This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.7.10 release.
There are 61 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.
Responses should be made by Fri Mar 15 04:32:27 PM UTC 2024.
Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git/patch/?id=linux-6.7.y&id2=v6.7.9
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.7.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
Thanks,
Sasha
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Aya Levin (1):
net/mlx5: Fix fw reporter diagnose output
Daniel Borkmann (2):
xdp, bonding: Fix feature flags when there are no slave devs anymore
selftests/bpf: Fix up xdp bonding test wrt feature flags
Eduard Zingerman (1):
bpf: check bpf_func_state->callback_depth when pruning states
Edward Adam Davis (1):
net/rds: fix WARNING in rds_conn_connect_if_down
Emeel Hakim (1):
net/mlx5e: Fix MACsec state loss upon state update in offload path
Emil Tantilov (1):
idpf: disable local BH when scheduling napi for marker packets
Eric Dumazet (2):
geneve: make sure to pull inner header in geneve_rx()
net/ipv6: avoid possible UAF in ip6_route_mpath_notify()
Florian Kauer (1):
igc: avoid returning frame twice in XDP_REDIRECT
Florian Westphal (1):
netfilter: nft_ct: fix l3num expectations with inet pseudo family
Frank Li (3):
dt-bindings: dma: fsl-edma: Add fsl-edma.h to prevent hardcoding in
dts
dmaengine: fsl-edma: utilize common dt-binding header file
dmaengine: fsl-edma: correct max_segment_size setting
Gao Xiang (1):
erofs: apply proper VMA alignment for memory mapped files on THP
Gavin Li (1):
Revert "net/mlx5: Block entering switchdev mode with ns inconsistency"
Guillaume Nault (1):
xfrm: Clear low order bits of ->flowi4_tos in decode_session4().
Horatiu Vultur (1):
net: sparx5: Fix use after free inside sparx5_del_mact_entry
Jacob Keller (2):
ice: replace ice_vf_recreate_vsi() with ice_vf_reconfig_vsi()
ice: virtchnl: stop pretending to support RSS over AQ or registers
Jan Kara (1):
readahead: avoid multiple marked readahead pages
Jason Xing (12):
netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_default_path_quality
netrom: Fix a data-race around
sysctl_netrom_obsolescence_count_initialiser
netrom: Fix data-races around sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser
netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_transport_timeout
netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries
netrom: Fix a data-race around
sysctl_netrom_transport_acknowledge_delay
netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay
netrom: Fix a data-race around
sysctl_netrom_transport_requested_window_size
netrom: Fix a data-race around
sysctl_netrom_transport_no_activity_timeout
netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_routing_control
netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_link_fails_count
netrom: Fix data-races around sysctl_net_busy_read
Jianbo Liu (2):
net/mlx5: E-switch, Change flow rule destination checking
net/mlx5e: Change the warning when ignore_flow_level is not supported
Lena Wang (1):
netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: Add protection for bmp length out of
range
Leon Romanovsky (1):
xfrm: Pass UDP encapsulation in TX packet offload
Maciej Fijalkowski (3):
ixgbe: {dis, en}able irqs in ixgbe_txrx_ring_{dis, en}able
i40e: disable NAPI right after disabling irqs when handling xsk_pool
ice: reorder disabling IRQ and NAPI in ice_qp_dis
Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) (1):
selftests: mptcp: decrease BW in simult flows
Michal Schmidt (1):
ice: fix uninitialized dplls mutex usage
Michal Swiatkowski (1):
ice: reconfig host after changing MSI-X on VF
Moshe Shemesh (1):
net/mlx5: Check capability for fw_reset
Oleg Nesterov (1):
exit: wait_task_zombie: kill the no longer necessary
spin_lock_irq(siglock)
Oleksij Rempel (1):
net: lan78xx: fix runtime PM count underflow on link stop
Pawan Gupta (4):
x86/mmio: Disable KVM mitigation when X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is set
Documentation/hw-vuln: Add documentation for RFDS
x86/rfds: Mitigate Register File Data Sampling (RFDS)
KVM/x86: Export RFDS_NO and RFDS_CLEAR to guests
Rahul Rameshbabu (2):
net/mlx5e: Use a memory barrier to enforce PTP WQ xmit submission
tracking occurs after populating the metadata_map
net/mlx5e: Switch to using _bh variant of of spinlock API in port
timestamping NAPI poll context
Rand Deeb (1):
net: ice: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference in
ice_bridge_setlink()
Saeed Mahameed (1):
Revert "net/mlx5e: Check the number of elements before walk TC
rhashtable"
Sasha Levin (1):
Linux 6.7.10-rc1
Steven Rostedt (Google) (1):
tracing/net_sched: Fix tracepoints that save qdisc_dev() as a string
Suren Baghdasaryan (1):
arch/arm/mm: fix major fault accounting when retrying under per-VMA
lock
Tobias Jakobi (Compleo) (1):
net: dsa: microchip: fix register write order in ksz8_ind_write8()
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen (1):
cpumap: Zero-initialise xdp_rxq_info struct before running XDP program
Wang Kefeng (1):
ARM: 9328/1: mm: try VMA lock-based page fault handling first
Yongzhi Liu (1):
net: pds_core: Fix possible double free in error handling path
.../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 +
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 +
.../hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst | 104 ++++++++++++++++++
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 21 ++++
Makefile | 4 +-
arch/arm/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/arm/mm/fault.c | 32 ++++++
arch/x86/Kconfig | 11 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 8 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 92 +++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 38 ++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 5 +-
drivers/base/cpu.c | 3 +
drivers/dma/fsl-edma-common.h | 5 +-
drivers/dma/fsl-edma-main.c | 21 ++--
drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz8795.c | 4 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pds_core/auxbus.c | 12 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_dpll.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c | 2 +
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c | 33 ++----
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c | 35 ++++--
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.h | 1 -
.../ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib_private.h | 1 +
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c | 9 +-
.../intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_allowlist.c | 2 -
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c | 9 +-
.../net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c | 2 +
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c | 13 +--
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c | 56 ++++++++--
.../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/devlink.c | 6 +
.../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/ptp.c | 12 +-
.../mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc/post_act.c | 2 +-
.../mellanox/mlx5/core/en_accel/macsec.c | 82 ++++++++------
.../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c | 2 +
.../mellanox/mlx5/core/esw/ipsec_fs.c | 2 +-
.../mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch_offloads.c | 46 +++-----
.../ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fw_reset.c | 22 +++-
.../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/health.c | 2 +-
.../microchip/sparx5/sparx5_mactable.c | 4 +-
drivers/net/geneve.c | 18 ++-
drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c | 3 +-
fs/erofs/data.c | 1 +
include/dt-bindings/dma/fsl-edma.h | 21 ++++
include/linux/cpu.h | 2 +
include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h | 4 +-
include/trace/events/qdisc.h | 20 ++--
kernel/bpf/cpumap.c | 2 +-
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 3 +
kernel/exit.c | 10 +-
mm/readahead.c | 4 +-
net/ipv6/route.c | 21 ++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c | 4 +
net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 11 +-
net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 14 +--
net/netrom/nr_dev.c | 2 +-
net/netrom/nr_in.c | 6 +-
net/netrom/nr_out.c | 2 +-
net/netrom/nr_route.c | 8 +-
net/netrom/nr_subr.c | 5 +-
net/rds/rdma.c | 3 +
net/rds/send.c | 6 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c | 2 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 +-
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_bonding.c | 4 +-
.../selftests/net/mptcp/simult_flows.sh | 8 +-
68 files changed, 648 insertions(+), 251 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst
create mode 100644 include/dt-bindings/dma/fsl-edma.h
--
2.43.0
From: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
commit e95df4ec0c0c9791941f112db699fae794b9862a upstream.
Currently MMIO Stale Data mitigation for CPUs not affected by MDS/TAA is
to only deploy VERW at VMentry by enabling mmio_stale_data_clear static
branch. No mitigation is needed for kernel->user transitions. If such
CPUs are also affected by RFDS, its mitigation may set
X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF to deploy VERW at kernel->user and VMentry.
This could result in duplicate VERW at VMentry.
Fix this by disabling mmio_stale_data_clear static branch when
X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 48d049cd74e71..cd6ac89c1a0df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -422,6 +422,13 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)))
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+
+ /*
+ * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF could be enabled by other VERW based
+ * mitigations, disable KVM-only mitigation in that case.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF))
+ static_branch_disable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
else
static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
@@ -498,8 +505,11 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
taa_select_mitigation();
}
- if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF &&
- boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
+ /*
+ * MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF is not checked here so that mmio_stale_data_clear
+ * gets updated correctly as per X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF state.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
mmio_select_mitigation();
}
--
2.43.0
From: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
commit 4e42765d1be01111df0c0275bbaf1db1acef346e upstream.
Add the documentation for transient execution vulnerability Register
File Data Sampling (RFDS) that affects Intel Atom CPUs.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 +
.../hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst | 104 ++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 105 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
index de99caabf65a3..ff0b440ef2dc9 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -21,3 +21,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
cross-thread-rsb
srso
gather_data_sampling
+ reg-file-data-sampling
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..0585d02b9a6cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+==================================
+Register File Data Sampling (RFDS)
+==================================
+
+Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) is a microarchitectural vulnerability that
+only affects Intel Atom parts(also branded as E-cores). RFDS may allow
+a malicious actor to infer data values previously used in floating point
+registers, vector registers, or integer registers. RFDS does not provide the
+ability to choose which data is inferred. CVE-2023-28746 is assigned to RFDS.
+
+Affected Processors
+===================
+Below is the list of affected Intel processors [#f1]_:
+
+ =================== ============
+ Common name Family_Model
+ =================== ============
+ ATOM_GOLDMONT 06_5CH
+ ATOM_GOLDMONT_D 06_5FH
+ ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS 06_7AH
+ ATOM_TREMONT_D 06_86H
+ ATOM_TREMONT 06_96H
+ ALDERLAKE 06_97H
+ ALDERLAKE_L 06_9AH
+ ATOM_TREMONT_L 06_9CH
+ RAPTORLAKE 06_B7H
+ RAPTORLAKE_P 06_BAH
+ ATOM_GRACEMONT 06_BEH
+ RAPTORLAKE_S 06_BFH
+ =================== ============
+
+As an exception to this table, Intel Xeon E family parts ALDERLAKE(06_97H) and
+RAPTORLAKE(06_B7H) codenamed Catlow are not affected. They are reported as
+vulnerable in Linux because they share the same family/model with an affected
+part. Unlike their affected counterparts, they do not enumerate RFDS_CLEAR or
+CPUID.HYBRID. This information could be used to distinguish between the
+affected and unaffected parts, but it is deemed not worth adding complexity as
+the reporting is fixed automatically when these parts enumerate RFDS_NO.
+
+Mitigation
+==========
+Intel released a microcode update that enables software to clear sensitive
+information using the VERW instruction. Like MDS, RFDS deploys the same
+mitigation strategy to force the CPU to clear the affected buffers before an
+attacker can extract the secrets. This is achieved by using the otherwise
+unused and obsolete VERW instruction in combination with a microcode update.
+The microcode clears the affected CPU buffers when the VERW instruction is
+executed.
+
+Mitigation points
+-----------------
+VERW is executed by the kernel before returning to user space, and by KVM
+before VMentry. None of the affected cores support SMT, so VERW is not required
+at C-state transitions.
+
+New bits in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
+----------------------------------
+Newer processors and microcode update on existing affected processors added new
+bits to IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. These bits can be used to enumerate
+vulnerability and mitigation capability:
+
+- Bit 27 - RFDS_NO - When set, processor is not affected by RFDS.
+- Bit 28 - RFDS_CLEAR - When set, processor is affected by RFDS, and has the
+ microcode that clears the affected buffers on VERW execution.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The kernel command line allows to control RFDS mitigation at boot time with the
+parameter "reg_file_data_sampling=". The valid arguments are:
+
+ ========== =================================================================
+ on If the CPU is vulnerable, enable mitigation; CPU buffer clearing
+ on exit to userspace and before entering a VM.
+ off Disables mitigation.
+ ========== =================================================================
+
+Mitigation default is selected by CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS.
+
+Mitigation status information
+-----------------------------
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current
+vulnerability status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and
+which mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/reg_file_data_sampling
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+ .. list-table::
+
+ * - 'Not affected'
+ - The processor is not vulnerable
+ * - 'Vulnerable'
+ - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+ * - 'Vulnerable: No microcode'
+ - The processor is vulnerable but microcode is not updated.
+ * - 'Mitigation: Clear Register File'
+ - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
+ enabled.
+
+References
+----------
+.. [#f1] Affected Processors
+ https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html
--
2.43.0
From: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
commit 8076fcde016c9c0e0660543e67bff86cb48a7c9c upstream.
RFDS is a CPU vulnerability that may allow userspace to infer kernel
stale data previously used in floating point registers, vector registers
and integer registers. RFDS only affects certain Intel Atom processors.
Intel released a microcode update that uses VERW instruction to clear
the affected CPU buffers. Unlike MDS, none of the affected cores support
SMT.
Add RFDS bug infrastructure and enable the VERW based mitigation by
default, that clears the affected buffers just before exiting to
userspace. Also add sysfs reporting and cmdline parameter
"reg_file_data_sampling" to control the mitigation.
For details see:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
.../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 +
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 21 +++++
arch/x86/Kconfig | 11 +++
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 8 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 38 ++++++++-
drivers/base/cpu.c | 3 +
include/linux/cpu.h | 2 +
9 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
index a1db6db475055..710d47be11e04 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -516,6 +516,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/reg_file_data_sampling
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index b72e2049c4876..40b89dd7c0bb3 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1137,6 +1137,26 @@
The filter can be disabled or changed to another
driver later using sysfs.
+ reg_file_data_sampling=
+ [X86] Controls mitigation for Register File Data
+ Sampling (RFDS) vulnerability. RFDS is a CPU
+ vulnerability which may allow userspace to infer
+ kernel data values previously stored in floating point
+ registers, vector registers, or integer registers.
+ RFDS only affects Intel Atom processors.
+
+ on: Turns ON the mitigation.
+ off: Turns OFF the mitigation.
+
+ This parameter overrides the compile time default set
+ by CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS. Mitigation cannot be
+ disabled when other VERW based mitigations (like MDS)
+ are enabled. In order to disable RFDS mitigation all
+ VERW based mitigations need to be disabled.
+
+ For details see:
+ Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst
+
driver_async_probe= [KNL]
List of driver names to be probed asynchronously. *
matches with all driver names. If * is specified, the
@@ -3385,6 +3405,7 @@
nospectre_bhb [ARM64]
nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC]
nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
+ reg_file_data_sampling=off [X86]
retbleed=off [X86]
spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 1566748f16c42..d2003865b7cf6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2609,6 +2609,17 @@ config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION
If in doubt, say N.
+config MITIGATION_RFDS
+ bool "RFDS Mitigation"
+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable mitigation for Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) by default.
+ RFDS is a hardware vulnerability which affects Intel Atom CPUs. It
+ allows unprivileged speculative access to stale data previously
+ stored in floating point, vector and integer registers.
+ See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst>
+
endif
config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index caf4cf2e1036f..0e4f2da9f618a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -499,4 +499,5 @@
/* BUG word 2 */
#define X86_BUG_SRSO X86_BUG(1*32 + 0) /* AMD SRSO bug */
#define X86_BUG_DIV0 X86_BUG(1*32 + 1) /* AMD DIV0 speculation bug */
+#define X86_BUG_RFDS X86_BUG(1*32 + 2) /* CPU is vulnerable to Register File Data Sampling */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 1d51e1850ed03..857839df66dfb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -165,6 +165,14 @@
* CPU is not vulnerable to Gather
* Data Sampling (GDS).
*/
+#define ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO BIT(27) /*
+ * Not susceptible to Register
+ * File Data Sampling.
+ */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR BIT(28) /*
+ * VERW clears CPU Register
+ * File.
+ */
#define ARCH_CAP_XAPIC_DISABLE BIT(21) /*
* IA32_XAPIC_DISABLE_STATUS MSR
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index cd6ac89c1a0df..01ac18f56147f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -480,6 +480,57 @@ static int __init mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline(char *str)
}
early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline);
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Register File Data Sampling: " fmt
+
+enum rfds_mitigations {
+ RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW,
+ RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for Register File Data Sampling */
+static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+static const char * const rfds_strings[] = {
+ [RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW] = "Mitigation: Clear Register File",
+ [RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode",
+};
+
+static void __init rfds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ return;
+ }
+ if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ return;
+
+ if (x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+ else
+ rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+}
+
+static __init int rfds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+ rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
+ rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("reg_file_data_sampling", rfds_parse_cmdline);
+
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "" fmt
@@ -513,6 +564,11 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
mmio_select_mitigation();
}
+ if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS)) {
+ rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ rfds_select_mitigation();
+ }
out:
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
@@ -522,6 +578,8 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
else if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: Unknown: No mitigations\n");
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS))
+ pr_info("Register File Data Sampling: %s\n", rfds_strings[rfds_mitigation]);
}
static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
@@ -529,11 +587,12 @@ static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
mds_select_mitigation();
taa_select_mitigation();
mmio_select_mitigation();
+ rfds_select_mitigation();
/*
- * As MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data mitigations are inter-related, update
- * and print their mitigation after MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
- * mitigation selection is done.
+ * As these mitigations are inter-related and rely on VERW instruction
+ * to clear the microarchitural buffers, update and print their status
+ * after mitigation selection is done for each of these vulnerabilities.
