Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given
a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without
having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/pub/fscaps-1.0-kg.src.rpm under
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php?FrontPage#b556e50d.
(For more information on how to use, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice
page on his use of file caps at http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
This has been boot tested with selinux on a FC6 image (qemu-i386),
and tested for basic regressions with LTP without selinux enabled.
Changelog:
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 2 +
include/linux/security.h | 10 ++-
security/Kconfig | 10 +++
security/capability.c | 4 +
security/commoncap.c | 159 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 +++
6 files changed, 188 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 6548b35..76a6e87 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -288,6 +288,8 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
#define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30
+#define CAP_NUMCAPS 31
+
#ifdef __KERNEL__
/*
* Bounding set
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index b200b98..ea631ee 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct den
extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
+extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
+extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
+extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
+extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
extern int cap_syslog (int type);
extern int cap_vm_enough_memory (long pages);
@@ -2594,12 +2598,12 @@ static inline int security_task_setgroup
static inline int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
- return 0;
+ return cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
}
static inline int security_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
{
- return 0;
+ return cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
}
static inline int security_task_getioprio (struct task_struct *p)
@@ -2634,7 +2638,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (st
struct siginfo *info, int sig,
u32 secid)
{
- return 0;
+ return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
}
static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 460e5c9..9c798a5 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -80,6 +80,16 @@ config SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
This enables the "default" Linux capabilities functionality.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y.
+config SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES
+ bool "Filesystem Capabilities"
+ depends on SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
+ default n
+ help
+ This enables filesystem capabilities, allowing you to give
+ binaries a subset of root's powers without using setuid 0.
+
+ If in doubt, answer N.
+
config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
tristate "Root Plug Support"
depends on USB && SECURITY
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index b868e7e..14cb592 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ static struct security_operations capabi
.inode_setxattr = cap_inode_setxattr,
.inode_removexattr = cap_inode_removexattr,
+ .task_kill = cap_task_kill,
+ .task_setscheduler = cap_task_setscheduler,
+ .task_setioprio = cap_task_setioprio,
+ .task_setnice = cap_task_setnice,
.task_post_setuid = cap_task_post_setuid,
.task_reparent_to_init = cap_task_reparent_to_init,
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 5a5ef5c..0eae004 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -109,11 +109,55 @@ void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct
target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
}
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
+#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
+struct vfs_cap_data_struct {
+ __u32 version;
+ __u32 effective;
+ __u32 permitted;
+ __u32 inheritable;
+};
+
+static inline void convert_to_le(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap)
+{
+ cap->version = le32_to_cpu(cap->version);
+ cap->effective = le32_to_cpu(cap->effective);
+ cap->permitted = le32_to_cpu(cap->permitted);
+ cap->inheritable = le32_to_cpu(cap->inheritable);
+}
+
+static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (cap->version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->effective); i++) {
+ if (cap->effective & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->permitted); i++) {
+ if (cap->permitted & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->inheritable); i++) {
+ if (cap->inheritable & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ ssize_t rc;
+ struct vfs_cap_data_struct cap_struct;
+ struct inode *inode;
+
/* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */
- /* We don't have VFS support for capabilities yet */
cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted);
cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);
@@ -134,6 +178,45 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_
if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES
+ /* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
+
+ dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
+ inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &cap_struct,
+ sizeof(cap_struct));
+ dput(dentry);
+
+ if (rc == -ENODATA)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: Error (%d) getting xattr\n",
+ __FUNCTION__, rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (rc != sizeof(cap_struct)) {
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: got wrong size for getxattr (%d)\n",
+ __FUNCTION__, rc);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ convert_to_le(&cap_struct);
+ if (check_cap_sanity(&cap_struct))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ bprm->cap_effective = cap_struct.effective;
+ bprm->cap_permitted = cap_struct.permitted;
+ bprm->cap_inheritable = cap_struct.inheritable;
+
+#endif
return 0;
}
@@ -182,11 +265,15 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_
int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- /* If/when this module is enhanced to incorporate capability
- bits on files, the test below should be extended to also perform a
- test between the old and new capability sets. For now,
- it simply preserves the legacy decision algorithm used by
- the old userland. */
+ if (current->uid != 0) {
+ if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective))
+ return 1;
+ if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_permitted))
+ return 1;
+ if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_inheritable))
+ return 1;
+ }
+
return (current->euid != current->uid ||
current->egid != current->gid);
}
@@ -300,6 +387,62 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
+ * task_setnice, assumes that
+ * . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed
+ * . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes,
+ * then those actions should be allowed
+ * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but
+ * yet with increased caps.
