From: Daniel Jacobowitz <[email protected]>
Do not implement CLONE_PARENT_SETTID until we know that clone will succeed.
If we do it too early NPTL's data structures temporarily reference a
non-existant TID.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jacobowitz <[email protected]>
---
On Tue, Sep 26, 2006 at 08:59:15PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, 26 Sep 2006, Roland McGrath wrote:
> >
> > It can go last, right before return, after unlock.
> > Userland only cares that parent_tidptr set before parent syscall returns,
> > and child_tidptr set before child returns.
>
> Ok, as long as people are sure, I don't care. Then we have to just ignore
> the error, though, since we can't recover (we've already "exposed" the
> child on the task lists).
>
> I don't think it's a big deal. Ignoring the error just means that if you
> pass in an invalid ptr, it's as if the bit to set that value wasn't set.
> Not a problem.
>
> Especially if there is a test-program, can we just have a patch to try
> that has been verified? It _sounded_ like somebody actually had a program
> that could trigger this with some horrid code that sent signals and cloned
> all the time?
I never got back to you about this...
Refresher, if there isn't enough above: CLONE_PARENT_SETTID is
currently implemented right after a TID is assigned. There's a lot of
clone left to go at that point including a check for pending signals
which can lead to clone failing. This leaves a TID in NPTL's thread
list which doesn't correspond to a thread.
I found Sunday another place where this is a problem, besides the
process-global UID stuff in glibc. GDB tries to attach to the
nonexistant thread and gets upset. I've made it cope, but at the same
time it provides a convenient test case.
Without the attached patch, tls.exp in the GDB testsuite would
intermittently report that it could not attach to a thread - always
within half an hour. With the patch it ran for four hours without
a problem.
kernel/fork.c | 13 ++++++++-----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Index: linux-source-2.6.18/kernel/fork.c
===================================================================
--- linux-source-2.6.18.orig/kernel/fork.c 2007-01-02 13:45:28.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-source-2.6.18/kernel/fork.c 2007-01-02 13:52:09.000000000 -0500
@@ -1012,10 +1012,6 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(
delayacct_tsk_init(p); /* Must remain after dup_task_struct() */
copy_flags(clone_flags, p);
p->pid = pid;
- retval = -EFAULT;
- if (clone_flags & CLONE_PARENT_SETTID)
- if (put_user(p->pid, parent_tidptr))
- goto bad_fork_cleanup_delays_binfmt;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->children);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->sibling);
@@ -1251,6 +1247,14 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(
total_forks++;
spin_unlock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+ /*
+ * Now that we know the fork has succeeded, record the new
+ * TID. It's too late to back out if this fails.
+ */
+ if (clone_flags & CLONE_PARENT_SETTID)
+ put_user(p->pid, parent_tidptr);
+
proc_fork_connector(p);
return p;
@@ -1281,7 +1285,6 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_policy:
bad_fork_cleanup_cpuset:
#endif
cpuset_exit(p);
-bad_fork_cleanup_delays_binfmt:
delayacct_tsk_free(p);
if (p->binfmt)
module_put(p->binfmt->module);
--
Daniel Jacobowitz
CodeSourcery