This patchset introduces the tiocsti_restrict sysctl, whose default is
controlled via CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT. When activated, this
control restricts all TIOCSTI ioctl calls from non CAP_SYS_ADMIN users.
This patch was inspired from GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY.
This patch would have prevented
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1411256 under the following
conditions:
* non-privileged container
* container run inside new user namespace
Possible effects on userland:
There could be a few user programs that would be effected by this
change.
See: <https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=ioctl%5C%28.*TIOCSTI>
notable programs are: agetty, csh, xemacs and tcsh
However, I still believe that this change is worth it given that the
Kconfig defaults to n. This will be a feature that is turned on for the
same reason that people activate it when using grsecurity. Users of this
opt-in feature will realize that they are choosing security over some OS
features like unprivileged TIOCSTI ioctls, as should be clear in the
Kconfig help message.
Threat Model/Patch Rational:
>From grsecurity's config for GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY.
| There are very few legitimate uses for this functionality and it
| has made vulnerabilities in several 'su'-like programs possible in
| the past. Even without these vulnerabilities, it provides an
| attacker with an easy mechanism to move laterally among other
| processes within the same user's compromised session.
So if one process within a tty session becomes compromised it can follow
that additional processes, that are thought to be in different security
boundaries, can be compromised as a result. When using a program like su
or sudo, these additional processes could be in a tty session where TTY file
descriptors are indeed shared over privilege boundaries.
This is also an excellent writeup about the issue:
<http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/TtyPushbackPrivilegeEscalation/>
When user namespaces are in use, the check for the capability
CAP_SYS_ADMIN is done against the user namespace that originally opened
the tty.
# Changes since v3:
* use get_user_ns and put_user_ns to take and drop references to the owner
user namespace because CONFIG_USER_NS is an option
# Changes since v2:
* take/drop reference to user namespace on tty struct alloc/free to prevent
use-after-free.
# Changes since v1:
* added owner_user_ns to tty_struct to enable capability checks against
the namespace that created the tty.
* rewording in different places to make patchset purpose clear
* Added Documentation
This introduces the tiocsti_restrict sysctl, whose default is controlled via
CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT. When activated, this control restricts
all TIOCSTI ioctl calls from non CAP_SYS_ADMIN users.
This patch depends on patch 1/2
This patch was inspired from GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY.
This patch would have prevented
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1411256 under the following
conditions:
* non-privileged container
* container run inside new user namespace
Possible effects on userland:
There could be a few user programs that would be effected by this
change.
See: <https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=ioctl%5C%28.*TIOCSTI>
notable programs are: agetty, csh, xemacs and tcsh
However, I still believe that this change is worth it given that the
Kconfig defaults to n. This will be a feature that is turned on for the
same reason that people activate it when using grsecurity. Users of this
opt-in feature will realize that they are choosing security over some OS
features like unprivileged TIOCSTI ioctls, as should be clear in the
Kconfig help message.
Threat Model/Patch Rational:
>From grsecurity's config for GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY.
| There are very few legitimate uses for this functionality and it
| has made vulnerabilities in several 'su'-like programs possible in
| the past. Even without these vulnerabilities, it provides an
| attacker with an easy mechanism to move laterally among other
| processes within the same user's compromised session.
So if one process within a tty session becomes compromised it can follow
that additional processes, that are thought to be in different security
boundaries, can be compromised as a result. When using a program like su
or sudo, these additional processes could be in a tty session where TTY file
descriptors are indeed shared over privilege boundaries.
This is also an excellent writeup about the issue:
<http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/TtyPushbackPrivilegeEscalation/>
When user namespaces are in use, the check for the capability
CAP_SYS_ADMIN is done against the user namespace that originally opened
the tty.
Signed-off-by: Matt Brown <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 6 ++++++
include/linux/tty.h | 2 ++
kernel/sysctl.c | 12 ++++++++++++
security/Kconfig | 13 +++++++++++++
5 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index bac23c1..c15c660 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
- sysctl_writes_strict
- tainted
- threads-max
+- tiocsti_restrict
- unknown_nmi_panic
- watchdog
- watchdog_thresh
@@ -987,6 +988,26 @@ available RAM pages threads-max is reduced accordingly.
