The RETPOLINE_AMD feature relies on a serializing LFENCE for speculation
control. For AMD hardware, only set RETPOLINE_AMD if LFENCE is a
serializing instruction, which is indicated by the LFENCE_RDTSC feature.
The call to spectre_v2_check_boottime_disable() is currently before the
boot CPU is identified and, therefore, able to set the LFENCE_RDTSC
feature. Move the call to spectre_v2_check_boottime_disable() to after
identify_boot_cpu() in check_bugs().
Also, protect against specifying spectre_v2=retpoline,amd for non-AMD
hardware and fall-back to the generic retpoline.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 --
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 2 --
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 8ddf851..6bda2c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -152,7 +152,5 @@
# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
#endif
-void spectre_v2_check_boottime_disable(void);
-
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b957f77..815dee2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
+static void __init spectre_v2_check_boottime_disable(void);
+
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -33,6 +35,9 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
}
+ /* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
+ spectre_v2_check_boottime_disable();
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
@@ -106,7 +111,7 @@ static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
}
-void __init spectre_v2_check_boottime_disable(void)
+static void __init spectre_v2_check_boottime_disable(void)
{
char arg[20];
int ret;
@@ -148,14 +153,21 @@ void __init spectre_v2_check_boottime_disable(void)
retpoline:
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
retpoline_amd:
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
+ pr_info("AMD retpoline not supported, fall back to generic\n");
+ goto retpoline_generic;
+ }
+
spectre_v2_enabled = retp_compiler() ?
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD : SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
- } else {
- retpoline_generic:
- spectre_v2_enabled = retp_compiler() ?
- SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC : SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL;
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+ return;
}
+retpoline_generic:
+ spectre_v2_enabled = retp_compiler() ?
+ SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC : SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
return;
#else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 9fb4f9d..b5a908b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1322,8 +1322,6 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
register_refined_jiffies(CLOCK_TICK_RATE);
- spectre_v2_check_boottime_disable();
-
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
efi_apply_memmap_quirks();
Commit-ID: b10d070a67d96db93223d11832c1e74588d7d566
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/b10d070a67d96db93223d11832c1e74588d7d566
Author: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 18:39:31 -0600
Committer: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
CommitDate: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 01:49:13 +0100
x86/retpoline: Only set RETPOLINE_AMD if LFENCE is serializing
The RETPOLINE_AMD feature relies on a serializing LFENCE for speculation
control. For AMD hardware, only set RETPOLINE_AMD if LFENCE is a
serializing instruction, which is indicated by the LFENCE_RDTSC feature.
The call to spectre_v2_check_boottime_disable() is currently before the
boot CPU is identified and, therefore, able to set the LFENCE_RDTSC
feature. Move the call to spectre_v2_check_boottime_disable() to after
identify_boot_cpu() in check_bugs().
Also, protect against specifying spectre_v2=retpoline,amd for non-AMD
hardware and fall-back to the generic retpoline.
54d5103245ff ("x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation")
Originally-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Turner <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 --
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 2 --
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 8ddf851..6bda2c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -152,7 +152,5 @@
# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
#endif
-void spectre_v2_check_boottime_disable(void);
-
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b957f77..815dee2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
+static void __init spectre_v2_check_boottime_disable(void);
+
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -33,6 +35,9 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
}
+ /* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
+ spectre_v2_check_boottime_disable();
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
@@ -106,7 +111,7 @@ static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
}
-void __init spectre_v2_check_boottime_disable(void)
+static void __init spectre_v2_check_boottime_disable(void)
{
char arg[20];
int ret;
@@ -148,14 +153,21 @@ force:
retpoline:
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
retpoline_amd:
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
+ pr_info("AMD retpoline not supported, fall back to generic\n");
+ goto retpoline_generic;
+ }
+
spectre_v2_enabled = retp_compiler() ?
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD : SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
- } else {
- retpoline_generic:
- spectre_v2_enabled = retp_compiler() ?
- SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC : SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL;
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+ return;
}
+retpoline_generic:
+ spectre_v2_enabled = retp_compiler() ?
+ SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC : SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
return;
#else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 9fb4f9d..b5a908b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1322,8 +1322,6 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
register_refined_jiffies(CLOCK_TICK_RATE);
- spectre_v2_check_boottime_disable();
-
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
efi_apply_memmap_quirks();