This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.121 release.
There are 63 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed 22 May 2019 11:50:54 AM UTC.
Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.121-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 4.14.121-rc1
zhangyi (F) <[email protected]>
ext4: fix compile error when using BUFFER_TRACE
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
iov_iter: optimize page_copy_sane()
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: x86: Skip EFER vs. guest CPUID checks for host-initiated writes
Michał Wadowski <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda/realtek - Fix for Lenovo B50-70 inverted internal microphone bug
Sahitya Tummala <[email protected]>
ext4: fix use-after-free in dx_release()
Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
ext4: fix data corruption caused by overlapping unaligned and aligned IO
Sriram Rajagopalan <[email protected]>
ext4: zero out the unused memory region in the extent tree block
Jiufei Xue <[email protected]>
fs/writeback.c: use rcu_barrier() to wait for inflight wb switches going into workqueue when umount
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
fib_rules: fix error in backport of e9919a24d302 ("fib_rules: return 0...")
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and "ccm_base"
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: salsa20 - don't access already-freed walk.iv
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs - don't access already-freed walk.iv
Kamlakant Patel <[email protected]>
ipmi:ssif: compare block number correctly for multi-part return messages
Debabrata Banerjee <[email protected]>
ext4: fix ext4_show_options for file systems w/o journal
Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
ext4: actually request zeroing of inode table after grow
Barret Rhoden <[email protected]>
ext4: fix use-after-free race with debug_want_extra_isize
Coly Li <[email protected]>
bcache: never set KEY_PTRS of journal key to 0 in journal_reclaim()
Liang Chen <[email protected]>
bcache: fix a race between cache register and cacheset unregister
Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Btrfs: do not start a transaction at iterate_extent_inodes()
Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Btrfs: do not start a transaction during fiemap
Pan Bian <[email protected]>
ext4: avoid drop reference to iloc.bh twice
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
ext4: ignore e_value_offs for xattrs with value-in-ea-inode
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
ext4: make sanity check in mballoc more strict
Jiufei Xue <[email protected]>
jbd2: check superblock mapped prior to committing
Sergei Trofimovich <[email protected]>
tty/vt: fix write/write race in ioctl(KDSKBSENT) handler
Yifeng Li <[email protected]>
tty: vt.c: Fix TIOCL_BLANKSCREEN console blanking if blankinterval == 0
Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]>
mtd: spi-nor: intel-spi: Avoid crossing 4K address boundary on read/write
Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>
mfd: max77620: Fix swapped FPS_PERIOD_MAX_US values
Steve Twiss <[email protected]>
mfd: da9063: Fix OTP control register names to match datasheets for DA9063/63L
Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
userfaultfd: use RCU to free the task struct when fork fails
Shuning Zhang <[email protected]>
ocfs2: fix ocfs2 read inode data panic in ocfs2_iget
Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
mm/mincore.c: make mincore() more conservative
Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
bpf, arm64: remove prefetch insn in xadd mapping
Curtis Malainey <[email protected]>
ASoC: RT5677-SPI: Disable 16Bit SPI Transfers
Jon Hunter <[email protected]>
ASoC: max98090: Fix restore of DAPM Muxes
Kailang Yang <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda/realtek - EAPD turn on later
Hui Wang <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda/hdmi - Consider eld_valid when reporting jack event
Hui Wang <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda/hdmi - Read the pin sense from register when repolling
Wenwen Wang <[email protected]>
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix a memory leak bug
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: arm/aes-neonbs - don't access already-freed walk.iv
Zhang Zhijie <[email protected]>
crypto: rockchip - update IV buffer to contain the next IV
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: gcm - fix incompatibility between "gcm" and "gcm_base"
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: x86/crct10dif-pcl - fix use via crypto_shash_digest()
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: crct10dif-generic - fix use via crypto_shash_digest()
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: skcipher - don't WARN on unprocessed data after slow walk step
Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
crypto: vmx - fix copy-paste error in CTR mode
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: chacha20poly1305 - set cra_name correctly
Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
sched/x86: Save [ER]FLAGS on context switch
Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
arm64: Save and restore OSDLR_EL1 across suspend/resume
Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
arm64: Clear OSDLR_EL1 on CPU boot
Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
arm64: compat: Reduce address limit
Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
power: supply: axp288_charger: Fix unchecked return value
Wen Yang <[email protected]>
ARM: exynos: Fix a leaked reference by adding missing of_node_put
Sylwester Nawrocki <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: exynos: Fix audio (microphone) routing on Odroid XU3
Stuart Menefy <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: exynos: Fix interrupt for shared EINTs on Exynos5260
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
objtool: Fix function fallthrough detection
Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
x86/speculation/mds: Improve CPU buffer clear documentation
Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
x86/speculation/mds: Revert CPU buffer clear on double fault exit
Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>
PCI: hv: Add pci_destroy_slot() in pci_devices_present_work(), if necessary
Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>
PCI: hv: Add hv_pci_remove_slots() when we unload the driver
Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>
PCI: hv: Fix a memory leak in hv_eject_device_work()
Waiman Long <[email protected]>
locking/rwsem: Prevent decrement of reader count before increment
Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
net: core: another layer of lists, around PF_MEMALLOC skb handling
-------------
Diffstat:
Documentation/x86/mds.rst | 44 +++-------------
Makefile | 4 +-
arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5260.dtsi | 2 +-
arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5422-odroidxu3-audio.dtsi | 2 +-
arch/arm/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c | 2 +
arch/arm/mach-exynos/firmware.c | 1 +
arch/arm/mach-exynos/suspend.c | 2 +
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c | 2 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 8 +++
arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c | 1 +
arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 34 ++++++------
arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit.h | 6 ---
arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 1 -
arch/x86/crypto/crct10dif-pclmul_glue.c | 13 ++---
arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 2 +
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c | 7 +++
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 8 +++
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 8 ---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 37 ++++++++-----
crypto/ccm.c | 44 +++++++---------
crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 4 +-
crypto/crct10dif_generic.c | 11 ++--
crypto/gcm.c | 34 ++++--------
crypto/salsa20_generic.c | 2 +-
crypto/skcipher.c | 9 +++-
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c | 6 ++-
drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto_ablkcipher.c | 25 ++++++---
drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.pl | 4 +-
drivers/md/bcache/journal.c | 11 ++--
drivers/md/bcache/super.c | 2 +-
drivers/mtd/spi-nor/intel-spi.c | 8 +++
drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c | 21 ++++++++
drivers/power/supply/axp288_charger.c | 4 ++
drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c | 33 +++++++++---
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 2 -
fs/btrfs/backref.c | 34 +++++++-----
fs/ext4/extents.c | 17 +++++-
fs/ext4/file.c | 7 +++
fs/ext4/inode.c | 2 +-
fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 2 +-
fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 2 +-
fs/ext4/namei.c | 5 +-
fs/ext4/resize.c | 1 +
fs/ext4/super.c | 60 +++++++++++++---------
fs/ext4/xattr.c | 2 +-
fs/fs-writeback.c | 11 ++--
fs/jbd2/journal.c | 4 ++
fs/ocfs2/export.c | 30 ++++++++++-
include/linux/list.h | 30 +++++++++++
include/linux/mfd/da9063/registers.h | 6 +--
include/linux/mfd/max77620.h | 4 +-
kernel/fork.c | 31 ++++++++++-
kernel/locking/rwsem-xadd.c | 44 +++++++++++-----
lib/iov_iter.c | 17 +++++-
mm/mincore.c | 23 ++++++++-
net/core/fib_rules.c | 1 +
sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c | 11 +++-
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 5 +-
sound/soc/codecs/max98090.c | 12 ++---
sound/soc/codecs/rt5677-spi.c | 35 ++++++-------
sound/usb/mixer.c | 2 +
tools/objtool/check.c | 3 +-
64 files changed, 527 insertions(+), 281 deletions(-)
[ Upstream commit 15becc2b56c6eda3d9bf5ae993bafd5661c1fad1 ]
When we unload the pci-hyperv host controller driver, the host does not
send us a PCI_EJECT message.
In this case we also need to make sure the sysfs PCI slot directory is
removed, otherwise a command on a slot file eg:
"cat /sys/bus/pci/slots/2/address"
will trigger a
"BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request"
and, if we unload/reload the driver several times we would end up with
stale slot entries in PCI slot directories in /sys/bus/pci/slots/
root@localhost:~# ls -rtl /sys/bus/pci/slots/
total 0
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Feb 7 10:49 2
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Feb 7 10:49 2-1
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Feb 7 10:51 2-2
Add the missing code to remove the PCI slot and fix the current
behaviour.
Fixes: a15f2c08c708 ("PCI: hv: support reporting serial number as slot information")
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: reformatted the log]
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c b/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c
index 292450c7da625..a5825bbcded72 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c
@@ -1513,6 +1513,21 @@ static void hv_pci_assign_slots(struct hv_pcibus_device *hbus)
}
}
+/*
+ * Remove entries in sysfs pci slot directory.
+ */
+static void hv_pci_remove_slots(struct hv_pcibus_device *hbus)
+{
+ struct hv_pci_dev *hpdev;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(hpdev, &hbus->children, list_entry) {
+ if (!hpdev->pci_slot)
+ continue;
+ pci_destroy_slot(hpdev->pci_slot);
+ hpdev->pci_slot = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
/**
* create_root_hv_pci_bus() - Expose a new root PCI bus
* @hbus: Root PCI bus, as understood by this driver
@@ -2719,6 +2734,7 @@ static int hv_pci_remove(struct hv_device *hdev)
pci_lock_rescan_remove();
pci_stop_root_bus(hbus->pci_bus);
pci_remove_root_bus(hbus->pci_bus);
+ hv_pci_remove_slots(hbus);
pci_unlock_rescan_remove();
hbus->state = hv_pcibus_removed;
}
--
2.20.1
From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
commit 9d8d0294e78a164d407133dea05caf4b84247d6a upstream.
On x86_64, all returns to usermode go through
prepare_exit_to_usermode(), with the sole exception of do_nmi().
