Data exfiltration attacks via speculative execution and
return-oriented-programming attacks rely on the ability to infer the
location of sensitive data objects. The kernel page allocator, has
predictable first-in-first-out behavior for physical pages. Pages are
freed in physical address order when first onlined. There are also
mechanisms like CMA that can free large contiguous areas at once
increasing the predictability of allocations in physical memory.
In addition to the security implications this randomization also
stabilizes the average performance of direct-mapped memory-side caches.
This includes memory-side caches like the one on the Knights Landing
processor and those generally described by the ACPI HMAT (Heterogeneous
Memory Attributes Table [1]). Cache conflicts are spread over a random
distribution rather than localized.
Given the performance sensitivity of the page allocator this
randomization is only performed for MAX_ORDER (4MB by default) pages. A
kernel parameter, page_alloc.shuffle_page_order, is included to change
the page size where randomization occurs.
[1]: See ACPI 6.2 Section 5.2.27.5 Memory Side Cache Information Structure
---
Dan Williams (3):
mm: Shuffle initial free memory
mm: Move buddy list manipulations into helpers
mm: Maintain randomization of page free lists
include/linux/list.h | 17 +++
include/linux/mm.h | 5 -
include/linux/mm_types.h | 3 +
include/linux/mmzone.h | 57 ++++++++++
mm/bootmem.c | 9 +-
mm/compaction.c | 4 -
mm/nobootmem.c | 7 +
mm/page_alloc.c | 267 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
8 files changed, 317 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
When freeing a page with an order >= shuffle_page_order randomly select
the front or back of the list for insertion.
While the mm tries to defragment physical pages into huge pages this can
tend to make the page allocator more predictable over time. Inject the
front-back randomness to preserve the initial randomness established by
shuffle_free_memory() when the kernel was booted.
The overhead of this manipulation is constrained by only being applied
for MAX_ORDER sized pages by default.
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/mmzone.h | 2 ++
mm/page_alloc.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/mmzone.h b/include/linux/mmzone.h
index adf9b3a7440d..4a095432843d 100644
--- a/include/linux/mmzone.h
+++ b/include/linux/mmzone.h
@@ -98,6 +98,8 @@ extern int page_group_by_mobility_disabled;
struct free_area {
struct list_head free_list[MIGRATE_TYPES];
unsigned long nr_free;
+ u64 rand;
+ u8 rand_bits;
};
/* Used for pages not on another list */
diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
index 175f2e5f9e50..33a6b40ae463 100644
--- a/mm/page_alloc.c
+++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#include <linux/mempolicy.h>
#include <linux/memremap.h>
#include <linux/stop_machine.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/sort.h>
#include <linux/pfn.h>
#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
@@ -746,6 +747,22 @@ static inline int page_is_buddy(struct page *page, struct page *buddy,
return 0;
}
+static void add_to_free_area_random(struct page *page, struct free_area *area,
+ int migratetype)
+{
+ if (area->rand_bits == 0) {
+ area->rand_bits = 64;
+ area->rand = get_random_u64();
+ }
+
+ if (area->rand & 1)
+ add_to_free_area(page, area, migratetype);
+ else
+ add_to_free_area_tail(page, area, migratetype);
+ area->rand_bits--;
+ area->rand >>= 1;
+}
+
/*
* Freeing function for a buddy system allocator.
*
@@ -851,7 +868,8 @@ static inline void __free_one_page(struct page *page,
* so it's less likely to be used soon and more likely to be merged
* as a higher order page
*/
- if ((order < MAX_ORDER-2) && pfn_valid_within(buddy_pfn)) {
+ if ((order < MAX_ORDER-2) && pfn_valid_within(buddy_pfn)
+ && order < shuffle_page_order) {
struct page *higher_page, *higher_buddy;
combined_pfn = buddy_pfn & pfn;
higher_page = page + (combined_pfn - pfn);
@@ -865,7 +883,12 @@ static inline void __free_one_page(struct page *page,
}
}
- add_to_free_area(page, &zone->free_area[order], migratetype);
+ if (order < shuffle_page_order)
+ add_to_free_area(page, &zone->free_area[order], migratetype);
+ else
+ add_to_free_area_random(page, &zone->free_area[order],
+ migratetype);
+
}
/*
Some data exfiltration and return-oriented-programming attacks rely on
the ability to infer the location of sensitive data objects. The kernel
page allocator, especially early in system boot, has predictable
first-in-first out behavior for physical pages. Pages are freed in
physical address order when first onlined.
Introduce shuffle_free_memory(), and its helper shuffle_zone(), to
perform a Fisher-Yates shuffle of the page allocator 'free_area' lists
when they are initially populated with free memory.
The shuffling is done in terms of 'shuffle_page_order' sized free pages
where the default shuffle_page_order is MAX_ORDER-1 i.e. 10, 4MB.
The performance impact of the shuffling appears to be in the noise
compared to other memory initialization work. Also the bulk of the work
is done in the background as a part of deferred_init_memmap().
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/list.h | 17 +++++
include/linux/mm.h | 2 +
include/linux/mmzone.h | 4 +
mm/bootmem.c | 9 ++-
mm/nobootmem.c | 7 ++
mm/page_alloc.c | 172 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 207 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/list.h b/include/linux/list.h
index de04cc5ed536..43f963328d7c 100644
--- a/include/linux/list.h
+++ b/include/linux/list.h
@@ -150,6 +150,23 @@ static inline void list_replace_init(struct list_head *old,
INIT_LIST_HEAD(old);
}
+/**
+ * list_swap - replace entry1 with entry2 and re-add entry1 at entry2's position
+ * @entry1: the location to place entry2
+ * @entry2: the location to place entry1
+ */
+static inline void list_swap(struct list_head *entry1,
+ struct list_head *entry2)
+{
+ struct list_head *pos = entry2->prev;
+
+ list_del(entry2);
+ list_replace(entry1, entry2);
+ if (pos == entry1)
+ pos = entry2;
+ list_add(entry1, pos);
+}
+
/**
* list_del_init - deletes entry from list and reinitialize it.
* @entry: the element to delete from the list.
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index a61ebe8ad4ca..588f34e4390e 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2040,6 +2040,8 @@ extern void adjust_managed_page_count(struct page *page, long count);
extern void mem_init_print_info(const char *str);
extern void reserve_bootmem_region(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end);
+extern void shuffle_free_memory(pg_data_t *pgdat, unsigned long start_pfn,
+ unsigned long end_pfn);
/* Free the reserved page into the buddy system, so it gets managed. */
static inline void __free_reserved_page(struct page *page)
diff --git a/include/linux/mmzone.h b/include/linux/mmzone.h
index 1e22d96734e0..8f8fc7dab5cb 100644
--- a/include/linux/mmzone.h
+++ b/include/linux/mmzone.h
@@ -1277,6 +1277,10 @@ void sparse_init(void);
#else
#define sparse_init() do {} while (0)
#define sparse_index_init(_sec, _nid) do {} while (0)
+static inline int pfn_present(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_SPARSEMEM */
/*
diff --git a/mm/bootmem.c b/mm/bootmem.c
index 97db0e8e362b..7f5ff899c622 100644
--- a/mm/bootmem.c
+++ b/mm/bootmem.c
@@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ void __init free_bootmem_late(unsigned long physaddr, unsigned long size)
static unsigned long __init free_all_bootmem_core(bootmem_data_t *bdata)
{
struct page *page;
+ int nid = bdata - bootmem_node_data;
unsigned long *map, start, end, pages, cur, count = 0;
if (!bdata->node_bootmem_map)
@@ -219,8 +220,7 @@ static unsigned long __init free_all_bootmem_core(bootmem_data_t *bdata)
start = bdata->node_min_pfn;
end = bdata->node_low_pfn;
- bdebug("nid=%td start=%lx end=%lx\n",
- bdata - bootmem_node_data, start, end);
+ bdebug("nid=%d start=%lx end=%lx\n", nid, start, end);
while (start < end) {
unsigned long idx, vec;
@@ -276,7 +276,10 @@ static unsigned long __init free_all_bootmem_core(bootmem_data_t *bdata)
__free_pages_bootmem(page++, cur++, 0);
bdata->node_bootmem_map = NULL;
- bdebug("nid=%td released=%lx\n", bdata - bootmem_node_data, count);
+ shuffle_free_memory(NODE_DATA(nid), bdata->node_min_pfn,
+ bdata->node_low_pfn);
+
+ bdebug("nid=%d released=%lx\n", nid, count);
return count;
}
diff --git a/mm/nobootmem.c b/mm/nobootmem.c
index 439af3b765a7..40b42434e805 100644
--- a/mm/nobootmem.c
+++ b/mm/nobootmem.c
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ static unsigned long __init free_low_memory_core_early(void)
{
unsigned long count = 0;
phys_addr_t start, end;
+ pg_data_t *pgdat;
u64 i;
memblock_clear_hotplug(0, -1);
@@ -144,8 +145,12 @@ static unsigned long __init free_low_memory_core_early(void)
* low ram will be on Node1
*/
for_each_free_mem_range(i, NUMA_NO_NODE, MEMBLOCK_NONE, &start, &end,
- NULL)
+ NULL) {
count += __free_memory_core(start, end);
+ for_each_online_pgdat(pgdat)
+ shuffle_free_memory(pgdat, PHYS_PFN(start),
+ PHYS_PFN(end));
+ }
return count;
}
diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
index 89d2a2ab3fe6..2fff9e69d8f3 100644
--- a/mm/page_alloc.c
+++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
#include <trace/events/kmem.h>
#include <trace/events/oom.h>
#include <linux/prefetch.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/mm_inline.h>
#include <linux/migrate.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
@@ -72,6 +73,13 @@
#include <asm/div64.h>
#include "internal.h"
+/*
+ * page_alloc.shuffle_page_order gates which page orders are shuffled by
+ * shuffle_zone() during memory initialization.
+ */
+static int __read_mostly shuffle_page_order = MAX_ORDER-1;
+module_param(shuffle_page_order, int, 0444);
+
/* prevent >1 _updater_ of zone percpu pageset ->high and ->batch fields */
static DEFINE_MUTEX(pcp_batch_high_lock);
#define MIN_PERCPU_PAGELIST_FRACTION (8)
@@ -1035,6 +1043,168 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page,
return true;
}
+/*
+ * For two pages to be swapped in the shuffle, they must be free (on a
+ * 'free_area' lru), have the same order, and have the same migratetype.
+ */
+static struct page * __init shuffle_valid_page(unsigned long pfn, int order)
+{
+ struct page *page;
+
+ /*
+ * Given we're dealing with randomly selected pfns in a zone we
+ * need to ask questions like...
+ */
+
+ /* ...is the pfn even in the memmap? */
+ if (!pfn_valid_within(pfn))
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* ...is the pfn in a present section or a hole? */
+ if (!pfn_present(pfn))
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* ...is the page free and currently on a free_area list? */
+ page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
+ if (!PageBuddy(page))
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * ...is the page on the same list as the page we will
+ * shuffle it with?
+ */
+ if (page_order(page) != order)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return page;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fisher-Yates shuffle the freelist which prescribes iterating through
+ * an array, pfns in this case, and randomly swapping each entry with
+ * another in the span, end_pfn - start_pfn.
+ *
+ * To keep the implementation simple it does not attempt to correct for
+ * sources of bias in the distribution, like modulo bias or
+ * pseudo-random number generator bias. I.e. the expectation is that
+ * this shuffling raises the bar for attacks that exploit the
+ * predictability of page allocations, but need not be a perfect
+ * shuffle.
+ *
+ * Note that we don't use @z->zone_start_pfn and zone_end_pfn(@z)
+ * directly since the caller may be aware of holes in the zone and can
+ * improve the accuracy of the random pfn selection.
+ */
+#define SHUFFLE_RETRY 10
+static void __init shuffle_zone_order(struct zone *z, unsigned long start_pfn,
+ unsigned long end_pfn, const int order)
+{
+ unsigned long i, flags;
+ const int order_pages = 1 << order;
+
+ if (start_pfn < z->zone_start_pfn)
+ start_pfn = z->zone_start_pfn;
+ if (end_pfn > zone_end_pfn(z))
+ end_pfn = zone_end_pfn(z);
+
+ /* probably means that start/end were outside the zone */
+ if (end_pfn <= start_pfn)
+ return;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&z->lock, flags);
+ start_pfn = ALIGN(start_pfn, order_pages);
+ for (i = start_pfn; i < end_pfn; i += order_pages) {
+ unsigned long j;
+ int migratetype, retry;
+ struct page *page_i, *page_j;
+
+ /*
+ * We expect page_i, in the sub-range of a zone being
+ * added (@start_pfn to @end_pfn), to more likely be
+ * valid compared to page_j randomly selected in the
+ * span @zone_start_pfn to @spanned_pages.
+ */
+ page_i = shuffle_valid_page(i, order);
+ if (!page_i)
+ continue;
+
+ for (retry = 0; retry < SHUFFLE_RETRY; retry++) {
+ /*
+ * Pick a random order aligned page from the
+ * start of the zone. Use the *whole* zone here
+ * so that if it is freed in tiny pieces that we
+ * randomize in the whole zone, not just within
+ * those fragments.
+ *
+ * Since page_j comes from a potentially sparse
+ * address range we want to try a bit harder to
+ * find a shuffle point for page_i.
+ */
+ j = z->zone_start_pfn +
+ ALIGN_DOWN(get_random_long() % z->spanned_pages,
+ order_pages);
+ page_j = shuffle_valid_page(j, order);
+ if (page_j && page_j != page_i)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (retry >= SHUFFLE_RETRY) {
+ pr_debug("%s: failed to swap %#lx\n", __func__, i);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Each migratetype corresponds to its own list, make
+ * sure the types match otherwise we're moving pages to
+ * lists where they do not belong.
+ */
+ migratetype = get_pageblock_migratetype(page_i);
+ if (get_pageblock_migratetype(page_j) != migratetype) {
+ pr_debug("%s: migratetype mismatch %#lx\n", __func__, i);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ list_swap(&page_i->lru, &page_j->lru);
+
+ pr_debug("%s: swap: %#lx -> %#lx\n", __func__, i, j);
+
+ /* take it easy on the zone lock */
+ if ((i % (100 * order_pages)) == 0) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&z->lock, flags);
+ cond_resched();
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&z->lock, flags);
+ }
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&z->lock, flags);
+}
+
+static void __init shuffle_zone(struct zone *z, unsigned long start_pfn,
+ unsigned long end_pfn)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* shuffle all the orders at the specified order and higher */
+ for (i = shuffle_page_order; i < MAX_ORDER; i++)
+ shuffle_zone_order(z, start_pfn, end_pfn, i);
+}
+
+/**
+ * shuffle_free_memory - reduce the predictability of the page allocator
+ * @pgdat: node page data
+ * @start_pfn: Limit the shuffle to the greater of this value or zone start
+ * @end_pfn: Limit the shuffle to the less of this value or zone end
+ *
+ * While shuffle_zone() attempts to avoid holes with pfn_valid() and
+ * pfn_present() they can not report sub-section sized holes. @start_pfn
+ * and @end_pfn limit the shuffle to the exact memory pages being freed.
+ */
+void __init shuffle_free_memory(pg_data_t *pgdat, unsigned long start_pfn,
+ unsigned long end_pfn)
+{
+ struct zone *z;
+
+ for (z = pgdat->node_zones; z < pgdat->node_zones + MAX_NR_ZONES; z++)
+ shuffle_zone(z, start_pfn, end_pfn);
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
static inline bool free_pcp_prepare(struct page *page)
{
@@ -1583,6 +1753,8 @@ static int __init deferred_init_memmap(void *data)
}
pgdat_resize_unlock(pgdat, &flags);
+ shuffle_zone(zone, first_init_pfn, zone_end_pfn(zone));
+
/* Sanity check that the next zone really is unpopulated */
WARN_ON(++zid < MAX_NR_ZONES && populated_zone(++zone));
In preparation for runtime randomization of the zone lists, take all
(well, most of) the list_*() functions in the buddy allocator and put
them in helper functions. Provide a common control point for injecting
additional behavior when freeing pages.
