It seems people are once again wondering how to make use of
capabilities in Linux. This module enables the use of Linux
capabilities on filesystems that do not support them.
To grant capabilities to an executable, a small wrapper file is
created that includes the path to an executable followed a
capability set written in hexadecimal. When this file is executed
by the kernel, the executable is granted the specified capabilities.
The wrapper file must be owned by root and have the SUID bit set.
For example, to grant the CAP_NET_RAW (bit 13) capability to ping:
# chmod -s /bin/ping
# mv /bin/ping /bin/ping_real
# echo '&/bin/ping_real 2000' > /bin/ping
# chmod +xs /bin/ping
Another example is to grant the CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE (bit 10) to
Apache:
# echo '&/usr/sbin/apache 400' > httpd
# chmod +xs httpd
The module is very small. Perhaps it could be considered for
inclusion in the standard kernel. I can work on a patch if people
are interested.
Neil
When I have time (hopefully real soon now), I'll post a patch to actually fix
capabilities. With that patch, this can be a trivial wrapper script instead of
a kernel module. Note that this could be _very_ dangerous if glibc does the
wrong thing (I don't know whether it does, though).
--Andy
Neil Schemenauer wrote:
> It seems people are once again wondering how to make use of
> capabilities in Linux. This module enables the use of Linux
> capabilities on filesystems that do not support them.
>
> To grant capabilities to an executable, a small wrapper file is
> created that includes the path to an executable followed a
> capability set written in hexadecimal. When this file is executed
> by the kernel, the executable is granted the specified capabilities.
> The wrapper file must be owned by root and have the SUID bit set.
>
> For example, to grant the CAP_NET_RAW (bit 13) capability to ping:
>
> # chmod -s /bin/ping
> # mv /bin/ping /bin/ping_real
> # echo '&/bin/ping_real 2000' > /bin/ping
> # chmod +xs /bin/ping
>
> Another example is to grant the CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE (bit 10) to
> Apache:
>
> # echo '&/usr/sbin/apache 400' > httpd
> # chmod +xs httpd
>
> The module is very small. Perhaps it could be considered for
> inclusion in the standard kernel. I can work on a patch if people
> are interested.
>
> Neil
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> /*
> * linux/fs/binfmt_capwrap.c
> *
> * Copyright (C) 2002 Neil Schemenauer
> */
>
> #include <linux/module.h>
> #include <linux/string.h>
> #include <linux/kernel.h>
> #include <linux/stat.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> #include <linux/binfmts.h>
> #include <linux/init.h>
> #include <linux/file.h>
> #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
> #include <linux/mount.h>
> #include <linux/fs.h>
>
>
> static int parse_cap(char **cp, unsigned int *cap)
> {
> char *tok, *endp;
> int n;
> if ((tok = strsep(cp, " \t")) == NULL)
> return 0;
> n = simple_strtol(tok, &endp, 16);
> if (*endp != '\0')
> return 0;
> *cap = n;
> return 1;
> }
>
> static void grant_capabilities(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned int caps)
> {
> /* This may have to be more complicated if the kernel
> * representation of capabilities changes. Right now it's trivial.
> */
> bprm->cap_effective |= caps;
> bprm->cap_permitted |= caps;
> }
>
> static int load_capwrap(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct pt_regs *regs)
> {
> struct inode * inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
> int mode = inode->i_mode;
> char exec_name[BINPRM_BUF_SIZE];
> char *cp, *tok;
> unsigned int caps = 0;
> struct file *file;
> int retval;
>
> /* must have magic */
> if ((bprm->buf[0] != '&'))
> return -ENOEXEC;
>
> /* must be owned by root */
> if (inode->i_uid != 0)
> return -ENOEXEC;
>
> /* must be SUID */
> if ((bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ||
> !(mode & S_ISUID))
> return -ENOEXEC;
>
> /*
> * Okay, parse the wrapper.
> */
>
> allow_write_access(bprm->file);
> fput(bprm->file);
> bprm->file = NULL;
>
> /* terminate first line */
> bprm->buf[BINPRM_BUF_SIZE - 1] = '\0';
> if ((cp = strchr(bprm->buf, '\n')) == NULL)
> cp = bprm->buf+BINPRM_BUF_SIZE-1;
> *cp = '\0';
>
> /* name */
> cp = bprm->buf+1;
> if ((tok = strsep(&cp, " \t")) == NULL)
> return -ENOEXEC;
> strcpy(exec_name, tok);
>
> /* capabilities to add */
> if (!parse_cap(&cp, &caps))
> return -ENOEXEC;
>
> /*
> * Restart the process with real executable's dentry.
> */
> file = open_exec(exec_name);
> if (IS_ERR(file))
> return PTR_ERR(file);
>
> bprm->file = file;
> retval = prepare_binprm(bprm);
> if (retval < 0)
> return retval;
>
> grant_capabilities(bprm, caps);
> printk(KERN_DEBUG "capwrap: granted %s %x effective now %x\n",
> exec_name, caps, bprm->cap_effective);
>
> return search_binary_handler(bprm, regs);
> }
>
> struct linux_binfmt capwrap_format = {
> .module = THIS_MODULE,
> .load_binary = load_capwrap,
> };
>
> static int __init init_capwrap_binfmt(void)
> {
> return register_binfmt(&capwrap_format);
> }
>
> static void __exit exit_capwrap_binfmt(void)
> {
> unregister_binfmt(&capwrap_format);
> }
>
> module_init(init_capwrap_binfmt)
> module_exit(exit_capwrap_binfmt)
> MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
On Thu, 2004-04-08 at 10:07, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> When I have time (hopefully real soon now), I'll post a patch to actually fix
> capabilities. With that patch, this can be a trivial wrapper script instead of
> a kernel module. Note that this could be _very_ dangerous if glibc does the
> wrong thing (I don't know whether it does, though).
The security_bprm_secureexec hook can be used to cause the AT_SECURE
flag to be set in the ELF auxiliary table, and glibc now uses that flag
to determine whether to enable secure mode. You would need to patch
cap_bprm_secureexec to do the right thing, but otherwise the support is
ready. SELinux uses this to enable glibc secure mode for role/domain
changes.
--
Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
National Security Agency
* Andy Lutomirski ([email protected]) wrote:
> When I have time (hopefully real soon now), I'll post a patch to actually fix
> capabilities. With that patch, this can be a trivial wrapper script instead of
> a kernel module. Note that this could be _very_ dangerous if glibc does the
> wrong thing (I don't know whether it does, though).
I agree, between my patch or Andy's patch, it makes more sense to fix
capabilities to be more useable, rather than add this new module.
thanks,
-chris
--
Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net