This even includes machine checks -- this was added several years
ago to support MCE recovery. Update the documentation.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Jon Masters <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 04dcbdb80578 ("x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/999fa9e126ba6a48e9d214d2f18dbde5c62ac55c.1557865329.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/x86/mds.rst | 39 +++++++--------------------------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
@@ -142,38 +142,13 @@ Mitigation points
mds_user_clear.
The mitigation is invoked in prepare_exit_to_usermode() which covers
- most of the kernel to user space transitions. There are a few exceptions
- which are not invoking prepare_exit_to_usermode() on return to user
- space. These exceptions use the paranoid exit code.
-
- - Non Maskable Interrupt (NMI):
-
- Access to sensible data like keys, credentials in the NMI context is
- mostly theoretical: The CPU can do prefetching or execute a
- misspeculated code path and thereby fetching data which might end up
- leaking through a buffer.
-
- But for mounting other attacks the kernel stack address of the task is
- already valuable information. So in full mitigation mode, the NMI is
- mitigated on the return from do_nmi() to provide almost complete
- coverage.
-
- - Machine Check Exception (#MC):
-
- Another corner case is a #MC which hits between the CPU buffer clear
- invocation and the actual return to user. As this still is in kernel
- space it takes the paranoid exit path which does not clear the CPU
- buffers. So the #MC handler repopulates the buffers to some
- extent. Machine checks are not reliably controllable and the window is
- extremly small so mitigation would just tick a checkbox that this
- theoretical corner case is covered. To keep the amount of special
- cases small, ignore #MC.
-
- - Debug Exception (#DB):
-
- This takes the paranoid exit path only when the INT1 breakpoint is in
- kernel space. #DB on a user space address takes the regular exit path,
- so no extra mitigation required.
+ all but one of the kernel to user space transitions. The exception
+ is when we return from a Non Maskable Interrupt (NMI), which is
+ handled directly in do_nmi().
+
+ (The reason that NMI is special is that prepare_exit_to_usermode() can
+ enable IRQs. In NMI context, NMIs are blocked, and we don't want to
+ enable IRQs with NMIs blocked.)
2. C-State transition
From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
commit 88640e1dcd089879530a49a8d212d1814678dfe7 upstream.
The double fault ESPFIX path doesn't return to user mode at all --
it returns back to the kernel by simulating a #GP fault.
prepare_exit_to_usermode() will run on the way out of
general_protection before running user code.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Jon Masters <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 04dcbdb80578 ("x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ac97612445c0a44ee10374f6ea79c222fe22a5c4.1557865329.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/x86/mds.rst | 7 -------
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 8 --------
2 files changed, 15 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
@@ -158,13 +158,6 @@ Mitigation points
mitigated on the return from do_nmi() to provide almost complete
coverage.
- - Double fault (#DF):
-
- A double fault is usually fatal, but the ESPFIX workaround, which can
- be triggered from user space through modify_ldt(2) is a recoverable
- double fault. #DF uses the paranoid exit path, so explicit mitigation
- in the double fault handler is required.
-
- Machine Check Exception (#MC):
Another corner case is a #MC which hits between the CPU buffer clear
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
#include <asm/trace/mpx.h>
-#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/mpx.h>
#include <asm/vm86.h>
@@ -386,13 +385,6 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struc
regs->ip = (unsigned long)general_protection;
regs->sp = (unsigned long)&gpregs->orig_ax;
- /*
- * This situation can be triggered by userspace via
- * modify_ldt(2) and the return does not take the regular
- * user space exit, so a CPU buffer clear is required when
- * MDS mitigation is enabled.
- */
- mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
return;
}
#endif
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
commit e6f393bc939d566ce3def71232d8013de9aaadde upstream.
When a function falls through to the next function due to a compiler
bug, objtool prints some obscure warnings. For example:
drivers/regulator/core.o: warning: objtool: regulator_count_voltages()+0x95: return with modified stack frame
drivers/regulator/core.o: warning: objtool: regulator_count_voltages()+0x0: stack state mismatch: cfa1=7+32 cfa2=7+8
Instead it should be printing:
drivers/regulator/core.o: warning: objtool: regulator_supply_is_couple() falls through to next function regulator_count_voltages()
This used to work, but was broken by the following commit:
13810435b9a7 ("objtool: Support GCC 8's cold subfunctions")
The padding nops at the end of a function aren't actually part of the
function, as defined by the symbol table. So the 'func' variable in
validate_branch() is getting cleared to NULL when a padding nop is
encountered, breaking the fallthrough detection.
If the current instruction doesn't have a function associated with it,
just consider it to be part of the previously detected function by not
overwriting the previous value of 'func'.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Fixes: 13810435b9a7 ("objtool: Support GCC 8's cold subfunctions")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/546d143820cd08a46624ae8440d093dd6c902cae.1557766718.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
tools/objtool/check.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -1779,7 +1779,8 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtoo
return 1;
}
- func = insn->func ? insn->func->pfunc : NULL;
+ if (insn->func)
+ func = insn->func->pfunc;
if (func && insn->ignore) {
WARN_FUNC("BUG: why am I validating an ignored function?",
[ Upstream commit 340d455699400f2c2c0f9b3f703ade3085cdb501 ]
When we hot-remove a device, usually the host sends us a PCI_EJECT message,
and a PCI_BUS_RELATIONS message with bus_rel->device_count == 0.
When we execute the quick hot-add/hot-remove test, the host may not send
us the PCI_EJECT message if the guest has not fully finished the
initialization by sending the PCI_RESOURCES_ASSIGNED* message to the
host, so it's potentially unsafe to only depend on the
pci_destroy_slot() in hv_eject_device_work() because the code path
create_root_hv_pci_bus()
-> hv_pci_assign_slots()
is not called in this case. Note: in this case, the host still sends the
guest a PCI_BUS_RELATIONS message with bus_rel->device_count == 0.
In the quick hot-add/hot-remove test, we can have such a race before
the code path
pci_devices_present_work()
-> new_pcichild_device()
adds the new device into the hbus->children list, we may have already
received the PCI_EJECT message, and since the tasklet handler
hv_pci_onchannelcallback()
may fail to find the "hpdev" by calling
get_pcichild_wslot(hbus, dev_message->wslot.slot)
hv_pci_eject_device() is not called; Later, by continuing execution
create_root_hv_pci_bus()
-> hv_pci_assign_slots()
creates the slot and the PCI_BUS_RELATIONS message with
bus_rel->device_count == 0 removes the device from hbus->children, and
we end up being unable to remove the slot in
hv_pci_remove()
-> hv_pci_remove_slots()
Remove the slot in pci_devices_present_work() when the device
is removed to address this race.
pci_devices_present_work() and hv_eject_device_work() run in the
singled-threaded hbus->wq, so there is not a double-remove issue for the
slot.
We cannot offload hv_pci_eject_device() from hv_pci_onchannelcallback()
to the workqueue, because we need the hv_pci_onchannelcallback()
synchronously call hv_pci_eject_device() to poll the channel
ringbuffer to work around the "hangs in hv_compose_msi_msg()" issue
fixed in commit de0aa7b2f97d ("PCI: hv: Fix 2 hang issues in
hv_compose_msi_msg()")
Fixes: a15f2c08c708 ("PCI: hv: support reporting serial number as slot information")
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: rewritten commit log]
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c b/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c
index a5825bbcded72..f591de23f3d35 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c
@@ -1824,6 +1824,10 @@ static void pci_devices_present_work(struct work_struct *work)
hpdev = list_first_entry(&removed, struct hv_pci_dev,
list_entry);
list_del(&hpdev->list_entry);
+
+ if (hpdev->pci_slot)
+ pci_destroy_slot(hpdev->pci_slot);
+
put_pcichild(hpdev, hv_pcidev_ref_initial);
}
--
2.20.1
From: Stuart Menefy <[email protected]>
commit b7ed69d67ff0788d8463e599dd5dd1b45c701a7e upstream.
Fix the interrupt information for the GPIO lines with a shared EINT
interrupt.
Fixes: 16d7ff2642e7 ("ARM: dts: add dts files for exynos5260 SoC")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stuart Menefy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5260.dtsi | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5260.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5260.dtsi
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@
wakeup-interrupt-controller {
compatible = "samsung,exynos4210-wakeup-eint";
interrupt-parent = <&gic>;
- interrupts = <GIC_SPI 32 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+ interrupts = <GIC_SPI 48 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
};
};
From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
commit 8968c67a82ab7501bc3b9439c3624a49b42fe54c upstream.
Prefetch-with-intent-to-write is currently part of the XADD mapping in
the AArch64 JIT and follows the kernel's implementation of atomic_add.
This may interfere with other threads executing the LDXR/STXR loop,
leading to potential starvation and fairness issues. Drop the optional
prefetch instruction.
Fixes: 85f68fe89832 ("bpf, arm64: implement jiting of BPF_XADD")
Reported-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit.h | 6 ------
arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 1 -
2 files changed, 7 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit.h
@@ -100,12 +100,6 @@
#define A64_STXR(sf, Rt, Rn, Rs) \
A64_LSX(sf, Rt, Rn, Rs, STORE_EX)
-/* Prefetch */
-#define A64_PRFM(Rn, type, target, policy) \
- aarch64_insn_gen_prefetch(Rn, AARCH64_INSN_PRFM_TYPE_##type, \
- AARCH64_INSN_PRFM_TARGET_##target, \
- AARCH64_INSN_PRFM_POLICY_##policy)
-
/* Add/subtract (immediate) */
#define A64_ADDSUB_IMM(sf, Rd, Rn, imm12, type) \
aarch64_insn_gen_add_sub_imm(Rd, Rn, imm12, \
--- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -712,7 +712,6 @@ emit_cond_jmp:
case BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_DW:
emit_a64_mov_i(1, tmp, off, ctx);
emit(A64_ADD(1, tmp, tmp, dst), ctx);
- emit(A64_PRFM(tmp, PST, L1, STRM), ctx);
emit(A64_LDXR(isdw, tmp2, tmp), ctx);
emit(A64_ADD(isdw, tmp2, tmp2, src), ctx);
emit(A64_STXR(isdw, tmp2, tmp, tmp3), ctx);
From: Kamlakant Patel <[email protected]>
commit 55be8658c7e2feb11a5b5b33ee031791dbd23a69 upstream.