+ * So we check for increased caps on the target process.
+ */
+static inline int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
+ !__capable(current, CAP_SYS_NICE))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
+ struct sched_param *lp)
+{
+ return cap_safe_nice(p);
+}
+
+int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+ return cap_safe_nice(p);
+}
+
+int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+ return cap_safe_nice(p);
+}
+
+int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+ int sig, u32 secid)
+{
+ if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (secid)
+ /*
+ * Signal sent as a particular user.
+ * Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the
+ * only thing we can do at the moment.
+ * Used only by usb drivers?
+ */
+ return 0;
+ if (capable(CAP_KILL))
+ return 0;
+ if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
{
p->cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
@@ -337,6 +480,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bprm_secureexec);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_inode_setxattr);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_inode_removexattr);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_post_setuid);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_kill);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_setscheduler);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_setioprio);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_setnice);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_reparent_to_init);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_syslog);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_vm_enough_memory);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8ab5679..2fcc60f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2775,6 +2775,12 @@ static int selinux_task_setnice(struct t
static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
@@ -2804,6 +2810,12 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsign
static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
--
1.4.3.3
Hi, Serge.
I packaged the xattr extension of libcap, get/setfcaps command and
manual pages with original libcap-1.10-25.
See, http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php?FrontPage#b556e50d
You can download RPM and SRPM package for the latest FC6 system.
There are no difference at its functionality, but the part of xattr
extension is moved into /lib/libcap.so.1.
Thanks,
Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given
> a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without
> having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
>
> This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
> http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/pub/fscaps-1.0-kg.src.rpm under
> http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php?FrontPage#b556e50d.
>
> (For more information on how to use, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice
> page on his use of file caps at http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
--
KaiGai Kohei <[email protected]>
On Mon, 2006-11-06 at 21:45 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given
> a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without
> having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index b200b98..ea631ee 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct den
> extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
> extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
> extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
> +extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
> +extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
> +extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
> +extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
> extern int cap_syslog (int type);
> extern int cap_vm_enough_memory (long pages);
>
> @@ -2594,12 +2598,12 @@ static inline int security_task_setgroup
>
> static inline int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
> {
> - return 0;
> + return cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
> }
>
> static inline int security_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
> {
> - return 0;
> + return cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
> }
>
> static inline int security_task_getioprio (struct task_struct *p)
setscheduler change seems to be missing here.
> @@ -2634,7 +2638,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (st
> struct siginfo *info, int sig,
> u32 secid)
> {
> - return 0;
> + return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
> }
>
> static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 5a5ef5c..0eae004 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> +int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
> + int sig, u32 secid)
> +{
> + if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (secid)
> + /*
> + * Signal sent as a particular user.
> + * Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the
> + * only thing we can do at the moment.
> + * Used only by usb drivers?
> + */
> + return 0;
> + if (capable(CAP_KILL))
> + return 0;
This will trigger spurious audit messages; should only be checked if
next test fails.
> + if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
> + return 0;
> +
> + return -EPERM;
> +}
> +
> void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
> {
> p->cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
Quoting Stephen Smalley ([email protected]):
> On Mon, 2006-11-06 at 21:45 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given
> > a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without
> > having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
>
> > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> > index b200b98..ea631ee 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/security.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> > @@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct den
> > extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
> > extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
> > extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
> > +extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
> > +extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
> > +extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
> > +extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
> > extern int cap_syslog (int type);
> > extern int cap_vm_enough_memory (long pages);
> >
> > @@ -2594,12 +2598,12 @@ static inline int security_task_setgroup
> >
> > static inline int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
> > {
> > - return 0;
> > + return cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
> > }
> >
> > static inline int security_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
> > {
> > - return 0;
> > + return cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
> > }
> >
> > static inline int security_task_getioprio (struct task_struct *p)
>
> setscheduler change seems to be missing here.