*/
md_clear_update_mitigation();
}
@@ -2622,6 +2681,11 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
}
+static ssize_t rfds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", rfds_strings[rfds_mitigation]);
+}
+
static char *stibp_state(void)
{
if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled) &&
@@ -2781,6 +2845,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
case X86_BUG_GDS:
return gds_show_state(buf);
+ case X86_BUG_RFDS:
+ return rfds_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -2855,4 +2922,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *bu
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_GDS);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RFDS);
+}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 34cac9ea19171..97ea52a4e8a39 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1274,6 +1274,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
#define SRSO BIT(5)
/* CPU is affected by GDS */
#define GDS BIT(6)
+/* CPU is affected by Register File Data Sampling */
+#define RFDS BIT(7)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
@@ -1301,9 +1303,18 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ALDERLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ALDERLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(RAPTORLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(RAPTORLAKE_P, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(RAPTORLAKE_S, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GRACEMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RFDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GOLDMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS),
VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
@@ -1337,6 +1348,24 @@ static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 ia32_cap)
ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO);
}
+static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 ia32_cap)
+{
+ /* The "immunity" bit trumps everything else: */
+ if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * VMMs set ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR for processors not in the blacklist to
+ * indicate that mitigation is needed because guest is running on a
+ * vulnerable hardware or may migrate to such hardware:
+ */
+ if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
+ return true;
+
+ /* Only consult the blacklist when there is no enumeration: */
+ return cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RFDS);
+}
+
static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
@@ -1448,6 +1477,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS);
+ if (vulnerable_to_rfds(ia32_cap))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS);
+
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c
index 548491de818ef..ef427ee787a99 100644
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -565,6 +565,7 @@ CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(mmio_stale_data);
CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(retbleed);
CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(spec_rstack_overflow);
CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(gds);
+CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(reg_file_data_sampling);
static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
@@ -579,6 +580,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_rstack_overflow, 0444, cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(gather_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_gds, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(reg_file_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling, NULL);
static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -594,6 +596,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_retbleed.attr,
&dev_attr_spec_rstack_overflow.attr,
&dev_attr_gather_data_sampling.attr,
+ &dev_attr_reg_file_data_sampling.attr,
NULL
};
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index fc8094419084f..e990c180282e7 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern ssize_t cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern __printf(4, 5)
struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
--
2.43.0
From: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 983a73da1f996faee9997149eb05b12fa7bd8cbf ]
In addition to citied commit in Fixes line, allow UDP encapsulation in
TX path too.
Fixes: 89edf40220be ("xfrm: Support UDP encapsulation in packet offload mode")
CC: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Mike Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c
index 3784534c91855..653e51ae39648 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ bool xfrm_dev_offload_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_state *x)
struct xfrm_dst *xdst = (struct xfrm_dst *)dst;
struct net_device *dev = x->xso.dev;
- if (!x->type_offload || x->encap)
+ if (!x->type_offload)
return false;
if (x->xso.type == XFRM_DEV_OFFLOAD_PACKET ||
--
2.43.0
From: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cbf996f52c4e658b3fb4349a869a62fd2d4c3c1c ]
Currently routines that are supposed to toggle state of ring pair do not
take care of associated interrupt with queue vector that these rings
belong to. This causes funky issues such as dead interface due to irq
misconfiguration, as per Pavel's report from Closes: tag.
Add a function responsible for disabling single IRQ in EIMC register and
call this as a very first thing when disabling ring pair during xsk_pool
setup. For enable let's reuse ixgbe_irq_enable_queues(). Besides this,
disable/enable NAPI as first/last thing when dealing with closing or
opening ring pair that xsk_pool is being configured on.
Reported-by: Pavel Vazharov <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAJEV1ijxNyPTwASJER1bcZzS9nMoZJqfR86nu_3jFFVXzZQ4NA@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 024aa5800f32 ("ixgbe: added Rx/Tx ring disable/enable functions")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <[email protected]> (A Contingent Worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c
index 6a3f633406c4b..ce234e76ea236 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c
@@ -2939,8 +2939,8 @@ static void ixgbe_check_lsc(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter)
static inline void ixgbe_irq_enable_queues(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter,
u64 qmask)
{
- u32 mask;
struct ixgbe_hw *hw = &adapter->hw;
+ u32 mask;
switch (hw->mac.type) {
case ixgbe_mac_82598EB:
@@ -10524,6 +10524,44 @@ static void ixgbe_reset_rxr_stats(struct ixgbe_ring *rx_ring)
memset(&rx_ring->rx_stats, 0, sizeof(rx_ring->rx_stats));
}
+/**
+ * ixgbe_irq_disable_single - Disable single IRQ vector
+ * @adapter: adapter structure
+ * @ring: ring index
+ **/
+static void ixgbe_irq_disable_single(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, u32 ring)
+{
+ struct ixgbe_hw *hw = &adapter->hw;
+ u64 qmask = BIT_ULL(ring);
+ u32 mask;
+
+ switch (adapter->hw.mac.type) {
+ case ixgbe_mac_82598EB:
+ mask = qmask & IXGBE_EIMC_RTX_QUEUE;
+ IXGBE_WRITE_REG(&adapter->hw, IXGBE_EIMC, mask);
+ break;
+ case ixgbe_mac_82599EB:
+ case ixgbe_mac_X540:
+ case ixgbe_mac_X550:
+ case ixgbe_mac_X550EM_x:
+ case ixgbe_mac_x550em_a:
+ mask = (qmask & 0xFFFFFFFF);
+ if (mask)
+ IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_EIMS_EX(0), mask);
+ mask = (qmask >> 32);
+ if (mask)
+ IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_EIMS_EX(1), mask);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ IXGBE_WRITE_FLUSH(&adapter->hw);
+ if (adapter->flags & IXGBE_FLAG_MSIX_ENABLED)
+ synchronize_irq(adapter->msix_entries[ring].vector);
+ else
+ synchronize_irq(adapter->pdev->irq);
+}
+
/**
* ixgbe_txrx_ring_disable - Disable Rx/Tx/XDP Tx rings
* @adapter: adapter structure
@@ -10540,6 +10578,11 @@ void ixgbe_txrx_ring_disable(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, int ring)
tx_ring = adapter->tx_ring[ring];
xdp_ring = adapter->xdp_ring[ring];
+ ixgbe_irq_disable_single(adapter, ring);
+
+ /* Rx/Tx/XDP Tx share the same napi context. */
+ napi_disable(&rx_ring->q_vector->napi);
+
ixgbe_disable_txr(adapter, tx_ring);
if (xdp_ring)
ixgbe_disable_txr(adapter, xdp_ring);
@@ -10548,9 +10591,6 @@ void ixgbe_txrx_ring_disable(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, int ring)
if (xdp_ring)
synchronize_rcu();
- /* Rx/Tx/XDP Tx share the same napi context. */
- napi_disable(&rx_ring->q_vector->napi);
-
ixgbe_clean_tx_ring(tx_ring);
if (xdp_ring)
ixgbe_clean_tx_ring(xdp_ring);
@@ -10578,9 +10618,6 @@ void ixgbe_txrx_ring_enable(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, int ring)
tx_ring = adapter->tx_ring[ring];
xdp_ring = adapter->xdp_ring[ring];
- /* Rx/Tx/XDP Tx share the same napi context. */
- napi_enable(&rx_ring->q_vector->napi);
-
ixgbe_configure_tx_ring(adapter, tx_ring);
if (xdp_ring)
ixgbe_configure_tx_ring(adapter, xdp_ring);
@@ -10589,6 +10626,11 @@ void ixgbe_txrx_ring_enable(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, int ring)
clear_bit(__IXGBE_TX_DISABLED, &tx_ring->state);
if (xdp_ring)
clear_bit(__IXGBE_TX_DISABLED, &xdp_ring->state);
+
+ /* Rx/Tx/XDP Tx share the same napi context. */
+ napi_enable(&rx_ring->q_vector->napi);
+ ixgbe_irq_enable_queues(adapter, BIT_ULL(ring));
+ IXGBE_WRITE_FLUSH(&adapter->hw);
}
/**
--
2.43.0
From: Frank Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1e9b05258271b76ccc04a4b535009d2cb596506a ]
Introduce a common dt-bindings header file, fsl-edma.h, shared between
the driver and dts files. This addition aims to eliminate hardcoded values
in dts files, promoting maintainability and consistency.
DTS header file not support BIT() macro yet. Directly use 2^n number.
Signed-off-by: Frank Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]>
Stable-dep-of: a79f949a5ce1 ("dmaengine: fsl-edma: correct max_segment_size setting")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
include/dt-bindings/dma/fsl-edma.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 include/dt-bindings/dma/fsl-edma.h
diff --git a/include/dt-bindings/dma/fsl-edma.h b/include/dt-bindings/dma/fsl-edma.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..fd11478cfe9cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/dt-bindings/dma/fsl-edma.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause */
+
+#ifndef _FSL_EDMA_DT_BINDING_H_
+#define _FSL_EDMA_DT_BINDING_H_
+
+/* Receive Channel */
+#define FSL_EDMA_RX 0x1
+
+/* iMX8 audio remote DMA */
+#define FSL_EDMA_REMOTE 0x2
+
+/* FIFO is continue memory region */
+#define FSL_EDMA_MULTI_FIFO 0x4
+
+/* Channel need stick to even channel */
+#define FSL_EDMA_EVEN_CH 0x8
+
+/* Channel need stick to odd channel */
+#define FSL_EDMA_ODD_CH 0x10
+
+#endif
--
2.43.0
From: Frank Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d0e217b72f9f5c5ef35e3423d393ea8093ce98ec ]
Refactor the code to use the common dt-binding header file, fsl-edma.h.
Renaming ARGS* to FSL_EDMA*, ensuring no functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Frank Li <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]>
Stable-dep-of: a79f949a5ce1 ("dmaengine: fsl-edma: correct max_segment_size setting")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/dma/fsl-edma-main.c | 17 ++++++-----------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-main.c b/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-main.c
index 75cae7ccae270..45cc419b1b4ac 100644
--- a/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-main.c
+++ b/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-main.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
* Vybrid and Layerscape SoCs.
*/
+#include <dt-bindings/dma/fsl-edma.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/clk.h>
@@ -21,12 +22,6 @@
#include "fsl-edma-common.h"
-#define ARGS_RX BIT(0)
-#define ARGS_REMOTE BIT(1)
-#define ARGS_MULTI_FIFO BIT(2)
-#define ARGS_EVEN_CH BIT(3)
-#define ARGS_ODD_CH BIT(4)
-
static void fsl_edma_synchronize(struct dma_chan *chan)
{
struct fsl_edma_chan *fsl_chan = to_fsl_edma_chan(chan);
@@ -155,14 +150,14 @@ static struct dma_chan *fsl_edma3_xlate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec,
i = fsl_chan - fsl_edma->chans;
fsl_chan->priority = dma_spec->args[1];
- fsl_chan->is_rxchan = dma_spec->args[2] & ARGS_RX;
- fsl_chan->is_remote = dma_spec->args[2] & ARGS_REMOTE;
- fsl_chan->is_multi_fifo = dma_spec->args[2] & ARGS_MULTI_FIFO;
+ fsl_chan->is_rxchan = dma_spec->args[2] & FSL_EDMA_RX;
+ fsl_chan->is_remote = dma_spec->args[2] & FSL_EDMA_REMOTE;
+ fsl_chan->is_multi_fifo = dma_spec->args[2] & FSL_EDMA_MULTI_FIFO;
- if ((dma_spec->args[2] & ARGS_EVEN_CH) && (i & 0x1))
+ if ((dma_spec->args[2] & FSL_EDMA_EVEN_CH) && (i & 0x1))
continue;
- if ((dma_spec->args[2] & ARGS_ODD_CH) && !(i & 0x1))
+ if ((dma_spec->args[2] & FSL_EDMA_ODD_CH) && !(i & 0x1))
continue;
if (!b_chmux && i == dma_spec->args[0]) {
--
2.43.0
From: Michal Swiatkowski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4035c72dc1ba81a96f94de84dfd5409056c1d9c9 ]
During VSI reconfiguration filters and VSI config which is set in
ice_vf_init_host_cfg() are lost. Recall the host configuration function
to restore them.
Without this config VF on which MSI-X amount was changed might had a
connection problems.
Fixes: 4d38cb44bd32 ("ice: manage VFs MSI-X using resource tracking")
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michal Swiatkowski <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
index c4caa9df473b5..cd61928700211 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
@@ -1074,6 +1074,7 @@ int ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count(struct pci_dev *vf_dev, int msix_vec_count)
struct ice_pf *pf = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
u16 prev_msix, prev_queues, queues;
bool needs_rebuild = false;
+ struct ice_vsi *vsi;
struct ice_vf *vf;
int id;
@@ -1108,6 +1109,10 @@ int ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count(struct pci_dev *vf_dev, int msix_vec_count)
if (!vf)
return -ENOENT;
+ vsi = ice_get_vf_vsi(vf);
+ if (!vsi)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
prev_msix = vf->num_msix;
prev_queues = vf->num_vf_qs;
@@ -1128,7 +1133,7 @@ int ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count(struct pci_dev *vf_dev, int msix_vec_count)
if (vf->first_vector_idx < 0)
goto unroll;
- if (ice_vf_reconfig_vsi(vf)) {
+ if (ice_vf_reconfig_vsi(vf) || ice_vf_init_host_cfg(vf, vsi)) {
/* Try to rebuild with previous values */
needs_rebuild = true;
goto unroll;
@@ -1154,8 +1159,10 @@ int ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count(struct pci_dev *vf_dev, int msix_vec_count)
if (vf->first_vector_idx < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- if (needs_rebuild)
+ if (needs_rebuild) {
ice_vf_reconfig_vsi(vf);
+ ice_vf_init_host_cfg(vf, vsi);
+ }
ice_ena_vf_mappings(vf);
ice_put_vf(vf);
--
2.43.0
From: Gavin Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8deeefb24786ea7950b37bde4516b286c877db00 ]
This reverts commit 662404b24a4c4d839839ed25e3097571f5938b9b.
The revert is required due to the suspicion it is not good for anything
and cause crash.
Fixes: 662404b24a4c ("net/mlx5e: Block entering switchdev mode with ns inconsistency")
Signed-off-by: Gavin Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
.../mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch_offloads.c | 23 -------------------
1 file changed, 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch_offloads.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch_offloads.c
index b0455134c98ef..14b3bd3c5e2f7 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch_offloads.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch_offloads.c
@@ -3658,22 +3658,6 @@ static int esw_inline_mode_to_devlink(u8 mlx5_mode, u8 *mode)
return 0;
}
-static bool esw_offloads_devlink_ns_eq_netdev_ns(struct devlink *devlink)
-{
- struct mlx5_core_dev *dev = devlink_priv(devlink);
- struct net *devl_net, *netdev_net;
- bool ret = false;
-
- mutex_lock(&dev->mlx5e_res.uplink_netdev_lock);
- if (dev->mlx5e_res.uplink_netdev) {
- netdev_net = dev_net(dev->mlx5e_res.uplink_netdev);
- devl_net = devlink_net(devlink);
- ret = net_eq(devl_net, netdev_net);
- }
- mutex_unlock(&dev->mlx5e_res.uplink_netdev_lock);
- return ret;
-}
-
int mlx5_eswitch_block_mode(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev)
{
struct mlx5_eswitch *esw = dev->priv.eswitch;
@@ -3718,13 +3702,6 @@ int mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set(struct devlink *devlink, u16 mode,
if (esw_mode_from_devlink(mode, &mlx5_mode))
return -EINVAL;
- if (mode == DEVLINK_ESWITCH_MODE_SWITCHDEV &&
- !esw_offloads_devlink_ns_eq_netdev_ns(devlink)) {
- NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack,
- "Can't change E-Switch mode to switchdev when netdev net namespace has diverged from the devlink's.");
- return -EPERM;
- }
-
mlx5_lag_disable_change(esw->dev);
err = mlx5_esw_try_lock(esw);
if (err < 0) {
--
2.43.0
From: Jianbo Liu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 85ea2c5c5ef5f24fe6e6e7028ddd90be1cb5d27e ]
The checking in the cited commit is not accurate. In the common case,
VF destination is internal, and uplink destination is external.
However, uplink destination with packet reformat is considered as
internal because firmware uses LB+hairpin to support it. Update the
checking so header rewrite rules with both internal and external
destinations are not allowed.
Fixes: e0e22d59b47a ("net/mlx5: E-switch, Add checking for flow rule destinations")
Signed-off-by: Jianbo Liu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Rahul Rameshbabu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
.../mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch_offloads.c | 23 +++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch_offloads.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch_offloads.c
index 14b3bd3c5e2f7..baaae628b0a0f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch_offloads.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch_offloads.c
@@ -535,21 +535,26 @@ esw_src_port_rewrite_supported(struct mlx5_eswitch *esw)
}
static bool
-esw_dests_to_vf_pf_vports(struct mlx5_flow_destination *dests, int max_dest)
+esw_dests_to_int_external(struct mlx5_flow_destination *dests, int max_dest)
{
- bool vf_dest = false, pf_dest = false;
+ bool internal_dest = false, external_dest = false;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < max_dest; i++) {
- if (dests[i].type != MLX5_FLOW_DESTINATION_TYPE_VPORT)
+ if (dests[i].type != MLX5_FLOW_DESTINATION_TYPE_VPORT &&
+ dests[i].type != MLX5_FLOW_DESTINATION_TYPE_UPLINK)
continue;
- if (dests[i].vport.num == MLX5_VPORT_UPLINK)
- pf_dest = true;
+ /* Uplink dest is external, but considered as internal
+ * if there is reformat because firmware uses LB+hairpin to support it.
+ */
+ if (dests[i].vport.num == MLX5_VPORT_UPLINK &&
+ !(dests[i].vport.flags & MLX5_FLOW_DEST_VPORT_REFORMAT_ID))
+ external_dest = true;
else
- vf_dest = true;
+ internal_dest = true;
- if (vf_dest && pf_dest)
+ if (internal_dest && external_dest)
return true;
}
@@ -695,9 +700,9 @@ mlx5_eswitch_add_offloaded_rule(struct mlx5_eswitch *esw,
/* Header rewrite with combined wire+loopback in FDB is not allowed */
if ((flow_act.action & MLX5_FLOW_CONTEXT_ACTION_MOD_HDR) &&
- esw_dests_to_vf_pf_vports(dest, i)) {
+ esw_dests_to_int_external(dest, i)) {
esw_warn(esw->dev,
- "FDB: Header rewrite with forwarding to both PF and VF is not allowed\n");
+ "FDB: Header rewrite with forwarding to both internal and external dests is not allowed\n");
rule = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
goto err_esw_get;
}
--
2.43.0
From: Jianbo Liu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit dd238b702064b21d25b4fc39a19699319746d655 ]
Downgrade the print from mlx5_core_warn() to mlx5_core_dbg(), as it
is just a statement of fact that firmware doesn't support ignore flow
level.