According to ipmi spec, block number is a number that is incremented,
starting with 0, for each new block of message data returned using the
middle transaction.
Here, the 'blocknum' is data[0] which always starts from zero(0) and
'ssif_info->multi_pos' starts from 1.
So, we need to add +1 to blocknum while comparing with multi_pos.
Fixes: 7d6380cd40f79 ("ipmi:ssif: Fix handling of multi-part return messages").
Reported-by: Kiran Kolukuluru <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamlakant Patel <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
[Also added a debug log if the block numbers don't match.]
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 4.4
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c
@@ -703,12 +703,16 @@ static void msg_done_handler(struct ssif
/* End of read */
len = ssif_info->multi_len;
data = ssif_info->data;
- } else if (blocknum != ssif_info->multi_pos) {
+ } else if (blocknum + 1 != ssif_info->multi_pos) {
/*
* Out of sequence block, just abort. Block
* numbers start at zero for the second block,
* but multi_pos starts at one, so the +1.
*/
+ if (ssif_info->ssif_debug & SSIF_DEBUG_MSG)
+ dev_dbg(&ssif_info->client->dev,
+ "Received message out of sequence, expected %u, got %u\n",
+ ssif_info->multi_pos - 1, blocknum);
result = -EIO;
} else {
ssif_inc_stat(ssif_info, received_message_parts);
From: Sylwester Nawrocki <[email protected]>
commit 9b23e1a3e8fde76e8cc0e366ab1ed4ffb4440feb upstream.
The name of CODEC input widget to which microphone is connected through
the "Headphone" jack is "IN12" not "IN1". This fixes microphone support
on Odroid XU3.
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Sylwester Nawrocki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5422-odroidxu3-audio.dtsi | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5422-odroidxu3-audio.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5422-odroidxu3-audio.dtsi
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
"Headphone Jack", "HPL",
"Headphone Jack", "HPR",
"Headphone Jack", "MICBIAS",
- "IN1", "Headphone Jack",
+ "IN12", "Headphone Jack",
"Speakers", "SPKL",
"Speakers", "SPKR";
From: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
commit 6fda41bf12615ee7c3ddac88155099b1a8cf8d00 upstream.
Some firmwares may reboot CPUs with OS Double Lock set. Make sure that
it is unlocked, in order to use debug exceptions.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(disable_debug_monitors);
*/
static int clear_os_lock(unsigned int cpu)
{
+ write_sysreg(0, osdlr_el1);
write_sysreg(0, oslar_el1);
isb();
return 0;
From: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
commit 134fca9063ad4851de767d1768180e5dede9a881 upstream.
The semantics of what mincore() considers to be resident is not
completely clear, but Linux has always (since 2.3.52, which is when
mincore() was initially done) treated it as "page is available in page
cache".
That's potentially a problem, as that [in]directly exposes
meta-information about pagecache / memory mapping state even about
memory not strictly belonging to the process executing the syscall,
opening possibilities for sidechannel attacks.
Change the semantics of mincore() so that it only reveals pagecache
information for non-anonymous mappings that belog to files that the
calling process could (if it tried to) successfully open for writing;
otherwise we'd be including shared non-exclusive mappings, which
- is the sidechannel
- is not the usecase for mincore(), as that's primarily used for data,
not (shared) text
[[email protected]: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[[email protected]: restructure can_do_mincore() conditions]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Josh Snyder <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Originally-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Originally-by: Dominique Martinet <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Cc: Kevin Easton <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Cyril Hrubis <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Gruss <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
mm/mincore.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/mm/mincore.c
+++ b/mm/mincore.c
@@ -169,6 +169,22 @@ out:
return 0;
}
+static inline bool can_do_mincore(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ if (vma_is_anonymous(vma))
+ return true;
+ if (!vma->vm_file)
+ return false;
+ /*
+ * Reveal pagecache information only for non-anonymous mappings that
+ * correspond to the files the calling process could (if tried) open
+ * for writing; otherwise we'd be including shared non-exclusive
+ * mappings, which opens a side channel.
+ */
+ return inode_owner_or_capable(file_inode(vma->vm_file)) ||
+ inode_permission(file_inode(vma->vm_file), MAY_WRITE) == 0;
+}
+
/*
* Do a chunk of "sys_mincore()". We've already checked
* all the arguments, we hold the mmap semaphore: we should
@@ -189,8 +205,13 @@ static long do_mincore(unsigned long add
vma = find_vma(current->mm, addr);
if (!vma || addr < vma->vm_start)
return -ENOMEM;
- mincore_walk.mm = vma->vm_mm;
end = min(vma->vm_end, addr + (pages << PAGE_SHIFT));
+ if (!can_do_mincore(vma)) {
+ unsigned long pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(end - addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+ memset(vec, 1, pages);
+ return pages;
+ }
+ mincore_walk.mm = vma->vm_mm;
err = walk_page_range(addr, end, &mincore_walk);
if (err < 0)
return err;
From: Jon Hunter <[email protected]>
commit ecb2795c08bc825ebd604997e5be440b060c5b18 upstream.
The max98090 driver defines 3 DAPM muxes; one for the right line output
(LINMOD Mux), one for the left headphone mixer source (MIXHPLSEL Mux)
and one for the right headphone mixer source (MIXHPRSEL Mux). The same
bit is used for the mux as well as the DAPM enable, and although the mux
can be correctly configured, after playback has completed, the mux will
be reset during the disable phase. This is preventing the state of these
muxes from being saved and restored correctly on system reboot. Fix this
by marking these muxes as SND_SOC_NOPM.
Note this has been verified this on the Tegra124 Nyan Big which features
the MAX98090 codec.
Signed-off-by: Jon Hunter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/soc/codecs/max98090.c | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/max98090.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/max98090.c
@@ -1209,14 +1209,14 @@ static const struct snd_soc_dapm_widget
&max98090_right_rcv_mixer_controls[0],
ARRAY_SIZE(max98090_right_rcv_mixer_controls)),
- SND_SOC_DAPM_MUX("LINMOD Mux", M98090_REG_LOUTR_MIXER,
- M98090_LINMOD_SHIFT, 0, &max98090_linmod_mux),
+ SND_SOC_DAPM_MUX("LINMOD Mux", SND_SOC_NOPM, 0, 0,
+ &max98090_linmod_mux),
- SND_SOC_DAPM_MUX("MIXHPLSEL Mux", M98090_REG_HP_CONTROL,
- M98090_MIXHPLSEL_SHIFT, 0, &max98090_mixhplsel_mux),
+ SND_SOC_DAPM_MUX("MIXHPLSEL Mux", SND_SOC_NOPM, 0, 0,
+ &max98090_mixhplsel_mux),
- SND_SOC_DAPM_MUX("MIXHPRSEL Mux", M98090_REG_HP_CONTROL,
- M98090_MIXHPRSEL_SHIFT, 0, &max98090_mixhprsel_mux),
+ SND_SOC_DAPM_MUX("MIXHPRSEL Mux", SND_SOC_NOPM, 0, 0,
+ &max98090_mixhprsel_mux),
SND_SOC_DAPM_PGA("HP Left Out", M98090_REG_OUTPUT_ENABLE,
M98090_HPLEN_SHIFT, 0, NULL, 0),
From: Pan Bian <[email protected]>
commit 8c380ab4b7b59c0c602743810be1b712514eaebc upstream.
The reference to iloc.bh has been dropped in ext4_mark_iloc_dirty.
However, the reference is dropped again if error occurs during
ext4_handle_dirty_metadata, which may result in use-after-free bugs.
Fixes: fb265c9cb49e("ext4: add ext4_sb_bread() to disambiguate ENOMEM cases")
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/resize.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/fs/ext4/resize.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/resize.c
@@ -849,6 +849,7 @@ static int add_new_gdb(handle_t *handle,
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, gdb_bh);
if (unlikely(err)) {
ext4_std_error(sb, err);
+ iloc.bh = NULL;
goto errout;
}
brelse(dind);
From: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
commit 827a108e354db633698f0b4a10c1ffd2b1f8d1d0 upstream.
When the CPU comes out of suspend, the firmware may have modified the OS
Double Lock Register. Save it in an unused slot of cpu_suspend_ctx, and
restore it on resume.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 34 ++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S
@@ -64,24 +64,25 @@ ENTRY(cpu_do_suspend)
mrs x2, tpidr_el0
mrs x3, tpidrro_el0
mrs x4, contextidr_el1
- mrs x5, cpacr_el1
- mrs x6, tcr_el1
- mrs x7, vbar_el1
- mrs x8, mdscr_el1
- mrs x9, oslsr_el1
- mrs x10, sctlr_el1
+ mrs x5, osdlr_el1
+ mrs x6, cpacr_el1
+ mrs x7, tcr_el1
+ mrs x8, vbar_el1
+ mrs x9, mdscr_el1
+ mrs x10, oslsr_el1
+ mrs x11, sctlr_el1
alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN
- mrs x11, tpidr_el1
+ mrs x12, tpidr_el1
alternative_else
- mrs x11, tpidr_el2
+ mrs x12, tpidr_el2
alternative_endif
- mrs x12, sp_el0
+ mrs x13, sp_el0
stp x2, x3, [x0]
- stp x4, xzr, [x0, #16]
- stp x5, x6, [x0, #32]
- stp x7, x8, [x0, #48]
- stp x9, x10, [x0, #64]
- stp x11, x12, [x0, #80]
+ stp x4, x5, [x0, #16]
+ stp x6, x7, [x0, #32]
+ stp x8, x9, [x0, #48]
+ stp x10, x11, [x0, #64]
+ stp x12, x13, [x0, #80]
ret
ENDPROC(cpu_do_suspend)
@@ -104,8 +105,8 @@ ENTRY(cpu_do_resume)
msr cpacr_el1, x6
/* Don't change t0sz here, mask those bits when restoring */
- mrs x5, tcr_el1
- bfi x8, x5, TCR_T0SZ_OFFSET, TCR_TxSZ_WIDTH
+ mrs x7, tcr_el1
+ bfi x8, x7, TCR_T0SZ_OFFSET, TCR_TxSZ_WIDTH
msr tcr_el1, x8
msr vbar_el1, x9
@@ -129,6 +130,7 @@ alternative_endif
/*
* Restore oslsr_el1 by writing oslar_el1
*/
+ msr osdlr_el1, x5
ubfx x11, x11, #1, #1
msr oslar_el1, x11
reset_pmuserenr_el0 x0 // Disable PMU access from EL0
From: Steve Twiss <[email protected]>
commit 6b4814a9451add06d457e198be418bf6a3e6a990 upstream.