==============================================================
+tiocsti_restrict:
+
+This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented
+from using the TIOCSTI ioctl to inject commands into otherprocesses
+which share a tty session.
+
+When tiocsti_restrict is set to (0) there are no restrictions(accept
+the default restriction of only being able to injection commands into
+one's own tty). When tiocsti_restrict is set to (1), users must
+have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to use the TIOCSTI ioctl.
+
+When user namespaces are in use, the check for the capability
+CAP_SYS_ADMIN is done against the user namespace that originally
+opened the tty.
+
+The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT sets the
+default value of tiocsti_restrict.
+
+==============================================================
+
unknown_nmi_panic:
The value in this file affects behavior of handling NMI. When the
diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
index c276814..fe68d14 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
@@ -2297,11 +2297,17 @@ static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
* FIXME: may race normal receive processing
*/
+int tiocsti_restrict = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT);
+
static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char __user *p)
{
char ch, mbz = 0;
struct tty_ldisc *ld;
+ if (tiocsti_restrict && !ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("TIOCSTI ioctl call blocked for non-privileged process\n");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (get_user(ch, p))
diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h
index d902d42..2fd7f49 100644
--- a/include/linux/tty.h
+++ b/include/linux/tty.h
@@ -344,6 +344,8 @@ struct tty_file_private {
struct list_head list;
};
+extern int tiocsti_restrict;
+
/* tty magic number */
#define TTY_MAGIC 0x5401
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index acf0a5a..68d1363 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -833,6 +834,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
.extra2 = &two,
},
#endif
+#if defined CONFIG_TTY
+ {
+ .procname = "tiocsti_restrict",
+ .data = &tiocsti_restrict,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
+ .extra1 = &zero,
+ .extra2 = &one,
+ },
+#endif
{
.procname = "ngroups_max",
.data = &ngroups_max,
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 3ff1bf9..7d13331 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -18,6 +18,19 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+config SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT
+ bool "Restrict unprivileged use of tiocsti command injection"
+ default n
+ help
+ This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users injecting commands
+ into other processes which share a tty session using the TIOCSTI
+ ioctl. This option makes TIOCSTI use require CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
+
+ If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
+ unless the tiocsti_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
config SECURITY
bool "Enable different security models"
depends on SYSFS
--
2.10.2
This patch adds struct user_namespace *owner_user_ns to the tty_struct.
Then it is set to current_user_ns() in the alloc_tty_struct function.
This is done to facilitate capability checks against the original user
namespace that allocated the tty.
E.g. ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
This combined with the use of user namespace's will allow hardening
protections to be built to mitigate container escapes that utilize TTY
ioctls such as TIOCSTI.
See: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1411256
Signed-off-by: Matt Brown <[email protected]>
---
drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 2 ++
include/linux/tty.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
index e6d1a65..c276814 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ static void free_tty_struct(struct tty_struct *tty)
put_device(tty->dev);
kfree(tty->write_buf);
tty->magic = 0xDEADDEAD;
+ put_user_ns(tty->owner_user_ns);
kfree(tty);
}
@@ -3191,6 +3192,7 @@ struct tty_struct *alloc_tty_struct(struct tty_driver *driver, int idx)
tty->index = idx;
tty_line_name(driver, idx, tty->name);
tty->dev = tty_get_device(tty);
+ tty->owner_user_ns = get_user_ns(current_user_ns());
return tty;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h
index 1017e904..d902d42 100644
--- a/include/linux/tty.h
+++ b/include/linux/tty.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <uapi/linux/tty.h>
#include <linux/rwsem.h>
#include <linux/llist.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
/*
@@ -333,6 +334,7 @@ struct tty_struct {
/* If the tty has a pending do_SAK, queue it here - akpm */
struct work_struct SAK_work;
struct tty_port *port;
+ struct user_namespace *owner_user_ns;
};
/* Each of a tty's open files has private_data pointing to tty_file_private */
--
2.10.2
Quoting Matt Brown ([email protected]):
> This patch adds struct user_namespace *owner_user_ns to the tty_struct.