I'm confused - my kernel version already had selinux_task_setscheduler()
calling a secondary_ops->task_setscheduler().
I don't know where that came from then.
> > @@ -2634,7 +2638,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (st
> > struct siginfo *info, int sig,
> > u32 secid)
> > {
> > - return 0;
> > + return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
> > }
> >
> > static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
>
> > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> > index 5a5ef5c..0eae004 100644
> > --- a/security/commoncap.c
> > +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> > +int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
> > + int sig, u32 secid)
> > +{
> > + if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > + if (secid)
> > + /*
> > + * Signal sent as a particular user.
> > + * Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the
> > + * only thing we can do at the moment.
> > + * Used only by usb drivers?
> > + */
> > + return 0;
> > + if (capable(CAP_KILL))
> > + return 0;
>
> This will trigger spurious audit messages; should only be checked if
> next test fails.
>
I see, will swap, thanks.
> > + if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > + return -EPERM;
> > +}
> > +
> > void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
> > {
> > p->cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
>
> --
> Stephen Smalley
> National Security Agency
On Tue, 2006-11-07 at 09:10 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Stephen Smalley ([email protected]):
> > On Mon, 2006-11-06 at 21:45 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given
> > > a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without
> > > having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
> >
> > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> > > index b200b98..ea631ee 100644
> > > --- a/include/linux/security.h
> > > +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> > > @@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct den
> > > extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
> > > extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
> > > extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
> > > +extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
> > > +extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
> > > +extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
> > > +extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
> > > extern int cap_syslog (int type);
> > > extern int cap_vm_enough_memory (long pages);
> > >
> > > @@ -2594,12 +2598,12 @@ static inline int security_task_setgroup
> > >
> > > static inline int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
> > > {
> > > - return 0;
> > > + return cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
> > > }
> > >
> > > static inline int security_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
> > > {
> > > - return 0;
> > > + return cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
> > > }
> > >
> > > static inline int security_task_getioprio (struct task_struct *p)
> >
> > setscheduler change seems to be missing here.
>
> I'm confused - my kernel version already had selinux_task_setscheduler()
> calling a secondary_ops->task_setscheduler().
I meant you didn't change the default implementation of
security_task_setscheduler() to call cap_task_setscheduler() in
security.h. For the case where CONFIG_SECURITY is not defined.
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
Quoting Stephen Smalley ([email protected]):
> On Tue, 2006-11-07 at 09:10 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Quoting Stephen Smalley ([email protected]):
> > > On Mon, 2006-11-06 at 21:45 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > > Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given
> > > > a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without
> > > > having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
> > >
> > > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> > > > index b200b98..ea631ee 100644
> > > > --- a/include/linux/security.h
> > > > +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> > > > @@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct den
> > > > extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
> > > > extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
> > > > extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
> > > > +extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
> > > > +extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
> > > > +extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
> > > > +extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
> > > > extern int cap_syslog (int type);
> > > > extern int cap_vm_enough_memory (long pages);
> > > >
> > > > @@ -2594,12 +2598,12 @@ static inline int security_task_setgroup
> > > >
> > > > static inline int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
> > > > {
> > > > - return 0;
> > > > + return cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > static inline int security_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
> > > > {
> > > > - return 0;
> > > > + return cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > static inline int security_task_getioprio (struct task_struct *p)
> > >
> > > setscheduler change seems to be missing here.
> >
> > I'm confused - my kernel version already had selinux_task_setscheduler()
> > calling a secondary_ops->task_setscheduler().
>
> I meant you didn't change the default implementation of
> security_task_setscheduler() to call cap_task_setscheduler() in
> security.h. For the case where CONFIG_SECURITY is not defined.
Oh, I thought my git tree had gotten messed up.
So I guess that CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES should not be dependent
on CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES, since the !CONFIG_SECURITY case
actually enables capabilities?
