If you have a process that has set itself to be non-dumpable, and it
then undergoes exec(2), any CLOEXEC file descriptors it has open are
"exposed" during a race window between the dumpable flags of the process
being reset for exec(2) and CLOEXEC being applied to the file
descriptors. This can be exploited by a process by attempting to access
/proc/<pid>/fd/... during this window, without requiring CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
The race in question is after set_dumpable has been (for get_link,
though the trace is basically the same for readlink):
[vfs]
-> proc_pid_link_inode_operations.get_link
-> proc_pid_get_link
-> proc_fd_access_allowed
-> ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
Which will return 0, during the race window and CLOEXEC file descriptors
will still be open during this window because do_close_on_exec has not
been called yet. As a result, the ordering of these calls should be
reversed to avoid this race window.
This is of particular concern to container runtimes, where joining a
PID namespace with file descriptors referring to the host filesystem
can result in security issues (since PRCTL_SET_DUMPABLE doesn't protect
against access of CLOEXEC file descriptors -- file descriptors which may
reference filesystem objects the container shouldn't have access to).
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Michael Crosby <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <[email protected]>
---
fs/exec.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 4e497b9ee71e..3ad50c379413 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
* current->executable is only used by the procfs. This allows a dispatch
* table to check for several different types of binary formats. We keep
* trying until we recognize the file or we run out of supported binary
- * formats.
+ * formats.
*/
#include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -1287,6 +1287,13 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
/* This is the point of no return */
current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
+ /*
+ * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is
+ * dumpable to avoid a race with a process in userspace trying to access
+ * the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process undergoing exec(2).
+ */
+ do_close_on_exec(current->files);
+
if (uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))
set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
else
@@ -1315,7 +1322,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
group */
current->self_exec_id++;
flush_signal_handlers(current, 0);
- do_close_on_exec(current->files);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec);
--
2.11.0
On 12/20, Aleksa Sarai wrote:
>
> @@ -1287,6 +1287,13 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
> /* This is the point of no return */
> current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
>
> + /*
> + * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is
> + * dumpable to avoid a race with a process in userspace trying to access
> + * the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process undergoing exec(2).
> + */
> + do_close_on_exec(current->files);
Cosmetic, but perhaps this should go into flush_old_exec() then?
But I am fine either way, up to you.
Oleg.
>> @@ -1287,6 +1287,13 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
>> /* This is the point of no return */
>> current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
>>
>> + /*
>> + * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is
>> + * dumpable to avoid a race with a process in userspace trying to access
>> + * the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process undergoing exec(2).
>> + */
>> + do_close_on_exec(current->files);
>
> Cosmetic, but perhaps this should go into flush_old_exec() then?
Yeah, I was thinking the same thing. Also, I'll cc stable (v3.2+) to the
patch.
--
Aleksa Sarai
Software Engineer (Containers)
SUSE Linux GmbH
https://www.cyphar.com/