> Then it is set to current_user_ns() in the alloc_tty_struct function.
>
> This is done to facilitate capability checks against the original user
> namespace that allocated the tty.
>
> E.g. ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
>
> This combined with the use of user namespace's will allow hardening
> protections to be built to mitigate container escapes that utilize TTY
> ioctls such as TIOCSTI.
>
> See: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1411256
>
> Signed-off-by: Matt Brown <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
> ---
> drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 2 ++
> include/linux/tty.h | 2 ++
> 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> index e6d1a65..c276814 100644
> --- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> @@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ static void free_tty_struct(struct tty_struct *tty)
> put_device(tty->dev);
> kfree(tty->write_buf);
> tty->magic = 0xDEADDEAD;
> + put_user_ns(tty->owner_user_ns);
> kfree(tty);
> }
>
> @@ -3191,6 +3192,7 @@ struct tty_struct *alloc_tty_struct(struct tty_driver *driver, int idx)
> tty->index = idx;
> tty_line_name(driver, idx, tty->name);
> tty->dev = tty_get_device(tty);
> + tty->owner_user_ns = get_user_ns(current_user_ns());
>
> return tty;
> }
> diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h
> index 1017e904..d902d42 100644
> --- a/include/linux/tty.h
> +++ b/include/linux/tty.h
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
> #include <uapi/linux/tty.h>
> #include <linux/rwsem.h>
> #include <linux/llist.h>
> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
>
>
> /*
> @@ -333,6 +334,7 @@ struct tty_struct {
> /* If the tty has a pending do_SAK, queue it here - akpm */
> struct work_struct SAK_work;
> struct tty_port *port;
> + struct user_namespace *owner_user_ns;
> };
>
> /* Each of a tty's open files has private_data pointing to tty_file_private */
> --
> 2.10.2
Quoting Matt Brown ([email protected]):
> This introduces the tiocsti_restrict sysctl, whose default is controlled via
> CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT. When activated, this control restricts
> all TIOCSTI ioctl calls from non CAP_SYS_ADMIN users.
>
> This patch depends on patch 1/2
>
> This patch was inspired from GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY.
>
> This patch would have prevented
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1411256 under the following
> conditions:
> * non-privileged container
> * container run inside new user namespace
>
> Possible effects on userland:
>
> There could be a few user programs that would be effected by this
> change.
> See: <https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=ioctl%5C%28.*TIOCSTI>
> notable programs are: agetty, csh, xemacs and tcsh
>
> However, I still believe that this change is worth it given that the
> Kconfig defaults to n. This will be a feature that is turned on for the
> same reason that people activate it when using grsecurity. Users of this
> opt-in feature will realize that they are choosing security over some OS
> features like unprivileged TIOCSTI ioctls, as should be clear in the
> Kconfig help message.
>
> Threat Model/Patch Rational:
>
> >From grsecurity's config for GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY.
>
> | There are very few legitimate uses for this functionality and it
> | has made vulnerabilities in several 'su'-like programs possible in
> | the past. Even without these vulnerabilities, it provides an
> | attacker with an easy mechanism to move laterally among other
> | processes within the same user's compromised session.
>
> So if one process within a tty session becomes compromised it can follow
> that additional processes, that are thought to be in different security
> boundaries, can be compromised as a result. When using a program like su
> or sudo, these additional processes could be in a tty session where TTY file
> descriptors are indeed shared over privilege boundaries.
>
> This is also an excellent writeup about the issue:
> <http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/TtyPushbackPrivilegeEscalation/>
>
> When user namespaces are in use, the check for the capability
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN is done against the user namespace that originally opened
> the tty.