-serge
Thanks, Stephen. Following is a new patch addressing your comments.
thanks,
-serge
>From 377dc4be01818296490ab4246ce96c25f6cfdbd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2006 11:35:07 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] security: introduce fs caps
Implement filesystem posix capabilities. This allows programs to
be given a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them,
without having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's
powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/pub/fscaps-1.0-kg.src.rpm under
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php?FrontPage#b556e50d.
Changelog:
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 2 +
include/linux/security.h | 12 ++-
security/Kconfig | 9 +++
security/capability.c | 4 +
security/commoncap.c | 159 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 +++
6 files changed, 188 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 6548b35..76a6e87 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -288,6 +288,8 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
#define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30
+#define CAP_NUMCAPS 31
+
#ifdef __KERNEL__
/*
* Bounding set
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index b200b98..2718aeb 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct den
extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
+extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
+extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
+extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
+extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
extern int cap_syslog (int type);
extern int cap_vm_enough_memory (long pages);
@@ -2594,12 +2598,12 @@ static inline int security_task_setgroup
static inline int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
- return 0;
+ return cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
}
static inline int security_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
{
- return 0;
+ return cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
}
static inline int security_task_getioprio (struct task_struct *p)
@@ -2617,7 +2621,7 @@ static inline int security_task_setsched
int policy,
struct sched_param *lp)
{
- return 0;
+ return cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
}
static inline int security_task_getscheduler (struct task_struct *p)
@@ -2634,7 +2638,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (st
struct siginfo *info, int sig,
u32 secid)
{
- return 0;
+ return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
}
static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 460e5c9..6c9d69e 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -80,6 +80,15 @@ config SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
This enables the "default" Linux capabilities functionality.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y.
+config SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES
+ bool "File POSIX Capabilities"
+ default n
+ help
+ This enables filesystem capabilities, allowing you to give
+ binaries a subset of root's powers without using setuid 0.
+
+ If in doubt, answer N.
+
config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
tristate "Root Plug Support"
depends on USB && SECURITY
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index b868e7e..14cb592 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ static struct security_operations capabi
.inode_setxattr = cap_inode_setxattr,
.inode_removexattr = cap_inode_removexattr,
+ .task_kill = cap_task_kill,
+ .task_setscheduler = cap_task_setscheduler,
+ .task_setioprio = cap_task_setioprio,
+ .task_setnice = cap_task_setnice,
.task_post_setuid = cap_task_post_setuid,
.task_reparent_to_init = cap_task_reparent_to_init,
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 5a5ef5c..6a0d033 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -109,11 +109,55 @@ void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct
target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
}
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
+#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
+struct vfs_cap_data_struct {
+ __u32 version;
+ __u32 effective;
+ __u32 permitted;
+ __u32 inheritable;
+};
+
+static inline void convert_to_le(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap)
+{
+ cap->version = le32_to_cpu(cap->version);
+ cap->effective = le32_to_cpu(cap->effective);
+ cap->permitted = le32_to_cpu(cap->permitted);
+ cap->inheritable = le32_to_cpu(cap->inheritable);
+}
+
+static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (cap->version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->effective); i++) {
+ if (cap->effective & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->permitted); i++) {
+ if (cap->permitted & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->inheritable); i++) {
+ if (cap->inheritable & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ ssize_t rc;
+ struct vfs_cap_data_struct cap_struct;
+ struct inode *inode;
+
/* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */
- /* We don't have VFS support for capabilities yet */
cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted);
cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);
@@ -134,6 +178,45 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_
if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES
+ /* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
+
+ dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
+ inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &cap_struct,
+ sizeof(cap_struct));
+ dput(dentry);
+
+ if (rc == -ENODATA)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: Error (%d) getting xattr\n",
+ __FUNCTION__, rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (rc != sizeof(cap_struct)) {
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: got wrong size for getxattr (%d)\n",
+ __FUNCTION__, rc);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ convert_to_le(&cap_struct);
+ if (check_cap_sanity(&cap_struct))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ bprm->cap_effective = cap_struct.effective;
+ bprm->cap_permitted = cap_struct.permitted;
+ bprm->cap_inheritable = cap_struct.inheritable;
+
+#endif
return 0;
}
@@ -182,11 +265,15 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_
int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- /* If/when this module is enhanced to incorporate capability
- bits on files, the test below should be extended to also perform a
- test between the old and new capability sets. For now,
- it simply preserves the legacy decision algorithm used by
- the old userland. */
+ if (current->uid != 0) {
+ if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective))
+ return 1;
+ if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_permitted))
+ return 1;
+ if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_inheritable))
+ return 1;
+ }
+
return (current->euid != current->uid ||
current->egid != current->gid);
}
@@ -300,6 +387,62 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
+ * task_setnice, assumes that
+ * . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed
+ * . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes,
+ * then those actions should be allowed
+ * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but
+ * yet with increased caps.
+ * So we check for increased caps on the target process.
+ */
+static inline int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
+ !__capable(current, CAP_SYS_NICE))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
+ struct sched_param *lp)
+{
+ return cap_safe_nice(p);
+}
+
+int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+ return cap_safe_nice(p);
+}
+
+int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+ return cap_safe_nice(p);
+}
+
+int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+ int sig, u32 secid)
+{
+ if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (secid)
+ /*
+ * Signal sent as a particular user.
+ * Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the
+ * only thing we can do at the moment.
+ * Used only by usb drivers?
+ */
+ return 0;
+ if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
+ return 0;
+ if (capable(CAP_KILL))
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
{
p->cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
@@ -337,6 +480,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bprm_secureexec);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_inode_setxattr);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_inode_removexattr);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_post_setuid);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_kill);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_setscheduler);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_setioprio);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_setnice);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_reparent_to_init);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_syslog);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_vm_enough_memory);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8ab5679..2fcc60f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2775,6 +2775,12 @@ static int selinux_task_setnice(struct t
static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
@@ -2804,6 +2810,12 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsign
static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
--
1.4.3.3
On Mon, Nov 06, 2006 at 09:45:50PM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> #define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30
>
> +#define CAP_NUMCAPS 31
[...]
> +struct vfs_cap_data_struct {
> + __u32 version;
> + __u32 effective;
> + __u32 permitted;
> + __u32 inheritable;
> +};
[...]
> +static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + if (cap->version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION)
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> + for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->effective); i++) {
> + if (cap->effective & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> + return -EPERM;
> + }
> + for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->permitted); i++) {
> + if (cap->permitted & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> + return -EPERM;
> + }
> + for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->inheritable); i++) {
> + if (cap->inheritable & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> + return -EPERM;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
for (i=31; i<4; i++) ...
I'm not sure this checks what you think it checks? :)
Thanks
Quoting Seth Arnold ([email protected]):
> On Mon, Nov 06, 2006 at 09:45:50PM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > #define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30
> >
> > +#define CAP_NUMCAPS 31
>
> [...]
>
> > +struct vfs_cap_data_struct {
> > + __u32 version;
> > + __u32 effective;
> > + __u32 permitted;
> > + __u32 inheritable;
> > +};
>
> [...]
>
> > +static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap)
> > +{
> > + int i;
> > +
> > + if (cap->version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION)
> > + return -EPERM;
> > +
> > + for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->effective); i++) {
> > + if (cap->effective & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> > + return -EPERM;
> > + }
> > + for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->permitted); i++) {
> > + if (cap->permitted & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> > + return -EPERM;
> > + }
> > + for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->inheritable); i++) {
> > + if (cap->inheritable & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> > + return -EPERM;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
>
> for (i=31; i<4; i++) ...
>
> I'm not sure this checks what you think it checks? :)
Hah! Thanks for catching that.
I will send a fix out tonight.
-serge
Quoting Seth Arnold ([email protected]):
> On Mon, Nov 06, 2006 at 09:45:50PM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > #define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30
> >
> > +#define CAP_NUMCAPS 31
>
> [...]
>
> > +struct vfs_cap_data_struct {
> > + __u32 version;
> > + __u32 effective;
> > + __u32 permitted;
> > + __u32 inheritable;
> > +};
>
> [...]
>
> > +static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap)
> > +{
> > + int i;
> > +
> > + if (cap->version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION)
> > + return -EPERM;
> > +
> > + for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->effective); i++) {
> > + if (cap->effective & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> > + return -EPERM;
> > + }
> > + for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->permitted); i++) {
> > + if (cap->permitted & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> > + return -EPERM;
> > + }
> > + for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->inheritable); i++) {
> > + if (cap->inheritable & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> > + return -EPERM;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
>
> for (i=31; i<4; i++) ...
>
> I'm not sure this checks what you think it checks? :)
Thanks again for catching this. Here is the obvious patch. Hopefully
I have it right this time.
>From b91c46589b13bab78ddf431245a7ecbd59bcf2fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2006 23:16:06 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] fscaps: fix cap sanity check
When checking for valid capabilities on files, we want to
make sure that unused bits are not set. Fix the calculation
of the highest bit checked.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
---
security/commoncap.c | 6 +++---
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 6a0d033..6f5e46c 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -133,15 +133,15 @@ static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_c
if (cap->version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION)
return -EPERM;
- for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->effective); i++) {
+ for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<8*sizeof(cap->effective); i++) {
if (cap->effective & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
return -EPERM;
}
- for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->permitted); i++) {
+ for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<8*sizeof(cap->permitted); i++) {
if (cap->permitted & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
return -EPERM;
}
- for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->inheritable); i++) {
+ for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<8*sizeof(cap->inheritable); i++) {
if (cap->inheritable & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
return -EPERM;
}
--
1.4.3.3
The patch from Nov 7 2006 with this fix configures, compiles, installs
and runns smotthly on 2.6.18.2.
I updated the page http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
I also put the patch and this fix for download on the page and I put a
slackware-package with Kaigai Kohei's libcap/userspace tools on the
page.
I hope this will increase the interest and so testing of this patch.
Thanks Serge and Kaigai
Chris
On Tue, 7 Nov 2006 23:32:29 -0600
"Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> wrote:
> Quoting Seth Arnold ([email protected]):
> > On Mon, Nov 06, 2006 at 09:45:50PM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > #define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30
> > >
> > > +#define CAP_NUMCAPS 31
> >
> > [...]
> >
> > > +struct vfs_cap_data_struct {
> > > + __u32 version;
> > > + __u32 effective;
> > > + __u32 permitted;
> > > + __u32 inheritable;
> > > +};
> >
> > [...]
> >
> > > +static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap)
> > > +{
> > > + int i;
> > > +
> > > + if (cap->version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION)
> > > + return -EPERM;
> > > +
> > > + for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->effective); i++) {
> > > + if (cap->effective & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> > > + return -EPERM;
> > > + }
> > > + for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->permitted); i++) {
> > > + if (cap->permitted & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> > > + return -EPERM;
> > > + }
> > > + for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->inheritable); i++) {
> > > + if (cap->inheritable & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> > > + return -EPERM;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + return 0;
> > > +}
> >
> > for (i=31; i<4; i++) ...
> >
> > I'm not sure this checks what you think it checks? :)
>
> Thanks again for catching this. Here is the obvious patch. Hopefully
> I have it right this time.
>
> >From b91c46589b13bab78ddf431245a7ecbd59bcf2fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
> Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2006 23:16:06 -0600
> Subject: [PATCH 1/1] fscaps: fix cap sanity check
>
> When checking for valid capabilities on files, we want to
> make sure that unused bits are not set. Fix the calculation
> of the highest bit checked.
>
> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
> ---
> security/commoncap.c | 6 +++---
> 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 6a0d033..6f5e46c 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -133,15 +133,15 @@ static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_c
> if (cap->version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION)
> return -EPERM;
>
> - for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->effective); i++) {
> + for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<8*sizeof(cap->effective); i++) {
> if (cap->effective & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> return -EPERM;
> }
> - for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->permitted); i++) {
> + for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<8*sizeof(cap->permitted); i++) {
> if (cap->permitted & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> return -EPERM;
> }
> - for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<sizeof(cap->inheritable); i++) {
> + for (i=CAP_NUMCAPS; i<8*sizeof(cap->inheritable); i++) {
> if (cap->inheritable & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> return -EPERM;
> }
> --
> 1.4.3.3
>
--------------------
Chris Friedhoff
[email protected]