When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs,
out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.
[ 38.402878] c7 1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[ 38.402891] c7 1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
[ 38.402935] c7 1827 Call trace:
[ 38.402952] c7 1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
[ 38.402966] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[ 38.402981] c7 1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
[ 38.402995] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
[ 38.403009] c7 1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
[ 38.403022] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
[ 38.403037] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
[ 38.403051] c7 1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[ 38.403066] c7 1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
[ 38.403080] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
[ 38.403096] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
[ 38.403109] c7 1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
[ 38.403123] c7 1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
[ 38.403136] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
[ 38.403149] c7 1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
[ 38.403163] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
[ 38.403177] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
[ 38.403190] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
[ 38.403203] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
[ 38.403216] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
[ 38.403229] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
[ 38.403241] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
Bug: 126558260
Signed-off-by: Randall Huang <[email protected]>
---
v2:
* return EFAULT if OOB error is detected
v3:
* fix typo in setxattr()
v4:
* change boundry definition
v5:
* revise boundry definition
---
fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
index 848a785abe25..587429e29a69 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
@@ -202,12 +202,18 @@ static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index)
return handler;
}
-static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr, int index,
- size_t len, const char *name)
+static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
+ void *last_base_addr, int index,
+ size_t len, const char *name)
{
struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
+ if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
+ (void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) +
+ sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr)
+ return NULL;
+
if (entry->e_name_index != index)
continue;
if (entry->e_name_len != len)
@@ -298,6 +304,7 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
void **base_addr, int *base_size)
{
void *cur_addr, *txattr_addr, *last_addr = NULL;
+ void *last_txattr_addr = NULL;
nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
unsigned int size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
if (!txattr_addr)
return -ENOMEM;
+ last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + inline_size + size;
+
/* read from inline xattr */
if (inline_size) {
err = read_inline_xattr(inode, ipage, txattr_addr);
@@ -337,7 +346,11 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
else
cur_addr = txattr_addr;
- *xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, index, len, name);
+ *xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, last_txattr_addr, index, len, name);
+ if (!*xe) {
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
check:
if (IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(*xe)) {
err = -ENODATA;
@@ -581,10 +594,14 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
struct page *ipage, int flags)
{
struct f2fs_xattr_entry *here, *last;
- void *base_addr;
+ void *base_addr, *last_base_addr = NULL;
int found, newsize;
size_t len;
__u32 new_hsize;
+ nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
+ unsigned int xattr_nid_size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
+ unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
+
int error = 0;
if (name == NULL)
@@ -604,9 +621,14 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
error = read_all_xattrs(inode, ipage, &base_addr);
if (error)
return error;
+ last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + xattr_nid_size + inline_size;
/* find entry with wanted name. */
- here = __find_xattr(base_addr, index, len, name);
+ here = __find_xattr(base_addr, last_base_addr, index, len, name);
+ if (!here) {
+ error = -EFAULT;
+ goto exit;
+ }
found = IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(here) ? 0 : 1;
--
2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog
On 2019/4/11 16:26, Randall Huang wrote:
> When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
> if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs,
> out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
> Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.
>
> [ 38.402878] c7 1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
> [ 38.402891] c7 1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
> [ 38.402935] c7 1827 Call trace:
> [ 38.402952] c7 1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
> [ 38.402966] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
> [ 38.402981] c7 1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
> [ 38.402995] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
> [ 38.403009] c7 1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
> [ 38.403022] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
> [ 38.403037] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
> [ 38.403051] c7 1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
> [ 38.403066] c7 1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
> [ 38.403080] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
> [ 38.403096] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
> [ 38.403109] c7 1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
> [ 38.403123] c7 1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
> [ 38.403136] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
> [ 38.403149] c7 1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
> [ 38.403163] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
> [ 38.403177] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
> [ 38.403190] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
> [ 38.403203] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
> [ 38.403216] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
> [ 38.403229] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
> [ 38.403241] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
>
> Bug: 126558260
>
> Signed-off-by: Randall Huang <[email protected]>
Looks good to me now. :)
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
> + unsigned int xattr_nid_size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
Nitpick, xnode_size or xattr_node_size will be better than xattr_nid_size?
Maybe Jaegeuk can help to change this when merging this patch, no new version
patch needed.
Thanks,
On 04/11, Randall Huang wrote:
> When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
> if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs,
> out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
> Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.
>
> [ 38.402878] c7 1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
> [ 38.402891] c7 1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
> [ 38.402935] c7 1827 Call trace:
> [ 38.402952] c7 1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
> [ 38.402966] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
> [ 38.402981] c7 1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
> [ 38.402995] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
> [ 38.403009] c7 1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
> [ 38.403022] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
> [ 38.403037] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
> [ 38.403051] c7 1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
> [ 38.403066] c7 1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
> [ 38.403080] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
> [ 38.403096] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
> [ 38.403109] c7 1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
> [ 38.403123] c7 1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
> [ 38.403136] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
> [ 38.403149] c7 1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
> [ 38.403163] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
> [ 38.403177] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
> [ 38.403190] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
> [ 38.403203] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
> [ 38.403216] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
> [ 38.403229] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
> [ 38.403241] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
>
> Bug: 126558260
>
> Signed-off-by: Randall Huang <[email protected]>
> ---
> v2:
> * return EFAULT if OOB error is detected
>
> v3:
> * fix typo in setxattr()
>
> v4:
> * change boundry definition
>
> v5:
> * revise boundry definition
> ---
> fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
> index 848a785abe25..587429e29a69 100644
> --- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
> +++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
> @@ -202,12 +202,18 @@ static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index)
> return handler;
> }
>
> -static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr, int index,
> - size_t len, const char *name)
> +static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
> + void *last_base_addr, int index,
> + size_t len, const char *name)
> {
> struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
>
> list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
> + if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
> + (void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) +
> + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr)
> + return NULL;
> +
> if (entry->e_name_index != index)
> continue;
> if (entry->e_name_len != len)
> @@ -298,6 +304,7 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
> void **base_addr, int *base_size)
> {
> void *cur_addr, *txattr_addr, *last_addr = NULL;
> + void *last_txattr_addr = NULL;
> nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
> unsigned int size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
> unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
> @@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
> if (!txattr_addr)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> + last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + inline_size + size;
I just found this should be + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE. Otherwise, generic/026 fails.
Let me know, if there is any other concern below.
---
fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 12 ++++--------
fs/f2fs/xattr.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
index 019778fb9a0d..cd199a09d436 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
@@ -306,19 +306,18 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
void *cur_addr, *txattr_addr, *last_addr = NULL;
void *last_txattr_addr = NULL;
nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
- unsigned int size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
int err = 0;
- if (!size && !inline_size)
+ if (!xnid && !inline_size)
return -ENODATA;
- *base_size = inline_size + size + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE;
+ *base_size = XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode);
txattr_addr = f2fs_kzalloc(F2FS_I_SB(inode), *base_size, GFP_NOFS);
if (!txattr_addr)
return -ENOMEM;
- last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + inline_size + size;
+ last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + *base_size;
/* read from inline xattr */
if (inline_size) {
@@ -599,9 +598,6 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
size_t len;
__u32 new_hsize;
nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
- unsigned int xnode_size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
- unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
-
int error = 0;
if (name == NULL)
@@ -621,7 +617,7 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
error = read_all_xattrs(inode, ipage, &base_addr);
if (error)
return error;
- last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + xnode_size + inline_size;
+ last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode);
/* find entry with wanted name. */
here = __find_xattr(base_addr, last_base_addr, index, len, name);
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.h b/fs/f2fs/xattr.h
index 9172ee082ca8..1eca1a2d996a 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.h
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ struct f2fs_xattr_entry {
entry = XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry))
#define VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct node_footer))
#define XATTR_PADDING_SIZE (sizeof(__u32))
+#define XATTR_SIZE(x,i) (((x) ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0) + \
+ (inline_xattr_size(i)) + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE)
#define MIN_OFFSET(i) XATTR_ALIGN(inline_xattr_size(i) + \
VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE)
--
2.19.0.605.g01d371f741-goog
On 2019/5/9 12:15, Jaegeuk Kim wrote:
> On 04/11, Randall Huang wrote:
>> When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
>> if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs,
>> out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
>> Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.
>>
>> [ 38.402878] c7 1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
>> [ 38.402891] c7 1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
>> [ 38.402935] c7 1827 Call trace:
>> [ 38.402952] c7 1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
>> [ 38.402966] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
>> [ 38.402981] c7 1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
>> [ 38.402995] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
>> [ 38.403009] c7 1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
>> [ 38.403022] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
>> [ 38.403037] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
>> [ 38.403051] c7 1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
>> [ 38.403066] c7 1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
>> [ 38.403080] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
>> [ 38.403096] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
>> [ 38.403109] c7 1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
>> [ 38.403123] c7 1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
>> [ 38.403136] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
>> [ 38.403149] c7 1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
>> [ 38.403163] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
>> [ 38.403177] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
>> [ 38.403190] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
>> [ 38.403203] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
>> [ 38.403216] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
>> [ 38.403229] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
>> [ 38.403241] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
>>
>> Bug: 126558260
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Randall Huang <[email protected]>
>> ---
>> v2:
>> * return EFAULT if OOB error is detected
>>
>> v3:
>> * fix typo in setxattr()
>>
>> v4:
>> * change boundry definition
>>
>> v5:
>> * revise boundry definition
>> ---
>> fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>> 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
>> index 848a785abe25..587429e29a69 100644
>> --- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
>> +++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
>> @@ -202,12 +202,18 @@ static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index)
>> return handler;
>> }
>>
>> -static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr, int index,
>> - size_t len, const char *name)
>> +static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
>> + void *last_base_addr, int index,
>> + size_t len, const char *name)
>> {
>> struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
>>
>> list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
>> + if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
>> + (void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) +
>> + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr)
>> + return NULL;
>> +
>> if (entry->e_name_index != index)
>> continue;
>> if (entry->e_name_len != len)
>> @@ -298,6 +304,7 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
>> void **base_addr, int *base_size)
>> {
>> void *cur_addr, *txattr_addr, *last_addr = NULL;
>> + void *last_txattr_addr = NULL;
>> nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
>> unsigned int size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
>> unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
>> @@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
>> if (!txattr_addr)
>> return -ENOMEM;
>>
>> + last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + inline_size + size;
>
> I just found this should be + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE. Otherwise, generic/026 fails.
> Let me know, if there is any other concern below.
We're trying to use [txattr_addr, last_txattr_addr] to indicate valid range of
xattr datas, any valid entries across the boundary is not allowed, so I think
it's correct to exclude padding space for last_txattr_addr.
I added log and tested generic/026, found that:
[365804.868431] base:ffff89e391f8e000, last:ffff89e391f8f0b0
[365804.868433] entry:ffff89e391f8e018, next:ffff89e391f8f0b0
The root cause of this issue is caused by below condition:
(void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) +
sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr)
It occurs when the end address of last valid entry is located in range
(last_base_addr - XATTR_PADDING_SIZE, last_base_addr], then next invalid entry's
head will across last_base_addr, result in returning -EFAULT.
So anyway, please try below diff instead. ;)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
index 019778fb9a0d..217bf7c2bb7a 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
@@ -210,10 +210,8 @@ static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
- (void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) +
- sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr)
+ (void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) > last_base_addr)
return NULL;
if (entry->e_name_index != index)
Thanks,
>
> ---
> fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 12 ++++--------
> fs/f2fs/xattr.h | 2 ++
> 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
> index 019778fb9a0d..cd199a09d436 100644
> --- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
> +++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
> @@ -306,19 +306,18 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
> void *cur_addr, *txattr_addr, *last_addr = NULL;
> void *last_txattr_addr = NULL;
> nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
> - unsigned int size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
> unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
> int err = 0;
>
> - if (!size && !inline_size)
> + if (!xnid && !inline_size)
> return -ENODATA;
>
> - *base_size = inline_size + size + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE;
> + *base_size = XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode);
> txattr_addr = f2fs_kzalloc(F2FS_I_SB(inode), *base_size, GFP_NOFS);
> if (!txattr_addr)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> - last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + inline_size + size;
> + last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + *base_size;
>
> /* read from inline xattr */
> if (inline_size) {
> @@ -599,9 +598,6 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
> size_t len;
> __u32 new_hsize;
> nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
> - unsigned int xnode_size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
> - unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
> -
> int error = 0;
>
> if (name == NULL)
> @@ -621,7 +617,7 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
> error = read_all_xattrs(inode, ipage, &base_addr);
> if (error)
> return error;
> - last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + xnode_size + inline_size;
> + last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode);
>
> /* find entry with wanted name. */
> here = __find_xattr(base_addr, last_base_addr, index, len, name);
> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.h b/fs/f2fs/xattr.h
> index 9172ee082ca8..1eca1a2d996a 100644
> --- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.h
> +++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.h
> @@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ struct f2fs_xattr_entry {
> entry = XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry))
> #define VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct node_footer))
> #define XATTR_PADDING_SIZE (sizeof(__u32))
> +#define XATTR_SIZE(x,i) (((x) ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0) + \
> + (inline_xattr_size(i)) + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE)
> #define MIN_OFFSET(i) XATTR_ALIGN(inline_xattr_size(i) + \
> VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE)
>
>
On 05/09, Chao Yu wrote:
> On 2019/5/9 12:15, Jaegeuk Kim wrote:
> > On 04/11, Randall Huang wrote:
> >> When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
> >> if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs,
> >> out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
> >> Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.
> >>
> >> [ 38.402878] c7 1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
> >> [ 38.402891] c7 1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
> >> [ 38.402935] c7 1827 Call trace:
> >> [ 38.402952] c7 1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
> >> [ 38.402966] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
> >> [ 38.402981] c7 1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
> >> [ 38.402995] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
> >> [ 38.403009] c7 1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
> >> [ 38.403022] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
> >> [ 38.403037] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
> >> [ 38.403051] c7 1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
> >> [ 38.403066] c7 1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
> >> [ 38.403080] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
> >> [ 38.403096] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
> >> [ 38.403109] c7 1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
> >> [ 38.403123] c7 1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
> >> [ 38.403136] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
> >> [ 38.403149] c7 1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
> >> [ 38.403163] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
> >> [ 38.403177] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
> >> [ 38.403190] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
> >> [ 38.403203] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
> >> [ 38.403216] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
> >> [ 38.403229] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
> >> [ 38.403241] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
> >>
> >> Bug: 126558260
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Randall Huang <[email protected]>
> >> ---
> >> v2:
> >> * return EFAULT if OOB error is detected
> >>
> >> v3:
> >> * fix typo in setxattr()
> >>
> >> v4:
> >> * change boundry definition
> >>
> >> v5:
> >> * revise boundry definition
> >> ---
> >> fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> >> 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
> >> index 848a785abe25..587429e29a69 100644
> >> --- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
> >> +++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
> >> @@ -202,12 +202,18 @@ static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index)
> >> return handler;
> >> }
> >>
> >> -static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr, int index,
> >> - size_t len, const char *name)
> >> +static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
> >> + void *last_base_addr, int index,
> >> + size_t len, const char *name)
> >> {
> >> struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
> >>
> >> list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
> >> + if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
> >> + (void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) +
> >> + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr)
> >> + return NULL;
> >> +
> >> if (entry->e_name_index != index)
> >> continue;
> >> if (entry->e_name_len != len)
> >> @@ -298,6 +304,7 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
> >> void **base_addr, int *base_size)
> >> {
> >> void *cur_addr, *txattr_addr, *last_addr = NULL;
> >> + void *last_txattr_addr = NULL;
> >> nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
> >> unsigned int size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
> >> unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
> >> @@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
> >> if (!txattr_addr)
> >> return -ENOMEM;
> >>
> >> + last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + inline_size + size;
> >
> > I just found this should be + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE. Otherwise, generic/026 fails.
> > Let me know, if there is any other concern below.
>
> We're trying to use [txattr_addr, last_txattr_addr] to indicate valid range of
> xattr datas, any valid entries across the boundary is not allowed, so I think
> it's correct to exclude padding space for last_txattr_addr.
Okay, how about this?
From 2777e654371dd4207a3a7f4fb5fa39550053a080 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Randall Huang <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 16:26:46 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: fix to avoid accessing xattr across the boundary
When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs,
out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.
[ 38.402878] c7 1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[ 38.402891] c7 1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
[ 38.402935] c7 1827 Call trace:
[ 38.402952] c7 1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
[ 38.402966] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[ 38.402981] c7 1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
[ 38.402995] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
[ 38.403009] c7 1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
[ 38.403022] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
[ 38.403037] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
[ 38.403051] c7 1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[ 38.403066] c7 1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
[ 38.403080] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
[ 38.403096] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
[ 38.403109] c7 1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
[ 38.403123] c7 1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
[ 38.403136] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
[ 38.403149] c7 1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
[ 38.403163] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
[ 38.403177] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
[ 38.403190] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
[ 38.403203] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
[ 38.403216] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
[ 38.403229] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
[ 38.403241] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
Signed-off-by: Randall Huang <[email protected]>
[Jaegeuk Kim: Fix wrong ending boundary]
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
fs/f2fs/xattr.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
index 848a785abe25..e791741d193b 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
@@ -202,12 +202,17 @@ static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index)
return handler;
}
-static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr, int index,
- size_t len, const char *name)
+static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
+ void *last_base_addr, int index,
+ size_t len, const char *name)
{
struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
+ if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
+ (void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) > last_base_addr)
+ return NULL;
+
if (entry->e_name_index != index)
continue;
if (entry->e_name_len != len)
@@ -297,20 +302,22 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
const char *name, struct f2fs_xattr_entry **xe,
void **base_addr, int *base_size)
{
- void *cur_addr, *txattr_addr, *last_addr = NULL;
+ void *cur_addr, *txattr_addr, *last_txattr_addr;
+ void *last_addr = NULL;
nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
- unsigned int size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
int err = 0;
- if (!size && !inline_size)
+ if (!xnid && !inline_size)
return -ENODATA;
- *base_size = inline_size + size + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE;
+ *base_size = XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode) + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE;
txattr_addr = f2fs_kzalloc(F2FS_I_SB(inode), *base_size, GFP_NOFS);
if (!txattr_addr)
return -ENOMEM;
+ last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode);
+
/* read from inline xattr */
if (inline_size) {
err = read_inline_xattr(inode, ipage, txattr_addr);
@@ -337,7 +344,11 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
else
cur_addr = txattr_addr;
- *xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, index, len, name);
+ *xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, last_txattr_addr, index, len, name);
+ if (!*xe) {
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
check:
if (IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(*xe)) {
err = -ENODATA;
@@ -581,7 +592,8 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
struct page *ipage, int flags)
{
struct f2fs_xattr_entry *here, *last;
- void *base_addr;
+ void *base_addr, *last_base_addr;
+ nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
int found, newsize;
size_t len;
__u32 new_hsize;
@@ -605,8 +617,14 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
if (error)
return error;
+ last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode);
+
/* find entry with wanted name. */
- here = __find_xattr(base_addr, index, len, name);
+ here = __find_xattr(base_addr, last_base_addr, index, len, name);
+ if (!here) {
+ error = -EFAULT;
+ goto exit;
+ }
found = IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(here) ? 0 : 1;
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.h b/fs/f2fs/xattr.h
index 9172ee082ca8..a90920e2f949 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.h
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ struct f2fs_xattr_entry {
entry = XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry))
#define VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct node_footer))
#define XATTR_PADDING_SIZE (sizeof(__u32))
+#define XATTR_SIZE(x,i) (((x) ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0) + \
+ (inline_xattr_size(i)))
#define MIN_OFFSET(i) XATTR_ALIGN(inline_xattr_size(i) + \
VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE)
--
2.19.0.605.g01d371f741-goog
On 2019/5/10 0:48, Jaegeuk Kim wrote:
> Okay, how about this?
>
>>From 2777e654371dd4207a3a7f4fb5fa39550053a080 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Randall Huang <[email protected]>
> Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 16:26:46 +0800
> Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: fix to avoid accessing xattr across the boundary
Looks good to me, and more clean. :)
Thanks,