>
> Signed-off-by: Matt Brown <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
(typo below)
> ---
> Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 6 ++++++
> include/linux/tty.h | 2 ++
> kernel/sysctl.c | 12 ++++++++++++
> security/Kconfig | 13 +++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> index bac23c1..c15c660 100644
> --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
> - sysctl_writes_strict
> - tainted
> - threads-max
> +- tiocsti_restrict
> - unknown_nmi_panic
> - watchdog
> - watchdog_thresh
> @@ -987,6 +988,26 @@ available RAM pages threads-max is reduced accordingly.
>
> ==============================================================
>
> +tiocsti_restrict:
> +
> +This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented
> +from using the TIOCSTI ioctl to inject commands into otherprocesses
space between other processes
> +which share a tty session.
> +
> +When tiocsti_restrict is set to (0) there are no restrictions(accept
> +the default restriction of only being able to injection commands into
> +one's own tty). When tiocsti_restrict is set to (1), users must
> +have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to use the TIOCSTI ioctl.
> +
> +When user namespaces are in use, the check for the capability
> +CAP_SYS_ADMIN is done against the user namespace that originally
> +opened the tty.
> +
> +The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT sets the
> +default value of tiocsti_restrict.
> +
> +==============================================================
> +
> unknown_nmi_panic:
>
> The value in this file affects behavior of handling NMI. When the
> diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> index c276814..fe68d14 100644
> --- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> @@ -2297,11 +2297,17 @@ static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
> * FIXME: may race normal receive processing
> */
>
> +int tiocsti_restrict = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT);
> +
> static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char __user *p)
> {
> char ch, mbz = 0;
> struct tty_ldisc *ld;
>
> + if (tiocsti_restrict && !ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
> + pr_warn_ratelimited("TIOCSTI ioctl call blocked for non-privileged process\n");
> + return -EPERM;
> + }
> if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
> if (get_user(ch, p))
> diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h
> index d902d42..2fd7f49 100644
> --- a/include/linux/tty.h
> +++ b/include/linux/tty.h
> @@ -344,6 +344,8 @@ struct tty_file_private {
> struct list_head list;
> };
>
> +extern int tiocsti_restrict;
> +
> /* tty magic number */
> #define TTY_MAGIC 0x5401
>
> diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> index acf0a5a..68d1363 100644
> --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
> #include <linux/kexec.h>
> #include <linux/bpf.h>
> #include <linux/mount.h>
> +#include <linux/tty.h>
>
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> #include <asm/processor.h>
> @@ -833,6 +834,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
> .extra2 = &two,
> },
> #endif
> +#if defined CONFIG_TTY
> + {
> + .procname = "tiocsti_restrict",
> + .data = &tiocsti_restrict,
> + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
> + .mode = 0644,
> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
> + .extra1 = &zero,
> + .extra2 = &one,
> + },
> +#endif
> {
> .procname = "ngroups_max",
> .data = &ngroups_max,
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 3ff1bf9..7d13331 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -18,6 +18,19 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
>
> If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
>
> +config SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT
> + bool "Restrict unprivileged use of tiocsti command injection"
> + default n
> + help
> + This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users injecting commands
> + into other processes which share a tty session using the TIOCSTI
> + ioctl. This option makes TIOCSTI use require CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> +
> + If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
> + unless the tiocsti_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
> +
> + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
> +
> config SECURITY
> bool "Enable different security models"
> depends on SYSFS
> --
> 2.10.2
On Mon, 24 Apr 2017 01:15:11 -0400
Matt Brown <[email protected]> wrote:
> This patch adds struct user_namespace *owner_user_ns to the tty_struct.
> Then it is set to current_user_ns() in the alloc_tty_struct function.
>
> This is done to facilitate capability checks against the original user
> namespace that allocated the tty.
>
> E.g. ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
>
> This combined with the use of user namespace's will allow hardening
> protections to be built to mitigate container escapes that utilize TTY
> ioctls such as TIOCSTI.
Regardles of the TIOCSTI usefulness this makes complete sense.
Alan