Mismatch between what is found in the Datasheets for DA9063 and DA9063L
provided by Dialog Semiconductor, and the register names provided in the
MFD registers file. The changes are for the OTP (one-time-programming)
control registers. The two naming errors are OPT instead of OTP, and
COUNT instead of CONT (i.e. control).
Cc: Stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve Twiss <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/mfd/da9063/registers.h | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/mfd/da9063/registers.h
+++ b/include/linux/mfd/da9063/registers.h
@@ -215,9 +215,9 @@
/* DA9063 Configuration registers */
/* OTP */
-#define DA9063_REG_OPT_COUNT 0x101
-#define DA9063_REG_OPT_ADDR 0x102
-#define DA9063_REG_OPT_DATA 0x103
+#define DA9063_REG_OTP_CONT 0x101
+#define DA9063_REG_OTP_ADDR 0x102
+#define DA9063_REG_OTP_DATA 0x103
/* Customer Trim and Configuration */
#define DA9063_REG_T_OFFSET 0x104
From: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
commit c3f3ce049f7d97cc7ec9c01cb51d9ec74e0f37c2 upstream.
The task structure is freed while get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() holds
rcu_read_lock() and dereferences mm->owner.
get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() failing fork()
---- ---
task = mm->owner
mm->owner = NULL;
free(task)
if (task) *task; /* use after free */
The fix consists in freeing the task with RCU also in the fork failure
case, exactly like it always happens for the regular exit(2) path. That
is enough to make the rcu_read_lock hold in get_mem_cgroup_from_mm()
(left side above) effective to avoid a use after free when dereferencing
the task structure.
An alternate possible fix would be to defer the delivery of the
userfaultfd contexts to the monitor until after fork() is guaranteed to
succeed. Such a change would require more changes because it would
create a strict ordering dependency where the uffd methods would need to
be called beyond the last potentially failing branch in order to be
safe. This solution as opposed only adds the dependency to common code
to set mm->owner to NULL and to free the task struct that was pointed by
mm->owner with RCU, if fork ends up failing. The userfaultfd methods
can still be called anywhere during the fork runtime and the monitor
will keep discarding orphaned "mm" coming from failed forks in userland.
This race condition couldn't trigger if CONFIG_MEMCG was set =n at build
time.
[[email protected]: improve changelog, reduce #ifdefs per Michal]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 893e26e61d04 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: Add fork() event")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Tested-by: zhong jiang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: zhong jiang <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
kernel/fork.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -790,6 +790,15 @@ static void mm_init_aio(struct mm_struct
#endif
}
+static __always_inline void mm_clear_owner(struct mm_struct *mm,
+ struct task_struct *p)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
+ if (mm->owner == p)
+ WRITE_ONCE(mm->owner, NULL);
+#endif
+}
+
static void mm_init_owner(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
@@ -1211,6 +1220,7 @@ static struct mm_struct *dup_mm(struct t
free_pt:
/* don't put binfmt in mmput, we haven't got module yet */
mm->binfmt = NULL;
+ mm_init_owner(mm, NULL);
mmput(mm);
fail_nomem:
@@ -1528,6 +1538,21 @@ static inline void rcu_copy_process(stru
#endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_TASKS_RCU */
}
+static void __delayed_free_task(struct rcu_head *rhp)
+{
+ struct task_struct *tsk = container_of(rhp, struct task_struct, rcu);
+
+ free_task(tsk);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void delayed_free_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MEMCG))
+ call_rcu(&tsk->rcu, __delayed_free_task);
+ else
+ free_task(tsk);
+}
+
/*
* This creates a new process as a copy of the old one,
* but does not actually start it yet.
@@ -1960,8 +1985,10 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_io:
bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces:
exit_task_namespaces(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_mm:
- if (p->mm)
+ if (p->mm) {
+ mm_clear_owner(p->mm, p);
mmput(p->mm);
+ }
bad_fork_cleanup_signal:
if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD))
free_signal_struct(p->signal);
@@ -1992,7 +2019,7 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_count:
bad_fork_free:
p->state = TASK_DEAD;
put_task_stack(p);
- free_task(p);
+ delayed_free_task(p);
fork_out:
return ERR_PTR(retval);
}
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit e5d01196c0428a206f307e9ee5f6842964098ff0 upstream.
In other places in fs/ext4/xattr.c, if e_value_inum is non-zero, the
code ignores the value in e_value_offs. The e_value_offs *should* be
zero, but we shouldn't depend upon it, since it might not be true in a
corrupted/fuzzed file system.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202897
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202877
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/xattr.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
@@ -1698,7 +1698,7 @@ static int ext4_xattr_set_entry(struct e
/* No failures allowed past this point. */
- if (!s->not_found && here->e_value_size && here->e_value_offs) {
+ if (!s->not_found && here->e_value_size && !here->e_value_inum) {
/* Remove the old value. */
void *first_val = s->base + min_offs;
size_t offs = le16_to_cpu(here->e_value_offs);
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 5e27f38f1f3f45a0c938299c3a34a2d2db77165a upstream.
If the rfc7539 template is instantiated with specific implementations,
e.g. "rfc7539(chacha20-generic,poly1305-generic)" rather than
"rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)", then the implementation names end up
included in the instance's cra_name. This is incorrect because it then
prevents all users from allocating "rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)", if the
highest priority implementations of chacha20 and poly1305 were selected.
Also, the self-tests aren't run on an instance allocated in this way.
Fix it by setting the instance's cra_name from the underlying
algorithms' actual cra_names, rather than from the requested names.
This matches what other templates do.
Fixes: 71ebc4d1b27d ("crypto: chacha20poly1305 - Add a ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD construction, RFC7539")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.2+
Cc: Martin Willi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Martin Willi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
+++ b/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -647,8 +647,8 @@ static int chachapoly_create(struct cryp
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
- "%s(%s,%s)", name, chacha_name,
- poly_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ "%s(%s,%s)", name, chacha->base.cra_name,
+ poly->cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto out_drop_chacha;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"%s(%s,%s)", name, chacha->base.cra_driver_name,
From: Yifeng Li <[email protected]>
commit 75ddbc1fb11efac87b611d48e9802f6fe2bb2163 upstream.
Previously, in the userspace, it was possible to use the "setterm" command
from util-linux to blank the VT console by default, using the following
command.
According to the man page,
> The force option keeps the screen blank even if a key is pressed.
It was implemented by calling TIOCL_BLANKSCREEN.
case BLANKSCREEN:
ioctlarg = TIOCL_BLANKSCREEN;
if (ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCLINUX, &ioctlarg))
warn(_("cannot force blank"));
break;
However, after Linux 4.12, this command ceased to work anymore, which is
unexpected. By inspecting the kernel source, it shows that the issue was
triggered by the side-effect from commit a4199f5eb809 ("tty: Disable
default console blanking interval").
The console blanking is implemented by function do_blank_screen() in vt.c:
"blank_state" will be initialized to "blank_normal_wait" in con_init() if
AND ONLY IF ("blankinterval" > 0). If "blankinterval" is 0, "blank_state"
will be "blank_off" (== 0), and a call to do_blank_screen() will always
abort, even if a forced blanking is required from the user by calling
TIOCL_BLANKSCREEN, the console won't be blanked.
This behavior is unexpected from a user's point-of-view, since it's not
mentioned in any documentation. The setterm man page suggests it will
always work, and the kernel comments in uapi/linux/tiocl.h says
> /* keep screen blank even if a key is pressed */
> #define TIOCL_BLANKSCREEN 14
To fix it, we simply remove the "blank_state != blank_off" check, as
pointed out by Nicolas Pitre, this check doesn't logically make sense
and it's safe to remove.
Suggested-by: Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]>
Fixes: a4199f5eb809 ("tty: Disable default console blanking interval")
Signed-off-by: Yifeng Li <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
@@ -3840,8 +3840,6 @@ void do_blank_screen(int entering_gfx)
return;
}
- if (blank_state != blank_normal_wait)
- return;
blank_state = blank_off;
/* don't blank graphics */
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit edaf28e996af69222b2cb40455dbb5459c2b875a upstream.
If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.
salsa20-generic doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't affected
by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv. However this is more
subtle than desired, and it was actually broken prior to the alignmask
being removed by commit b62b3db76f73 ("crypto: salsa20-generic - cleanup
and convert to skcipher API").
Since salsa20-generic does not update the IV and does not need any IV
alignment, update it to use req->iv instead of walk.iv.
Fixes: 2407d60872dd ("[CRYPTO] salsa20: Salsa20 stream cipher")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
crypto/salsa20_generic.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/crypto/salsa20_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/salsa20_generic.c
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static int encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, &walk, 64);
- salsa20_ivsetup(ctx, walk.iv);
+ salsa20_ivsetup(ctx, desc->info);
while (walk.nbytes >= 64) {
salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr,
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
When commit e9919a24d302 ("fib_rules: return 0 directly if an exactly
same rule exists when NLM_F_EXCL not supplied") was backported to 4.9.y,
it changed the logic a bit as err should have been reset before exiting
the test, like it happens in the original logic.
If this is not set, errors happen :(
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
Reported-by: David Ahern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Cc: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/core/fib_rules.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/core/fib_rules.c b/net/core/fib_rules.c
index bb26457e8c21..c03dd2104d33 100644
--- a/net/core/fib_rules.c
+++ b/net/core/fib_rules.c
@@ -430,6 +430,7 @@ int fib_nl_newrule(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
goto errout_free;
if (rule_exists(ops, frh, tb, rule)) {
+ err = 0;
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL)
err = -EEXIST;
goto errout_free;
--
2.21.0
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit 31562b954b60f02acb91b7349dc6432d3f8c3c5f upstream.
The sanity check in mb_find_extent() only checked that returned extent
does not extend past blocksize * 8, however it should not extend past
EXT4_CLUSTERS_PER_GROUP(sb). This can happen when clusters_per_group <
blocksize * 8 and the tail of the bitmap is not properly filled by 1s
which happened e.g. when ancient kernels have grown the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
@@ -1555,7 +1555,7 @@ static int mb_find_extent(struct ext4_bu
ex->fe_len += 1 << order;
}
- if (ex->fe_start + ex->fe_len > (1 << (e4b->bd_blkbits + 3))) {
+ if (ex->fe_start + ex->fe_len > EXT4_CLUSTERS_PER_GROUP(e4b->bd_sb)) {
/* Should never happen! (but apparently sometimes does?!?) */
WARN_ON(1);
ext4_error(e4b->bd_sb, "corruption or bug in mb_find_extent "
From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
commit 6690e86be83ac75832e461c141055b5d601c0a6d upstream.
Effectively reverts commit:
2c7577a75837 ("sched/x86_64: Don't save flags on context switch")
Specifically because SMAP uses FLAGS.AC which invalidates the claim
that the kernel has clean flags.
In particular; while preemption from interrupt return is fine (the
IRET frame on the exception stack contains FLAGS) it breaks any code
that does synchonous scheduling, including preempt_enable().
This has become a significant issue ever since commit:
5b24a7a2aa20 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses")
provided for means of having 'normal' C code between STAC / CLAC,
exposing the FLAGS.AC state. So far this hasn't led to trouble,
however fix it before it comes apart.
Reported-by: Julien Thierry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 5b24a7a2aa20 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 2 ++
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c | 7 +++++++
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 8 ++++++++
5 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
pushl %ebx
pushl %edi
pushl %esi
+ pushfl
/* switch stack */
movl %esp, TASK_threadsp(%eax)
@@ -256,6 +257,7 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
#endif
/* restore callee-saved registers */
+ popfl
popl %esi
popl %edi
popl %ebx
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
pushq %r13
pushq %r14
pushq %r15
+ pushfq
/* switch stack */
movq %rsp, TASK_threadsp(%rdi)
@@ -364,6 +365,7 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
#endif
/* restore callee-saved registers */
+ popfq
popq %r15
popq %r14
popq %r13
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ asmlinkage void ret_from_fork(void);
* order of the fields must match the code in __switch_to_asm().
*/
struct inactive_task_frame {
+ unsigned long flags;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
unsigned long r15;
unsigned long r14;
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
@@ -132,6 +132,13 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_
struct task_struct *tsk;
int err;
+ /*
+ * For a new task use the RESET flags value since there is no before.
+ * All the status flags are zero; DF and all the system flags must also
+ * be 0, specifically IF must be 0 because we context switch to the new
+ * task with interrupts disabled.
+ */
+ frame->flags = X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
frame->bp = 0;
frame->ret_addr = (unsigned long) ret_from_fork;
p->thread.sp = (unsigned long) fork_frame;
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -278,6 +278,14 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_
childregs = task_pt_regs(p);
fork_frame = container_of(childregs, struct fork_frame, regs);
frame = &fork_frame->frame;
+
+ /*
+ * For a new task use the RESET flags value since there is no before.
+ * All the status flags are zero; DF and all the system flags must also
+ * be 0, specifically IF must be 0 because we context switch to the new
+ * task with interrupts disabled.
+ */
+ frame->flags = X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
frame->bp = 0;
frame->ret_addr = (unsigned long) ret_from_fork;
p->thread.sp = (unsigned long) fork_frame;
From: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
commit d263119387de9975d2acba1dfd3392f7c5979c18 upstream.
Currently, compat tasks running on arm64 can allocate memory up to
TASK_SIZE_32 (UL(0x100000000)).
This means that mmap() allocations, if we treat them as returning an
array, are not compliant with the sections 6.5.8 of the C standard
(C99) which states that: "If the expression P points to an element of
an array object and the expression Q points to the last element of the
same array object, the pointer expression Q+1 compares greater than P".
Redefine TASK_SIZE_32 to address the issue.
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
[will: fixed typo in comment]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -49,7 +49,15 @@
* TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE - the lower boundary of the mmap VM area.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_64K_PAGES
+/*
+ * With CONFIG_ARM64_64K_PAGES enabled, the last page is occupied
+ * by the compat vectors page.
+ */
#define TASK_SIZE_32 UL(0x100000000)
+#else
+#define TASK_SIZE_32 (UL(0x100000000) - PAGE_SIZE)
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_64K_PAGES */
#define TASK_SIZE (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \
TASK_SIZE_32 : TASK_SIZE_64)
#define TASK_SIZE_OF(tsk) (test_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_32BIT) ? \
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit dec3d0b1071a0f3194e66a83d26ecf4aa8c5910e upstream.
The ->digest() method of crct10dif-pclmul reads the current CRC value
from the shash_desc context. But this value is uninitialized, causing
crypto_shash_digest() to compute the wrong result. Fix it.
Probably this wasn't noticed before because lib/crc-t10dif.c only uses
crypto_shash_update(), not crypto_shash_digest(). Likewise,
crypto_shash_digest() is not yet tested by the crypto self-tests because
those only test the ahash API which only uses shash init/update/final.
Fixes: 0b95a7f85718 ("crypto: crct10dif - Glue code to cast accelerated CRCT10DIF assembly as a crypto transform")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.11+
Cc: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/crypto/crct10dif-pclmul_glue.c | 13 +++++--------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/crct10dif-pclmul_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/crct10dif-pclmul_glue.c
@@ -76,15 +76,14 @@ static int chksum_final(struct shash_des
return 0;
}
-static int __chksum_finup(__u16 *crcp, const u8 *data, unsigned int len,
- u8 *out)
+static int __chksum_finup(__u16 crc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
if (irq_fpu_usable()) {
kernel_fpu_begin();
- *(__u16 *)out = crc_t10dif_pcl(*crcp, data, len);
+ *(__u16 *)out = crc_t10dif_pcl(crc, data, len);
kernel_fpu_end();
} else
- *(__u16 *)out = crc_t10dif_generic(*crcp, data, len);
+ *(__u16 *)out = crc_t10dif_generic(crc, data, len);
return 0;
}
@@ -93,15 +92,13 @@ static int chksum_finup(struct shash_des
{
struct chksum_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
- return __chksum_finup(&ctx->crc, data, len, out);
+ return __chksum_finup(ctx->crc, data, len, out);
}
static int chksum_digest(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int length, u8 *out)
{
- struct chksum_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
-
- return __chksum_finup(&ctx->crc, data, length, out);
+ return __chksum_finup(0, data, length, out);
}
static struct shash_alg alg = {
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit f699594d436960160f6d5ba84ed4a222f20d11cd upstream.
GCM instances can be created by either the "gcm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "gcm(aes)"; or by "gcm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and ghash implementations, e.g.
"gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)".
However, a "gcm_base" instance prevents a "gcm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "gcm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "gcm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "gcm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"gcm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "gcm" instances, e.g.
"gcm(aes)" instead of "gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
algorithm. It also requires starting to verify that the algorithms are
really ctr and ghash, not something else entirely. But it would be
bizarre if anyone were actually using non-gcm-compatible algorithms with
gcm_base, so this shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: d00aa19b507b ("[CRYPTO] gcm: Allow block cipher parameter")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
crypto/gcm.c | 34 +++++++++++-----------------------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
--- a/crypto/gcm.c
+++ b/crypto/gcm.c
@@ -616,7 +616,6 @@ static void crypto_gcm_free(struct aead_
static int crypto_gcm_create_common(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
struct rtattr **tb,
- const char *full_name,
const char *ctr_name,
const char *ghash_name)
{
@@ -657,7 +656,8 @@ static int crypto_gcm_create_common(stru
goto err_free_inst;
err = -EINVAL;
- if (ghash->digestsize != 16)
+ if (strcmp(ghash->base.cra_name, "ghash") != 0 ||
+ ghash->digestsize != 16)
goto err_drop_ghash;
crypto_set_skcipher_spawn(&ctx->ctr, aead_crypto_instance(inst));
@@ -669,24 +669,24 @@ static int crypto_gcm_create_common(stru
ctr = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg(&ctx->ctr);
- /* We only support 16-byte blocks. */
+ /* The skcipher algorithm must be CTR mode, using 16-byte blocks. */
err = -EINVAL;
- if (crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(ctr) != 16)
+ if (strncmp(ctr->base.cra_name, "ctr(", 4) != 0 ||
+ crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(ctr) != 16 ||
+ ctr->base.cra_blocksize != 1)
goto out_put_ctr;
- /* Not a stream cipher? */
- if (ctr->base.cra_blocksize != 1)
+ err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+ "gcm(%s", ctr->base.cra_name + 4) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto out_put_ctr;
- err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"gcm_base(%s,%s)", ctr->base.cra_driver_name,
ghash_alg->cra_driver_name) >=
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto out_put_ctr;
- memcpy(inst->alg.base.cra_name, full_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
-
inst->alg.base.cra_flags = (ghash->base.cra_flags |
ctr->base.cra_flags) & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
inst->alg.base.cra_priority = (ghash->base.cra_priority +
@@ -728,7 +728,6 @@ static int crypto_gcm_create(struct cryp
{
const char *cipher_name;
char ctr_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
- char full_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
if (IS_ERR(cipher_name))
@@ -738,12 +737,7 @@ static int crypto_gcm_create(struct cryp
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
- if (snprintf(full_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "gcm(%s)", cipher_name) >=
- CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
- return -ENAMETOOLONG;
-
- return crypto_gcm_create_common(tmpl, tb, full_name,
- ctr_name, "ghash");
+ return crypto_gcm_create_common(tmpl, tb, ctr_name, "ghash");
}
static struct crypto_template crypto_gcm_tmpl = {
@@ -757,7 +751,6 @@ static int crypto_gcm_base_create(struct
{
const char *ctr_name;
const char *ghash_name;
- char full_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
ctr_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
if (IS_ERR(ctr_name))
@@ -767,12 +760,7 @@ static int crypto_gcm_base_create(struct
if (IS_ERR(ghash_name))
return PTR_ERR(ghash_name);
- if (snprintf(full_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "gcm_base(%s,%s)",
- ctr_name, ghash_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
- return -ENAMETOOLONG;
-
- return crypto_gcm_create_common(tmpl, tb, full_name,
- ctr_name, ghash_name);
+ return crypto_gcm_create_common(tmpl, tb, ctr_name, ghash_name);
}
static struct crypto_template crypto_gcm_base_tmpl = {
From: Michał Wadowski <[email protected]>
commit 56df90b631fc027fe28b70d41352d820797239bb upstream.
