The [ip,ip6,arp]_tables use x_tables_info internally and the underlying
memory is already accounted to kmemcg. Do the same for ebtables. The
syzbot, by using setsockopt(EBT_SO_SET_ENTRIES), was able to OOM the
whole system from a restricted memcg, a potential DoS.
By accounting the ebt_table_info, the memory used for ebt_table_info can
be contained within the memcg of the allocating process. However the
lifetime of ebt_table_info is independent of the allocating process and
is tied to the network namespace. So, the oom-killer will not be able to
relieve the memory pressure due to ebt_table_info memory. The memory for
ebt_table_info is allocated through vmalloc. Currently vmalloc does not
handle the oom-killed allocating process correctly and one large
allocation can bypass memcg limit enforcement. So, with this patch,
at least the small allocations will be contained. For large allocations,
we need to fix vmalloc.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Cc: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <[email protected]>
Cc: Roopa Prabhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Linux MM <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: LKML <[email protected]>
---
Changelog since v1:
- More descriptive commit message.
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
index 491828713e0b..5e55cef0cec3 100644
--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
+++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
@@ -1137,14 +1137,16 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name) - 1] = 0;
countersize = COUNTER_OFFSET(tmp.nentries) * nr_cpu_ids;
- newinfo = vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize);
+ newinfo = __vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
+ PAGE_KERNEL);
if (!newinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
if (countersize)
memset(newinfo->counters, 0, countersize);
- newinfo->entries = vmalloc(tmp.entries_size);
+ newinfo->entries = __vmalloc(tmp.entries_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
+ PAGE_KERNEL);
if (!newinfo->entries) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto free_newinfo;
--
2.20.1.415.g653613c723-goog
> On Jan 2, 2019, at 8:14 PM, Shakeel Butt <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> countersize = COUNTER_OFFSET(tmp.nentries) * nr_cpu_ids;
> - newinfo = vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize);
> + newinfo = __vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
> + PAGE_KERNEL);
> if (!newinfo)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> if (countersize)
> memset(newinfo->counters, 0, countersize);
>
> - newinfo->entries = vmalloc(tmp.entries_size);
> + newinfo->entries = __vmalloc(tmp.entries_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
> + PAGE_KERNEL);
> if (!newinfo->entries) {
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> goto free_newinfo;
> --
Just out of curiosity, what are the actual sizes of these areas in typical use
given __vmalloc() will be allocating by the page?
On Thu, Jan 3, 2019 at 2:15 AM William Kucharski
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Jan 2, 2019, at 8:14 PM, Shakeel Butt <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > countersize = COUNTER_OFFSET(tmp.nentries) * nr_cpu_ids;
> > - newinfo = vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize);
> > + newinfo = __vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
> > + PAGE_KERNEL);
> > if (!newinfo)
> > return -ENOMEM;
> >
> > if (countersize)
> > memset(newinfo->counters, 0, countersize);
> >
> > - newinfo->entries = vmalloc(tmp.entries_size);
> > + newinfo->entries = __vmalloc(tmp.entries_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
> > + PAGE_KERNEL);
> > if (!newinfo->entries) {
> > ret = -ENOMEM;
> > goto free_newinfo;
> > --
>
> Just out of curiosity, what are the actual sizes of these areas in typical use
> given __vmalloc() will be allocating by the page?
>
We don't really use this in production, so, I don't have a good idea
of the size in the typical case. The size depends on the workload. The
motivation behind this patch was the system OOM triggered by a syzbot
running in a restricted memcg.
Shakeel
On 03.01.2019 06:14, Shakeel Butt wrote:
> The [ip,ip6,arp]_tables use x_tables_info internally and the underlying
> memory is already accounted to kmemcg. Do the same for ebtables. The
> syzbot, by using setsockopt(EBT_SO_SET_ENTRIES), was able to OOM the
> whole system from a restricted memcg, a potential DoS.
>
> By accounting the ebt_table_info, the memory used for ebt_table_info can
> be contained within the memcg of the allocating process. However the
> lifetime of ebt_table_info is independent of the allocating process and
> is tied to the network namespace. So, the oom-killer will not be able to
> relieve the memory pressure due to ebt_table_info memory. The memory for
> ebt_table_info is allocated through vmalloc. Currently vmalloc does not
> handle the oom-killed allocating process correctly and one large
> allocation can bypass memcg limit enforcement. So, with this patch,
> at least the small allocations will be contained. For large allocations,
> we need to fix vmalloc.
>
> Reported-by: [email protected]
> Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
> Cc: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
> Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
> Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <[email protected]>
> Cc: Roopa Prabhu <[email protected]>
> Cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
> Cc: Linux MM <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: LKML <[email protected]>
> ---
> Changelog since v1:
> - More descriptive commit message.
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
>
> net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 6 ++++--
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
> index 491828713e0b..5e55cef0cec3 100644
> --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
> +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
> @@ -1137,14 +1137,16 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
> tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name) - 1] = 0;
>
> countersize = COUNTER_OFFSET(tmp.nentries) * nr_cpu_ids;
> - newinfo = vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize);
> + newinfo = __vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
> + PAGE_KERNEL);
> if (!newinfo)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> if (countersize)
> memset(newinfo->counters, 0, countersize);
>
> - newinfo->entries = vmalloc(tmp.entries_size);
> + newinfo->entries = __vmalloc(tmp.entries_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
> + PAGE_KERNEL);
> if (!newinfo->entries) {
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> goto free_newinfo;
>
On Wed, Jan 02, 2019 at 07:14:31PM -0800, Shakeel Butt wrote:
> The [ip,ip6,arp]_tables use x_tables_info internally and the underlying
> memory is already accounted to kmemcg. Do the same for ebtables. The
> syzbot, by using setsockopt(EBT_SO_SET_ENTRIES), was able to OOM the
> whole system from a restricted memcg, a potential DoS.
>
> By accounting the ebt_table_info, the memory used for ebt_table_info can
> be contained within the memcg of the allocating process. However the
> lifetime of ebt_table_info is independent of the allocating process and
> is tied to the network namespace. So, the oom-killer will not be able to
> relieve the memory pressure due to ebt_table_info memory. The memory for
> ebt_table_info is allocated through vmalloc. Currently vmalloc does not
> handle the oom-killed allocating process correctly and one large
> allocation can bypass memcg limit enforcement. So, with this patch,
> at least the small allocations will be contained. For large allocations,
> we need to fix vmalloc.
Fine with this -mm?
If no objections, I'll apply this to the netfilter tree. Thanks.
> Reported-by: [email protected]
> Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
> Cc: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
> Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
> Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <[email protected]>
> Cc: Roopa Prabhu <[email protected]>
> Cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
> Cc: Linux MM <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: LKML <[email protected]>
> ---
> Changelog since v1:
> - More descriptive commit message.
>
> net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 6 ++++--
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
> index 491828713e0b..5e55cef0cec3 100644
> --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
> +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
> @@ -1137,14 +1137,16 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
> tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name) - 1] = 0;
>
> countersize = COUNTER_OFFSET(tmp.nentries) * nr_cpu_ids;
> - newinfo = vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize);
> + newinfo = __vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
> + PAGE_KERNEL);
> if (!newinfo)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> if (countersize)
> memset(newinfo->counters, 0, countersize);
>
> - newinfo->entries = vmalloc(tmp.entries_size);
> + newinfo->entries = __vmalloc(tmp.entries_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
> + PAGE_KERNEL);
> if (!newinfo->entries) {
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> goto free_newinfo;
> --
> 2.20.1.415.g653613c723-goog
>
On Thu 10-01-19 12:22:09, Kirill Tkhai wrote:
[...]
> >> diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
> >> index 491828713e0b..5e55cef0cec3 100644
> >> --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
> >> +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
> >> @@ -1137,14 +1137,16 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
> >> tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name) - 1] = 0;
> >>
> >> countersize = COUNTER_OFFSET(tmp.nentries) * nr_cpu_ids;
> >> - newinfo = vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize);
> >> + newinfo = __vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
> >> + PAGE_KERNEL);
>
> Do we need GFP_HIGHMEM here?
No. vmalloc adds __GPF_HIGHMEM implicitly (see __vmalloc_area_node).
--
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs
On 10.01.2019 12:41, Michal Hocko wrote:
> On Thu 10-01-19 12:22:09, Kirill Tkhai wrote:
> [...]
>>>> diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
>>>> index 491828713e0b..5e55cef0cec3 100644
>>>> --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
>>>> +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
>>>> @@ -1137,14 +1137,16 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
>>>> tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name) - 1] = 0;
>>>>
>>>> countersize = COUNTER_OFFSET(tmp.nentries) * nr_cpu_ids;
>>>> - newinfo = vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize);
>>>> + newinfo = __vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
>>>> + PAGE_KERNEL);
>>
>> Do we need GFP_HIGHMEM here?
>
> No. vmalloc adds __GPF_HIGHMEM implicitly (see __vmalloc_area_node).
Then OK, thanks for the explanation.
Kirill
On 06.01.2019 14:00, Kirill Tkhai wrote:
> On 03.01.2019 06:14, Shakeel Butt wrote:
>> The [ip,ip6,arp]_tables use x_tables_info internally and the underlying
>> memory is already accounted to kmemcg. Do the same for ebtables. The
>> syzbot, by using setsockopt(EBT_SO_SET_ENTRIES), was able to OOM the
>> whole system from a restricted memcg, a potential DoS.
>>
>> By accounting the ebt_table_info, the memory used for ebt_table_info can
>> be contained within the memcg of the allocating process. However the
>> lifetime of ebt_table_info is independent of the allocating process and
>> is tied to the network namespace. So, the oom-killer will not be able to
>> relieve the memory pressure due to ebt_table_info memory. The memory for
>> ebt_table_info is allocated through vmalloc. Currently vmalloc does not
>> handle the oom-killed allocating process correctly and one large
>> allocation can bypass memcg limit enforcement. So, with this patch,
>> at least the small allocations will be contained. For large allocations,
>> we need to fix vmalloc.
>>
>> Reported-by: [email protected]
>> Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Roopa Prabhu <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Linux MM <[email protected]>
>> Cc: [email protected]
>> Cc: [email protected]
>> Cc: [email protected]
>> Cc: LKML <[email protected]>
>> ---
>> Changelog since v1:
>> - More descriptive commit message.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
>
>>
>> net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 6 ++++--
>> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
>> index 491828713e0b..5e55cef0cec3 100644
>> --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
>> +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
>> @@ -1137,14 +1137,16 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
>> tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name) - 1] = 0;
>>
>> countersize = COUNTER_OFFSET(tmp.nentries) * nr_cpu_ids;
>> - newinfo = vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize);
>> + newinfo = __vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
>> + PAGE_KERNEL);
Do we need GFP_HIGHMEM here?
>> if (!newinfo)
>> return -ENOMEM;
>>
>> if (countersize)
>> memset(newinfo->counters, 0, countersize);
>>
>> - newinfo->entries = vmalloc(tmp.entries_size);
>> + newinfo->entries = __vmalloc(tmp.entries_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
>> + PAGE_KERNEL);
>> if (!newinfo->entries) {
>> ret = -ENOMEM;
>> goto free_newinfo;
>>
>
On Wed, Jan 02, 2019 at 07:14:31PM -0800, Shakeel Butt wrote:
> The [ip,ip6,arp]_tables use x_tables_info internally and the underlying
> memory is already accounted to kmemcg. Do the same for ebtables. The
> syzbot, by using setsockopt(EBT_SO_SET_ENTRIES), was able to OOM the
> whole system from a restricted memcg, a potential DoS.
>
> By accounting the ebt_table_info, the memory used for ebt_table_info can
> be contained within the memcg of the allocating process. However the
> lifetime of ebt_table_info is independent of the allocating process and
> is tied to the network namespace. So, the oom-killer will not be able to
> relieve the memory pressure due to ebt_table_info memory. The memory for
> ebt_table_info is allocated through vmalloc. Currently vmalloc does not
> handle the oom-killed allocating process correctly and one large
> allocation can bypass memcg limit enforcement. So, with this patch,
> at least the small allocations will be contained. For large allocations,
> we need to fix vmalloc.
OK, patch is applied, thanks.