And change the wording to "firmware flow level support is missing", to
make it more accurate.
Fixes: ae2ee3be99a8 ("net/mlx5: CT: Remove warning of ignore_flow_level support for VFs")
Signed-off-by: Jianbo Liu <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Elliott, Robert (Servers) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc/post_act.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc/post_act.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc/post_act.c
index 86bf007fd05b7..b500cc2c9689d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc/post_act.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc/post_act.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ mlx5e_tc_post_act_init(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, struct mlx5_fs_chains *chains,
if (!MLX5_CAP_FLOWTABLE_TYPE(priv->mdev, ignore_flow_level, table_type)) {
if (priv->mdev->coredev_type == MLX5_COREDEV_PF)
- mlx5_core_warn(priv->mdev, "firmware level support is missing\n");
+ mlx5_core_dbg(priv->mdev, "firmware flow level support is missing\n");
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto err_check;
}
--
2.43.0
From: Emeel Hakim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a71f2147b64941efee156bfda54fd6461d0f95df ]
The packet number attribute of the SA is incremented by the device rather
than the software stack when enabling hardware offload. Because the packet
number attribute is managed by the hardware, the software has no insight
into the value of the packet number attribute actually written by the
device.
Previously when MACsec offload was enabled, the hardware object for
handling the offload was destroyed when the SA was disabled. Re-enabling
the SA would lead to a new hardware object being instantiated. This new
hardware object would not have any recollection of the correct packet
number for the SA. Instead, destroy the flow steering rule when
deactivating the SA and recreate it upon reactivation, preserving the
original hardware object.
Fixes: 8ff0ac5be144 ("net/mlx5: Add MACsec offload Tx command support")
Signed-off-by: Emeel Hakim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rahul Rameshbabu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Gal Pressman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
.../mellanox/mlx5/core/en_accel/macsec.c | 82 ++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_accel/macsec.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_accel/macsec.c
index d4ebd87431145..b2cabd6ab86cb 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_accel/macsec.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_accel/macsec.c
@@ -310,9 +310,9 @@ static void mlx5e_macsec_destroy_object(struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev, u32 macsec_o
mlx5_cmd_exec(mdev, in, sizeof(in), out, sizeof(out));
}
-static void mlx5e_macsec_cleanup_sa(struct mlx5e_macsec *macsec,
- struct mlx5e_macsec_sa *sa,
- bool is_tx, struct net_device *netdev, u32 fs_id)
+static void mlx5e_macsec_cleanup_sa_fs(struct mlx5e_macsec *macsec,
+ struct mlx5e_macsec_sa *sa, bool is_tx,
+ struct net_device *netdev, u32 fs_id)
{
int action = (is_tx) ? MLX5_ACCEL_MACSEC_ACTION_ENCRYPT :
MLX5_ACCEL_MACSEC_ACTION_DECRYPT;
@@ -322,20 +322,49 @@ static void mlx5e_macsec_cleanup_sa(struct mlx5e_macsec *macsec,
mlx5_macsec_fs_del_rule(macsec->mdev->macsec_fs, sa->macsec_rule, action, netdev,
fs_id);
- mlx5e_macsec_destroy_object(macsec->mdev, sa->macsec_obj_id);
sa->macsec_rule = NULL;
}
+static void mlx5e_macsec_cleanup_sa(struct mlx5e_macsec *macsec,
+ struct mlx5e_macsec_sa *sa, bool is_tx,
+ struct net_device *netdev, u32 fs_id)
+{
+ mlx5e_macsec_cleanup_sa_fs(macsec, sa, is_tx, netdev, fs_id);
+ mlx5e_macsec_destroy_object(macsec->mdev, sa->macsec_obj_id);
+}
+
+static int mlx5e_macsec_init_sa_fs(struct macsec_context *ctx,
+ struct mlx5e_macsec_sa *sa, bool encrypt,
+ bool is_tx, u32 *fs_id)
+{
+ struct mlx5e_priv *priv = macsec_netdev_priv(ctx->netdev);
+ struct mlx5_macsec_fs *macsec_fs = priv->mdev->macsec_fs;
+ struct mlx5_macsec_rule_attrs rule_attrs;
+ union mlx5_macsec_rule *macsec_rule;
+
+ rule_attrs.macsec_obj_id = sa->macsec_obj_id;
+ rule_attrs.sci = sa->sci;
+ rule_attrs.assoc_num = sa->assoc_num;
+ rule_attrs.action = (is_tx) ? MLX5_ACCEL_MACSEC_ACTION_ENCRYPT :
+ MLX5_ACCEL_MACSEC_ACTION_DECRYPT;
+
+ macsec_rule = mlx5_macsec_fs_add_rule(macsec_fs, ctx, &rule_attrs, fs_id);
+ if (!macsec_rule)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ sa->macsec_rule = macsec_rule;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int mlx5e_macsec_init_sa(struct macsec_context *ctx,
struct mlx5e_macsec_sa *sa,
bool encrypt, bool is_tx, u32 *fs_id)
{
struct mlx5e_priv *priv = macsec_netdev_priv(ctx->netdev);
struct mlx5e_macsec *macsec = priv->macsec;
- struct mlx5_macsec_rule_attrs rule_attrs;
struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = priv->mdev;
struct mlx5_macsec_obj_attrs obj_attrs;
- union mlx5_macsec_rule *macsec_rule;
int err;
obj_attrs.next_pn = sa->next_pn;
@@ -357,20 +386,12 @@ static int mlx5e_macsec_init_sa(struct macsec_context *ctx,
if (err)
return err;
- rule_attrs.macsec_obj_id = sa->macsec_obj_id;
- rule_attrs.sci = sa->sci;
- rule_attrs.assoc_num = sa->assoc_num;
- rule_attrs.action = (is_tx) ? MLX5_ACCEL_MACSEC_ACTION_ENCRYPT :
- MLX5_ACCEL_MACSEC_ACTION_DECRYPT;
-
- macsec_rule = mlx5_macsec_fs_add_rule(mdev->macsec_fs, ctx, &rule_attrs, fs_id);
- if (!macsec_rule) {
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto destroy_macsec_object;
+ if (sa->active) {
+ err = mlx5e_macsec_init_sa_fs(ctx, sa, encrypt, is_tx, fs_id);
+ if (err)
+ goto destroy_macsec_object;
}
- sa->macsec_rule = macsec_rule;
-
return 0;
destroy_macsec_object:
@@ -526,9 +547,7 @@ static int mlx5e_macsec_add_txsa(struct macsec_context *ctx)
goto destroy_sa;
macsec_device->tx_sa[assoc_num] = tx_sa;
- if (!secy->operational ||
- assoc_num != tx_sc->encoding_sa ||
- !tx_sa->active)
+ if (!secy->operational)
goto out;
err = mlx5e_macsec_init_sa(ctx, tx_sa, tx_sc->encrypt, true, NULL);
@@ -595,7 +614,7 @@ static int mlx5e_macsec_upd_txsa(struct macsec_context *ctx)
goto out;
if (ctx_tx_sa->active) {
- err = mlx5e_macsec_init_sa(ctx, tx_sa, tx_sc->encrypt, true, NULL);
+ err = mlx5e_macsec_init_sa_fs(ctx, tx_sa, tx_sc->encrypt, true, NULL);
if (err)
goto out;
} else {
@@ -604,7 +623,7 @@ static int mlx5e_macsec_upd_txsa(struct macsec_context *ctx)
goto out;
}
- mlx5e_macsec_cleanup_sa(macsec, tx_sa, true, ctx->secy->netdev, 0);
+ mlx5e_macsec_cleanup_sa_fs(macsec, tx_sa, true, ctx->secy->netdev, 0);
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&macsec->lock);
@@ -1030,8 +1049,9 @@ static int mlx5e_macsec_del_rxsa(struct macsec_context *ctx)
goto out;
}
- mlx5e_macsec_cleanup_sa(macsec, rx_sa, false, ctx->secy->netdev,
- rx_sc->sc_xarray_element->fs_id);
+ if (rx_sa->active)
+ mlx5e_macsec_cleanup_sa(macsec, rx_sa, false, ctx->secy->netdev,
+ rx_sc->sc_xarray_element->fs_id);
mlx5_destroy_encryption_key(macsec->mdev, rx_sa->enc_key_id);
kfree(rx_sa);
rx_sc->rx_sa[assoc_num] = NULL;
@@ -1112,8 +1132,8 @@ static int macsec_upd_secy_hw_address(struct macsec_context *ctx,
if (!rx_sa || !rx_sa->macsec_rule)
continue;
- mlx5e_macsec_cleanup_sa(macsec, rx_sa, false, ctx->secy->netdev,
- rx_sc->sc_xarray_element->fs_id);
+ mlx5e_macsec_cleanup_sa_fs(macsec, rx_sa, false, ctx->secy->netdev,
+ rx_sc->sc_xarray_element->fs_id);
}
}
@@ -1124,8 +1144,8 @@ static int macsec_upd_secy_hw_address(struct macsec_context *ctx,
continue;
if (rx_sa->active) {
- err = mlx5e_macsec_init_sa(ctx, rx_sa, true, false,
- &rx_sc->sc_xarray_element->fs_id);
+ err = mlx5e_macsec_init_sa_fs(ctx, rx_sa, true, false,
+ &rx_sc->sc_xarray_element->fs_id);
if (err)
goto out;
}
@@ -1178,7 +1198,7 @@ static int mlx5e_macsec_upd_secy(struct macsec_context *ctx)
if (!tx_sa)
continue;
- mlx5e_macsec_cleanup_sa(macsec, tx_sa, true, ctx->secy->netdev, 0);
+ mlx5e_macsec_cleanup_sa_fs(macsec, tx_sa, true, ctx->secy->netdev, 0);
}
for (i = 0; i < MACSEC_NUM_AN; ++i) {
@@ -1187,7 +1207,7 @@ static int mlx5e_macsec_upd_secy(struct macsec_context *ctx)
continue;
if (tx_sa->assoc_num == tx_sc->encoding_sa && tx_sa->active) {
- err = mlx5e_macsec_init_sa(ctx, tx_sa, tx_sc->encrypt, true, NULL);
+ err = mlx5e_macsec_init_sa_fs(ctx, tx_sa, tx_sc->encrypt, true, NULL);
if (err)
goto out;
}
--
2.43.0
From: Rahul Rameshbabu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 90502d433c0e7e5483745a574cb719dd5d05b10c ]
The NAPI poll context is a softirq context. Do not use normal spinlock API
in this context to prevent concurrency issues.
Fixes: 3178308ad4ca ("net/mlx5e: Make tx_port_ts logic resilient to out-of-order CQEs")
Signed-off-by: Rahul Rameshbabu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
CC: Vadim Fedorenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/ptp.c | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/ptp.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/ptp.c
index 803035d4e5976..15d97c685ad33 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/ptp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/ptp.c
@@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ mlx5e_ptp_port_ts_cqe_list_add(struct mlx5e_ptp_port_ts_cqe_list *list, u8 metad
WARN_ON_ONCE(tracker->inuse);
tracker->inuse = true;
- spin_lock(&list->tracker_list_lock);
+ spin_lock_bh(&list->tracker_list_lock);
list_add_tail(&tracker->entry, &list->tracker_list_head);
- spin_unlock(&list->tracker_list_lock);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&list->tracker_list_lock);
}
static void
@@ -54,9 +54,9 @@ mlx5e_ptp_port_ts_cqe_list_remove(struct mlx5e_ptp_port_ts_cqe_list *list, u8 me
WARN_ON_ONCE(!tracker->inuse);
tracker->inuse = false;
- spin_lock(&list->tracker_list_lock);
+ spin_lock_bh(&list->tracker_list_lock);
list_del(&tracker->entry);
- spin_unlock(&list->tracker_list_lock);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&list->tracker_list_lock);
}
void mlx5e_ptpsq_track_metadata(struct mlx5e_ptpsq *ptpsq, u8 metadata)
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static void mlx5e_ptpsq_mark_ts_cqes_undelivered(struct mlx5e_ptpsq *ptpsq,
struct mlx5e_ptp_metadata_map *metadata_map = &ptpsq->metadata_map;
struct mlx5e_ptp_port_ts_cqe_tracker *pos, *n;
- spin_lock(&cqe_list->tracker_list_lock);
+ spin_lock_bh(&cqe_list->tracker_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, n, &cqe_list->tracker_list_head, entry) {
struct sk_buff *skb =
mlx5e_ptp_metadata_map_lookup(metadata_map, pos->metadata_id);
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ static void mlx5e_ptpsq_mark_ts_cqes_undelivered(struct mlx5e_ptpsq *ptpsq,
pos->inuse = false;
list_del(&pos->entry);
}
- spin_unlock(&cqe_list->tracker_list_lock);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&cqe_list->tracker_list_lock);
}
#define PTP_WQE_CTR2IDX(val) ((val) & ptpsq->ts_cqe_ctr_mask)
--
2.43.0
From: Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1eecc7ab82c42133b748e1895275942a054a7f67 ]
Current driver has some asymmetry in the runtime PM calls. On lan78xx_open()
it will call usb_autopm_get() and unconditionally usb_autopm_put(). And
on lan78xx_stop() it will call only usb_autopm_put(). So far, it was
working only because this driver do not activate autosuspend by default,
so it was visible only by warning "Runtime PM usage count underflow!".
Since, with current driver, we can't use runtime PM with active link,
execute lan78xx_open()->usb_autopm_put() only in error case. Otherwise,
keep ref counting high as long as interface is open.
Fixes: 55d7de9de6c3 ("Microchip's LAN7800 family USB 2/3 to 10/100/1000 Ethernet device driver")
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c b/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c
index a2dde84499fdd..f0fb9cd1ff56c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c
@@ -3137,7 +3137,8 @@ static int lan78xx_open(struct net_device *net)
done:
mutex_unlock(&dev->dev_mutex);
- usb_autopm_put_interface(dev->intf);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ usb_autopm_put_interface(dev->intf);
return ret;
}
--
2.43.0
From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 51270d573a8d9dd5afdc7934de97d66c0e14b5fd ]
I'm updating __assign_str() and will be removing the second parameter. To
make sure that it does not break anything, I make sure that it matches the
__string() field, as that is where the string is actually going to be
saved in. To make sure there's nothing that breaks, I added a WARN_ON() to
make sure that what was used in __string() is the same that is used in
__assign_str().
In doing this change, an error was triggered as __assign_str() now expects
the string passed in to be a char * value. I instead had the following
warning:
include/trace/events/qdisc.h: In function ‘trace_event_raw_event_qdisc_reset’:
include/trace/events/qdisc.h:91:35: error: passing argument 1 of 'strcmp' from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
91 | __assign_str(dev, qdisc_dev(q));
That's because the qdisc_enqueue() and qdisc_reset() pass in qdisc_dev(q)
to __assign_str() and to __string(). But that function returns a pointer
to struct net_device and not a string.
It appears that these events are just saving the pointer as a string and
then reading it as a string as well.
Use qdisc_dev(q)->name to save the device instead.
Fixes: a34dac0b90552 ("net_sched: add tracepoints for qdisc_reset() and qdisc_destroy()")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
include/trace/events/qdisc.h | 20 ++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/trace/events/qdisc.h b/include/trace/events/qdisc.h
index a3995925cb057..1f4258308b967 100644
--- a/include/trace/events/qdisc.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/qdisc.h
@@ -81,14 +81,14 @@ TRACE_EVENT(qdisc_reset,
TP_ARGS(q),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __string( dev, qdisc_dev(q) )
- __string( kind, q->ops->id )
- __field( u32, parent )
- __field( u32, handle )
+ __string( dev, qdisc_dev(q)->name )
+ __string( kind, q->ops->id )
+ __field( u32, parent )
+ __field( u32, handle )
),
TP_fast_assign(
- __assign_str(dev, qdisc_dev(q));
+ __assign_str(dev, qdisc_dev(q)->name);
__assign_str(kind, q->ops->id);
__entry->parent = q->parent;
__entry->handle = q->handle;
@@ -106,14 +106,14 @@ TRACE_EVENT(qdisc_destroy,
TP_ARGS(q),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __string( dev, qdisc_dev(q) )
- __string( kind, q->ops->id )
- __field( u32, parent )
- __field( u32, handle )
+ __string( dev, qdisc_dev(q)->name )
+ __string( kind, q->ops->id )
+ __field( u32, parent )
+ __field( u32, handle )
),
TP_fast_assign(
- __assign_str(dev, qdisc_dev(q));
+ __assign_str(dev, qdisc_dev(q)->name);
__assign_str(kind, q->ops->id);
__entry->parent = q->parent;
__entry->handle = q->handle;
--
2.43.0
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1ca1ba465e55b9460e4e75dec9fff31e708fec74 ]
syzbot triggered a bug in geneve_rx() [1]
Issue is similar to the one I fixed in commit 8d975c15c0cd
("ip6_tunnel: make sure to pull inner header in __ip6_tnl_rcv()")
We have to save skb->network_header in a temporary variable
in order to be able to recompute the network_header pointer
after a pskb_inet_may_pull() call.
pskb_inet_may_pull() makes sure the needed headers are in skb->head.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in IP_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:302 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_rx drivers/net/geneve.c:279 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_udp_encap_recv+0x36f9/0x3c10 drivers/net/geneve.c:391
IP_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:302 [inline]
geneve_rx drivers/net/geneve.c:279 [inline]
geneve_udp_encap_recv+0x36f9/0x3c10 drivers/net/geneve.c:391
udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x1d39/0x1f20 net/ipv4/udp.c:2108
udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x6ae/0x6e0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2186
udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x184/0x4b0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2346
__udp4_lib_rcv+0x1c6b/0x3010 net/ipv4/udp.c:2422
udp_rcv+0x7d/0xa0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2604
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x264/0x1300 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2b8/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
ip_local_deliver+0x21f/0x490 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254
dst_input include/net/dst.h:461 [inline]
ip_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
ip_rcv+0x46f/0x760 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5534 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5648
process_backlog+0x480/0x8b0 net/core/dev.c:5976
__napi_poll+0xe3/0x980 net/core/dev.c:6576
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6645 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x8b8/0x1870 net/core/dev.c:6778
__do_softirq+0x1b7/0x7c5 kernel/softirq.c:553
do_softirq+0x9a/0xf0 kernel/softirq.c:454
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x9b/0xa0 kernel/softirq.c:381
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:820 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2768/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4378
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3819 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5cb/0xbc0 mm/slub.c:3903
kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:560
__alloc_skb+0x352/0x790 net/core/skbuff.c:651
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1296 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbd0 net/core/skbuff.c:6394
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa80/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2783
packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2930 [inline]
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3024 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x70c2/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
Fixes: 2d07dc79fe04 ("geneve: add initial netdev driver for GENEVE tunnels")
Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/geneve.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/geneve.c b/drivers/net/geneve.c
index acd9c615d1f4f..356da958ee81b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/geneve.c
+++ b/drivers/net/geneve.c
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static void geneve_rx(struct geneve_dev *geneve, struct geneve_sock *gs,
struct genevehdr *gnvh = geneve_hdr(skb);
struct metadata_dst *tun_dst = NULL;
unsigned int len;
- int err = 0;
+ int nh, err = 0;
void *oiph;
if (ip_tunnel_collect_metadata() || gs->collect_md) {
@@ -272,9 +272,23 @@ static void geneve_rx(struct geneve_dev *geneve, struct geneve_sock *gs,
skb->pkt_type = PACKET_HOST;
}
- oiph = skb_network_header(skb);
+ /* Save offset of outer header relative to skb->head,
+ * because we are going to reset the network header to the inner header
+ * and might change skb->head.
+ */
+ nh = skb_network_header(skb) - skb->head;
+
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
+ if (!pskb_inet_may_pull(skb)) {
+ DEV_STATS_INC(geneve->dev, rx_length_errors);
+ DEV_STATS_INC(geneve->dev, rx_errors);
+ goto drop;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the outer header. */
+ oiph = skb->head + nh;
+
if (geneve_get_sk_family(gs) == AF_INET)
err = IP_ECN_decapsulate(oiph, skb);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
--
2.43.0
From: Horatiu Vultur <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 89d72d4125e94aa3c2140fedd97ce07ba9e37674 ]
Based on the static analyzis of the code it looks like when an entry
from the MAC table was removed, the entry was still used after being
freed. More precise the vid of the mac_entry was used after calling
devm_kfree on the mac_entry.
The fix consists in first using the vid of the mac_entry to delete the
entry from the HW and after that to free it.
Fixes: b37a1bae742f ("net: sparx5: add mactable support")
Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_mactable.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_mactable.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_mactable.c
index 4af285918ea2a..75868b3f548ec 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_mactable.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_mactable.c
@@ -347,10 +347,10 @@ int sparx5_del_mact_entry(struct sparx5 *sparx5,
list) {
if ((vid == 0 || mact_entry->vid == vid) &&
ether_addr_equal(addr, mact_entry->mac)) {
+ sparx5_mact_forget(sparx5, addr, mact_entry->vid);
+
list_del(&mact_entry->list);
devm_kfree(sparx5->dev, mact_entry);
-
- sparx5_mact_forget(sparx5, addr, mact_entry->vid);
}
}
mutex_unlock(&sparx5->mact_lock);
--
2.43.0
From: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 99099c6bc75a30b76bb5d6774a0509ab6f06af05 ]
ice_qp_dis() currently does things in very mixed way. Tx is stopped
before disabling IRQ on related queue vector, then it takes care of
disabling Rx and finally NAPI is disabled.
Let us start with disabling IRQs in the first place followed by turning
off NAPI. Then it is safe to handle queues.
One subtle change on top of that is that even though ice_qp_ena() looks
more sane, clear ICE_CFG_BUSY as the last thing there.
Fixes: 2d4238f55697 ("ice: Add support for AF_XDP")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <[email protected]> (A Contingent Worker at Intel)
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c
index f3663b3f6390e..0fd5551b108ce 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c
@@ -179,6 +179,10 @@ static int ice_qp_dis(struct ice_vsi *vsi, u16 q_idx)
return -EBUSY;
usleep_range(1000, 2000);
}
+
+ ice_qvec_dis_irq(vsi, rx_ring, q_vector);
+ ice_qvec_toggle_napi(vsi, q_vector, false);
+
netif_tx_stop_queue(netdev_get_tx_queue(vsi->netdev, q_idx));
ice_fill_txq_meta(vsi, tx_ring, &txq_meta);
@@ -195,13 +199,10 @@ static int ice_qp_dis(struct ice_vsi *vsi, u16 q_idx)
if (err)
return err;
}
- ice_qvec_dis_irq(vsi, rx_ring, q_vector);
-
err = ice_vsi_ctrl_one_rx_ring(vsi, false, q_idx, true);
if (err)
return err;
- ice_qvec_toggle_napi(vsi, q_vector, false);
ice_qp_clean_rings(vsi, q_idx);
ice_qp_reset_stats(vsi, q_idx);
@@ -259,11 +260,11 @@ static int ice_qp_ena(struct ice_vsi *vsi, u16 q_idx)
if (err)
return err;
- clear_bit(ICE_CFG_BUSY, vsi->state);
ice_qvec_toggle_napi(vsi, q_vector, true);
ice_qvec_ena_irq(vsi, q_vector);
netif_tx_start_queue(netdev_get_tx_queue(vsi->netdev, q_idx));
+ clear_bit(ICE_CFG_BUSY, vsi->state);
return 0;
}
--
2.43.0
From: Emil Tantilov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 330068589389ccae3452db15ecacc3e147ac9c1c ]
Fix softirq's not being handled during napi_schedule() call when
receiving marker packets for queue disable by disabling local bottom
half.
The issue can be seen on ifdown:
NOHZ tick-stop error: Non-RCU local softirq work is pending, handler #08!!!
Using ftrace to catch the failing scenario:
ifconfig [003] d.... 22739.830624: softirq_raise: vec=3 [action=NET_RX]
<idle>-0 [003] ..s.. 22739.831357: softirq_entry: vec=3 [action=NET_RX]
No interrupt and CPU is idle.
After the patch when disabling local BH before calling napi_schedule:
ifconfig [003] d.... 22993.928336: softirq_raise: vec=3 [action=NET_RX]
ifconfig [003] ..s1. 22993.928337: softirq_entry: vec=3 [action=NET_RX]
Fixes: c2d548cad150 ("idpf: add TX splitq napi poll support")
Reviewed-by: Jesse Brandeburg <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Emil Tantilov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alan Brady <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Krishneil Singh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c
index 2c1b051fdc0d4..b0c52f17848f6 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c
@@ -2087,8 +2087,10 @@ int idpf_send_disable_queues_msg(struct idpf_vport *vport)
set_bit(__IDPF_Q_POLL_MODE, vport->txqs[i]->flags);
/* schedule the napi to receive all the marker packets */
+ local_bh_disable();
for (i = 0; i < vport->num_q_vectors; i++)
napi_schedule(&vport->q_vectors[i].napi);
+ local_bh_enable();
return idpf_wait_for_marker_event(vport);
}
--
2.43.0
From: Jacob Keller <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2652b99e43403dc464f3648483ffb38e48872fe4 ]
The E800 series hardware uses the same iAVF driver as older devices,
including the virtchnl negotiation scheme.
This negotiation scheme includes a mechanism to determine what type of RSS
should be supported, including RSS over PF virtchnl messages, RSS over
firmware AdminQ messages, and RSS via direct register access.
The PF driver will always prefer VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_PF if its
supported by the VF driver. However, if an older VF driver is loaded, it
may request only VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_REG or VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_AQ.
The ice driver happily agrees to support these methods. Unfortunately, the
underlying hardware does not support these mechanisms. The E800 series VFs
don't have the appropriate registers for RSS_REG. The mailbox queue used by
VFs for VF to PF communication blocks messages which do not have the
VF-to-PF opcode.
Stop lying to the VF that it could support RSS over AdminQ or registers, as
these interfaces do not work when the hardware is operating on an E800
series device.
In practice this is unlikely to be hit by any normal user. The iAVF driver
has supported RSS over PF virtchnl commands since 2016, and always defaults
to using RSS_PF if possible.
In principle, nothing actually stops the existing VF from attempting to
access the registers or send an AQ command. However a properly coded VF
will check the capability flags and will report a more useful error if it
detects a case where the driver does not support the RSS offloads that it
does.
Fixes: 1071a8358a28 ("ice: Implement virtchnl commands for AVF support")
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alan Brady <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c | 9 +--------
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_allowlist.c | 2 --
2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
index 8872f7a4f4320..d6348f20822e8 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
@@ -440,7 +440,6 @@ static int ice_vc_get_vf_res_msg(struct ice_vf *vf, u8 *msg)
vf->driver_caps = *(u32 *)msg;
else
vf->driver_caps = VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_L2 |
- VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_REG |
VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_VLAN;
vfres->vf_cap_flags = VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_L2;
@@ -453,14 +452,8 @@ static int ice_vc_get_vf_res_msg(struct ice_vf *vf, u8 *msg)
vfres->vf_cap_flags |= ice_vc_get_vlan_caps(hw, vf, vsi,
vf->driver_caps);
- if (vf->driver_caps & VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_PF) {
+ if (vf->driver_caps & VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_PF)
vfres->vf_cap_flags |= VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_PF;
- } else {
- if (vf->driver_caps & VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_AQ)
- vfres->vf_cap_flags |= VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_AQ;
- else
- vfres->vf_cap_flags |= VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_REG;
- }
if (vf->driver_caps & VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RX_FLEX_DESC)
vfres->vf_cap_flags |= VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RX_FLEX_DESC;
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_allowlist.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_allowlist.c
index 7d547fa616fa6..588b77f1a4bf6 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_allowlist.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_allowlist.c
@@ -13,8 +13,6 @@
* - opcodes needed by VF when caps are activated
*
* Caps that don't use new opcodes (no opcodes should be allowed):
- * - VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_AQ
- * - VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_REG
* - VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_WB_ON_ITR
* - VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_CRC
* - VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RX_POLLING
--
2.43.0
From: Rand Deeb <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 06e456a05d669ca30b224b8ed962421770c1496c ]
The function ice_bridge_setlink() may encounter a NULL pointer dereference
if nlmsg_find_attr() returns NULL and br_spec is dereferenced subsequently
in nla_for_each_nested(). To address this issue, add a check to ensure that
br_spec is not NULL before proceeding with the nested attribute iteration.
Fixes: b1edc14a3fbf ("ice: Implement ice_bridge_getlink and ice_bridge_setlink")
Signed-off-by: Rand Deeb <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c
index adfdea1e2805a..a9cca2d24120a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c
@@ -7800,6 +7800,8 @@ ice_bridge_setlink(struct net_device *dev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
pf_sw = pf->first_sw;
/* find the attribute in the netlink message */
br_spec = nlmsg_find_attr(nlh, sizeof(struct ifinfomsg), IFLA_AF_SPEC);
+ if (!br_spec)
+ return -EINVAL;
nla_for_each_nested(attr, br_spec, rem) {
__u16 mode;
--
2.43.0
From: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b7bbd698c90591546d22093181e266785f08c18b ]
This reverts commit 4e25b661f484df54b6751b65f9ea2434a3b67539.
This Commit was mistakenly applied by pulling the wrong tag, remove it.
Fixes: 4e25b661f484 ("net/mlx5e: Check the number of elements before walk TC rhashtable")
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/esw/ipsec_fs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/esw/ipsec_fs.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/esw/ipsec_fs.c
index 190f10aba1702..5a0047bdcb510 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/esw/ipsec_fs.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/esw/ipsec_fs.c
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ void mlx5_esw_ipsec_restore_dest_uplink(struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev)
xa_for_each(&esw->offloads.vport_reps, i, rep) {
rpriv = rep->rep_data[REP_ETH].priv;
- if (!rpriv || !rpriv->netdev || !atomic_read(&rpriv->tc_ht.nelems))
+ if (!rpriv || !rpriv->netdev)
continue;
rhashtable_walk_enter(&rpriv->tc_ht, &iter);
--
2.43.0
From: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9224fc86f1776193650a33a275cac628952f80a9 ]
The pf->dplls.lock mutex is initialized too late, after its first use.
Move it to the top of ice_dpll_init.
Note that the "err_exit" error path destroys the mutex. And the mutex is
the last thing destroyed in ice_dpll_deinit.
This fixes the following warning with CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES:
ice 0000:10:00.0: The DDP package was successfully loaded: ICE OS Default Package version 1.3.36.0
ice 0000:10:00.0: 252.048 Gb/s available PCIe bandwidth (16.0 GT/s PCIe x16 link)
ice 0000:10:00.0: PTP init successful
------------[ cut here ]------------
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock)
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 410 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 __mutex_lock+0x773/0xd40
Modules linked in: crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ice(+) nvme nvme_c>
CPU: 0 PID: 410 Comm: kworker/0:4 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc5+ #3
Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL110 Gen10 Plus/ProLiant DL110 Gen10 Plus, BIOS U56 10/19/2023
Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x773/0xd40
Code: c0 0f 84 1d f9 ff ff 44 8b 35 0d 9c 69 01 45 85 f6 0f 85 0d f9 ff ff 48 c7 c6 12 a2 a9 85 48 c7 c7 12 f1 a>
RSP: 0018:ff7eb1a3417a7ae0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff85ac2bff RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ff7eb1a3417a7b80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffbfff
R10: ff7eb1a3417a7978 R11: ff32b80f7fd2e568 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ff32b7f02c50e0d8
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff32b80efe800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055b5852cc000 CR3: 000000003c43a004 CR4: 0000000000771ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x84/0x170
? __mutex_lock+0x773/0xd40
? report_bug+0x1c7/0x1d0
? prb_read_valid+0x1b/0x30
? handle_bug+0x42/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? __mutex_lock+0x773/0xd40
? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50
? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x346/0x490
? ice_dpll_lock_status_get+0x28/0x50 [ice]
? __pfx_ice_dpll_lock_status_get+0x10/0x10 [ice]
? ice_dpll_lock_status_get+0x28/0x50 [ice]
ice_dpll_lock_status_get+0x28/0x50 [ice]
dpll_device_get_one+0x14f/0x2e0
dpll_device_event_send+0x7d/0x150
dpll_device_register+0x124/0x180
ice_dpll_init_dpll+0x7b/0xd0 [ice]
ice_dpll_init+0x224/0xa40 [ice]
? _dev_info+0x70/0x90
ice_load+0x468/0x690 [ice]
ice_probe+0x75b/0xa10 [ice]
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4f/0x80
? process_one_work+0x1a3/0x500
local_pci_probe+0x47/0xa0
work_for_cpu_fn+0x17/0x30
process_one_work+0x20d/0x500
worker_thread+0x1df/0x3e0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x103/0x140
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
irq event stamp: 125197
hardirqs last enabled at (125197): [<ffffffff8416409d>] finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x12d/0x3d0
hardirqs last disabled at (125196): [<ffffffff85134044>] __schedule+0xea4/0x19f0
softirqs last enabled at (105334): [<ffffffff84e1e65a>] napi_get_frags_check+0x1a/0x60
softirqs last disabled at (105332): [<ffffffff84e1e65a>] napi_get_frags_check+0x1a/0x60
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Fixes: d7999f5ea64b ("ice: implement dpll interface to control cgu")
Signed-off-by: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_dpll.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_dpll.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_dpll.c
index 2b657d43c769d..68b894bb68fe7 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_dpll.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_dpll.c
@@ -2146,6 +2146,7 @@ void ice_dpll_init(struct ice_pf *pf)
struct ice_dplls *d = &pf->dplls;
int err = 0;
+ mutex_init(&d->lock);
err = ice_dpll_init_info(pf, cgu);
if (err)
goto err_exit;
@@ -2158,7 +2159,6 @@ void ice_dpll_init(struct ice_pf *pf)
err = ice_dpll_init_pins(pf, cgu);
if (err)
goto deinit_pps;
- mutex_init(&d->lock);
if (cgu) {
err = ice_dpll_init_worker(pf);
if (err)
--
2.43.0
From: Florian Kauer <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ef27f655b438bed4c83680e4f01e1cde2739854b ]
When a frame can not be transmitted in XDP_REDIRECT
(e.g. due to a full queue), it is necessary to free
it by calling xdp_return_frame_rx_napi.
However, this is the responsibility of the caller of
the ndo_xdp_xmit (see for example bq_xmit_all in
kernel/bpf/devmap.c) and thus calling it inside
igc_xdp_xmit (which is the ndo_xdp_xmit of the igc
driver) as well will lead to memory corruption.
In fact, bq_xmit_all expects that it can return all
frames after the last successfully transmitted one.
Therefore, break for the first not transmitted frame,
but do not call xdp_return_frame_rx_napi in igc_xdp_xmit.
This is equally implemented in other Intel drivers
such as the igb.
There are two alternatives to this that were rejected:
1. Return num_frames as all the frames would have been
transmitted and release them inside igc_xdp_xmit.
While it might work technically, it is not what
the return value is meant to represent (i.e. the
number of SUCCESSFULLY transmitted packets).
2. Rework kernel/bpf/devmap.c and all drivers to
support non-consecutively dropped packets.
Besides being complex, it likely has a negative
performance impact without a significant gain
since it is anyway unlikely that the next frame
can be transmitted if the previous one was dropped.
The memory corruption can be reproduced with
the following script which leads to a kernel panic
after a few seconds. It basically generates more
traffic than a i225 NIC can transmit and pushes it
via XDP_REDIRECT from a virtual interface to the
physical interface where frames get dropped.
#!/bin/bash
INTERFACE=enp4s0
INTERFACE_IDX=`cat /sys/class/net/$INTERFACE/ifindex`
sudo ip link add dev veth1 type veth peer name veth2
sudo ip link set up $INTERFACE
sudo ip link set up veth1
sudo ip link set up veth2
cat << EOF > redirect.bpf.c
SEC("prog")
int redirect(struct xdp_md *ctx)
{
return bpf_redirect($INTERFACE_IDX, 0);
}
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
EOF
clang -O2 -g -Wall -target bpf -c redirect.bpf.c -o redirect.bpf.o
sudo ip link set veth2 xdp obj redirect.bpf.o
cat << EOF > pass.bpf.c
SEC("prog")
int pass(struct xdp_md *ctx)
{
return XDP_PASS;
}
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
EOF
clang -O2 -g -Wall -target bpf -c pass.bpf.c -o pass.bpf.o
sudo ip link set $INTERFACE xdp obj pass.bpf.o
cat << EOF > trafgen.cfg
{
/* Ethernet Header */
0xe8, 0x6a, 0x64, 0x41, 0xbf, 0x46,
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
const16(ETH_P_IP),
/* IPv4 Header */
0b01000101, 0, # IPv4 version, IHL, TOS
const16(1028), # IPv4 total length (UDP length + 20 bytes (IP header))
const16(2), # IPv4 ident
0b01000000, 0, # IPv4 flags, fragmentation off
64, # IPv4 TTL
17, # Protocol UDP
csumip(14, 33), # IPv4 checksum
/* UDP Header */
10, 0, 1, 1, # IP Src - adapt as needed
10, 0, 1, 2, # IP Dest - adapt as needed
const16(6666), # UDP Src Port
const16(6666), # UDP Dest Port
const16(1008), # UDP length (UDP header 8 bytes + payload length)
csumudp(14, 34), # UDP checksum
/* Payload */
fill('W', 1000),
}
EOF
sudo trafgen -i trafgen.cfg -b3000MB -o veth1 --cpp
Fixes: 4ff320361092 ("igc: Add support for XDP_REDIRECT action")
Signed-off-by: Florian Kauer <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Naama Meir <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c | 13 ++++++-------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c
index e9bb403bbacf9..58ffddc6419ad 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c
@@ -6489,7 +6489,7 @@ static int igc_xdp_xmit(struct net_device *dev, int num_frames,
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct netdev_queue *nq;
struct igc_ring *ring;
- int i, drops;
+ int i, nxmit;
if (unlikely(!netif_carrier_ok(dev)))
return -ENETDOWN;
@@ -6505,16 +6505,15 @@ static int igc_xdp_xmit(struct net_device *dev, int num_frames,
/* Avoid transmit queue timeout since we share it with the slow path */
txq_trans_cond_update(nq);
- drops = 0;
+ nxmit = 0;
for (i = 0; i < num_frames; i++) {
int err;
struct xdp_frame *xdpf = frames[i];
err = igc_xdp_init_tx_descriptor(ring, xdpf);
- if (err) {
- xdp_return_frame_rx_napi(xdpf);
- drops++;
- }
+ if (err)
+ break;
+ nxmit++;
}
if (flags & XDP_XMIT_FLUSH)
@@ -6522,7 +6521,7 @@ static int igc_xdp_xmit(struct net_device *dev, int num_frames,
__netif_tx_unlock(nq);
- return num_frames - drops;
+ return nxmit;
}
static void igc_trigger_rxtxq_interrupt(struct igc_adapter *adapter,
--
2.43.0
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 685f7d531264599b3f167f1e94bbd22f120e5fab ]
syzbot found another use-after-free in ip6_route_mpath_notify() [1]
Commit f7225172f25a ("net/ipv6: prevent use after free in
ip6_route_mpath_notify") was not able to fix the root cause.
We need to defer the fib6_info_release() calls after
ip6_route_mpath_notify(), in the cleanup phase.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rt6_fill_node+0x1460/0x1ac0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88809a07fc64 by task syz-executor.2/23037
CPU: 0 PID: 23037 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-01035-gea7f3cfaa588 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2e0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x167/0x540 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x142/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
rt6_fill_node+0x1460/0x1ac0
inet6_rt_notify+0x13b/0x290 net/ipv6/route.c:6184
ip6_route_mpath_notify net/ipv6/route.c:5198 [inline]
ip6_route_multipath_add net/ipv6/route.c:5404 [inline]
inet6_rtm_newroute+0x1d0f/0x2300 net/ipv6/route.c:5517
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x885/0x1040 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6597
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367
netlink_sendmsg+0xa3b/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2667
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
RIP: 0033:0x7f73dd87dda9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f73de6550c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f73dd9ac050 RCX: 00007f73dd87dda9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000140 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007f73dd8ca47a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000006e R14: 00007f73dd9ac050 R15: 00007ffdbdeb7858
</TASK>
Allocated by task 23037:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:372 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:389
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3981 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x22e/0x490 mm/slub.c:3994
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:594 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:711 [inline]
fib6_info_alloc+0x2e/0xf0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:155
ip6_route_info_create+0x445/0x12b0 net/ipv6/route.c:3758
ip6_route_multipath_add net/ipv6/route.c:5298 [inline]
inet6_rtm_newroute+0x744/0x2300 net/ipv6/route.c:5517
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x885/0x1040 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6597
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367
netlink_sendmsg+0xa3b/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2667
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
Freed by task 16:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x4e/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:640
poison_slab_object+0xa6/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:241
__kasan_slab_free+0x34/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:257
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2121 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4299 [inline]
kfree+0x14a/0x380 mm/slub.c:4409
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2190 [inline]
rcu_core+0xd76/0x1810 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2465
__do_softirq+0x2bb/0x942 kernel/softirq.c:553
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x3f/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0xae/0x100 mm/kasan/generic.c:586
__call_rcu_common kernel/rcu/tree.c:2715 [inline]
call_rcu+0x167/0xa80 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2829
fib6_info_release include/net/ip6_fib.h:341 [inline]
ip6_route_multipath_add net/ipv6/route.c:5344 [inline]
inet6_rtm_newroute+0x114d/0x2300 net/ipv6/route.c:5517
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x885/0x1040 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6597
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367
netlink_sendmsg+0xa3b/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2667
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88809a07fc00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 100 bytes inside of
freed 512-byte region [ffff88809a07fc00, ffff88809a07fe00)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea0002681f00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9a07c
head:ffffea0002681f00 order:2 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0xfff00000000840(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 00fff00000000840 ffff888014c41c80 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x1d20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_HARDWALL), pid 23028, tgid 23027 (syz-executor.4), ts 2340253595219, free_ts 2339107097036
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1ea/0x210 mm/page_alloc.c:1533
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1540 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x33ea/0x3580 mm/page_alloc.c:3311
__alloc_pages+0x255/0x680 mm/page_alloc.c:4567
__alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline]
alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline]
alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x160 mm/slub.c:2190
allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2354 [inline]
new_slab+0x84/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:2407
___slab_alloc+0xd17/0x13e0 mm/slub.c:3540
__slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3625 [inline]
__slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3678 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3850 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3980 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x2e0/0x490 mm/slub.c:3994
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:594 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:711 [inline]
new_dir fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:956 [inline]
get_subdir fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1000 [inline]
sysctl_mkdir_p fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1295 [inline]
__register_sysctl_table+0xb30/0x1440 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1376
neigh_sysctl_register+0x416/0x500 net/core/neighbour.c:3859
devinet_sysctl_register+0xaf/0x1f0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:2644
inetdev_init+0x296/0x4d0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:286
inetdev_event+0x338/0x15c0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1555
notifier_call_chain+0x18f/0x3b0 kernel/notifier.c:93
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1987 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2001 [inline]
register_netdevice+0x15b2/0x1a20 net/core/dev.c:10340
br_dev_newlink+0x27/0x100 net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1563
rtnl_newlink_create net/core/rtnetlink.c:3497 [inline]
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3717 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x158f/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3730
page last free pid 11583 tgid 11583 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1140 [inline]
free_unref_page_prepare+0x968/0xa90 mm/page_alloc.c:2346
free_unref_page+0x37/0x3f0 mm/page_alloc.c:2486
kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte+0x74/0x90 mm/kasan/shadow.c:415
apply_to_pte_range mm/memory.c:2619 [inline]
apply_to_pmd_range mm/memory.c:2663 [inline]
apply_to_pud_range mm/memory.c:2699 [inline]
apply_to_p4d_range mm/memory.c:2735 [inline]
__apply_to_page_range+0x8ec/0xe40 mm/memory.c:2769
kasan_release_vmalloc+0x9a/0xb0 mm/kasan/shadow.c:532
__purge_vmap_area_lazy+0x163f/0x1a10 mm/vmalloc.c:1770
drain_vmap_area_work+0x40/0xd0 mm/vmalloc.c:1804
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0x913/0x1420 kernel/workqueue.c:2706
worker_thread+0xa5f/0x1000 kernel/workqueue.c:2787
kthread+0x2ef/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88809a07fb00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88809a07fb80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88809a07fc00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff88809a07fc80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff88809a07fd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 3b1137fe7482 ("net: ipv6: Change notifications for multipath add to RTA_MULTIPATH")
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv6/route.c | 21 +++++++--------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c
index ea1dec8448fce..ef815ba583a8f 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -5332,19 +5332,7 @@ static int ip6_route_multipath_add(struct fib6_config *cfg,
err_nh = NULL;
list_for_each_entry(nh, &rt6_nh_list, next) {
err = __ip6_ins_rt(nh->fib6_info, info, extack);
- fib6_info_release(nh->fib6_info);
-
- if (!err) {
- /* save reference to last route successfully inserted */
- rt_last = nh->fib6_info;
-
- /* save reference to first route for notification */
- if (!rt_notif)
- rt_notif = nh->fib6_info;
- }
- /* nh->fib6_info is used or freed at this point, reset to NULL*/
- nh->fib6_info = NULL;
if (err) {
if (replace && nhn)
NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack,
@@ -5352,6 +5340,12 @@ static int ip6_route_multipath_add(struct fib6_config *cfg,
err_nh = nh;
goto add_errout;
}
+ /* save reference to last route successfully inserted */
+ rt_last = nh->fib6_info;
+
+ /* save reference to first route for notification */
+ if (!rt_notif)
+ rt_notif = nh->fib6_info;
/* Because each route is added like a single route we remove
* these flags after the first nexthop: if there is a collision,
@@ -5412,8 +5406,7 @@ static int ip6_route_multipath_add(struct fib6_config *cfg,
cleanup:
list_for_each_entry_safe(nh, nh_safe, &rt6_nh_list, next) {
- if (nh->fib6_info)
- fib6_info_release(nh->fib6_info);
+ fib6_info_release(nh->fib6_info);
list_del(&nh->next);
kfree(nh);
}
--
2.43.0
From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0bfc0336e1348883fdab4689f0c8c56458f36dd8 ]
Adjust the XDP feature flags for the bond device when no bond slave
devices are attached. After 9b0ed890ac2a ("bonding: do not report
NETDEV_XDP_ACT_XSK_ZEROCOPY"), the empty bond device must report 0
as flags instead of NETDEV_XDP_ACT_MASK.
# ./vmtest.sh -- ./test_progs -t xdp_bond
[...]
[ 3.983311] bond1 (unregistering): (slave veth1_1): Releasing backup interface
[ 3.995434] bond1 (unregistering): Released all slaves
[ 4.022311] bond2: (slave veth2_1): Releasing backup interface
#507/1 xdp_bonding/xdp_bonding_attach:OK
#507/2 xdp_bonding/xdp_bonding_nested:OK
#507/3 xdp_bonding/xdp_bonding_features:OK
#507/4 xdp_bonding/xdp_bonding_roundrobin:OK
#507/5 xdp_bonding/xdp_bonding_activebackup:OK
#507/6 xdp_bonding/xdp_bonding_xor_layer2:OK
#507/7 xdp_bonding/xdp_bonding_xor_layer23:OK
#507/8 xdp_bonding/xdp_bonding_xor_layer34:OK
#507/9 xdp_bonding/xdp_bonding_redirect_multi:OK
#507 xdp_bonding:OK
Summary: 1/9 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
[ 4.185255] bond2 (unregistering): Released all slaves
[...]
Fixes: 9b0ed890ac2a ("bonding: do not report NETDEV_XDP_ACT_XSK_ZEROCOPY")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <[email protected]>
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_bonding.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_bonding.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_bonding.c
index c3b45745cbccd..6d8b54124cb35 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_bonding.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_bonding.c
@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ static void test_xdp_bonding_features(struct skeletons *skeletons)
if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bond bpf_xdp_query"))
goto out;
- if (!ASSERT_EQ(query_opts.feature_flags, NETDEV_XDP_ACT_MASK,
+ if (!ASSERT_EQ(query_opts.feature_flags, 0,
"bond query_opts.feature_flags"))
goto out;
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ static void test_xdp_bonding_features(struct skeletons *skeletons)
if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bond bpf_xdp_query"))
goto out;
- ASSERT_EQ(query_opts.feature_flags, NETDEV_XDP_ACT_MASK,
+ ASSERT_EQ(query_opts.feature_flags, 0,
"bond query_opts.feature_flags");
out:
bpf_link__destroy(link);
--
2.43.0
From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2487007aa3b9fafbd2cb14068f49791ce1d7ede5 ]
When running an XDP program that is attached to a cpumap entry, we don't
initialise the xdp_rxq_info data structure being used in the xdp_buff
that backs the XDP program invocation. Tobias noticed that this leads to
random values being returned as the xdp_md->rx_queue_index value for XDP
programs running in a cpumap.
This means we're basically returning the contents of the uninitialised
memory, which is bad. Fix this by zero-initialising the rxq data
structure before running the XDP program.
Fixes: 9216477449f3 ("bpf: cpumap: Add the possibility to attach an eBPF program to cpumap")
Reported-by: Tobias Böhm <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
kernel/bpf/cpumap.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
index 8a0bb80fe48a3..ef82ffc90cbe9 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ static int cpu_map_bpf_prog_run_xdp(struct bpf_cpu_map_entry *rcpu,
void **frames, int n,
struct xdp_cpumap_stats *stats)
{
- struct xdp_rxq_info rxq;
+ struct xdp_rxq_info rxq = {};
struct xdp_buff xdp;
int i, nframes = 0;
--
2.43.0
From: Lena Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 767146637efc528b5e3d31297df115e85a2fd362 ]
UBSAN load reports an exception of BRK#5515 SHIFT_ISSUE:Bitwise shifts
that are out of bounds for their data type.
vmlinux get_bitmap(b=75) + 712
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:0>
vmlinux decode_seq(bs=0xFFFFFFD008037000, f=0xFFFFFFD008037018, level=134443100) + 1956
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:592>
vmlinux decode_choice(base=0xFFFFFFD0080370F0, level=23843636) + 1216
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:814>
vmlinux decode_seq(f=0xFFFFFFD0080371A8, level=134443500) + 812
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:576>
vmlinux decode_choice(base=0xFFFFFFD008037280, level=0) + 1216
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:814>
vmlinux DecodeRasMessage() + 304
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:833>
vmlinux ras_help() + 684
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_main.c:1728>
vmlinux nf_confirm() + 188
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:137>
Due to abnormal data in skb->data, the extension bitmap length
exceeds 32 when decoding ras message then uses the length to make
a shift operation. It will change into negative after several loop.
UBSAN load could detect a negative shift as an undefined behaviour
and reports exception.
So we add the protection to avoid the length exceeding 32. Or else
it will return out of range error and stop decoding.
Fixes: 5e35941d9901 ("[NETFILTER]: Add H.323 conntrack/NAT helper")
Signed-off-by: Lena Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c
index e697a824b0018..540d97715bd23 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c
@@ -533,6 +533,8 @@ static int decode_seq(struct bitstr *bs, const struct field_t *f,
/* Get fields bitmap */
if (nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, 0, f->sz))
return H323_ERROR_BOUND;
+ if (f->sz > 32)
+ return H323_ERROR_RANGE;
bmp = get_bitmap(bs, f->sz);
if (base)
*(unsigned int *)base = bmp;
@@ -589,6 +591,8 @@ static int decode_seq(struct bitstr *bs, const struct field_t *f,
bmp2_len = get_bits(bs, 7) + 1;
if (nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, 0, bmp2_len))
return H323_ERROR_BOUND;
+ if (bmp2_len > 32)
+ return H323_ERROR_RANGE;
bmp2 = get_bitmap(bs, bmp2_len);
bmp |= bmp2 >> f->sz;
if (base)
--
2.43.0
From: Gao Xiang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4127caee89612a84adedd78c9453089138cd5afe ]
There are mainly two reasons that thp_get_unmapped_area() should be
used for EROFS as other filesystems:
- It's needed to enable PMD mappings as a FSDAX filesystem, see
commit 74d2fad1334d ("thp, dax: add thp_get_unmapped_area for pmd
mappings");
- It's useful together with large folios and
CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS which enable THPs for mmapped files
(e.g. shared libraries) even without FSDAX. See commit 1854bc6e2420
("mm/readahead: Align file mappings for non-DAX").
Fixes: 06252e9ce05b ("erofs: dax support for non-tailpacking regular file")
Fixes: ce529cc25b18 ("erofs: enable large folios for iomap mode")
Fixes: e6687b89225e ("erofs: enable large folios for fscache mode")
Reviewed-by: Jingbo Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
fs/erofs/data.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/fs/erofs/data.c b/fs/erofs/data.c
index c98aeda8abb21..3d9721b3faa81 100644
--- a/fs/erofs/data.c
+++ b/fs/erofs/data.c
@@ -447,5 +447,6 @@ const struct file_operations erofs_file_fops = {
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
.read_iter = erofs_file_read_iter,
.mmap = erofs_file_mmap,
+ .get_unmapped_area = thp_get_unmapped_area,
.splice_read = filemap_splice_read,
};
--
2.43.0
From: Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e9a8e5a587ca55fec6c58e4881742705d45bee54 ]
When comparing current and cached states verifier should consider
bpf_func_state->callback_depth. Current state cannot be pruned against
cached state, when current states has more iterations left compared to
cached state. Current state has more iterations left when it's
callback_depth is smaller.
Below is an example illustrating this bug, minimized from mailing list
discussion [0] (assume that BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ is set).
The example is not a safe program: if loop_cb point (1) is followed by
loop_cb point (2), then division by zero is possible at point (4).
struct ctx {
__u64 a;
__u64 b;
__u64 c;
};
static void loop_cb(int i, struct ctx *ctx)
{
/* assume that generated code is "fallthrough-first":
* if ... == 1 goto
* if ... == 2 goto
* <default>
*/
switch (bpf_get_prandom_u32()) {
case 1: /* 1 */ ctx->a = 42; return 0; break;
case 2: /* 2 */ ctx->b = 42; return 0; break;
default: /* 3 */ ctx->c = 42; return 0; break;
}
}
SEC("tc")
__failure
__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
int test(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ctx ctx = { 7, 7, 7 };
bpf_loop(2, loop_cb, &ctx, 0); /* 0 */
/* assume generated checks are in-order: .a first */
if (ctx.a == 42 && ctx.b == 42 && ctx.c == 7)
asm volatile("r0 /= 0;":::"r0"); /* 4 */
return 0;
}
Prior to this commit verifier built the following checkpoint tree for
this example:
.------------------------------------- Checkpoint / State name
| .-------------------------------- Code point number
| | .---------------------------- Stack state {ctx.a,ctx.b,ctx.c}
| | | .------------------- Callback depth in frame #0
v v v v
- (0) {7P,7P,7},depth=0
- (3) {7P,7P,7},depth=1
- (0) {7P,7P,42},depth=1
- (3) {7P,7,42},depth=2
- (0) {7P,7,42},depth=2 loop terminates because of depth limit
- (4) {7P,7,42},depth=0 predicted false, ctx.a marked precise
- (6) exit
(a) - (2) {7P,7,42},depth=2
- (0) {7P,42,42},depth=2 loop terminates because of depth limit
- (4) {7P,42,42},depth=0 predicted false, ctx.a marked precise
- (6) exit
(b) - (1) {7P,7P,42},depth=2
- (0) {42P,7P,42},depth=2 loop terminates because of depth limit
- (4) {42P,7P,42},depth=0 predicted false, ctx.{a,b} marked precise
- (6) exit
- (2) {7P,7,7},depth=1 considered safe, pruned using checkpoint (a)
(c) - (1) {7P,7P,7},depth=1 considered safe, pruned using checkpoint (b)
Here checkpoint (b) has callback_depth of 2, meaning that it would
never reach state {42,42,7}.
While checkpoint (c) has callback_depth of 1, and thus
could yet explore the state {42,42,7} if not pruned prematurely.
This commit makes forbids such premature pruning,
allowing verifier to explore states sub-tree starting at (c):
(c) - (1) {7,7,7P},depth=1
- (0) {42P,7,7P},depth=1
...
- (2) {42,7,7},depth=2
- (0) {42,42,7},depth=2 loop terminates because of depth limit
- (4) {42,42,7},depth=0 predicted true, ctx.{a,b,c} marked precise
- (5) division by zero
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
Fixes: bb124da69c47 ("bpf: keep track of max number of bpf_loop callback iterations")
Suggested-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index e215413c79a52..9698e93d48c6e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -16686,6 +16686,9 @@ static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_stat
{
int i;
+ if (old->callback_depth > cur->callback_depth)
+ return false;
+
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
if (!regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i],
&env->idmap_scratch, exact))
--
2.43.0
From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f267f262815033452195f46c43b572159262f533 ]
Commit 9b0ed890ac2a ("bonding: do not report NETDEV_XDP_ACT_XSK_ZEROCOPY")
changed the driver from reporting everything as supported before a device
was bonded into having the driver report that no XDP feature is supported
until a real device is bonded as it seems to be more truthful given
eventually real underlying devices decide what XDP features are supported.
The change however did not take into account when all slave devices get
removed from the bond device. In this case after 9b0ed890ac2a, the driver
keeps reporting a feature mask of 0x77, that is, NETDEV_XDP_ACT_MASK &
~NETDEV_XDP_ACT_XSK_ZEROCOPY whereas it should have reported a feature
mask of 0.
Fix it by resetting XDP feature flags in the same way as if no XDP program
is attached to the bond device. This was uncovered by the XDP bond selftest
which let BPF CI fail. After adjusting the starting masks on the latter
to 0 instead of NETDEV_XDP_ACT_MASK the test passes again together with
this fix.
Fixes: 9b0ed890ac2a ("bonding: do not report NETDEV_XDP_ACT_XSK_ZEROCOPY")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Magnus Karlsson <[email protected]>
Cc: Prashant Batra <[email protected]>
Cc: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <[email protected]>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <[email protected]>
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
index 6cf7f364704e8..b094c48bebc30 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
@@ -1811,7 +1811,7 @@ void bond_xdp_set_features(struct net_device *bond_dev)
ASSERT_RTNL();
- if (!bond_xdp_check(bond)) {
+ if (!bond_xdp_check(bond) || !bond_has_slaves(bond)) {
xdp_clear_features_flag(bond_dev);
return;
}
--
2.43.0
From: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cfd9f4a740f772298308b2e6070d2c744fb5cf79 ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value
because the value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netrom/nr_route.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_route.c b/net/netrom/nr_route.c
index 6f709fdffc11f..b8ddd8048f352 100644
--- a/net/netrom/nr_route.c
+++ b/net/netrom/nr_route.c
@@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ int nr_route_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, ax25_cb *ax25)
if (ax25 != NULL) {
ret = nr_add_node(nr_src, "", &ax25->dest_addr, ax25->digipeat,
ax25->ax25_dev->dev, 0,
- sysctl_netrom_obsolescence_count_initialiser);
+ READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_obsolescence_count_initialiser));
if (ret)
return ret;
}
--
2.43.0
From: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1982a2a02c9197436d4a8ea12f66bafab53f16a0 ]
Commit 23e7b1bfed61 ("xfrm: Don't accidentally set RTO_ONLINK in
decode_session4()") fixed a problem where decode_session4() could
erroneously set the RTO_ONLINK flag for IPv4 route lookups. This
problem was reintroduced when decode_session4() was modified to
use the flow dissector.
Fix this by clearing again the two low order bits of ->flowi4_tos.
Found by code inspection, compile tested only.
Fixes: 7a0207094f1b ("xfrm: policy: replace session decode with flow dissector")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index c13dc3ef79107..e69d588caa0c6 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -3416,7 +3416,7 @@ decode_session4(const struct xfrm_flow_keys *flkeys, struct flowi *fl, bool reve
}
fl4->flowi4_proto = flkeys->basic.ip_proto;
- fl4->flowi4_tos = flkeys->ip.tos;
+ fl4->flowi4_tos = flkeys->ip.tos & ~INET_ECN_MASK;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
--
2.43.0
From: Frank Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a79f949a5ce1d45329d63742c2a995f2b47f9852 ]
Correcting the previous setting of 0x3fff to the actual value of 0x7fff.
Introduced new macro 'EDMA_TCD_ITER_MASK' for improved code clarity and
utilization of FIELD_GET to obtain the accurate maximum value.
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: e06748539432 ("dmaengine: fsl-edma: support edma memcpy")
Signed-off-by: Frank Li <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/dma/fsl-edma-common.h | 5 +++--
drivers/dma/fsl-edma-main.c | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-common.h b/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-common.h
index bb5221158a770..f5e216b157c75 100644
--- a/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-common.h
+++ b/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-common.h
@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@
#define EDMA_TCD_ATTR_SSIZE(x) (((x) & GENMASK(2, 0)) << 8)
#define EDMA_TCD_ATTR_SMOD(x) (((x) & GENMASK(4, 0)) << 11)
-#define EDMA_TCD_CITER_CITER(x) ((x) & GENMASK(14, 0))
-#define EDMA_TCD_BITER_BITER(x) ((x) & GENMASK(14, 0))
+#define EDMA_TCD_ITER_MASK GENMASK(14, 0)
+#define EDMA_TCD_CITER_CITER(x) ((x) & EDMA_TCD_ITER_MASK)
+#define EDMA_TCD_BITER_BITER(x) ((x) & EDMA_TCD_ITER_MASK)
#define EDMA_TCD_CSR_START BIT(0)
#define EDMA_TCD_CSR_INT_MAJOR BIT(1)
diff --git a/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-main.c b/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-main.c
index 45cc419b1b4ac..d36e28b9c767a 100644
--- a/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-main.c
+++ b/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-main.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
*/
#include <dt-bindings/dma/fsl-edma.h>
+#include <linux/bitfield.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/clk.h>
@@ -582,7 +583,8 @@ static int fsl_edma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
DMAENGINE_ALIGN_32_BYTES;
/* Per worst case 'nbytes = 1' take CITER as the max_seg_size */
- dma_set_max_seg_size(fsl_edma->dma_dev.dev, 0x3fff);
+ dma_set_max_seg_size(fsl_edma->dma_dev.dev,
+ FIELD_GET(EDMA_TCD_ITER_MASK, EDMA_TCD_ITER_MASK));
fsl_edma->dma_dev.residue_granularity = DMA_RESIDUE_GRANULARITY_SEGMENT;
--
2.43.0
From: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d562b11c1eac7d73f4c778b4cbe5468f86b1f20d ]
Disable NAPI before shutting down queues that this particular NAPI
contains so that the order of actions in i40e_queue_pair_disable()
mirrors what we do in i40e_queue_pair_enable().
Fixes: 123cecd427b6 ("i40e: added queue pair disable/enable functions")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <[email protected]> (A Contingent Worker at Intel)
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c
index d9716bcec81bb..b0dc0fc6b1359 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c
@@ -13629,9 +13629,9 @@ int i40e_queue_pair_disable(struct i40e_vsi *vsi, int queue_pair)
return err;
i40e_queue_pair_disable_irq(vsi, queue_pair);
+ i40e_queue_pair_toggle_napi(vsi, queue_pair, false /* off */);
err = i40e_queue_pair_toggle_rings(vsi, queue_pair, false /* off */);
i40e_clean_rx_ring(vsi->rx_rings[queue_pair]);
- i40e_queue_pair_toggle_napi(vsi, queue_pair, false /* off */);
i40e_queue_pair_clean_rings(vsi, queue_pair);
i40e_queue_pair_reset_stats(vsi, queue_pair);
--
2.43.0
From: "Tobias Jakobi (Compleo)" <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b7fb7729c94fb2d23c79ff44f7a2da089c92d81c ]
This bug was noticed while re-implementing parts of the kernel
driver in userspace using spidev. The goal was to enable some
of the errata workarounds that Microchip describes in their
errata sheet [1].
Both the errata sheet and the regular datasheet of e.g. the KSZ8795
imply that you need to do this for indirect register accesses:
- write a 16-bit value to a control register pair (this value
consists of the indirect register table, and the offset inside
the table)
- either read or write an 8-bit value from the data storage
register (indicated by REG_IND_BYTE in the kernel)
The current implementation has the order swapped. It can be
proven, by reading back some indirect register with known content
(the EEE register modified in ksz8_handle_global_errata() is one of
these), that this implementation does not work.
Private discussion with Oleksij Rempel of Pengutronix has revealed
that the workaround was apparantly never tested on actual hardware.
[1] https://ww1.microchip.com/downloads/aemDocuments/documents/OTH/ProductDocuments/Errata/KSZ87xx-Errata-DS80000687C.pdf
Signed-off-by: Tobias Jakobi (Compleo) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]>
Fixes: 7b6e6235b664 ("net: dsa: microchip: ksz8795: handle eee specif erratum")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz8795.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz8795.c b/drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz8795.c
index 4bf4d67557dcf..9048d1f196110 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz8795.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz8795.c
@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ static int ksz8_ind_write8(struct ksz_device *dev, u8 table, u16 addr, u8 data)
mutex_lock(&dev->alu_mutex);
ctrl_addr = IND_ACC_TABLE(table) | addr;
- ret = ksz_write8(dev, regs[REG_IND_BYTE], data);
+ ret = ksz_write16(dev, regs[REG_IND_CTRL_0], ctrl_addr);
if (!ret)
- ret = ksz_write16(dev, regs[REG_IND_CTRL_0], ctrl_addr);
+ ret = ksz_write8(dev, regs[REG_IND_BYTE], data);
mutex_unlock(&dev->alu_mutex);
--
2.43.0
From: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e799299aafed417cc1f32adccb2a0e5268b3f6d5 ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
index 4d0e0834d527b..312fc745db7ff 100644
--- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
+++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
nr->t2 =
msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_acknowledge_delay);
nr->n2 =
- msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries);
+ msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries));
nr->t4 =
msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay);
nr->idle =
--
2.43.0
From: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 806f462ba9029d41aadf8ec93f2f99c5305deada ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
index 312fc745db7ff..8ada0da3c0e08 100644
--- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
+++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
nr->t1 =
msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_timeout));
nr->t2 =
- msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_acknowledge_delay);
+ msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_acknowledge_delay));
nr->n2 =
msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries));
nr->t4 =
--
2.43.0
From: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 43547d8699439a67b78d6bb39015113f7aa360fd ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
index 8ada0da3c0e08..10eee02ef99ed 100644
--- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
+++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
nr->n2 =
msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries));
nr->t4 =
- msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay);
+ msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay));
nr->idle =
msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_no_activity_timeout);
nr->window = sysctl_netrom_transport_requested_window_size;
--
2.43.0
From: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
commit 2a0180129d726a4b953232175857d442651b55a0 upstream.
Mitigation for RFDS requires RFDS_CLEAR capability which is enumerated
by MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bit 27. If the host has it set, export it
to guests so that they can deploy the mitigation.
RFDS_NO indicates that the system is not vulnerable to RFDS, export it
to guests so that they don't deploy the mitigation unnecessarily. When
the host is not affected by X86_BUG_RFDS, but has RFDS_NO=0, synthesize
RFDS_NO to the guest.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 468870450b8ba..8021c62b0e7b0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1620,7 +1620,8 @@ static bool kvm_is_immutable_feature_msr(u32 msr)
ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH | ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO | \
ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO | ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR | ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO | \
ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO | \
- ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO)
+ ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO | \
+ ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO | ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
{
@@ -1652,6 +1653,8 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
data |= ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO;
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
data |= ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO;
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS))
+ data |= ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO;
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
/*
--
2.43.0
From: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a2e706841488f474c06e9b33f71afc947fb3bf56 ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
index 10eee02ef99ed..e65418fb9d882 100644
--- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
+++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay));
nr->idle =
msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_no_activity_timeout);
- nr->window = sysctl_netrom_transport_requested_window_size;
+ nr->window = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_requested_window_size);
nr->bpqext = 1;
nr->state = NR_STATE_0;
--
2.43.0
From: Edward Adam Davis <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c055fc00c07be1f0df7375ab0036cebd1106ed38 ]
If connection isn't established yet, get_mr() will fail, trigger connection after
get_mr().
Fixes: 584a8279a44a ("RDS: RDMA: return appropriate error on rdma map failures")
Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/rds/rdma.c | 3 +++
net/rds/send.c | 6 +-----
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/rds/rdma.c b/net/rds/rdma.c
index fba82d36593ad..a4e3c5de998be 100644
--- a/net/rds/rdma.c
+++ b/net/rds/rdma.c
@@ -301,6 +301,9 @@ static int __rds_rdma_map(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_get_mr_args *args,
kfree(sg);
}
ret = PTR_ERR(trans_private);
+ /* Trigger connection so that its ready for the next retry */
+ if (ret == -ENODEV)
+ rds_conn_connect_if_down(cp->cp_conn);
goto out;
}
diff --git a/net/rds/send.c b/net/rds/send.c
index 5e57a1581dc60..2899def23865f 100644
--- a/net/rds/send.c
+++ b/net/rds/send.c
@@ -1313,12 +1313,8 @@ int rds_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t payload_len)
/* Parse any control messages the user may have included. */
ret = rds_cmsg_send(rs, rm, msg, &allocated_mr, &vct);
- if (ret) {
- /* Trigger connection so that its ready for the next retry */
- if (ret == -EAGAIN)
- rds_conn_connect_if_down(conn);
+ if (ret)
goto out;
- }
if (rm->rdma.op_active && !conn->c_trans->xmit_rdma) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE "rdma_op %p conn xmit_rdma %p\n",
--
2.43.0
From: Aya Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ac8082a3c7a158640a2c493ec437dd9da881a6a7 ]
Restore fw reporter diagnose to print the syndrome even if it is zero.
Following the cited commit, in this case (syndrome == 0) command returns no
output at all.
This fix restores command output in case syndrome is cleared:
$ devlink health diagnose pci/0000:82:00.0 reporter fw
Syndrome: 0
Fixes: d17f98bf7cc9 ("net/mlx5: devlink health: use retained error fmsg API")
Signed-off-by: Aya Levin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/health.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/health.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/health.c
index 8ff6dc9bc8033..b5c709bba1553 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/health.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/health.c
@@ -452,10 +452,10 @@ mlx5_fw_reporter_diagnose(struct devlink_health_reporter *reporter,
struct health_buffer __iomem *h = health->health;
u8 synd = ioread8(&h->synd);
+ devlink_fmsg_u8_pair_put(fmsg, "Syndrome", synd);
if (!synd)
return 0;
- devlink_fmsg_u8_pair_put(fmsg, "Syndrome", synd);
devlink_fmsg_string_pair_put(fmsg, "Description", hsynd_str(synd));
return 0;
--
2.43.0
From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 99993789966a6eb4f1295193dc543686899892d3 ]
Following is rejected but should be allowed:
table inet t {
ct expectation exp1 {
[..]
l3proto ip
Valid combos are:
table ip t, l3proto ip
table ip6 t, l3proto ip6
table inet t, l3proto ip OR l3proto ip6
Disallow inet pseudeo family, the l3num must be a on-wire protocol known
to conntrack.
Retain NFPROTO_INET case to make it clear its rejected
intentionally rather as oversight.
Fixes: 8059918a1377 ("netfilter: nft_ct: sanitize layer 3 and 4 protocol number in custom expectations")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 11 +++++------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
index bfd3e5a14dab6..255640013ab84 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
@@ -1256,14 +1256,13 @@ static int nft_ct_expect_obj_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
switch (priv->l3num) {
case NFPROTO_IPV4:
case NFPROTO_IPV6:
- if (priv->l3num != ctx->family)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (priv->l3num == ctx->family || ctx->family == NFPROTO_INET)
+ break;
- fallthrough;
- case NFPROTO_INET:
- break;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ case NFPROTO_INET: /* tuple.src.l3num supports NFPROTO_IPV4/6 only */
default:
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
priv->l4proto = nla_get_u8(tb[NFTA_CT_EXPECT_L4PROTO]);
--
2.43.0
From: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f99b494b40431f0ca416859f2345746199398e2b ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
index e65418fb9d882..1671be042ffef 100644
--- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
+++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
nr->t4 =
msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay));
nr->idle =
- msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_no_activity_timeout);
+ msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_no_activity_timeout));
nr->window = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_requested_window_size);
nr->bpqext = 1;
--
2.43.0
From: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bc76645ebdd01be9b9994dac39685a3d0f6f7985 ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netrom/nr_route.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_route.c b/net/netrom/nr_route.c
index 89e12e6eea2ef..70480869ad1c5 100644
--- a/net/netrom/nr_route.c
+++ b/net/netrom/nr_route.c
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ void nr_link_failed(ax25_cb *ax25, int reason)
nr_neigh->ax25 = NULL;
ax25_cb_put(ax25);
- if (++nr_neigh->failed < sysctl_netrom_link_fails_count) {
+ if (++nr_neigh->failed < READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_link_fails_count)) {
nr_neigh_put(nr_neigh);
return;
}
--
2.43.0
From: Jacob Keller <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2a2cb4c6c18130e9f14d2e39deb75590744d98ef ]
The ice_vf_create_vsi() function and its VF ops helper introduced by commit
a4c785e8162e ("ice: convert vf_ops .vsi_rebuild to .create_vsi") are used
during an individual VF reset to re-create the VSI. This was done in order
to ensure that the VSI gets properly reconfigured within the hardware.
This is somewhat heavy handed as we completely release the VSI memory and
structure, and then create a new VSI. This can also potentially force a
change of the VSI index as we will re-use the first open slot in the VSI
array which may not be the same.
As part of implementing devlink reload, commit 6624e780a577 ("ice: split
ice_vsi_setup into smaller functions") split VSI setup into smaller
functions, introducing both ice_vsi_cfg() and ice_vsi_decfg() which can be
used to configure or deconfigure an existing software VSI structure.
Rather than completely removing the VSI and adding a new one using the
create_vsi() VF operation, simply use ice_vsi_decfg() to remove the
current configuration. Save the VSI type and then call ice_vsi_cfg() to
reconfigure the VSI as the same type that it was before.
The existing reset logic assumes that all hardware filters will be removed,
so also call ice_fltr_remove_all() before re-configuring the VSI.
This new operation does not re-create the VSI, so rename it to
ice_vf_reconfig_vsi().
The new approach can safely share the exact same flow for both SR-IOV VFs
as well as the Scalable IOV VFs being worked on. This uses less code and is
a better abstraction over fully deleting the VSI and adding a new one.
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Petr Oros <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Stable-dep-of: 4035c72dc1ba ("ice: reconfig host after changing MSI-X on VF")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c | 24 ++-----------
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c | 35 +++++++++++++------
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.h | 1 -
.../ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib_private.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
index e1494f24f661d..c4caa9df473b5 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
@@ -762,24 +762,6 @@ static void ice_sriov_clear_reset_trigger(struct ice_vf *vf)
ice_flush(hw);
}
-/**
- * ice_sriov_create_vsi - Create a new VSI for a VF
- * @vf: VF to create the VSI for
- *
- * This is called by ice_vf_recreate_vsi to create the new VSI after the old
- * VSI has been released.
- */
-static int ice_sriov_create_vsi(struct ice_vf *vf)
-{
- struct ice_vsi *vsi;
-
- vsi = ice_vf_vsi_setup(vf);
- if (!vsi)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/**
* ice_sriov_post_vsi_rebuild - tasks to do after the VF's VSI have been rebuilt
* @vf: VF to perform tasks on
@@ -799,7 +781,6 @@ static const struct ice_vf_ops ice_sriov_vf_ops = {
.poll_reset_status = ice_sriov_poll_reset_status,
.clear_reset_trigger = ice_sriov_clear_reset_trigger,
.irq_close = NULL,
- .create_vsi = ice_sriov_create_vsi,
.post_vsi_rebuild = ice_sriov_post_vsi_rebuild,
};
@@ -1147,8 +1128,7 @@ int ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count(struct pci_dev *vf_dev, int msix_vec_count)
if (vf->first_vector_idx < 0)
goto unroll;
- ice_vf_vsi_release(vf);
- if (vf->vf_ops->create_vsi(vf)) {
+ if (ice_vf_reconfig_vsi(vf)) {
/* Try to rebuild with previous values */
needs_rebuild = true;
goto unroll;
@@ -1175,7 +1155,7 @@ int ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count(struct pci_dev *vf_dev, int msix_vec_count)
return -EINVAL;
if (needs_rebuild)
- vf->vf_ops->create_vsi(vf);
+ ice_vf_reconfig_vsi(vf);
ice_ena_vf_mappings(vf);
ice_put_vf(vf);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c
index b7ae099521566..88e3cd09f8d0c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c
@@ -248,29 +248,44 @@ static void ice_vf_pre_vsi_rebuild(struct ice_vf *vf)
}
/**
- * ice_vf_recreate_vsi - Release and re-create the VF's VSI
- * @vf: VF to recreate the VSI for
+ * ice_vf_reconfig_vsi - Reconfigure a VF VSI with the device
+ * @vf: VF to reconfigure the VSI for
*
- * This is only called when a single VF is being reset (i.e. VVF, VFLR, host
- * VF configuration change, etc)
+ * This is called when a single VF is being reset (i.e. VVF, VFLR, host VF
+ * configuration change, etc).
*
- * It releases and then re-creates a new VSI.
+ * It brings the VSI down and then reconfigures it with the hardware.
*/
-static int ice_vf_recreate_vsi(struct ice_vf *vf)
+int ice_vf_reconfig_vsi(struct ice_vf *vf)
{
+ struct ice_vsi *vsi = ice_get_vf_vsi(vf);
+ struct ice_vsi_cfg_params params = {};
struct ice_pf *pf = vf->pf;
int err;
- ice_vf_vsi_release(vf);
+ if (WARN_ON(!vsi))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ params = ice_vsi_to_params(vsi);
+ params.flags = ICE_VSI_FLAG_NO_INIT;
- err = vf->vf_ops->create_vsi(vf);
+ ice_vsi_decfg(vsi);
+ ice_fltr_remove_all(vsi);
+
+ err = ice_vsi_cfg(vsi, ¶ms);
if (err) {
dev_err(ice_pf_to_dev(pf),
- "Failed to recreate the VF%u's VSI, error %d\n",
+ "Failed to reconfigure the VF%u's VSI, error %d\n",
vf->vf_id, err);
return err;
}
+ /* Update the lan_vsi_num field since it might have been changed. The
+ * PF lan_vsi_idx number remains the same so we don't need to change
+ * that.
+ */
+ vf->lan_vsi_num = vsi->vsi_num;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -929,7 +944,7 @@ int ice_reset_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, u32 flags)
ice_vf_pre_vsi_rebuild(vf);
- if (ice_vf_recreate_vsi(vf)) {
+ if (ice_vf_reconfig_vsi(vf)) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to release and setup the VF%u's VSI\n",
vf->vf_id);
err = -EFAULT;
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.h
index 93c774f2f4376..6b41e0f3d37ed 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.h
@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ struct ice_vf_ops {
bool (*poll_reset_status)(struct ice_vf *vf);
void (*clear_reset_trigger)(struct ice_vf *vf);
void (*irq_close)(struct ice_vf *vf);
- int (*create_vsi)(struct ice_vf *vf);
void (*post_vsi_rebuild)(struct ice_vf *vf);
};
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib_private.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib_private.h
index 0c7e77c0a09fa..91ba7fe0eaee1 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib_private.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib_private.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#warning "Only include ice_vf_lib_private.h in CONFIG_PCI_IOV virtualization files"
#endif
+int ice_vf_reconfig_vsi(struct ice_vf *vf);
void ice_initialize_vf_entry(struct ice_vf *vf);
void ice_dis_vf_qs(struct ice_vf *vf);
int ice_check_vf_init(struct ice_vf *vf);
--
2.43.0
From: Moshe Shemesh <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5e6107b499f3fc4748109e1d87fd9603b34f1e0d ]
Functions which can't access MFRL (Management Firmware Reset Level)
register, have no use of fw_reset structures or events. Remove fw_reset
structures allocation and registration for fw reset events notifications
for these functions.
Having the devlink param enable_remote_dev_reset on functions that don't
have this capability is misleading as these functions are not allowed to
influence the reset flow. Hence, this patch removes this parameter for
such functions.
In addition, return not supported on devlink reload action fw_activate
for these functions.
Fixes: 38b9f903f22b ("net/mlx5: Handle sync reset request event")
Signed-off-by: Moshe Shemesh <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Aya Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
.../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/devlink.c | 6 +++++
.../ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fw_reset.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++--
include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h | 4 +++-
3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/devlink.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/devlink.c
index 3e064234f6fe9..98d4306929f3e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/devlink.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/devlink.c
@@ -157,6 +157,12 @@ static int mlx5_devlink_reload_down(struct devlink *devlink, bool netns_change,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+ if (action == DEVLINK_RELOAD_ACTION_FW_ACTIVATE &&
+ !dev->priv.fw_reset) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "FW activate is unsupported for this function");
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
if (mlx5_core_is_pf(dev) && pci_num_vf(pdev))
NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "reload while VFs are present is unfavorable");
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fw_reset.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fw_reset.c
index c4e19d627da21..3a9cdf79403ae 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fw_reset.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fw_reset.c
@@ -679,19 +679,30 @@ void mlx5_fw_reset_events_start(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev)
{
struct mlx5_fw_reset *fw_reset = dev->priv.fw_reset;
+ if (!fw_reset)
+ return;
+
MLX5_NB_INIT(&fw_reset->nb, fw_reset_event_notifier, GENERAL_EVENT);
mlx5_eq_notifier_register(dev, &fw_reset->nb);
}
void mlx5_fw_reset_events_stop(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev)
{
- mlx5_eq_notifier_unregister(dev, &dev->priv.fw_reset->nb);
+ struct mlx5_fw_reset *fw_reset = dev->priv.fw_reset;
+
+ if (!fw_reset)
+ return;
+
+ mlx5_eq_notifier_unregister(dev, &fw_reset->nb);
}
void mlx5_drain_fw_reset(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev)
{
struct mlx5_fw_reset *fw_reset = dev->priv.fw_reset;
+ if (!fw_reset)
+ return;
+
set_bit(MLX5_FW_RESET_FLAGS_DROP_NEW_REQUESTS, &fw_reset->reset_flags);
cancel_work_sync(&fw_reset->fw_live_patch_work);
cancel_work_sync(&fw_reset->reset_request_work);
@@ -709,9 +720,13 @@ static const struct devlink_param mlx5_fw_reset_devlink_params[] = {
int mlx5_fw_reset_init(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev)
{
- struct mlx5_fw_reset *fw_reset = kzalloc(sizeof(*fw_reset), GFP_KERNEL);
+ struct mlx5_fw_reset *fw_reset;
int err;
+ if (!MLX5_CAP_MCAM_REG(dev, mfrl))
+ return 0;
+
+ fw_reset = kzalloc(sizeof(*fw_reset), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fw_reset)
return -ENOMEM;
fw_reset->wq = create_singlethread_workqueue("mlx5_fw_reset_events");
@@ -747,6 +762,9 @@ void mlx5_fw_reset_cleanup(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev)
{
struct mlx5_fw_reset *fw_reset = dev->priv.fw_reset;
+ if (!fw_reset)
+ return;
+
devl_params_unregister(priv_to_devlink(dev),
mlx5_fw_reset_devlink_params,
ARRAY_SIZE(mlx5_fw_reset_devlink_params));
diff --git a/include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h b/include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h
index 77cd2e13724e7..bfc8320fb46cb 100644
--- a/include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h
+++ b/include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h
@@ -10215,7 +10215,9 @@ struct mlx5_ifc_mcam_access_reg_bits {
u8 regs_63_to_46[0x12];
u8 mrtc[0x1];
- u8 regs_44_to_32[0xd];
+ u8 regs_44_to_41[0x4];
+ u8 mfrl[0x1];
+ u8 regs_39_to_32[0x8];
u8 regs_31_to_10[0x16];
u8 mtmp[0x1];
--
2.43.0
From: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 958d6145a6d9ba9e075c921aead8753fb91c9101 ]
We need to protect the reader reading sysctl_netrom_default_path_quality
because the value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netrom/nr_route.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_route.c b/net/netrom/nr_route.c
index baea3cbd76ca5..6f709fdffc11f 100644
--- a/net/netrom/nr_route.c
+++ b/net/netrom/nr_route.c
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static int __must_check nr_add_node(ax25_address *nr, const char *mnemonic,
nr_neigh->digipeat = NULL;
nr_neigh->ax25 = NULL;
nr_neigh->dev = dev;
- nr_neigh->quality = sysctl_netrom_default_path_quality;
+ nr_neigh->quality = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_default_path_quality);
nr_neigh->locked = 0;
nr_neigh->count = 0;
nr_neigh->number = nr_neigh_no++;
--
2.43.0
From: Yongzhi Liu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ba18deddd6d502da71fd6b6143c53042271b82bd ]
When auxiliary_device_add() returns error and then calls
auxiliary_device_uninit(), Callback function pdsc_auxbus_dev_release
calls kfree(padev) to free memory. We shouldn't call kfree(padev)
again in the error handling path.
Fix this by cleaning up the redundant kfree() and putting
the error handling back to where the errors happened.
Fixes: 4569cce43bc6 ("pds_core: add auxiliary_bus devices")
Signed-off-by: Yongzhi Liu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Wojciech Drewek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Shannon Nelson <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pds_core/auxbus.c | 12 ++++--------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pds_core/auxbus.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pds_core/auxbus.c
index 11c23a7f3172d..fd1a5149c0031 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pds_core/auxbus.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pds_core/auxbus.c
@@ -160,23 +160,19 @@ static struct pds_auxiliary_dev *pdsc_auxbus_dev_register(struct pdsc *cf,
if (err < 0) {
dev_warn(cf->dev, "auxiliary_device_init of %s failed: %pe\n",
name, ERR_PTR(err));
- goto err_out;
+ kfree(padev);
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
}
err = auxiliary_device_add(aux_dev);
if (err) {
dev_warn(cf->dev, "auxiliary_device_add of %s failed: %pe\n",
name, ERR_PTR(err));
- goto err_out_uninit;
+ auxiliary_device_uninit(aux_dev);
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
}
return padev;
-
-err_out_uninit:
- auxiliary_device_uninit(aux_dev);
-err_out:
- kfree(padev);
- return ERR_PTR(err);
}
int pdsc_auxbus_dev_del(struct pdsc *cf, struct pdsc *pf)
--
2.43.0
From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5e2f3c65af47e527ccac54060cf909e3306652ff ]
When running the simult_flow selftest in slow environments -- e.g. QEmu
without KVM support --, the results can be unstable. This selftest
checks if the aggregated bandwidth is (almost) fully used as expected.
To help improving the stability while still keeping the same validation
in place, the BW and the delay are reduced to lower the pressure on the
CPU.
Fixes: 1a418cb8e888 ("mptcp: simult flow self-tests")
Fixes: 219d04992b68 ("mptcp: push pending frames when subflow has free space")
Cc: [email protected]
Suggested-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240131-upstream-net-20240131-mptcp-ci-issues-v1-6-4c1c11e571ff@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/simult_flows.sh | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/simult_flows.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/simult_flows.sh
index 9096bf5794888..25693b37f820d 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/simult_flows.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/simult_flows.sh
@@ -302,12 +302,12 @@ done
setup
run_test 10 10 0 0 "balanced bwidth"
-run_test 10 10 1 50 "balanced bwidth with unbalanced delay"
+run_test 10 10 1 25 "balanced bwidth with unbalanced delay"
# we still need some additional infrastructure to pass the following test-cases
-run_test 30 10 0 0 "unbalanced bwidth"
-run_test 30 10 1 50 "unbalanced bwidth with unbalanced delay"
-run_test 30 10 50 1 "unbalanced bwidth with opposed, unbalanced delay"
+run_test 10 3 0 0 "unbalanced bwidth"
+run_test 10 3 1 25 "unbalanced bwidth with unbalanced delay"
+run_test 10 3 25 1 "unbalanced bwidth with opposed, unbalanced delay"
mptcp_lib_result_print_all_tap
exit $ret
--
2.43.0
From: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 60a7a152abd494ed4f69098cf0f322e6bb140612 ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
index 0eed00184adf4..4d0e0834d527b 100644
--- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
+++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
nr_init_timers(sk);
nr->t1 =
- msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_timeout);
+ msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_timeout));
nr->t2 =
msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_acknowledge_delay);
nr->n2 =
--
2.43.0
From: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 119cae5ea3f9e35cdada8e572cc067f072fa825a ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netrom/nr_dev.c | 2 +-
net/netrom/nr_out.c | 2 +-
net/netrom/nr_subr.c | 5 +++--
3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_dev.c b/net/netrom/nr_dev.c
index 3aaac4a22b387..2c34389c3ce6f 100644
--- a/net/netrom/nr_dev.c
+++ b/net/netrom/nr_dev.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static int nr_header(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
buff[6] |= AX25_SSSID_SPARE;
buff += AX25_ADDR_LEN;
- *buff++ = sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser;
+ *buff++ = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser);
*buff++ = NR_PROTO_IP;
*buff++ = NR_PROTO_IP;
diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_out.c b/net/netrom/nr_out.c
index 44929657f5b71..5e531394a724b 100644
--- a/net/netrom/nr_out.c
+++ b/net/netrom/nr_out.c
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ void nr_transmit_buffer(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
dptr[6] |= AX25_SSSID_SPARE;
dptr += AX25_ADDR_LEN;
- *dptr++ = sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser;
+ *dptr++ = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser);
if (!nr_route_frame(skb, NULL)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_subr.c b/net/netrom/nr_subr.c
index e2d2af924cff4..c3bbd5880850b 100644
--- a/net/netrom/nr_subr.c
+++ b/net/netrom/nr_subr.c
@@ -182,7 +182,8 @@ void nr_write_internal(struct sock *sk, int frametype)
*dptr++ = nr->my_id;
*dptr++ = frametype;
*dptr++ = nr->window;
- if (nr->bpqext) *dptr++ = sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser;
+ if (nr->bpqext)
+ *dptr++ = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser);
break;
case NR_DISCREQ:
@@ -236,7 +237,7 @@ void __nr_transmit_reply(struct sk_buff *skb, int mine, unsigned char cmdflags)
dptr[6] |= AX25_SSSID_SPARE;
dptr += AX25_ADDR_LEN;
- *dptr++ = sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser;
+ *dptr++ = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser);
if (mine) {
*dptr++ = 0;
--
2.43.0
From: Wang Kefeng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c16af1212479570454752671a170a1756e11fdfb ]
Attempt VMA lock-based page fault handling first, and fall back to the
existing mmap_lock-based handling if that fails, the ebizzy benchmark
shows 25% improvement on qemu with 2 cpus.
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Stable-dep-of: e870920bbe68 ("arch/arm/mm: fix major fault accounting when retrying under per-VMA lock")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/arm/mm/fault.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index f8567e95f98be..8f47d6762ea4b 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ config ARM
select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT if CPU_V7
select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
select ARCH_SUPPORTS_HUGETLBFS if ARM_LPAE
+ select ARCH_SUPPORTS_PER_VMA_LOCK
select ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP
select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
select ARCH_USE_MEMTEST
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
index fef62e4a9edde..e96fb40b9cc32 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
@@ -278,6 +278,35 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, addr);
+ if (!(flags & FAULT_FLAG_USER))
+ goto lock_mmap;
+
+ vma = lock_vma_under_rcu(mm, addr);
+ if (!vma)
+ goto lock_mmap;
+
+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) {
+ vma_end_read(vma);
+ goto lock_mmap;
+ }
+ fault = handle_mm_fault(vma, addr, flags | FAULT_FLAG_VMA_LOCK, regs);
+ if (!(fault & (VM_FAULT_RETRY | VM_FAULT_COMPLETED)))
+ vma_end_read(vma);
+
+ if (!(fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY)) {
+ count_vm_vma_lock_event(VMA_LOCK_SUCCESS);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ count_vm_vma_lock_event(VMA_LOCK_RETRY);
+
+ /* Quick path to respond to signals */
+ if (fault_signal_pending(fault, regs)) {
+ if (!user_mode(regs))
+ goto no_context;
+ return 0;
+ }
+lock_mmap:
+
retry:
vma = lock_mm_and_find_vma(mm, addr, regs);
if (unlikely(!vma)) {
@@ -316,6 +345,7 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
}
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
+done:
/*
* Handle the "normal" case first - VM_FAULT_MAJOR
--
2.43.0
From: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e870920bbe68e52335a4c31a059e6af6a9a59dbb ]
The change [1] missed ARM architecture when fixing major fault accounting
for page fault retry under per-VMA lock.
The user-visible effects is that it restores correct major fault
accounting that was broken after [2] was merged in 6.7 kernel. The
more detailed description is in [3] and this patch simply adds the
same fix to ARM architecture which I missed in [3].
Add missing code to fix ARM architecture fault accounting.
[1] 46e714c729c8 ("arch/mm/fault: fix major fault accounting when retrying under per-VMA lock")
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 12214eba1992 ("mm: handle read faults under the VMA lock")
Reported-by: Russell King (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Gerald Schaefer <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/mm/fault.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
index e96fb40b9cc32..07565b593ed68 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
@@ -298,6 +298,8 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
goto done;
}
count_vm_vma_lock_event(VMA_LOCK_RETRY);
+ if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR)
+ flags |= FAULT_FLAG_TRIED;
/* Quick path to respond to signals */
if (fault_signal_pending(fault, regs)) {
--
2.43.0
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
Makefile | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index f1a592b7c7bc8..76b44693956a8 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 6
PATCHLEVEL = 7
-SUBLEVEL = 9
-EXTRAVERSION =
+SUBLEVEL = 10
+EXTRAVERSION = -rc1
NAME = Hurr durr I'ma ninja sloth
# *DOCUMENTATION*
--
2.43.0
From: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b5dffcb8f71bdd02a4e5799985b51b12f4eeaf76 ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netrom/nr_route.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_route.c b/net/netrom/nr_route.c
index b8ddd8048f352..89e12e6eea2ef 100644
--- a/net/netrom/nr_route.c
+++ b/net/netrom/nr_route.c
@@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ int nr_route_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, ax25_cb *ax25)
return ret;
}
- if (!sysctl_netrom_routing_control && ax25 != NULL)
+ if (!READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_routing_control) && ax25 != NULL)
return 0;
/* Its Time-To-Live has expired */
--
2.43.0
From: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d380ce70058a4ccddc3e5f5c2063165dc07672c6 ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 2 +-
net/netrom/nr_in.c | 6 +++---
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
index 1671be042ffef..104a80b75477f 100644
--- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
+++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ int nr_rx_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
* G8PZT's Xrouter which is sending packets with command type 7
* as an extension of the protocol.
*/
- if (sysctl_netrom_reset_circuit &&
+ if (READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_reset_circuit) &&
(frametype != NR_RESET || flags != 0))
nr_transmit_reset(skb, 1);
diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_in.c b/net/netrom/nr_in.c
index 2f084b6f69d7e..97944db6b5ac6 100644
--- a/net/netrom/nr_in.c
+++ b/net/netrom/nr_in.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int nr_state1_machine(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
break;
case NR_RESET:
- if (sysctl_netrom_reset_circuit)
+ if (READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_reset_circuit))
nr_disconnect(sk, ECONNRESET);
break;
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static int nr_state2_machine(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
break;
case NR_RESET:
- if (sysctl_netrom_reset_circuit)
+ if (READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_reset_circuit))
nr_disconnect(sk, ECONNRESET);
break;
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ static int nr_state3_machine(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int frametype
break;
case NR_RESET:
- if (sysctl_netrom_reset_circuit)
+ if (READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_reset_circuit))
nr_disconnect(sk, ECONNRESET);
break;
--
2.43.0
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ab4443fe3ca6298663a55c4a70efc6c3ce913ca6 ]
ra_alloc_folio() marks a page that should trigger next round of async
readahead. However it rounds up computed index to the order of page being
allocated. This can however lead to multiple consecutive pages being
marked with readahead flag. Consider situation with index == 1, mark ==
1, order == 0. We insert order 0 page at index 1 and mark it. Then we
bump order to 1, index to 2, mark (still == 1) is rounded up to 2 so page
at index 2 is marked as well. Then we bump order to 2, index is
incremented to 4, mark gets rounded to 4 so page at index 4 is marked as
well. The fact that multiple pages get marked within a single readahead
window confuses the readahead logic and results in readahead window being
trimmed back to 1. This situation is triggered in particular when maximum
readahead window size is not a power of two (in the observed case it was
768 KB) and as a result sequential read throughput suffers.
Fix the problem by rounding 'mark' down instead of up. Because the index
is naturally aligned to 'order', we are guaranteed 'rounded mark' == index
iff 'mark' is within the page we are allocating at 'index' and thus
exactly one page is marked with readahead flag as required by the
readahead code and sequential read performance is restored.
This effectively reverts part of commit b9ff43dd2743 ("mm/readahead: Fix
readahead with large folios"). The commit changed the rounding with the
rationale:
"... we were setting the readahead flag on the folio which contains the
last byte read from the block. This is wrong because we will trigger
readahead at the end of the read without waiting to see if a subsequent
read is going to use the pages we just read."
Although this is true, the fact is this was always the case with read
sizes not aligned to folio boundaries and large folios in the page cache
just make the situation more obvious (and frequent). Also for sequential
read workloads it is better to trigger the readahead earlier rather than
later. It is true that the difference in the rounding and thus earlier
triggering of the readahead can result in reading more for semi-random
workloads. However workloads really suffering from this seem to be rare.
In particular I have verified that the workload described in commit
b9ff43dd2743 ("mm/readahead: Fix readahead with large folios") of reading
random 100k blocks from a file like:
[reader]
bs=100k
rw=randread
numjobs=1
size=64g
runtime=60s
is not impacted by the rounding change and achieves ~70MB/s in both cases.
[[email protected]: fix one more place where mark rounding was done as well]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: b9ff43dd2743 ("mm/readahead: Fix readahead with large folios")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Guo Xuenan <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
mm/readahead.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/readahead.c b/mm/readahead.c
index 6925e6959fd3f..1d1a84deb5bc5 100644
--- a/mm/readahead.c
+++ b/mm/readahead.c
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static inline int ra_alloc_folio(struct readahead_control *ractl, pgoff_t index,
if (!folio)
return -ENOMEM;
- mark = round_up(mark, 1UL << order);
+ mark = round_down(mark, 1UL << order);
if (index == mark)
folio_set_readahead(folio);
err = filemap_add_folio(ractl->mapping, folio, index, gfp);
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ static void ondemand_readahead(struct readahead_control *ractl,
* It's the expected callback index, assume sequential access.
* Ramp up sizes, and push forward the readahead window.
*/
- expected = round_up(ra->start + ra->size - ra->async_size,
+ expected = round_down(ra->start + ra->size - ra->async_size,
1UL << order);
if (index == expected || index == (ra->start + ra->size)) {
ra->start += ra->size;
--
2.43.0
From: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c1be35a16b2f1fe21f4f26f9de030ad6eaaf6a25 ]
After the recent changes nobody use siglock to read the values protected
by stats_lock, we can kill spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock) and
update the comment.
With this patch only __exit_signal() and thread_group_start_cputime() take
stats_lock under siglock.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dylan Hatch <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
kernel/exit.c | 10 +++-------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index aedc0832c9f4d..0c4858581c98c 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -1125,17 +1125,14 @@ static int wait_task_zombie(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *p)
* and nobody can change them.
*
* psig->stats_lock also protects us from our sub-threads
- * which can reap other children at the same time. Until
- * we change k_getrusage()-like users to rely on this lock
- * we have to take ->siglock as well.
+ * which can reap other children at the same time.
*
* We use thread_group_cputime_adjusted() to get times for
* the thread group, which consolidates times for all threads
* in the group including the group leader.
*/
thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime);
- spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
- write_seqlock(&psig->stats_lock);
+ write_seqlock_irq(&psig->stats_lock);
psig->cutime += tgutime + sig->cutime;
psig->cstime += tgstime + sig->cstime;
psig->cgtime += task_gtime(p) + sig->gtime + sig->cgtime;
@@ -1158,8 +1155,7 @@ static int wait_task_zombie(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *p)
psig->cmaxrss = maxrss;
task_io_accounting_add(&psig->ioac, &p->ioac);
task_io_accounting_add(&psig->ioac, &sig->ioac);
- write_sequnlock(&psig->stats_lock);
- spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
+ write_sequnlock_irq(&psig->stats_lock);
}
if (wo->wo_rusage)
--
2.43.0
From: Rahul Rameshbabu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b7cf07586c40f926063d4d09f7de28ff82f62b2a ]
Just simply reordering the functions mlx5e_ptp_metadata_map_put and
mlx5e_ptpsq_track_metadata in the mlx5e_txwqe_complete context is not good
enough since both the compiler and CPU are free to reorder these two
functions. If reordering does occur, the issue that was supposedly fixed by
7e3f3ba97e6c ("net/mlx5e: Track xmit submission to PTP WQ after populating
metadata map") will be seen. This will lead to NULL pointer dereferences in
mlx5e_ptpsq_mark_ts_cqes_undelivered in the NAPI polling context due to the
tracking list being populated before the metadata map.
Fixes: 7e3f3ba97e6c ("net/mlx5e: Track xmit submission to PTP WQ after populating metadata map")
Signed-off-by: Rahul Rameshbabu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
CC: Vadim Fedorenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c
index f0b506e562df3..1ead69c5f5fa3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c
@@ -401,6 +401,8 @@ mlx5e_txwqe_complete(struct mlx5e_txqsq *sq, struct sk_buff *skb,
mlx5e_skb_cb_hwtstamp_init(skb);
mlx5e_ptp_metadata_map_put(&sq->ptpsq->metadata_map, skb,
metadata_index);
+ /* ensure skb is put on metadata_map before tracking the index */
+ wmb();
mlx5e_ptpsq_track_metadata(sq->ptpsq, metadata_index);
if (!netif_tx_queue_stopped(sq->txq) &&
mlx5e_ptpsq_metadata_freelist_empty(sq->ptpsq)) {
--
2.43.0
On Wed, Mar 13, 2024 at 12:31:35PM -0400, Sasha Levin wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.7.10 release.
> There are 61 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
Successfully compiled and installed the kernel on my computer (Acer
Aspire E15, Intel Core i3 Haswell). No noticeable regressions.
Tested-by: Bagas Sanjaya <[email protected]>
--
An old man doll... just what I always wanted! - Clara
On Wed, 13 Mar 2024 at 22:02, Sasha Levin <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.7.10 release.
> There are 61 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Fri Mar 15 04:32:27 PM UTC 2024.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git/patch/?id=linux-6.7.y&id2=v6.7.9
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.7.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> Thanks,
> Sasha
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <[email protected]>
## Build
* kernel: 6.7.10-rc1
* git: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc
* git branch: linux-6.7.y
* git commit: b103e69cd70cdeef14f92bdca721df82e6dcbe0a
* git describe: v6.7.9-61-gb103e69cd70c
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-6.7.y/build/v6.7.9-61-gb103e69cd70c
## Test Regressions (compared to v6.7.9)
## Metric Regressions (compared to v6.7.9)
## Test Fixes (compared to v6.7.9)
## Metric Fixes (compared to v6.7.9)
## Test result summary
total: 185974, pass: 159975, fail: 2323, skip: 23481, xfail: 195
## Build Summary
* arc: 5 total, 5 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 133 total, 129 passed, 4 failed
* arm64: 41 total, 40 passed, 1 failed
* i386: 33 total, 28 passed, 5 failed
* mips: 26 total, 23 passed, 3 failed
* parisc: 4 total, 4 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 36 total, 28 passed, 8 failed
* riscv: 18 total, 18 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 13 total, 13 passed, 0 failed
* sh: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 8 total, 8 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 37 total, 33 passed, 4 failed
## Test suites summary
* boot
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-arm64
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-drivers-dma-buf
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-exec
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-filesystems-binderfs
* kselftest-filesystems-epoll
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-ftrace
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-memory-hotplug
* kselftest-mincore
* kselftest-mm
* kselftest-mount
* kselftest-mqueue
* kselftest-net
* kselftest-net-forwarding
* kselftest-net-mptcp
* kselftest-netfilter
* kselftest-nsfs
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-pid_namespace
* kselftest-pidfd
* kselftest-proc
* kselftest-pstore
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-user_events
* kselftest-vDSO
* kselftest-watchdog
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kunit
* kvm-unit-tests
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-cap_bounds
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-filecaps
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-io
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-math
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-securebits
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-smoketest
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* perf
* rcutorture
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
On 3/13/24 09:31, Sasha Levin wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.7.10 release.
> There are 61 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Fri Mar 15 04:32:27 PM UTC 2024.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git/patch/?id=linux-6.7.y&id2=v6.7.9
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.7.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> Thanks,
> Sasha
On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on
BMIPS_GENERIC:
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
--
Florian
On 3/13/24 09:31, Sasha Levin wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.7.10 release.
> There are 61 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Fri Mar 15 04:32:27 PM UTC 2024.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git/patch/?id=linux-6.7.y&id2=v6.7.9
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.7.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> Thanks,
> Sasha
On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on
BMIPS_GENERIC:
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
--
Florian
On 3/13/24 9:31 AM, Sasha Levin wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.7.10 release.
> There are 61 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Fri Mar 15 04:32:27 PM UTC 2024.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git/patch/?id=linux-6.7.y&id2=v6.7.9
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.7.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> Thanks,
> Sasha
Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).
Tested-by: Ron Economos <[email protected]>
On Wednesday, March 13, 2024 22:01 IST, Sasha Levin <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.7.10 release.
> There are 61 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Fri Mar 15 04:32:27 PM UTC 2024.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git/patch/?id=linux-6.7.y&id2=v6.7.9
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.7.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
KernelCI report for stable-rc/linux-6.7.y for this week :-
## stable-rc HEAD for linux-6.7.y:
Date: 2024-03-13
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git/log/?h=b103e69cd70cdeef14f92bdca721df82e6dcbe0a
## Build failures:
No build failures seen for the stable-rc/linux-6.7.y commit head \o/
## Boot failures:
No **new** boot failures seen for the stable-rc/linux-6.7.y commit head \o/
Tested-by: kernelci.org bot <[email protected]>
Thanks,
Shreeya Patel
On Wed, Mar 13, 2024 at 12:31:35PM -0400, Sasha Levin wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.7.10 release.
> There are 61 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
Tested-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>