Add patch for realtek codec in Lenovo B50-70 that fixes inverted
internal microphone channel.
Device IdeaPad Y410P has the same PCI SSID as Lenovo B50-70,
but first one is about fix the noise and it didn't seem help in a
later kernel version.
So I replaced IdeaPad Y410P device description with B50-70 and apply
inverted microphone fix.
Bugzilla: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/alsa-driver/+bug/1524215
Signed-off-by: Michał Wadowski <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
@@ -6550,7 +6550,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x313c, "ThinkCentre Station", ALC294_FIXUP_LENOVO_MIC_LOCATION),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3902, "Lenovo E50-80", ALC269_FIXUP_DMIC_THINKPAD_ACPI),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3977, "IdeaPad S210", ALC283_FIXUP_INT_MIC),
- SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3978, "IdeaPad Y410P", ALC269_FIXUP_NO_SHUTUP),
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3978, "Lenovo B50-70", ALC269_FIXUP_DMIC_THINKPAD_ACPI),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x5013, "Thinkpad", ALC269_FIXUP_LIMIT_INT_MIC_BOOST),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x501a, "Thinkpad", ALC283_FIXUP_INT_MIC),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x501e, "Thinkpad L440", ALC292_FIXUP_TPT440_DOCK),
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit 6daef95b8c914866a46247232a048447fff97279 upstream.
Avoid cache line miss dereferencing struct page if we can.
page_copy_sane() mostly deals with order-0 pages.
Extra cache line miss is visible on TCP recvmsg() calls dealing
with GRO packets (typically 45 page frags are attached to one skb).
Bringing the 45 struct pages into cpu cache while copying the data
is not free, since the freeing of the skb (and associated
page frags put_page()) can happen after cache lines have been evicted.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
lib/iov_iter.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/lib/iov_iter.c
+++ b/lib/iov_iter.c
@@ -687,8 +687,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(_copy_from_iter_full_nocac
static inline bool page_copy_sane(struct page *page, size_t offset, size_t n)
{
- struct page *head = compound_head(page);
- size_t v = n + offset + page_address(page) - page_address(head);
+ struct page *head;
+ size_t v = n + offset;
+
+ /*
+ * The general case needs to access the page order in order
+ * to compute the page size.
+ * However, we mostly deal with order-0 pages and thus can
+ * avoid a possible cache line miss for requests that fit all
+ * page orders.
+ */
+ if (n <= v && v <= PAGE_SIZE)
+ return true;
+
+ head = compound_head(page);
+ v += (page - head) << PAGE_SHIFT;
if (likely(n <= v && v <= (PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(head))))
return true;
From: Sahitya Tummala <[email protected]>
commit 08fc98a4d6424af66eb3ac4e2cedd2fc927ed436 upstream.
The buffer_head (frames[0].bh) and it's corresping page can be
potentially free'd once brelse() is done inside the for loop
but before the for loop exits in dx_release(). It can be free'd
in another context, when the page cache is flushed via
drop_caches_sysctl_handler(). This results into below data abort
when accessing info->indirect_levels in dx_release().
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffc17ac3e01e
Call trace:
dx_release+0x70/0x90
ext4_htree_fill_tree+0x2d4/0x300
ext4_readdir+0x244/0x6f8
iterate_dir+0xbc/0x160
SyS_getdents64+0x94/0x174
Signed-off-by: Sahitya Tummala <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/namei.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c
@@ -870,12 +870,15 @@ static void dx_release(struct dx_frame *
{
struct dx_root_info *info;
int i;
+ unsigned int indirect_levels;
if (frames[0].bh == NULL)
return;
info = &((struct dx_root *)frames[0].bh->b_data)->info;
- for (i = 0; i <= info->indirect_levels; i++) {
+ /* save local copy, "info" may be freed after brelse() */
+ indirect_levels = info->indirect_levels;
+ for (i = 0; i <= indirect_levels; i++) {
if (frames[i].bh == NULL)
break;
brelse(frames[i].bh);
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 4a8108b70508df0b6c4ffa4a3974dab93dcbe851 upstream.
If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.
xts-aes-neonbs doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't affected
by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv. However this is more
subtle than desired, and unconditionally accessing walk.iv has caused a
real problem in other algorithms. Thus, update xts-aes-neonbs to start
checking the return value of skcipher_walk_virt().
Fixes: 1abee99eafab ("crypto: arm64/aes - reimplement bit-sliced ARM/NEON implementation for arm64")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.11+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
@@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ static int __xts_crypt(struct skcipher_r
int err;
err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
kernel_neon_begin();
From: Zhang Zhijie <[email protected]>
commit f0cfd57b43fec65761ca61d3892b983a71515f23 upstream.
The Kernel Crypto API request output the next IV data to
IV buffer for CBC implementation. So the last block data of
ciphertext should be copid into assigned IV buffer.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Fixes: 433cd2c617bf ("crypto: rockchip - add crypto driver for rk3288")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.5+
Signed-off-by: Zhang Zhijie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto_ablkcipher.c | 25 +++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto_ablkcipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto_ablkcipher.c
@@ -250,9 +250,14 @@ static int rk_set_data_start(struct rk_c
u8 *src_last_blk = page_address(sg_page(dev->sg_src)) +
dev->sg_src->offset + dev->sg_src->length - ivsize;
- /* store the iv that need to be updated in chain mode */
- if (ctx->mode & RK_CRYPTO_DEC)
+ /* Store the iv that need to be updated in chain mode.
+ * And update the IV buffer to contain the next IV for decryption mode.
+ */
+ if (ctx->mode & RK_CRYPTO_DEC) {
memcpy(ctx->iv, src_last_blk, ivsize);
+ sg_pcopy_to_buffer(dev->first, dev->src_nents, req->info,
+ ivsize, dev->total - ivsize);
+ }
err = dev->load_data(dev, dev->sg_src, dev->sg_dst);
if (!err)
@@ -288,13 +293,19 @@ static void rk_iv_copyback(struct rk_cry
struct ablkcipher_request *req =
ablkcipher_request_cast(dev->async_req);
struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm = crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ struct rk_cipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(tfm);
u32 ivsize = crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(tfm);
- if (ivsize == DES_BLOCK_SIZE)
- memcpy_fromio(req->info, dev->reg + RK_CRYPTO_TDES_IV_0,
- ivsize);
- else if (ivsize == AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
- memcpy_fromio(req->info, dev->reg + RK_CRYPTO_AES_IV_0, ivsize);
+ /* Update the IV buffer to contain the next IV for encryption mode. */
+ if (!(ctx->mode & RK_CRYPTO_DEC)) {
+ if (dev->aligned) {
+ memcpy(req->info, sg_virt(dev->sg_dst) +
+ dev->sg_dst->length - ivsize, ivsize);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(req->info, dev->addr_vir +
+ dev->count - ivsize, ivsize);
+ }
+ }
}
static void rk_update_iv(struct rk_crypto_info *dev)
[ Upstream commit 05f151a73ec2b23ffbff706e5203e729a995cdc2 ]
When a device is created in new_pcichild_device(), hpdev->refs is set
to 2 (i.e. the initial value of 1 plus the get_pcichild()).
When we hot remove the device from the host, in a Linux VM we first call
hv_pci_eject_device(), which increases hpdev->refs by get_pcichild() and
then schedules a work of hv_eject_device_work(), so hpdev->refs becomes
3 (let's ignore the paired get/put_pcichild() in other places). But in
hv_eject_device_work(), currently we only call put_pcichild() twice,
meaning the 'hpdev' struct can't be freed in put_pcichild().
Add one put_pcichild() to fix the memory leak.
The device can also be removed when we run "rmmod pci-hyperv". On this
path (hv_pci_remove() -> hv_pci_bus_exit() -> hv_pci_devices_present()),
hpdev->refs is 2, and we do correctly call put_pcichild() twice in
pci_devices_present_work().
Fixes: 4daace0d8ce8 ("PCI: hv: Add paravirtual PCI front-end for Microsoft Hyper-V VMs")
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: commit log rework]
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c b/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c
index 53d1c08cef4dc..292450c7da625 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c
@@ -1941,6 +1941,7 @@ static void hv_eject_device_work(struct work_struct *work)
VM_PKT_DATA_INBAND, 0);
put_pcichild(hpdev, hv_pcidev_ref_childlist);
+ put_pcichild(hpdev, hv_pcidev_ref_initial);
put_pcichild(hpdev, hv_pcidev_ref_pnp);
put_hvpcibus(hpdev->hbus);
}
--
2.20.1
From: Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
commit 57a0da28ced8707cb9f79f071a016b9d005caf5a upstream.
Unaligned AIO must be serialized because the zeroing of partial blocks
of unaligned AIO can result in data corruption in case it's overlapping
another in flight IO.
Currently we wait for all unwritten extents before we submit unaligned
AIO which protects data in case of unaligned AIO is following overlapping
IO. However if a unaligned AIO is followed by overlapping aligned AIO we
can still end up corrupting data.
To fix this, we must make sure that the unaligned AIO is the only IO in
flight by waiting for unwritten extents conversion not just before the
IO submission, but right after it as well.
This problem can be reproduced by xfstest generic/538
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/file.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/ext4/file.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/file.c
@@ -262,6 +262,13 @@ ext4_file_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb,
}
ret = __generic_file_write_iter(iocb, from);
+ /*
+ * Unaligned direct AIO must be the only IO in flight. Otherwise
+ * overlapping aligned IO after unaligned might result in data
+ * corruption.
+ */
+ if (ret == -EIOCBQUEUED && unaligned_aio)
+ ext4_unwritten_wait(inode);
inode_unlock(inode);
if (ret > 0)
From: Shuning Zhang <[email protected]>
commit e091eab028f9253eac5c04f9141bbc9d170acab3 upstream.
In some cases, ocfs2_iget() reads the data of inode, which has been
deleted for some reason. That will make the system panic. So We should
judge whether this inode has been deleted, and tell the caller that the
inode is a bad inode.
For example, the ocfs2 is used as the backed of nfs, and the client is
nfsv3. This issue can be reproduced by the following steps.
on the nfs server side,
..../patha/pathb
Step 1: The process A was scheduled before calling the function fh_verify.
Step 2: The process B is removing the 'pathb', and just completed the call
to function dput. Then the dentry of 'pathb' has been deleted from the
dcache, and all ancestors have been deleted also. The relationship of
dentry and inode was deleted through the function hlist_del_init. The
following is the call stack.
dentry_iput->hlist_del_init(&dentry->d_u.d_alias)
At this time, the inode is still in the dcache.
Step 3: The process A call the function ocfs2_get_dentry, which get the
inode from dcache. Then the refcount of inode is 1. The following is the
call stack.
nfsd3_proc_getacl->fh_verify->exportfs_decode_fh->fh_to_dentry(ocfs2_get_dentry)
Step 4: Dirty pages are flushed by bdi threads. So the inode of 'patha'
is evicted, and this directory was deleted. But the inode of 'pathb'
can't be evicted, because the refcount of the inode was 1.
Step 5: The process A keep running, and call the function
reconnect_path(in exportfs_decode_fh), which call function
ocfs2_get_parent of ocfs2. Get the block number of parent
directory(patha) by the name of ... Then read the data from disk by the
block number. But this inode has been deleted, so the system panic.
Process A Process B
1. in nfsd3_proc_getacl |
2. | dput
3. fh_to_dentry(ocfs2_get_dentry) |
4. bdi flush dirty cache |
5. ocfs2_iget |
[283465.542049] OCFS2: ERROR (device sdp): ocfs2_validate_inode_block:
Invalid dinode #580640: OCFS2_VALID_FL not set
[283465.545490] Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device sdp): panic forced
after error
[283465.546889] CPU: 5 PID: 12416 Comm: nfsd Tainted: G W
4.1.12-124.18.6.el6uek.bug28762940v3.x86_64 #2
[283465.548382] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX
Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 09/21/2015
[283465.549657] 0000000000000000 ffff8800a56fb7b8 ffffffff816e839c
ffffffffa0514758
[283465.550392] 000000000008dc20 ffff8800a56fb838 ffffffff816e62d3
0000000000000008
[283465.551056] ffff880000000010 ffff8800a56fb848 ffff8800a56fb7e8
ffff88005df9f000
[283465.551710] Call Trace:
[283465.552516] [<ffffffff816e839c>] dump_stack+0x63/0x81
[283465.553291] [<ffffffff816e62d3>] panic+0xcb/0x21b
[283465.554037] [<ffffffffa04e66b0>] ocfs2_handle_error+0xf0/0xf0 [ocfs2]
[283465.554882] [<ffffffffa04e7737>] __ocfs2_error+0x67/0x70 [ocfs2]
[283465.555768] [<ffffffffa049c0f9>] ocfs2_validate_inode_block+0x229/0x230
[ocfs2]
[283465.556683] [<ffffffffa047bcbc>] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x46c/0x7b0 [ocfs2]
[283465.557408] [<ffffffffa049bed0>] ? ocfs2_inode_cache_io_unlock+0x20/0x20
[ocfs2]
[283465.557973] [<ffffffffa049f0eb>] ocfs2_read_inode_block_full+0x3b/0x60
[ocfs2]
[283465.558525] [<ffffffffa049f5ba>] ocfs2_iget+0x4aa/0x880 [ocfs2]
[283465.559082] [<ffffffffa049146e>] ocfs2_get_parent+0x9e/0x220 [ocfs2]
[283465.559622] [<ffffffff81297c05>] reconnect_path+0xb5/0x300
[283465.560156] [<ffffffff81297f46>] exportfs_decode_fh+0xf6/0x2b0
[283465.560708] [<ffffffffa062faf0>] ? nfsd_proc_getattr+0xa0/0xa0 [nfsd]
[283465.561262] [<ffffffff810a8196>] ? prepare_creds+0x26/0x110
[283465.561932] [<ffffffffa0630860>] fh_verify+0x350/0x660 [nfsd]
[283465.562862] [<ffffffffa0637804>] ? nfsd_cache_lookup+0x44/0x630 [nfsd]
[283465.563697] [<ffffffffa063a8b9>] nfsd3_proc_getattr+0x69/0xf0 [nfsd]
[283465.564510] [<ffffffffa062cf60>] nfsd_dispatch+0xe0/0x290 [nfsd]
[283465.565358] [<ffffffffa05eb892>] ? svc_tcp_adjust_wspace+0x12/0x30
[sunrpc]
[283465.566272] [<ffffffffa05ea652>] svc_process_common+0x412/0x6a0 [sunrpc]
[283465.567155] [<ffffffffa05eaa03>] svc_process+0x123/0x210 [sunrpc]
[283465.568020] [<ffffffffa062c90f>] nfsd+0xff/0x170 [nfsd]
[283465.568962] [<ffffffffa062c810>] ? nfsd_destroy+0x80/0x80 [nfsd]
[283465.570112] [<ffffffff810a622b>] kthread+0xcb/0xf0
[283465.571099] [<ffffffff810a6160>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x180/0x180
[283465.572114] [<ffffffff816f11b8>] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90
[283465.573156] [<ffffffff810a6160>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x180/0x180
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Shuning Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: piaojun <[email protected]>
Cc: "Gang He" <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ocfs2/export.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/ocfs2/export.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/export.c
@@ -148,16 +148,24 @@ static struct dentry *ocfs2_get_parent(s
u64 blkno;
struct dentry *parent;
struct inode *dir = d_inode(child);
+ int set;
trace_ocfs2_get_parent(child, child->d_name.len, child->d_name.name,
(unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(dir)->ip_blkno);
+ status = ocfs2_nfs_sync_lock(OCFS2_SB(dir->i_sb), 1);
+ if (status < 0) {
+ mlog(ML_ERROR, "getting nfs sync lock(EX) failed %d\n", status);
+ parent = ERR_PTR(status);
+ goto bail;
+ }
+
status = ocfs2_inode_lock(dir, NULL, 0);
if (status < 0) {
if (status != -ENOENT)
mlog_errno(status);
parent = ERR_PTR(status);
- goto bail;
+ goto unlock_nfs_sync;
}
status = ocfs2_lookup_ino_from_name(dir, "..", 2, &blkno);
@@ -166,11 +174,31 @@ static struct dentry *ocfs2_get_parent(s
goto bail_unlock;
}
+ status = ocfs2_test_inode_bit(OCFS2_SB(dir->i_sb), blkno, &set);
+ if (status < 0) {
+ if (status == -EINVAL) {
+ status = -ESTALE;
+ } else
+ mlog(ML_ERROR, "test inode bit failed %d\n", status);
+ parent = ERR_PTR(status);
+ goto bail_unlock;
+ }
+
+ trace_ocfs2_get_dentry_test_bit(status, set);
+ if (!set) {
+ status = -ESTALE;
+ parent = ERR_PTR(status);
+ goto bail_unlock;
+ }
+
parent = d_obtain_alias(ocfs2_iget(OCFS2_SB(dir->i_sb), blkno, 0, 0));
bail_unlock:
ocfs2_inode_unlock(dir, 0);
+unlock_nfs_sync:
+ ocfs2_nfs_sync_unlock(OCFS2_SB(dir->i_sb), 1);
+
bail:
trace_ocfs2_get_parent_end(parent);
From: Curtis Malainey <[email protected]>
commit a46eb523220e242affb9a6bc9bb8efc05f4f7459 upstream.
The current algorithm allows 3 types of transfers, 16bit, 32bit and
burst. According to Realtek, 16bit transfers have a special restriction
in that it is restricted to the memory region of
0x18020000 ~ 0x18021000. This region is the memory location of the I2C
registers. The current algorithm does not uphold this restriction and
therefore fails to complete writes.
Since this has been broken for some time it likely no one is using it.
Better to simply disable the 16 bit writes. This will allow users to
properly load firmware over SPI without data corruption.
Signed-off-by: Curtis Malainey <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ben Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/soc/codecs/rt5677-spi.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/rt5677-spi.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/rt5677-spi.c
@@ -58,13 +58,15 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(spi_mutex);
* RT5677_SPI_READ/WRITE_32: Transfer 4 bytes
* RT5677_SPI_READ/WRITE_BURST: Transfer any multiples of 8 bytes
*
- * For example, reading 260 bytes at 0x60030002 uses the following commands:
- * 0x60030002 RT5677_SPI_READ_16 2 bytes
+ * Note:
+ * 16 Bit writes and reads are restricted to the address range
+ * 0x18020000 ~ 0x18021000
+ *
+ * For example, reading 256 bytes at 0x60030004 uses the following commands:
* 0x60030004 RT5677_SPI_READ_32 4 bytes
* 0x60030008 RT5677_SPI_READ_BURST 240 bytes
* 0x600300F8 RT5677_SPI_READ_BURST 8 bytes
* 0x60030100 RT5677_SPI_READ_32 4 bytes
- * 0x60030104 RT5677_SPI_READ_16 2 bytes
*
* Input:
* @read: true for read commands; false for write commands
@@ -79,15 +81,13 @@ static u8 rt5677_spi_select_cmd(bool rea
{
u8 cmd;
- if (align == 2 || align == 6 || remain == 2) {
- cmd = RT5677_SPI_READ_16;
- *len = 2;
- } else if (align == 4 || remain <= 6) {
+ if (align == 4 || remain <= 4) {
cmd = RT5677_SPI_READ_32;
*len = 4;
} else {
cmd = RT5677_SPI_READ_BURST;
- *len = min_t(u32, remain & ~7, RT5677_SPI_BURST_LEN);
+ *len = (((remain - 1) >> 3) + 1) << 3;
+ *len = min_t(u32, *len, RT5677_SPI_BURST_LEN);
}
return read ? cmd : cmd + 1;
}
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static void rt5677_spi_reverse(u8 *dst,
}
}
-/* Read DSP address space using SPI. addr and len have to be 2-byte aligned. */
+/* Read DSP address space using SPI. addr and len have to be 4-byte aligned. */
int rt5677_spi_read(u32 addr, void *rxbuf, size_t len)
{
u32 offset;
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ int rt5677_spi_read(u32 addr, void *rxbu
if (!g_spi)
return -ENODEV;
- if ((addr & 1) || (len & 1)) {
+ if ((addr & 3) || (len & 3)) {
dev_err(&g_spi->dev, "Bad read align 0x%x(%zu)\n", addr, len);
return -EACCES;
}
@@ -159,13 +159,13 @@ int rt5677_spi_read(u32 addr, void *rxbu
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rt5677_spi_read);
-/* Write DSP address space using SPI. addr has to be 2-byte aligned.
- * If len is not 2-byte aligned, an extra byte of zero is written at the end
+/* Write DSP address space using SPI. addr has to be 4-byte aligned.
+ * If len is not 4-byte aligned, then extra zeros are written at the end
* as padding.
*/
int rt5677_spi_write(u32 addr, const void *txbuf, size_t len)
{
- u32 offset, len_with_pad = len;
+ u32 offset;
int status = 0;
struct spi_transfer t;
struct spi_message m;
@@ -178,22 +178,19 @@ int rt5677_spi_write(u32 addr, const voi
if (!g_spi)
return -ENODEV;
- if (addr & 1) {
+ if (addr & 3) {
dev_err(&g_spi->dev, "Bad write align 0x%x(%zu)\n", addr, len);
return -EACCES;
}
- if (len & 1)
- len_with_pad = len + 1;
-
memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t));
t.tx_buf = buf;
t.speed_hz = RT5677_SPI_FREQ;
spi_message_init_with_transfers(&m, &t, 1);
- for (offset = 0; offset < len_with_pad;) {
+ for (offset = 0; offset < len;) {
spi_cmd = rt5677_spi_select_cmd(false, (addr + offset) & 7,
- len_with_pad - offset, &t.len);
+ len - offset, &t.len);
/* Construct SPI message header */
buf[0] = spi_cmd;
From: Liang Chen <[email protected]>
commit a4b732a248d12cbdb46999daf0bf288c011335eb upstream.
There is a race between cache device register and cache set unregister.
For an already registered cache device, register_bcache will call
bch_is_open to iterate through all cachesets and check every cache
there. The race occurs if cache_set_free executes at the same time and
clears the caches right before ca is dereferenced in bch_is_open_cache.
To close the race, let's make sure the clean up work is protected by
the bch_register_lock as well.
This issue can be reproduced as follows,
while true; do echo /dev/XXX> /sys/fs/bcache/register ; done&
while true; do echo 1> /sys/block/XXX/bcache/set/unregister ; done &
and results in the following oops,
[ +0.000053] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000998
[ +0.000457] #PF error: [normal kernel read fault]
[ +0.000464] PGD 800000003ca9d067 P4D 800000003ca9d067 PUD 3ca9c067 PMD 0
[ +0.000388] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ +0.000269] CPU: 1 PID: 3266 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.0.0+ #6
[ +0.000346] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.fc28 04/01/2014
[ +0.000472] RIP: 0010:register_bcache+0x1829/0x1990 [bcache]
[ +0.000344] Code: b0 48 83 e8 50 48 81 fa e0 e1 10 c0 0f 84 a9 00 00 00 48 89 c6 48 89 ca 0f b7 ba 54 04 00 00 4c 8b 82 60 0c 00 00 85 ff 74 2f <49> 3b a8 98 09 00 00 74 4e 44 8d 47 ff 31 ff 49 c1 e0 03 eb 0d
[ +0.000839] RSP: 0018:ffff92ee804cbd88 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ +0.000328] RAX: ffffffffc010e190 RBX: ffff918b5c6b5000 RCX: ffff918b7d8e0000
[ +0.000399] RDX: ffff918b7d8e0000 RSI: ffffffffc010e190 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ +0.000398] RBP: ffff918b7d318340 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffb9bd2d7a
[ +0.000385] R10: ffff918b7eb253c0 R11: ffffb95980f51200 R12: ffffffffc010e1a0
[ +0.000411] R13: fffffffffffffff2 R14: 000000000000000b R15: ffff918b7e232620
[ +0.000384] FS: 00007f955bec2740(0000) GS:ffff918b7eb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ +0.000420] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ +0.000801] CR2: 0000000000000998 CR3: 000000003cad6000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
[ +0.000837] Call Trace:
[ +0.000682] ? _cond_resched+0x10/0x20
[ +0.000691] ? __kmalloc+0x131/0x1b0
[ +0.000710] kernfs_fop_write+0xfa/0x170
[ +0.000733] __vfs_write+0x2e/0x190
[ +0.000688] ? inode_security+0x10/0x30
[ +0.000698] ? selinux_file_permission+0xd2/0x120
[ +0.000752] ? security_file_permission+0x2b/0x100
[ +0.000753] vfs_write+0xa8/0x1a0
[ +0.000676] ksys_write+0x4d/0xb0
[ +0.000699] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xf0
[ +0.000692] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Signed-off-by: Liang Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/md/bcache/super.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/md/bcache/super.c
+++ b/drivers/md/bcache/super.c
@@ -1357,6 +1357,7 @@ static void cache_set_free(struct closur
bch_btree_cache_free(c);
bch_journal_free(c);
+ mutex_lock(&bch_register_lock);
for_each_cache(ca, c, i)
if (ca) {
ca->set = NULL;
@@ -1379,7 +1380,6 @@ static void cache_set_free(struct closur
mempool_destroy(c->search);
kfree(c->devices);
- mutex_lock(&bch_register_lock);
list_del(&c->list);
mutex_unlock(&bch_register_lock);
stable-rc/linux-4.14.y boot: 117 boots: 1 failed, 113 passed with 1 offline, 1 untried/unknown, 1 conflict (v4.14.120-64-gffedd7fd95e8)
Full Boot Summary: https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.14.y/kernel/v4.14.120-64-gffedd7fd95e8/
Full Build Summary: https://kernelci.org/build/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.14.y/kernel/v4.14.120-64-gffedd7fd95e8/
Tree: stable-rc
Branch: linux-4.14.y
Git Describe: v4.14.120-64-gffedd7fd95e8
Git Commit: ffedd7fd95e8d03834094434754a33dbc060770d
Git URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Tested: 62 unique boards, 24 SoC families, 14 builds out of 201
Boot Regressions Detected:
arm:
omap2plus_defconfig:
gcc-8:
omap4-panda:
lab-baylibre: new failure (last pass: v4.14.120)
Boot Failure Detected:
arm64:
defconfig:
gcc-8:
rk3399-firefly: 1 failed lab
Offline Platforms:
arm:
multi_v7_defconfig:
gcc-8
stih410-b2120: 1 offline lab
Conflicting Boot Failure Detected: (These likely are not failures as other labs are reporting PASS. Needs review.)
arm:
omap2plus_defconfig:
omap4-panda:
lab-baylibre: FAIL (gcc-8)
lab-baylibre-seattle: PASS (gcc-8)
---
For more info write to <[email protected]>
From: Hui Wang <[email protected]>
commit 8c2e6728c2bf95765b724e07d0278ae97cd1ee0d upstream.
The driver will check the monitor presence when resuming from suspend,
starting poll or interrupt triggers. In these 3 situations, the
jack_dirty will be set to 1 first, then the hda_jack.c reads the
pin_sense from register, after reading the register, the jack_dirty
will be set to 0. But hdmi_repoll_work() is enabled in these 3
situations, It will read the pin_sense a couple of times subsequently,
since the jack_dirty is 0 now, It does not read the register anymore,
instead it uses the shadow pin_sense which is read at the first time.
It is meaningless to check the shadow pin_sense a couple of times,
we need to read the register to check the real plugging state, so
we set the jack_dirty to 1 in the hdmi_repoll_work().
Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c
@@ -1661,6 +1661,11 @@ static void hdmi_repoll_eld(struct work_
container_of(to_delayed_work(work), struct hdmi_spec_per_pin, work);
struct hda_codec *codec = per_pin->codec;
struct hdmi_spec *spec = codec->spec;
+ struct hda_jack_tbl *jack;
+
+ jack = snd_hda_jack_tbl_get(codec, per_pin->pin_nid);
+ if (jack)
+ jack->jack_dirty = 1;
if (per_pin->repoll_count++ > 6)
per_pin->repoll_count = 0;
On 20/05/2019 13:13, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.121 release.
> There are 63 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed 22 May 2019 11:50:54 AM UTC.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.121-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
All tests are passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v4.14:
8 builds: 8 pass, 0 fail
16 boots: 16 pass, 0 fail
24 tests: 24 pass, 0 fail
Linux version: 4.14.121-rc1-gffedd7f
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,
tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04
Cheers
Jon
--
nvpublic
On Mon, 20 May 2019 at 17:49, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.121 release.
> There are 63 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed 22 May 2019 11:50:54 AM UTC.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.121-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.14.121-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.14.y
git commit: ffedd7fd95e8d03834094434754a33dbc060770d
git describe: v4.14.120-64-gffedd7fd95e8
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.14-oe/build/v4.14.120-64-gffedd7fd95e8
No regressions (compared to build v4.14.120)
No fixes (compared to build v4.14.120)
Ran 23544 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64
Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* perf
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* v4l2-compliance
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* kvm-unit-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none
* ssuite
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
On 5/20/19 6:13 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.121 release.
> There are 63 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed 22 May 2019 11:50:54 AM UTC.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.121-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah