to be actually written. This means that read propagation for
+ * future reads cannot be terminated by this write.
+ *
+ * For privileged programs, uninitialized stack slots are considered
+ * initialized by this write (even though we don't know exactly what offsets
+ * are going to be written to). The idea is that we don't want the verifier to
+ * reject future reads that access slots written to through variable offsets.
+ */
+static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ /* func where register points to */
+ struct bpf_func_state *state,
+ int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
+ int value_regno, int insn_idx)
+{
+ struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */
+ int min_off, max_off;
+ int i, err;
+ struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, *value_reg = NULL;
+ bool writing_zero = false;
+ /* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any
+ * stack slots remain STACK_ZERO
+ */
+ bool zero_used = false;
+
+ cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
+ ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno];
+ min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off;
+ max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size;
+ if (value_regno >= 0)
+ value_reg = &cur->regs[value_regno];
+ if (value_reg && register_is_null(value_reg))
+ writing_zero = true;
+
+ err = realloc_func_state(state, round_up(-min_off, BPF_REG_SIZE),
+ state->acquired_refs, true);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+
+ /* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */
+ for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
+ u8 new_type, *stype;
+ int slot, spi;
+
+ slot = -i - 1;
+ spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
+ stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE];
+
+ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks
+ && *stype != NOT_INIT
+ && *stype != SCALAR_VALUE) {
+ /* Reject the write if there's are spilled pointers in
+ * range. If we didn't reject here, the ptr status
+ * would be erased below (even though not all slots are
+ * actually overwritten), possibly opening the door to
+ * leaks.
+ */
+ verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d",
+ insn_idx, i);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Erase all spilled pointers. */
+ state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT;
+
+ /* Update the slot type. */
+ new_type = STACK_MISC;
+ if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_ZERO) {
+ new_type = STACK_ZERO;
+ zero_used = true;
+ }
+ /* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we check whether it's OK to
+ * pretend that it will be initialized by this write. The slot
+ * might not actually be written to, and so if we mark it as
+ * initialized future reads might leak uninitialized memory.
+ * For privileged programs, we will accept such reads to slots
+ * that may or may not be written because, if we're reject
+ * them, the error would be too confusing.
+ */
+ if (*stype == STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) {
+ verbose(env, "uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d",
+ insn_idx, i);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ *stype = new_type;
+ }
+ if (zero_used) {
+ /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */
+ err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* When register 'dst_regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off,
+ * max_off), we set the register's type according to the types of the
+ * respective stack slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then
+ * so is the destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be
+ * SCALAR. This function does not deal with register filling; the caller must
+ * ensure that all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as
+ * read.
+ */
+static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ /* func where src register points to */
+ struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state,
+ int min_off, int max_off, int dst_regno)
+{
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
+ struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
+ int i, slot, spi;
+ u8 *stype;
+ int zeros = 0;
+
+ for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
+ slot = -i - 1;
+ spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
+ stype = ptr_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
+ if (stype[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_ZERO)
+ break;
+ zeros++;
+ }
+ if (zeros == max_off - min_off) {
+ /* any access_size read into register is zero extended,
+ * so the whole register == const_zero
+ */
+ __mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[dst_regno]);
+ /* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet,
+ * so mark it precise here, so that later
+ * backtracking can stop here.
+ * Backtracking may not need this if this register
+ * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment.
+ * Forward propagation of precise flag is not
+ * necessary either. This mark is only to stop
+ * backtracking. Any register that contributed
+ * to const 0 was marked precise before spill.
+ */
+ state->regs[dst_regno].precise = true;
+ } else {
+ /* have read misc data from the stack */
+ mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno);
+ }
+ state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
+}
+
+/* Read the stack at 'off' and put the results into the register indicated by
+ * 'dst_regno'. It handles reg filling if the addressed stack slot is a
+ * spilled reg.
+ *
+ * 'dst_regno' can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a
+ * register.
+ *
+ * The access is assumed to be within the current stack bounds.
+ */
+static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ /* func where src register points to */
+ struct bpf_func_state *reg_state,
+ int off, int size, int dst_regno)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
@@ -2409,11 +2577,6 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
u8 *stype;
- if (reg_state->allocated_stack <= slot) {
- verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+0 size %d\n",
- off, size);
- return -EACCES;
- }
stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
@@ -2424,9 +2587,9 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n");
return -EACCES;
}
- if (value_regno >= 0) {
- mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno);
- state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
+ if (dst_regno >= 0) {
+ mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno);
+ state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
}
mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
return 0;
@@ -2438,16 +2601,16 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
}
- if (value_regno >= 0) {
+ if (dst_regno >= 0) {
/* restore register state from stack */
- state->regs[value_regno] = *reg;
+ state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg;
/* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely
* has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited()
* which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions
*/
- state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
+ state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
} else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) {
- /* If value_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether
+ /* If dst_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether
* it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE
* (e.g. for XADD).
* We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that
@@ -2459,70 +2622,167 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
} else {
- int zeros = 0;
+ u8 type;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
- if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC)
+ type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE];
+ if (type == STACK_MISC)
continue;
- if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) {
- zeros++;
+ if (type == STACK_ZERO)
continue;
- }
verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, size);
return -EACCES;
}
mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
- if (value_regno >= 0) {
- if (zeros == size) {
- /* any size read into register is zero extended,
- * so the whole register == const_zero
- */
- __mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[value_regno]);
- /* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet,
- * so mark it precise here, so that later
- * backtracking can stop here.
- * Backtracking may not need this if this register
- * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment.
- * Forward propagation of precise flag is not
- * necessary either. This mark is only to stop
- * backtracking. Any register that contributed
- * to const 0 was marked precise before spill.
- */
- state->regs[value_regno].precise = true;
- } else {
- /* have read misc data from the stack */
- mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno);
- }
- state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
- }
+ if (dst_regno >= 0)
+ mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno);
}
return 0;
}
-static int check_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
- int off, int size)
+enum stack_access_src {
+ ACCESS_DIRECT = 1, /* the access is performed by an instruction */
+ ACCESS_HELPER = 2, /* the access is performed by a helper */
+};
+
+static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ int regno, int off, int access_size,
+ bool zero_size_allowed,
+ enum stack_access_src type,
+ struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta);
+
+static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
+{
+ return cur_regs(env) + regno;
+}
+
+/* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register
+ * 'dst_regno'.
+ * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'),
+ * but not its variable offset.
+ * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned.
+ *
+ * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with
+ * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when
+ * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing
+ * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable
+ * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used
+ * instead.
+ */
+static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno)
+{
+ /* The state of the source register. */
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
+ struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg);
+ int err;
+ int min_off, max_off;
+
+ /* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted.
+ */
+ err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
+ false, ACCESS_DIRECT, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
+ max_off = reg->smax_value + off;
+ mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or
+ * check_stack_read_var_off.
+ *
+ * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack
+ * bounds.
+ *
+ * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It
+ * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register.
+ */
+static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
+ int dst_regno)
{
- /* Stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we
- * can determine what type of data were returned. See
- * check_stack_read().
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
+ struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
+ int err;
+ /* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */
+ bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
+
+ /* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a
+ * register, in order to not leak pointers (see
+ * check_stack_read_fixed_off).
*/
- if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
- verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
+ verbose(env, "variable offset stack pointer cannot be passed into helper function; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
tn_buf, off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
+ /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity
+ * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack
+ * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit().
+ */
+ if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && var_off) {
+ char tn_buf[48];
- if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
- verbose(env, "invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
+ tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+ verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
+ ptr_regno, tn_buf);
return -EACCES;
}
- return 0;
+ if (!var_off) {
+ off += reg->var_off.value;
+ err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
+ dst_regno);
+ } else {
+ /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
+ * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this
+ * branch.
+ */
+ err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
+ dst_regno);
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+
+
+/* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or
+ * check_stack_write_var_off.
+ *
+ * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack.
+ * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any).
+ * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can
+ * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register.
+ *
+ * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size.
+ */
+static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
+ int value_regno, int insn_idx)
+{
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
+ struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
+ int err;
+
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ off += reg->var_off.value;
+ err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
+ value_regno, insn_idx);
+ } else {
+ /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
+ * than fixed offset ones.
+ */
+ err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state,
+ ptr_regno, off, size,
+ value_regno, insn_idx);
+ }
+ return err;
}
static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
@@ -2851,11 +3111,6 @@ static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
return -EACCES;
}
-static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
-{
- return cur_regs(env) + regno;
-}
-
static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
{
return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno));
@@ -2974,8 +3229,8 @@ static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
break;
case PTR_TO_STACK:
pointer_desc = "stack ";
- /* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write()
- * and check_stack_read() relies on stack accesses being
+ /* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write_fixed_off()
+ * and check_stack_read_fixed_off() relies on stack accesses being
* aligned.
*/
strict = true;
@@ -3393,6 +3648,91 @@ static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return 0;
}
+/* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The
+ * maximum valid offset is -1.
+ *
+ * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and
+ * -state->allocated_stack for reads.
+ */
+static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(int off,
+ struct bpf_func_state *state,
+ enum bpf_access_type t)
+{
+ int min_valid_off;
+
+ if (t == BPF_WRITE)
+ min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK;
+ else
+ min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack;
+
+ if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1)
+ return -EACCES;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack
+ * bounds.
+ *
+ * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any).
+ */
+static int check_stack_access_within_bounds(
+ struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ int regno, int off, int access_size,
+ enum stack_access_src src, enum bpf_access_type type)
+{
+ struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
+ struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
+ int min_off, max_off;
+ int err;
+ char *err_extra;
+
+ if (src == ACCESS_HELPER)
+ /* We don't know if helpers are reading or writing (or both). */
+ err_extra = " indirect access to";
+ else if (type == BPF_READ)
+ err_extra = " read from";
+ else
+ err_extra = " write to";
+
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ min_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
+ if (access_size > 0)
+ max_off = min_off + access_size - 1;
+ else
+ max_off = min_off;
+ } else {
+ if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF ||
+ reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
+ verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n",
+ err_extra, regno);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
+ if (access_size > 0)
+ max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1;
+ else
+ max_off = min_off;
+ }
+
+ err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type);
+ if (!err)
+ err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(max_off, state, type);
+
+ if (err) {
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ verbose(env, "invalid%s stack R%d off=%d size=%d\n",
+ err_extra, regno, off, access_size);
+ } else {
+ char tn_buf[48];
+
+ tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+ verbose(env, "invalid variable-offset%s stack R%d var_off=%s size=%d\n",
+ err_extra, regno, tn_buf, access_size);
+ }
+ }
+ return err;
+}
/* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write)
* if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory
@@ -3505,8 +3845,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
}
} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
- off += reg->var_off.value;
- err = check_stack_access(env, reg, off, size);
+ /* Basic bounds checks. */
+ err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, size, ACCESS_DIRECT, t);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -3515,12 +3855,12 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
if (err)
return err;
- if (t == BPF_WRITE)
- err = check_stack_write(env, state, off, size,
- value_regno, insn_idx);
- else
- err = check_stack_read(env, state, off, size,
+ if (t == BPF_READ)
+ err = check_stack_read(env, regno, off, size,
value_regno);
+ else
+ err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size,
+ value_regno, insn_idx);
} else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) {
if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) {
verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n");
@@ -3642,49 +3982,53 @@ static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_ins
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true);
}
-static int __check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
- int off, int access_size,
- bool zero_size_allowed)
+/* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through
+ * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending
+ * on the access type, that all elements of the stack are initialized.
+ *
+ * 'off' includes 'regno->off', but not its dynamic part (if any).
+ *
+ * All registers that have been spilled on the stack in the slots within the
+ * read offsets are marked as read.
+ */
+static int check_stack_range_initialized(
+ struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int off,
+ int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
+ enum stack_access_src type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
+ struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
+ int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi;
+ char *err_extra = type == ACCESS_HELPER ? " indirect" : "";
+ enum bpf_access_type bounds_check_type;
+ /* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are
+ * read-only.
+ */
+ bool clobber = false;
- if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
- access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
- if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
- verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
- regno, off, access_size);
- } else {
- char tn_buf[48];
-
- tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
- verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d var_off=%s access_size=%d\n",
- regno, tn_buf, access_size);
- }
+ if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) {
+ verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n");
return -EACCES;
}
- return 0;
-}
-/* when register 'regno' is passed into function that will read 'access_size'
- * bytes from that pointer, make sure that it's within stack boundary
- * and all elements of stack are initialized.
- * Unlike most pointer bounds-checking functions, this one doesn't take an
- * 'off' argument, so it has to add in reg->off itself.
- */
-static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
- int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
- struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
-{
- struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
- struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
- int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi;
+ if (type == ACCESS_HELPER) {
+ /* The bounds checks for writes are more permissive than for
+ * reads. However, if raw_mode is not set, we'll do extra
+ * checks below.
+ */
+ bounds_check_type = BPF_WRITE;
+ clobber = true;
+ } else {
+ bounds_check_type = BPF_READ;
+ }
+ err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size,
+ type, bounds_check_type);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
- min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + reg->off;
- err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, min_off, access_size,
- zero_size_allowed);
- if (err)
- return err;
+ min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
} else {
/* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for
* simplicity since it requires corresponding support in
@@ -3695,8 +4039,8 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
- verbose(env, "R%d indirect variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
- regno, tn_buf);
+ verbose(env, "R%d%s variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
+ regno, err_extra, tn_buf);
return -EACCES;
}
/* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed
@@ -3708,28 +4052,8 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
if (meta && meta->raw_mode)
meta = NULL;
- if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF ||
- reg->smax_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
- verbose(env, "R%d unbounded indirect variable offset stack access\n",
- regno);
- return -EACCES;
- }
- min_off = reg->smin_value + reg->off;
- max_off = reg->smax_value + reg->off;
- err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, min_off, access_size,
- zero_size_allowed);
- if (err) {
- verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of stack bound\n",
- regno);
- return err;
- }
- err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, max_off, access_size,
- zero_size_allowed);
- if (err) {
- verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of stack bound\n",
- regno);
- return err;
- }
+ min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
+ max_off = reg->smax_value + off;
}
if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
@@ -3749,8 +4073,10 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
if (*stype == STACK_MISC)
goto mark;
if (*stype == STACK_ZERO) {
- /* helper can write anything into the stack */
- *stype = STACK_MISC;
+ if (clobber) {
+ /* helper can write anything into the stack */
+ *stype = STACK_MISC;
+ }
goto mark;
}
@@ -3759,23 +4085,26 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
goto mark;
if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL &&
- state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
- __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
- for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
- state->stack[spi].slot_type[j] = STACK_MISC;
+ (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE ||
+ env->allow_ptr_leaks)) {
+ if (clobber) {
+ __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
+ for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
+ state->stack[spi].slot_type[j] = STACK_MISC;
+ }
goto mark;
}
err:
if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
- verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
- min_off, i - min_off, access_size);
+ verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n",
+ err_extra, regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size);
} else {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
- verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack var_off %s+%d size %d\n",
- tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size);
+ verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d var_off %s+%d size %d\n",
+ err_extra, regno, tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size);
}
return -EACCES;
mark:
@@ -3824,8 +4153,10 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
"rdwr",
&env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access);
case PTR_TO_STACK:
- return check_stack_boundary(env, regno, access_size,
- zero_size_allowed, meta);
+ return check_stack_range_initialized(
+ env,
+ regno, reg->off, access_size,
+ zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta);
default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */
/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
@@ -5343,7 +5674,7 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) ||
(opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
- u32 off, max = 0, ptr_limit = 0;
+ u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0;
if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) &&
(off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0))
@@ -5352,26 +5683,18 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
switch (ptr_reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_STACK:
/* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the
- * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP.
+ * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar
+ * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is
+ * currently prohibited for unprivileged.
*/
max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left;
- /* Indirect variable offset stack access is prohibited in
- * unprivileged mode so it's not handled here.
- */
- off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value;
- if (mask_to_left)
- ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
- else
- ptr_limit = -off - 1;
+ ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off);
break;
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size;
- if (mask_to_left) {
- ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off;
- } else {
- off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off;
- ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off - 1;
- }
+ ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ?
+ ptr_reg->smin_value :
+ ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off;
break;
default:
return REASON_TYPE;
@@ -5426,10 +5749,12 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
- struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
+ struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
+ struct bpf_insn_aux_data *tmp_aux,
+ const bool commit_window)
{
+ struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : tmp_aux;
struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
- struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg;
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
@@ -5448,18 +5773,33 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (vstate->speculative)
goto do_sim;
- alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
- alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
- BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
-
err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, off_reg, &alu_limit, opcode);
if (err < 0)
return err;
+ if (commit_window) {
+ /* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on
+ * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation.
+ */
+ alu_state = tmp_aux->alu_state;
+ alu_limit = abs(tmp_aux->alu_limit - alu_limit);
+ } else {
+ alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
+ alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
+ BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
+ }
+
err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit);
if (err < 0)
return err;
do_sim:
+ /* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already
+ * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification
+ * stack.
+ */
+ if (commit_window)
+ return 0;
+
/* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under
* speculative execution from truncation as a result of
* masking when off was not within expected range. If off
@@ -5518,6 +5858,72 @@ static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return -EACCES;
}
+/* check that stack access falls within stack limits and that 'reg' doesn't
+ * have a variable offset.
+ *
+ * Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity since it
+ * requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU. See also
+ * retrieve_ptr_limit().
+ *
+ *
+ * 'off' includes 'reg->off'.
+ */
+static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(
+ struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ int regno,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+ int off)
+{
+ if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ char tn_buf[48];
+
+ tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+ verbose(env, "R%d variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s off=%d\n",
+ regno, tn_buf, off);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
+ "prohibited for !root; off=%d\n", regno, off);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ const struct bpf_insn *insn,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
+{
+ u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
+
+ /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
+ * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
+ */
+ if (env->bypass_spec_v1)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (dst_reg->type) {
+ case PTR_TO_STACK:
+ if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg,
+ dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value))
+ return -EACCES;
+ break;
+ case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
+ if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
+ "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
* Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately.
* If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a
@@ -5536,6 +5942,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
+ struct bpf_insn_aux_data tmp_aux = {};
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
int ret;
@@ -5602,12 +6009,15 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
/* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */
__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
- switch (opcode) {
- case BPF_ADD:
- ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg);
+ if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
+ ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
+ &tmp_aux, false);
if (ret < 0)
return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
+ }
+ switch (opcode) {
+ case BPF_ADD:
/* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
* the s32 'off' field
*/
@@ -5658,10 +6068,6 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
break;
case BPF_SUB:
- ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg);
- if (ret < 0)
- return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
-
if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
/* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */
verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
@@ -5742,22 +6148,13 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
- /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
- * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
- */
- if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) {
- if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
- check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) {
- verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
- "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
- return -EACCES;
- } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK &&
- check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off +
- dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) {
- verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
- "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
- return -EACCES;
- }
+ if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0)
+ return -EACCES;
+ if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
+ ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
+ &tmp_aux, true);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
}
return 0;
@@ -11951,6 +12348,7 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
env->strict_alignment = false;
env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks();
+ env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack();
env->allow_ptr_to_map_access = bpf_allow_ptr_to_map_access();
env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1();
env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4();
diff --git a/kernel/locking/qrwlock.c b/kernel/locking/qrwlock.c
index fe9ca92faa2a..909b0bf22a1e 100644
--- a/kernel/locking/qrwlock.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/qrwlock.c
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(queued_read_lock_slowpath);
*/
void queued_write_lock_slowpath(struct qrwlock *lock)
{
+ int cnts;
+
/* Put the writer into the wait queue */
arch_spin_lock(&lock->wait_lock);
@@ -74,9 +76,8 @@ void queued_write_lock_slowpath(struct qrwlock *lock)
/* When no more readers or writers, set the locked flag */
do {
- atomic_cond_read_acquire(&lock->cnts, VAL == _QW_WAITING);
- } while (atomic_cmpxchg_relaxed(&lock->cnts, _QW_WAITING,
- _QW_LOCKED) != _QW_WAITING);
+ cnts = atomic_cond_read_relaxed(&lock->cnts, VAL == _QW_WAITING);
+ } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_acquire(&lock->cnts, &cnts, _QW_LOCKED));
unlock:
arch_spin_unlock(&lock->wait_lock);
}
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.kasan b/scripts/Makefile.kasan
index 1e000cc2e7b4..127012f45166 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.kasan
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.kasan
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE := -fno-builtin
KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET ?= $(CONFIG_KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
+cc-param = $(call cc-option, -mllvm -$(1), $(call cc-option, --param $(1)))
+
ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE
@@ -12,8 +14,6 @@ endif
CFLAGS_KASAN_MINIMAL := -fsanitize=kernel-address
-cc-param = $(call cc-option, -mllvm -$(1), $(call cc-option, --param $(1)))
-
# -fasan-shadow-offset fails without -fsanitize
CFLAGS_KASAN_SHADOW := $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=kernel-address \
-fasan-shadow-offset=$(KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET), \
@@ -36,14 +36,14 @@ endif # CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS
ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE
- instrumentation_flags := -mllvm -hwasan-mapping-offset=$(KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
+ instrumentation_flags := $(call cc-param,hwasan-mapping-offset=$(KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET))
else
- instrumentation_flags := -mllvm -hwasan-instrument-with-calls=1
+ instrumentation_flags := $(call cc-param,hwasan-instrument-with-calls=1)
endif
CFLAGS_KASAN := -fsanitize=kernel-hwaddress \
- -mllvm -hwasan-instrument-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK) \
- -mllvm -hwasan-use-short-granules=0 \
+ $(call cc-param,hwasan-instrument-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)) \
+ $(call cc-param,hwasan-use-short-granules=0) \
$(instrumentation_flags)
endif # CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index e2a0ed5d02f0..c87c4df8703d 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map))
return -EINVAL;
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
+ rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
if (rc)
return rc;
diff --git a/tools/arch/ia64/include/asm/barrier.h b/tools/arch/ia64/include/asm/barrier.h
index 4d471d9511a5..6fffe5682713 100644
--- a/tools/arch/ia64/include/asm/barrier.h
+++ b/tools/arch/ia64/include/asm/barrier.h
@@ -39,9 +39,6 @@
* sequential memory pages only.
*/
-/* XXX From arch/ia64/include/uapi/asm/gcc_intrin.h */
-#define ia64_mf() asm volatile ("mf" ::: "memory")
-
#define mb() ia64_mf()
#define rmb() mb()
#define wmb() mb()
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c b/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c
index d8ada6a3c555..d3c15b53495d 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ int auxtrace_parse_snapshot_options(struct auxtrace_record *itr,
break;
}
- if (itr)
+ if (itr && itr->parse_snapshot_options)
return itr->parse_snapshot_options(itr, opts, str);
pr_err("No AUX area tracing to snapshot\n");
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/map.c b/tools/perf/util/map.c
index e2537d5acab0..f4d44f75ba15 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/map.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/map.c
@@ -836,15 +836,18 @@ int maps__fixup_overlappings(struct maps *maps, struct map *map, FILE *fp)
int maps__clone(struct thread *thread, struct maps *parent)
{
struct maps *maps = thread->maps;
- int err = -ENOMEM;
+ int err;
struct map *map;
down_read(&parent->lock);
maps__for_each_entry(parent, map) {
struct map *new = map__clone(map);
- if (new == NULL)
+
+ if (new == NULL) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_unlock;
+ }
err = unwind__prepare_access(maps, new, NULL);
if (err)
On 2021/4/28 20:53, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> I'm announcing the release of the 5.10.33 kernel.
>
> All users of the 5.10 kernel series must upgrade.
>
> The updated 5.10.y git tree can be found at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git linux-5.10.y
> and can be browsed at the normal kernel.org git web browser:
> https://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git;a=summary
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Tested on arm64 and x86 for 5.10.33,
Kernel repo:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Branch: linux-5.10.y
Version: 5.10.33
Commit: 8bd8301ccc115b7885517077a097ee028fcb1ec2
Compiler: gcc version 7.3.0 (GCC)
arm64:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Testcase Result Summary:
total: 6304
passed: 6304
failed: 0
timeout: 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------
x86:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Testcase Result Summary:
total: 6304
passed: 6304
failed: 0
timeout: 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Tested-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>