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/mm.h | 3 --
include/linux/mm_types.h | 3 ++
include/linux/mmzone.h | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
mm/compaction.c | 4 +--
mm/page_alloc.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
5 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 588f34e4390e..9a87ab0782c3 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -473,9 +473,6 @@ static inline void vma_set_anonymous(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
struct mmu_gather;
struct inode;
-#define page_private(page) ((page)->private)
-#define set_page_private(page, v) ((page)->private = (v))
-
#if !defined(__HAVE_ARCH_PTE_DEVMAP) || !defined(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE)
static inline int pmd_devmap(pmd_t pmd)
{
diff --git a/include/linux/mm_types.h b/include/linux/mm_types.h
index cd2bc939efd0..191610be62bd 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm_types.h
@@ -209,6 +209,9 @@ struct page {
#define PAGE_FRAG_CACHE_MAX_SIZE __ALIGN_MASK(32768, ~PAGE_MASK)
#define PAGE_FRAG_CACHE_MAX_ORDER get_order(PAGE_FRAG_CACHE_MAX_SIZE)
+#define page_private(page) ((page)->private)
+#define set_page_private(page, v) ((page)->private = (v))
+
struct page_frag_cache {
void * va;
#if (PAGE_SIZE < PAGE_FRAG_CACHE_MAX_SIZE)
diff --git a/include/linux/mmzone.h b/include/linux/mmzone.h
index 8f8fc7dab5cb..adf9b3a7440d 100644
--- a/include/linux/mmzone.h
+++ b/include/linux/mmzone.h
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
#include <linux/pageblock-flags.h>
#include <linux/page-flags-layout.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/mm_types.h>
+#include <linux/page-flags.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
/* Free memory management - zoned buddy allocator. */
@@ -98,6 +100,55 @@ struct free_area {
unsigned long nr_free;
};
+/* Used for pages not on another list */
+static inline void add_to_free_area(struct page *page, struct free_area *area,
+ int migratetype)
+{
+ list_add(&page->lru, &area->free_list[migratetype]);
+ area->nr_free++;
+}
+
+/* Used for pages not on another list */
+static inline void add_to_free_area_tail(struct page *page, struct free_area *area,
+ int migratetype)
+{
+ list_add_tail(&page->lru, &area->free_list[migratetype]);
+ area->nr_free++;
+}
+
+/* Used for pages which are on another list */
+static inline void move_to_free_area(struct page *page, struct free_area *area,
+ int migratetype)
+{
+ list_move(&page->lru, &area->free_list[migratetype]);
+}
+
+static inline struct page *get_page_from_free_area(struct free_area *area,
+ int migratetype)
+{
+ return list_first_entry_or_null(&area->free_list[migratetype],
+ struct page, lru);
+}
+
+static inline void rmv_page_order(struct page *page)
+{
+ __ClearPageBuddy(page);
+ set_page_private(page, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void del_page_from_free_area(struct page *page,
+ struct free_area *area, int migratetype)
+{
+ list_del(&page->lru);
+ rmv_page_order(page);
+ area->nr_free--;
+}
+
+static inline bool free_area_empty(struct free_area *area, int migratetype)
+{
+ return list_empty(&area->free_list[migratetype]);
+}
+
struct pglist_data;
/*
diff --git a/mm/compaction.c b/mm/compaction.c
index faca45ebe62d..48736044f682 100644
--- a/mm/compaction.c
+++ b/mm/compaction.c
@@ -1358,13 +1358,13 @@ static enum compact_result __compact_finished(struct zone *zone,
bool can_steal;
/* Job done if page is free of the right migratetype */
- if (!list_empty(&area->free_list[migratetype]))
+ if (!free_area_empty(area, migratetype))
return COMPACT_SUCCESS;
#ifdef CONFIG_CMA
/* MIGRATE_MOVABLE can fallback on MIGRATE_CMA */
if (migratetype == MIGRATE_MOVABLE &&
- !list_empty(&area->free_list[MIGRATE_CMA]))
+ !free_area_empty(area, MIGRATE_CMA))
return COMPACT_SUCCESS;
#endif
/*
diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
index 2fff9e69d8f3..175f2e5f9e50 100644
--- a/mm/page_alloc.c
+++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
@@ -705,12 +705,6 @@ static inline void set_page_order(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
__SetPageBuddy(page);
}
-static inline void rmv_page_order(struct page *page)
-{
- __ClearPageBuddy(page);
- set_page_private(page, 0);
-}
-
/*
* This function checks whether a page is free && is the buddy
* we can coalesce a page and its buddy if
@@ -811,13 +805,11 @@ static inline void __free_one_page(struct page *page,
* Our buddy is free or it is CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC guard page,
* merge with it and move up one order.
*/
- if (page_is_guard(buddy)) {
+ if (page_is_guard(buddy))
clear_page_guard(zone, buddy, order, migratetype);
- } else {
- list_del(&buddy->lru);
- zone->free_area[order].nr_free--;
- rmv_page_order(buddy);
- }
+ else
+ del_page_from_free_area(buddy, &zone->free_area[order],
+ migratetype);
combined_pfn = buddy_pfn & pfn;
page = page + (combined_pfn - pfn);
pfn = combined_pfn;
@@ -867,15 +859,13 @@ static inline void __free_one_page(struct page *page,
higher_buddy = higher_page + (buddy_pfn - combined_pfn);
if (pfn_valid_within(buddy_pfn) &&
page_is_buddy(higher_page, higher_buddy, order + 1)) {
- list_add_tail(&page->lru,
- &zone->free_area[order].free_list[migratetype]);
- goto out;
+ add_to_free_area_tail(page, &zone->free_area[order],
+ migratetype);
+ return;
}
}
- list_add(&page->lru, &zone->free_area[order].free_list[migratetype]);
-out:
- zone->free_area[order].nr_free++;
+ add_to_free_area(page, &zone->free_area[order], migratetype);
}
/*
@@ -1977,7 +1967,7 @@ static inline void expand(struct zone *zone, struct page *page,
if (set_page_guard(zone, &page[size], high, migratetype))
continue;
- list_add(&page[size].lru, &area->free_list[migratetype]);
+ add_to_free_area(&page[size], area, migratetype);
area->nr_free++;
set_page_order(&page[size], high);
}
@@ -2119,13 +2109,10 @@ struct page *__rmqueue_smallest(struct zone *zone, unsigned int order,
/* Find a page of the appropriate size in the preferred list */
for (current_order = order; current_order < MAX_ORDER; ++current_order) {
area = &(zone->free_area[current_order]);
- page = list_first_entry_or_null(&area->free_list[migratetype],
- struct page, lru);
+ page = get_page_from_free_area(area, migratetype);
if (!page)
continue;
- list_del(&page->lru);
- rmv_page_order(page);
- area->nr_free--;
+ del_page_from_free_area(page, area, migratetype);
expand(zone, page, order, current_order, area, migratetype);
set_pcppage_migratetype(page, migratetype);
return page;
@@ -2215,8 +2202,7 @@ static int move_freepages(struct zone *zone,
}
order = page_order(page);
- list_move(&page->lru,
- &zone->free_area[order].free_list[migratetype]);
+ move_to_free_area(page, &zone->free_area[order], migratetype);
page += 1 << order;
pages_moved += 1 << order;
}
@@ -2365,7 +2351,7 @@ static void steal_suitable_fallback(struct zone *zone, struct page *page,
single_page:
area = &zone->free_area[current_order];
- list_move(&page->lru, &area->free_list[start_type]);
+ move_to_free_area(page, area, start_type);
}
/*
@@ -2389,7 +2375,7 @@ int find_suitable_fallback(struct free_area *area, unsigned int order,
if (fallback_mt == MIGRATE_TYPES)
break;
- if (list_empty(&area->free_list[fallback_mt]))
+ if (free_area_empty(area, fallback_mt))
continue;
if (can_steal_fallback(order, migratetype))
@@ -2476,9 +2462,7 @@ static bool unreserve_highatomic_pageblock(const struct alloc_context *ac,
for (order = 0; order < MAX_ORDER; order++) {
struct free_area *area = &(zone->free_area[order]);
- page = list_first_entry_or_null(
- &area->free_list[MIGRATE_HIGHATOMIC],
- struct page, lru);
+ page = get_page_from_free_area(area, MIGRATE_HIGHATOMIC);
if (!page)
continue;
@@ -2591,8 +2575,7 @@ __rmqueue_fallback(struct zone *zone, int order, int start_migratetype)
VM_BUG_ON(current_order == MAX_ORDER);
do_steal:
- page = list_first_entry(&area->free_list[fallback_mt],
- struct page, lru);
+ page = get_page_from_free_area(area, fallback_mt);
steal_suitable_fallback(zone, page, start_migratetype, can_steal);
@@ -3019,6 +3002,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(split_page);
int __isolate_free_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
{
+ struct free_area *area = &page_zone(page)->free_area[order];
unsigned long watermark;
struct zone *zone;
int mt;
@@ -3043,9 +3027,8 @@ int __isolate_free_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
}
/* Remove page from free list */
- list_del(&page->lru);
- zone->free_area[order].nr_free--;
- rmv_page_order(page);
+
+ del_page_from_free_area(page, area, mt);
/*
* Set the pageblock if the isolated page is at least half of a
@@ -3339,13 +3322,13 @@ bool __zone_watermark_ok(struct zone *z, unsigned int order, unsigned long mark,
continue;
for (mt = 0; mt < MIGRATE_PCPTYPES; mt++) {
- if (!list_empty(&area->free_list[mt]))
+ if (!free_area_empty(area, mt))
return true;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CMA
if ((alloc_flags & ALLOC_CMA) &&
- !list_empty(&area->free_list[MIGRATE_CMA])) {
+ !free_area_empty(area, MIGRATE_CMA)) {
return true;
}
#endif
@@ -5191,7 +5174,7 @@ void show_free_areas(unsigned int filter, nodemask_t *nodemask)
types[order] = 0;
for (type = 0; type < MIGRATE_TYPES; type++) {
- if (!list_empty(&area->free_list[type]))
+ if (!free_area_empty(area, type))
types[order] |= 1 << type;
}
}
@@ -8220,6 +8203,9 @@ __offline_isolated_pages(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn)
spin_lock_irqsave(&zone->lock, flags);
pfn = start_pfn;
while (pfn < end_pfn) {
+ struct free_area *area;
+ int mt;
+
if (!pfn_valid(pfn)) {
pfn++;
continue;
@@ -8238,13 +8224,13 @@ __offline_isolated_pages(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn)
BUG_ON(page_count(page));
BUG_ON(!PageBuddy(page));
order = page_order(page);
+ area = &zone->free_area[order];
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
pr_info("remove from free list %lx %d %lx\n",
pfn, 1 << order, end_pfn);
#endif
- list_del(&page->lru);
- rmv_page_order(page);
- zone->free_area[order].nr_free--;
+ mt = get_pageblock_migratetype(page);
+ del_page_from_free_area(page, area, mt);
for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
SetPageReserved((page+i));
pfn += (1 << order);
On Sat, 15 Sep 2018 09:23:02 -0700 Dan Williams <[email protected]> wrote:
> Data exfiltration attacks via speculative execution and
> return-oriented-programming attacks rely on the ability to infer the
> location of sensitive data objects. The kernel page allocator, has
> predictable first-in-first-out behavior for physical pages. Pages are
> freed in physical address order when first onlined. There are also
> mechanisms like CMA that can free large contiguous areas at once
> increasing the predictability of allocations in physical memory.
>
> In addition to the security implications this randomization also
> stabilizes the average performance of direct-mapped memory-side caches.
> This includes memory-side caches like the one on the Knights Landing
> processor and those generally described by the ACPI HMAT (Heterogeneous
> Memory Attributes Table [1]). Cache conflicts are spread over a random
> distribution rather than localized.
>
> Given the performance sensitivity of the page allocator this
> randomization is only performed for MAX_ORDER (4MB by default) pages. A
> kernel parameter, page_alloc.shuffle_page_order, is included to change
> the page size where randomization occurs.
>
> [1]: See ACPI 6.2 Section 5.2.27.5 Memory Side Cache Information Structure
I'm struggling to understand the justification of all of this. Are
such attacks known to exist? Or reasonably expected to exist in the
future? What is the likelihood and what is their cost? Or is this all
academic and speculative and possibly pointless?
ie, something must have motivated you to do this work rather than
<something-else>. Please spell out that motivation.
The new module parameter should be documented, please. Let's try to
help people understand why they might ever want to alter the default
and if so, what settings they should be trying.
How come we aren't also shuffling at memory hot-add time?
On Mon, Sep 17, 2018 at 4:12 PM, Andrew Morton
<[email protected]> wrote:
> On Sat, 15 Sep 2018 09:23:02 -0700 Dan Williams <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> Data exfiltration attacks via speculative execution and
>> return-oriented-programming attacks rely on the ability to infer the
>> location of sensitive data objects. The kernel page allocator, has
>> predictable first-in-first-out behavior for physical pages. Pages are
>> freed in physical address order when first onlined. There are also
>> mechanisms like CMA that can free large contiguous areas at once
>> increasing the predictability of allocations in physical memory.
>>
>> In addition to the security implications this randomization also
>> stabilizes the average performance of direct-mapped memory-side caches.
>> This includes memory-side caches like the one on the Knights Landing
>> processor and those generally described by the ACPI HMAT (Heterogeneous
>> Memory Attributes Table [1]). Cache conflicts are spread over a random
>> distribution rather than localized.
>>
>> Given the performance sensitivity of the page allocator this
>> randomization is only performed for MAX_ORDER (4MB by default) pages. A
>> kernel parameter, page_alloc.shuffle_page_order, is included to change
>> the page size where randomization occurs.
>>
>> [1]: See ACPI 6.2 Section 5.2.27.5 Memory Side Cache Information Structure
>
> I'm struggling to understand the justification of all of this. Are
> such attacks known to exist? Or reasonably expected to exist in the
> future? What is the likelihood and what is their cost? Or is this all
> academic and speculative and possibly pointless?
While we already have a base-address randomization
(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY), attacks against the same hardware and
memory layouts would certainly be using the predictability of
allocation ordering (i.e. for attacks where the base address isn't
important: only the relative positions between allocated memory). This
is common in lots of heap-style attacks. They try to gain control over
ordering by spraying allocations, etc.
I'd really like to see this because it gives us something similar to
CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM but for the page allocator. (This may be
worth mentioning in the series, especially as a comparison to its
behavior and this.)
> ie, something must have motivated you to do this work rather than
> <something-else>. Please spell out that motivation.
I'd be curious to hear more about the mentioned cache performance
improvements. I love it when a security feature actually _improves_
performance. :)
Thanks for working on this!
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email protected] <linux-kernel-
> [email protected]> On Behalf Of Kees Cook
> Sent: Friday, September 21, 2018 2:13 PM
> Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] mm: Randomize free memory
...
> I'd be curious to hear more about the mentioned cache performance
> improvements. I love it when a security feature actually _improves_
> performance. :)
It's been a problem in the HPC space:
http://www.nersc.gov/research-and-development/knl-cache-mode-performance-coe/
A kernel module called zonesort is available to try to help:
https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/xeon-phi-software
and this abandoned patch series proposed that for the kernel:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/8/23/195
Dan's patch series doesn't attempt to ensure buffers won't conflict, but
also reduces the chance that the buffers will. This will make performance
more consistent, albeit slower than "optimal" (which is near impossible
to attain in a general-purpose kernel). That's better than forcing
users to deploy remedies like:
"To eliminate this gradual degradation, we have added a Stream
measurement to the Node Health Check that follows each job;
nodes are rebooted whenever their measured memory bandwidth
falls below 300 GB/s."
---
Robert Elliott, HPE Persistent Memory
On Fri, Sep 21, 2018 at 4:51 PM Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: [email protected] <linux-kernel-
> > [email protected]> On Behalf Of Kees Cook
> > Sent: Friday, September 21, 2018 2:13 PM
> > Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] mm: Randomize free memory
> ...
> > I'd be curious to hear more about the mentioned cache performance
> > improvements. I love it when a security feature actually _improves_
> > performance. :)
>
> It's been a problem in the HPC space:
> http://www.nersc.gov/research-and-development/knl-cache-mode-performance-coe/
>
> A kernel module called zonesort is available to try to help:
> https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/xeon-phi-software
>
> and this abandoned patch series proposed that for the kernel:
> https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/8/23/195
>
> Dan's patch series doesn't attempt to ensure buffers won't conflict, but
> also reduces the chance that the buffers will. This will make performance
> more consistent, albeit slower than "optimal" (which is near impossible
> to attain in a general-purpose kernel). That's better than forcing
> users to deploy remedies like:
> "To eliminate this gradual degradation, we have added a Stream
> measurement to the Node Health Check that follows each job;
> nodes are rebooted whenever their measured memory bandwidth
> falls below 300 GB/s."
Robert, thanks for that! Yes, instead of run-to-run variations
alternating between almost-never-conflict and nearly-always-conflict,
we'll get a random / average distribution of cache conflicts.
On Sat 15-09-18 09:23:02, Dan Williams wrote:
> Data exfiltration attacks via speculative execution and
> return-oriented-programming attacks rely on the ability to infer the
> location of sensitive data objects. The kernel page allocator, has
> predictable first-in-first-out behavior for physical pages. Pages are
> freed in physical address order when first onlined. There are also
> mechanisms like CMA that can free large contiguous areas at once
> increasing the predictability of allocations in physical memory.
>
> In addition to the security implications this randomization also
> stabilizes the average performance of direct-mapped memory-side caches.
> This includes memory-side caches like the one on the Knights Landing
> processor and those generally described by the ACPI HMAT (Heterogeneous
> Memory Attributes Table [1]). Cache conflicts are spread over a random
> distribution rather than localized.
>
> Given the performance sensitivity of the page allocator this
> randomization is only performed for MAX_ORDER (4MB by default) pages. A
> kernel parameter, page_alloc.shuffle_page_order, is included to change
> the page size where randomization occurs.
I have only glanced through the implementation. The boot allocator part
seems unexpectedly too large but I haven't tried to actually think about
simplification.
It is the more general idea that I am not really sure about. First of
all. Does it make _any_ sense to randomize 4MB blocks by default? Why
cannot we simply have it disabled? Then and more concerning question is,
does it even make sense to have this randomization applied to higher
orders than 0? Attacker might fragment the memory and keep recycling the
lowest order and get the predictable behavior that we have right now.
--
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs