Support extended packet number cipher suites (802.1AEbw) frames handling.
This does not include the needed netlink patches.
* Added xpn boolean field to `struct macsec_secy`.
* Added ssci field to `struct_macsec_tx_sa` (802.1AE figure 10-5).
* Added ssci field to `struct_macsec_rx_sa` (802.1AE figure 10-5).
* Added salt field to `struct macsec_key` (802.1AE 10.7 NOTE 1).
* Created pn_t type for easy access to lower and upper halves.
* Created salt_t type for easy access to the "ssci" and "pn" parts.
* Created `macsec_fill_iv_xpn` function to create IV in XPN mode.
* Support in PN recovery and preliminary replay check in XPN mode.
In addition, according to IEEE 802.1AEbw figure 10-5, the PN of incoming
frame can be 0 when XPN cipher suite is used, so fixed the function
`macsec_validate_skb` to fail on PN=0 only if XPN is off.
Signed-off-by: Era Mayflower <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/macsec.c | 130 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
include/net/macsec.h | 45 ++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/macsec.c b/drivers/net/macsec.c
index 45bfd99f1..de9578daa 100644
--- a/drivers/net/macsec.c
+++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <net/gro_cells.h>
#include <net/macsec.h>
#include <linux/phy.h>
+#include <linux/byteorder/generic.h>
#include <uapi/linux/if_macsec.h>
@@ -68,6 +69,16 @@ struct macsec_eth_header {
sc; \
sc = rtnl_dereference(sc->next))
+#define pn_same_half(pn1, pn2) (!(((pn1) >> 31) ^ ((pn2) >> 31)))
+
+struct gcm_iv_xpn {
+ union {
+ u8 short_secure_channel_id[4];
+ ssci_t ssci;
+ };
+ __be64 pn;
+} __packed;
+
struct gcm_iv {
union {
u8 secure_channel_id[8];
@@ -372,8 +383,8 @@ static const struct macsec_ops *macsec_get_ops(struct macsec_dev *macsec,
return __macsec_get_ops(macsec->offload, macsec, ctx);
}
-/* validate MACsec packet according to IEEE 802.1AE-2006 9.12 */
-static bool macsec_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 icv_len)
+/* validate MACsec packet according to IEEE 802.1AE-2018 9.12 */
+static bool macsec_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 icv_len, bool xpn)
{
struct macsec_eth_header *h = (struct macsec_eth_header *)skb->data;
int len = skb->len - 2 * ETH_ALEN;
@@ -398,8 +409,8 @@ static bool macsec_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 icv_len)
if (h->unused)
return false;
- /* rx.pn != 0 (figure 10-5) */
- if (!h->packet_number)
+ /* rx.pn != 0 if not XPN (figure 10-5 with 802.11AEbw-2013 amendment) */
+ if (!h->packet_number && !xpn)
return false;
/* length check, f) g) h) i) */
@@ -411,6 +422,15 @@ static bool macsec_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 icv_len)
#define MACSEC_NEEDED_HEADROOM (macsec_extra_len(true))
#define MACSEC_NEEDED_TAILROOM MACSEC_STD_ICV_LEN
+static void macsec_fill_iv_xpn(unsigned char *iv, ssci_t ssci, u64 pn,
+ salt_t salt)
+{
+ struct gcm_iv_xpn *gcm_iv = (struct gcm_iv_xpn *)iv;
+
+ gcm_iv->ssci = ssci ^ salt.ssci;
+ gcm_iv->pn = cpu_to_be64(pn) ^ salt.pn;
+}
+
static void macsec_fill_iv(unsigned char *iv, sci_t sci, u32 pn)
{
struct gcm_iv *gcm_iv = (struct gcm_iv *)iv;
@@ -441,14 +461,19 @@ void macsec_pn_wrapped(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(macsec_pn_wrapped);
-static u32 tx_sa_update_pn(struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa, struct macsec_secy *secy)
+static pn_t tx_sa_update_pn(struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa,
+ struct macsec_secy *secy)
{
- u32 pn;
+ pn_t pn;
spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
- pn = tx_sa->next_pn;
- tx_sa->next_pn++;
+ pn = tx_sa->next_pn_halves;
+ if (secy->xpn)
+ tx_sa->next_pn++;
+ else
+ tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower++;
+
if (tx_sa->next_pn == 0)
__macsec_pn_wrapped(secy, tx_sa);
spin_unlock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
@@ -563,7 +588,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa;
struct macsec_dev *macsec = macsec_priv(dev);
bool sci_present;
- u32 pn;
+ pn_t pn;
secy = &macsec->secy;
tx_sc = &secy->tx_sc;
@@ -605,12 +630,12 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
memmove(hh, eth, 2 * ETH_ALEN);
pn = tx_sa_update_pn(tx_sa, secy);
- if (pn == 0) {
+ if (pn.full64 == 0) {
macsec_txsa_put(tx_sa);
kfree_skb(skb);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOLINK);
}
- macsec_fill_sectag(hh, secy, pn, sci_present);
+ macsec_fill_sectag(hh, secy, pn.lower, sci_present);
macsec_set_shortlen(hh, unprotected_len - 2 * ETH_ALEN);
skb_put(skb, secy->icv_len);
@@ -641,7 +666,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
- macsec_fill_iv(iv, secy->sci, pn);
+ if (secy->xpn)
+ macsec_fill_iv_xpn(iv, tx_sa->ssci, pn.full64, tx_sa->key.salt);
+ else
+ macsec_fill_iv(iv, secy->sci, pn.lower);
sg_init_table(sg, ret);
ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
@@ -693,13 +721,14 @@ static bool macsec_post_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, struct macsec_secy *secy, u
u32 lowest_pn = 0;
spin_lock(&rx_sa->lock);
- if (rx_sa->next_pn >= secy->replay_window)
- lowest_pn = rx_sa->next_pn - secy->replay_window;
+ if (rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower >= secy->replay_window)
+ lowest_pn = rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower - secy->replay_window;
/* Now perform replay protection check again
* (see IEEE 802.1AE-2006 figure 10-5)
*/
- if (secy->replay_protect && pn < lowest_pn) {
+ if (secy->replay_protect && pn < lowest_pn &&
+ (!secy->xpn || pn_same_half(pn, lowest_pn))) {
spin_unlock(&rx_sa->lock);
u64_stats_update_begin(&rxsc_stats->syncp);
rxsc_stats->stats.InPktsLate++;
@@ -748,8 +777,15 @@ static bool macsec_post_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, struct macsec_secy *secy, u
}
u64_stats_update_end(&rxsc_stats->syncp);
- if (pn >= rx_sa->next_pn)
- rx_sa->next_pn = pn + 1;
+ // Instead of "pn >=" - to support pn overflow in xpn
+ if (pn + 1 > rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower) {
+ rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = pn + 1;
+ } else if (secy->xpn &&
+ !pn_same_half(pn, rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower)) {
+ rx_sa->next_pn_halves.upper++;
+ rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = pn + 1;
+ }
+
spin_unlock(&rx_sa->lock);
}
@@ -836,6 +872,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned char *iv;
struct aead_request *req;
struct macsec_eth_header *hdr;
+ u32 hdr_pn;
u16 icv_len = secy->icv_len;
macsec_skb_cb(skb)->valid = false;
@@ -855,7 +892,21 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
}
hdr = (struct macsec_eth_header *)skb->data;
- macsec_fill_iv(iv, sci, ntohl(hdr->packet_number));
+ hdr_pn = ntohl(hdr->packet_number);
+
+ if (secy->xpn) {
+ pn_t recovered_pn = rx_sa->next_pn_halves;
+
+ recovered_pn.lower = hdr_pn;
+ if (hdr_pn < rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower &&
+ !pn_same_half(hdr_pn, rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower))
+ recovered_pn.upper++;
+
+ macsec_fill_iv_xpn(iv, rx_sa->ssci, recovered_pn.full64,
+ rx_sa->key.salt);
+ } else {
+ macsec_fill_iv(iv, sci, hdr_pn);
+ }
sg_init_table(sg, ret);
ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
@@ -996,7 +1047,7 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb)
struct macsec_rxh_data *rxd;
struct macsec_dev *macsec;
sci_t sci;
- u32 pn;
+ u32 hdr_pn;
bool cbit;
struct pcpu_rx_sc_stats *rxsc_stats;
struct pcpu_secy_stats *secy_stats;
@@ -1067,7 +1118,7 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb)
secy_stats = this_cpu_ptr(macsec->stats);
rxsc_stats = this_cpu_ptr(rx_sc->stats);
- if (!macsec_validate_skb(skb, secy->icv_len)) {
+ if (!macsec_validate_skb(skb, secy->icv_len, secy->xpn)) {
u64_stats_update_begin(&secy_stats->syncp);
secy_stats->stats.InPktsBadTag++;
u64_stats_update_end(&secy_stats->syncp);
@@ -1099,13 +1150,16 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb)
}
/* First, PN check to avoid decrypting obviously wrong packets */
- pn = ntohl(hdr->packet_number);
+ hdr_pn = ntohl(hdr->packet_number);
if (secy->replay_protect) {
bool late;
spin_lock(&rx_sa->lock);
- late = rx_sa->next_pn >= secy->replay_window &&
- pn < (rx_sa->next_pn - secy->replay_window);
+ late = rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower >= secy->replay_window &&
+ hdr_pn < (rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower - secy->replay_window);
+
+ if (secy->xpn)
+ late = late && pn_same_half(rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower, hdr_pn);
spin_unlock(&rx_sa->lock);
if (late) {
@@ -1134,7 +1188,7 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb)
return RX_HANDLER_CONSUMED;
}
- if (!macsec_post_decrypt(skb, secy, pn))
+ if (!macsec_post_decrypt(skb, secy, hdr_pn))
goto drop;
deliver:
@@ -1661,7 +1715,7 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
spin_lock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
- rx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
+ rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
spin_unlock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
}
@@ -1868,7 +1922,7 @@ static int macsec_add_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
}
spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
- tx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
+ tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
spin_unlock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE])
@@ -2132,9 +2186,11 @@ static int macsec_upd_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
u8 assoc_num;
struct nlattr *tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_MAX + 1];
bool was_operational, was_active;
- u32 prev_pn = 0;
+ pn_t prev_pn;
int ret = 0;
+ prev_pn.full64 = 0;
+
if (!attrs[MACSEC_ATTR_IFINDEX])
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2154,8 +2210,8 @@ static int macsec_upd_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
- prev_pn = tx_sa->next_pn;
- tx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
+ prev_pn = tx_sa->next_pn_halves;
+ tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
spin_unlock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
}
@@ -2193,7 +2249,7 @@ static int macsec_upd_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
cleanup:
if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
- tx_sa->next_pn = prev_pn;
+ tx_sa->next_pn_halves = prev_pn;
spin_unlock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
}
tx_sa->active = was_active;
@@ -2213,9 +2269,11 @@ static int macsec_upd_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
struct nlattr *tb_rxsc[MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_MAX + 1];
struct nlattr *tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_MAX + 1];
bool was_active;
- u32 prev_pn = 0;
+ pn_t prev_pn;
int ret = 0;
+ prev_pn.full64 = 0;
+
if (!attrs[MACSEC_ATTR_IFINDEX])
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2238,8 +2296,8 @@ static int macsec_upd_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
spin_lock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
- prev_pn = rx_sa->next_pn;
- rx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
+ prev_pn = rx_sa->next_pn_halves;
+ rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
spin_unlock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
}
@@ -2272,7 +2330,7 @@ static int macsec_upd_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
cleanup:
if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
spin_lock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
- rx_sa->next_pn = prev_pn;
+ rx_sa->next_pn_halves = prev_pn;
spin_unlock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
}
rx_sa->active = was_active;
@@ -2791,7 +2849,7 @@ dump_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct net_device *dev,
}
if (nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN, i) ||
- nla_put_u32(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, tx_sa->next_pn) ||
+ nla_put_u32(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower) ||
nla_put(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID, MACSEC_KEYID_LEN, tx_sa->key.id) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE, tx_sa->active)) {
nla_nest_cancel(skb, txsa_nest);
@@ -2895,7 +2953,7 @@ dump_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct net_device *dev,
nla_nest_end(skb, attr);
if (nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN, i) ||
- nla_put_u32(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, rx_sa->next_pn) ||
+ nla_put_u32(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower) ||
nla_put(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID, MACSEC_KEYID_LEN, rx_sa->key.id) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE, rx_sa->active)) {
nla_nest_cancel(skb, rxsa_nest);
diff --git a/include/net/macsec.h b/include/net/macsec.h
index 92e43db8b..43cd54e17 100644
--- a/include/net/macsec.h
+++ b/include/net/macsec.h
@@ -11,18 +11,45 @@
#include <uapi/linux/if_link.h>
#include <uapi/linux/if_macsec.h>
+#define MACSEC_SALT_LEN 12
+#define MACSEC_NUM_AN 4 /* 2 bits for the association number */
+
typedef u64 __bitwise sci_t;
+typedef u32 __bitwise ssci_t;
-#define MACSEC_NUM_AN 4 /* 2 bits for the association number */
+typedef union salt {
+ struct {
+ u32 ssci;
+ u64 pn;
+ } __packed;
+ u8 bytes[MACSEC_SALT_LEN];
+} __packed salt_t;
+
+typedef union pn {
+ struct {
+#if defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
+ u32 lower;
+ u32 upper;
+#elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
+ u32 upper;
+ u32 lower;
+#else
+#error "Please fix <asm/byteorder.h>"
+#endif
+ };
+ u64 full64;
+} pn_t;
/**
* struct macsec_key - SA key
* @id: user-provided key identifier
* @tfm: crypto struct, key storage
+ * @salt: salt used to generate IV in XPN cipher suites
*/
struct macsec_key {
u8 id[MACSEC_KEYID_LEN];
struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+ salt_t salt;
};
struct macsec_rx_sc_stats {
@@ -64,12 +91,17 @@ struct macsec_tx_sc_stats {
* @next_pn: packet number expected for the next packet
* @lock: protects next_pn manipulations
* @key: key structure
+ * @ssci: short secure channel identifier
* @stats: per-SA stats
*/
struct macsec_rx_sa {
struct macsec_key key;
+ ssci_t ssci;
spinlock_t lock;
- u32 next_pn;
+ union {
+ pn_t next_pn_halves;
+ u64 next_pn;
+ };
refcount_t refcnt;
bool active;
struct macsec_rx_sa_stats __percpu *stats;
@@ -110,12 +142,17 @@ struct macsec_rx_sc {
* @next_pn: packet number to use for the next packet
* @lock: protects next_pn manipulations
* @key: key structure
+ * @ssci: short secure channel identifier
* @stats: per-SA stats
*/
struct macsec_tx_sa {
struct macsec_key key;
+ ssci_t ssci;
spinlock_t lock;
- u32 next_pn;
+ union {
+ pn_t next_pn_halves;
+ u64 next_pn;
+ };
refcount_t refcnt;
bool active;
struct macsec_tx_sa_stats __percpu *stats;
@@ -152,6 +189,7 @@ struct macsec_tx_sc {
* @key_len: length of keys used by the cipher suite
* @icv_len: length of ICV used by the cipher suite
* @validate_frames: validation mode
+ * @xpn: enable XPN for this SecY
* @operational: MAC_Operational flag
* @protect_frames: enable protection for this SecY
* @replay_protect: enable packet number checks on receive
@@ -166,6 +204,7 @@ struct macsec_secy {
u16 key_len;
u16 icv_len;
enum macsec_validation_type validate_frames;
+ bool xpn;
bool operational;
bool protect_frames;
bool replay_protect;
--
2.20.1
Netlink support of extended packet number cipher suites,
allows adding and updating XPN macsec interfaces.
Added support in:
* Creating interfaces with GCM-AES-XPN-128 and GCM-AES-XPN-256 suites.
* Setting and getting 64bit packet numbers with of SAs.
* Setting (only on SA creation) and getting ssci of SAs.
* Setting salt when installing a SAK.
Added 2 cipher suite identifiers according to 802.1AE-2018 table 14-1:
* MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_128
* MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_256
In addition, added 2 new netlink attribute types:
* MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SSCI
* MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT
Depends on: macsec: Support XPN frame handling - IEEE 802.1AEbw.
Signed-off-by: Era Mayflower <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/macsec.c | 161 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
include/net/macsec.h | 3 +
include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h | 8 +-
3 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/macsec.c b/drivers/net/macsec.c
index de9578daa..7083ee157 100644
--- a/drivers/net/macsec.c
+++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c
@@ -240,11 +240,13 @@ static struct macsec_cb *macsec_skb_cb(struct sk_buff *skb)
#define MACSEC_PORT_ES (htons(0x0001))
#define MACSEC_PORT_SCB (0x0000)
#define MACSEC_UNDEF_SCI ((__force sci_t)0xffffffffffffffffULL)
+#define MACSEC_UNDEF_SSCI ((__force ssci_t)0xffffffff)
#define MACSEC_GCM_AES_128_SAK_LEN 16
#define MACSEC_GCM_AES_256_SAK_LEN 32
#define DEFAULT_SAK_LEN MACSEC_GCM_AES_128_SAK_LEN
+#define DEFAULT_XPN false
#define DEFAULT_SEND_SCI true
#define DEFAULT_ENCRYPT false
#define DEFAULT_ENCODING_SA 0
@@ -1306,6 +1308,7 @@ static int init_rx_sa(struct macsec_rx_sa *rx_sa, char *sak, int key_len,
return PTR_ERR(rx_sa->key.tfm);
}
+ rx_sa->ssci = MACSEC_UNDEF_SSCI;
rx_sa->active = false;
rx_sa->next_pn = 1;
refcount_set(&rx_sa->refcnt, 1);
@@ -1404,6 +1407,7 @@ static int init_tx_sa(struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa, char *sak, int key_len,
return PTR_ERR(tx_sa->key.tfm);
}
+ tx_sa->ssci = MACSEC_UNDEF_SSCI;
tx_sa->active = false;
refcount_set(&tx_sa->refcnt, 1);
spin_lock_init(&tx_sa->lock);
@@ -1447,6 +1451,16 @@ static int nla_put_sci(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, sci_t value,
return nla_put_u64_64bit(skb, attrtype, (__force u64)value, padattr);
}
+static ssci_t nla_get_ssci(const struct nlattr *nla)
+{
+ return (__force ssci_t)nla_get_u32(nla);
+}
+
+static int nla_put_ssci(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, ssci_t value)
+{
+ return nla_put_u32(skb, attrtype, (__force u64)value);
+}
+
static struct macsec_tx_sa *get_txsa_from_nl(struct net *net,
struct nlattr **attrs,
struct nlattr **tb_sa,
@@ -1562,11 +1576,14 @@ static const struct nla_policy macsec_genl_rxsc_policy[NUM_MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR] = {
static const struct nla_policy macsec_genl_sa_policy[NUM_MACSEC_SA_ATTR] = {
[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
- [MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN] = { .type = NLA_MIN_LEN, .len = 4 },
[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
.len = MACSEC_KEYID_LEN, },
[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
.len = MACSEC_MAX_KEY_LEN, },
+ [MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SSCI] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+ .len = MACSEC_SALT_LEN, },
};
static const struct nla_policy macsec_genl_offload_policy[NUM_MACSEC_OFFLOAD_ATTR] = {
@@ -1639,7 +1656,8 @@ static bool validate_add_rxsa(struct nlattr **attrs)
if (nla_get_u8(attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN]) >= MACSEC_NUM_AN)
return false;
- if (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN] && nla_get_u32(attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) == 0)
+ if (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN] &&
+ *(u64 *)nla_data(attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) == 0)
return false;
if (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE]) {
@@ -1661,6 +1679,7 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
struct macsec_rx_sc *rx_sc;
struct macsec_rx_sa *rx_sa;
unsigned char assoc_num;
+ int pn_len;
struct nlattr *tb_rxsc[MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_MAX + 1];
struct nlattr *tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_MAX + 1];
int err;
@@ -1693,6 +1712,29 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
return -EINVAL;
}
+ pn_len = secy->xpn ? MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN : MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN;
+ if (nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) != pn_len) {
+ pr_notice("macsec: nl: add_rxsa: bad pn length: %d != %d\n",
+ nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]), pn_len);
+ rtnl_unlock();
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (secy->xpn) {
+ if (!tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SSCI] || !tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT]) {
+ rtnl_unlock();
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT]) != MACSEC_SALT_LEN) {
+ pr_notice("macsec: nl: add_rxsa: bad salt length: %d != %d\n",
+ nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT]),
+ MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT);
+ rtnl_unlock();
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
rx_sa = rtnl_dereference(rx_sc->sa[assoc_num]);
if (rx_sa) {
rtnl_unlock();
@@ -1715,7 +1757,7 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
spin_lock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
- rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
+ rx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u64(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
spin_unlock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
}
@@ -1745,6 +1787,12 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
goto cleanup;
}
+ if (secy->xpn) {
+ rx_sa->ssci = nla_get_ssci(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SSCI]);
+ nla_memcpy(rx_sa->key.salt.bytes, tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT],
+ MACSEC_SALT_LEN);
+ }
+
nla_memcpy(rx_sa->key.id, tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID], MACSEC_KEYID_LEN);
rcu_assign_pointer(rx_sc->sa[assoc_num], rx_sa);
@@ -1869,6 +1917,7 @@ static int macsec_add_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
struct macsec_tx_sc *tx_sc;
struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa;
unsigned char assoc_num;
+ int pn_len;
struct nlattr *tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_MAX + 1];
bool was_operational;
int err;
@@ -1901,6 +1950,29 @@ static int macsec_add_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
return -EINVAL;
}
+ pn_len = secy->xpn ? MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN : MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN;
+ if (nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) != pn_len) {
+ pr_notice("macsec: nl: add_txsa: bad pn length: %d != %d\n",
+ nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]), pn_len);
+ rtnl_unlock();
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (secy->xpn) {
+ if (!tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SSCI] || !tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT]) {
+ rtnl_unlock();
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT]) != MACSEC_SALT_LEN) {
+ pr_notice("macsec: nl: add_txsa: bad salt length: %d != %d\n",
+ nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT]),
+ MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT);
+ rtnl_unlock();
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
tx_sa = rtnl_dereference(tx_sc->sa[assoc_num]);
if (tx_sa) {
rtnl_unlock();
@@ -1922,7 +1994,7 @@ static int macsec_add_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
}
spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
- tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
+ tx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u64(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
spin_unlock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE])
@@ -1953,6 +2025,12 @@ static int macsec_add_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
goto cleanup;
}
+ if (secy->xpn) {
+ tx_sa->ssci = nla_get_ssci(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SSCI]);
+ nla_memcpy(tx_sa->key.salt.bytes, tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT],
+ MACSEC_SALT_LEN);
+ }
+
nla_memcpy(tx_sa->key.id, tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID], MACSEC_KEYID_LEN);
rcu_assign_pointer(tx_sc->sa[assoc_num], tx_sa);
@@ -2159,7 +2237,9 @@ static bool validate_upd_sa(struct nlattr **attrs)
{
if (!attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN] ||
attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY] ||
- attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID])
+ attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID] ||
+ attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SSCI] ||
+ attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT])
return false;
if (nla_get_u8(attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN]) >= MACSEC_NUM_AN)
@@ -2209,9 +2289,19 @@ static int macsec_upd_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
}
if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
+ int pn_len;
+
+ pn_len = secy->xpn ? MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN : MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN;
+ if (nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) != pn_len) {
+ pr_notice("macsec: nl: upd_txsa: bad pn length: %d != %d\n",
+ nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]), pn_len);
+ rtnl_unlock();
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
prev_pn = tx_sa->next_pn_halves;
- tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
+ tx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u64(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
spin_unlock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
}
@@ -2295,9 +2385,19 @@ static int macsec_upd_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
}
if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
+ int pn_len;
+
+ pn_len = secy->xpn ? MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN : MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN;
+ if (nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) != pn_len) {
+ pr_notice("macsec: nl: upd_rxsa: bad pn length: %d != %d\n",
+ nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]), pn_len);
+ rtnl_unlock();
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
spin_lock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
prev_pn = rx_sa->next_pn_halves;
- rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
+ rx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u64(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
spin_unlock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
}
@@ -2744,10 +2844,10 @@ static int nla_put_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct sk_buff *skb)
switch (secy->key_len) {
case MACSEC_GCM_AES_128_SAK_LEN:
- csid = MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID;
+ csid = secy->xpn ? MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_128 : MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID;
break;
case MACSEC_GCM_AES_256_SAK_LEN:
- csid = MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256;
+ csid = secy->xpn ? MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_256 : MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256;
break;
default:
goto cancel;
@@ -2838,6 +2938,8 @@ dump_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct net_device *dev,
for (i = 0, j = 1; i < MACSEC_NUM_AN; i++) {
struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa = rtnl_dereference(tx_sc->sa[i]);
struct nlattr *txsa_nest;
+ u64 pn;
+ int pn_len;
if (!tx_sa)
continue;
@@ -2848,9 +2950,18 @@ dump_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct net_device *dev,
goto nla_put_failure;
}
+ if (secy->xpn) {
+ pn = tx_sa->next_pn;
+ pn_len = MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN;
+ } else {
+ pn = tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower;
+ pn_len = MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN;
+ }
+
if (nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN, i) ||
- nla_put_u32(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower) ||
+ nla_put(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, pn_len, &pn) ||
nla_put(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID, MACSEC_KEYID_LEN, tx_sa->key.id) ||
+ (secy->xpn && nla_put_ssci(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SSCI, tx_sa->ssci)) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE, tx_sa->active)) {
nla_nest_cancel(skb, txsa_nest);
nla_nest_cancel(skb, txsa_list);
@@ -2923,6 +3034,8 @@ dump_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct net_device *dev,
for (i = 0, k = 1; i < MACSEC_NUM_AN; i++) {
struct macsec_rx_sa *rx_sa = rtnl_dereference(rx_sc->sa[i]);
struct nlattr *rxsa_nest;
+ u64 pn;
+ int pn_len;
if (!rx_sa)
continue;
@@ -2952,9 +3065,18 @@ dump_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct net_device *dev,
}
nla_nest_end(skb, attr);
+ if (secy->xpn) {
+ pn = rx_sa->next_pn;
+ pn_len = MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN;
+ } else {
+ pn = rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower;
+ pn_len = MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN;
+ }
+
if (nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN, i) ||
- nla_put_u32(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower) ||
+ nla_put(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, pn_len, &pn) ||
nla_put(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID, MACSEC_KEYID_LEN, rx_sa->key.id) ||
+ (secy->xpn && nla_put_ssci(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SSCI, rx_sa->ssci)) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE, rx_sa->active)) {
nla_nest_cancel(skb, rxsa_nest);
nla_nest_cancel(skb, rxsc_nest);
@@ -3483,9 +3605,19 @@ static int macsec_changelink_common(struct net_device *dev,
case MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_128:
case MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID:
secy->key_len = MACSEC_GCM_AES_128_SAK_LEN;
+ secy->xpn = false;
break;
case MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256:
secy->key_len = MACSEC_GCM_AES_256_SAK_LEN;
+ secy->xpn = false;
+ break;
+ case MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_128:
+ secy->key_len = MACSEC_GCM_AES_128_SAK_LEN;
+ secy->xpn = true;
+ break;
+ case MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_256:
+ secy->key_len = MACSEC_GCM_AES_256_SAK_LEN;
+ secy->xpn = true;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
@@ -3680,6 +3812,7 @@ static int macsec_add_dev(struct net_device *dev, sci_t sci, u8 icv_len)
secy->validate_frames = MACSEC_VALIDATE_DEFAULT;
secy->protect_frames = true;
secy->replay_protect = false;
+ secy->xpn = DEFAULT_XPN;
secy->sci = sci;
secy->tx_sc.active = true;
@@ -3809,6 +3942,8 @@ static int macsec_validate_attr(struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[],
switch (csid) {
case MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_128:
case MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256:
+ case MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_128:
+ case MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_256:
case MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID:
if (icv_len < MACSEC_MIN_ICV_LEN ||
icv_len > MACSEC_STD_ICV_LEN)
@@ -3882,10 +4017,10 @@ static int macsec_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb,
switch (secy->key_len) {
case MACSEC_GCM_AES_128_SAK_LEN:
- csid = MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID;
+ csid = secy->xpn ? MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_128 : MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID;
break;
case MACSEC_GCM_AES_256_SAK_LEN:
- csid = MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256;
+ csid = secy->xpn ? MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_256 : MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256;
break;
default:
goto nla_put_failure;
diff --git a/include/net/macsec.h b/include/net/macsec.h
index 43cd54e17..2e4780dbf 100644
--- a/include/net/macsec.h
+++ b/include/net/macsec.h
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
#include <uapi/linux/if_link.h>
#include <uapi/linux/if_macsec.h>
+#define MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN 4
+#define MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN 8
+
#define MACSEC_SALT_LEN 12
#define MACSEC_NUM_AN 4 /* 2 bits for the association number */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
index 1d63c43c3..3af2aa069 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
@@ -22,9 +22,11 @@
#define MACSEC_KEYID_LEN 16
-/* cipher IDs as per IEEE802.1AEbn-2011 */
+/* cipher IDs as per IEEE802.1AE-2018 (Table 14-1) */
#define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_128 0x0080C20001000001ULL
#define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256 0x0080C20001000002ULL
+#define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_128 0x0080C20001000003ULL
+#define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_256 0x0080C20001000004ULL
/* deprecated cipher ID for GCM-AES-128 */
#define MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID 0x0080020001000001ULL
@@ -88,11 +90,13 @@ enum macsec_sa_attrs {
MACSEC_SA_ATTR_UNSPEC,
MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN, /* config/dump, u8 0..3 */
MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE, /* config/dump, u8 0..1 */
- MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, /* config/dump, u32 */
+ MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, /* config/dump, u32/u64 (u64 if XPN) */
MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY, /* config, data */
MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID, /* config/dump, 128-bit */
MACSEC_SA_ATTR_STATS, /* dump, nested, macsec_sa_stats_attr */
MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PAD,
+ MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SSCI, /* config/dump, u32 - XPN only */
+ MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT, /* config, 96-bit - XPN only */
__MACSEC_SA_ATTR_END,
NUM_MACSEC_SA_ATTR = __MACSEC_SA_ATTR_END,
MACSEC_SA_ATTR_MAX = __MACSEC_SA_ATTR_END - 1,
--
2.20.1
In the future, please fix the time on your computer. It is inaccurate and this
shows up in the email headers, and thus makes your patches appear out of order
relative to other submissions on this mailing list when they are queued up in
patchwork.
Thank you.
From: Era Mayflower <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2020 19:47:01 +0000
> Support extended packet number cipher suites (802.1AEbw) frames handling.
> This does not include the needed netlink patches.
>
> * Added xpn boolean field to `struct macsec_secy`.
> * Added ssci field to `struct_macsec_tx_sa` (802.1AE figure 10-5).
> * Added ssci field to `struct_macsec_rx_sa` (802.1AE figure 10-5).
> * Added salt field to `struct macsec_key` (802.1AE 10.7 NOTE 1).
> * Created pn_t type for easy access to lower and upper halves.
> * Created salt_t type for easy access to the "ssci" and "pn" parts.
> * Created `macsec_fill_iv_xpn` function to create IV in XPN mode.
> * Support in PN recovery and preliminary replay check in XPN mode.
>
> In addition, according to IEEE 802.1AEbw figure 10-5, the PN of incoming
> frame can be 0 when XPN cipher suite is used, so fixed the function
> `macsec_validate_skb` to fail on PN=0 only if XPN is off.
>
> Signed-off-by: Era Mayflower <[email protected]>
Sabrina, please review these two patches.
Thank you.
From: Era Mayflower <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2020 19:47:02 +0000
> Netlink support of extended packet number cipher suites,
> allows adding and updating XPN macsec interfaces.
>
> Added support in:
> * Creating interfaces with GCM-AES-XPN-128 and GCM-AES-XPN-256 suites.
> * Setting and getting 64bit packet numbers with of SAs.
> * Setting (only on SA creation) and getting ssci of SAs.
> * Setting salt when installing a SAK.
>
> Added 2 cipher suite identifiers according to 802.1AE-2018 table 14-1:
> * MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_128
> * MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_256
>
> In addition, added 2 new netlink attribute types:
> * MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SSCI
> * MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT
>
> Depends on: macsec: Support XPN frame handling - IEEE 802.1AEbw.
>
> Signed-off-by: Era Mayflower <[email protected]>
Applied.
From: Era Mayflower <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2020 19:47:01 +0000
> Support extended packet number cipher suites (802.1AEbw) frames handling.
> This does not include the needed netlink patches.
>
> * Added xpn boolean field to `struct macsec_secy`.
> * Added ssci field to `struct_macsec_tx_sa` (802.1AE figure 10-5).
> * Added ssci field to `struct_macsec_rx_sa` (802.1AE figure 10-5).
> * Added salt field to `struct macsec_key` (802.1AE 10.7 NOTE 1).
> * Created pn_t type for easy access to lower and upper halves.
> * Created salt_t type for easy access to the "ssci" and "pn" parts.
> * Created `macsec_fill_iv_xpn` function to create IV in XPN mode.
> * Support in PN recovery and preliminary replay check in XPN mode.
>
> In addition, according to IEEE 802.1AEbw figure 10-5, the PN of incoming
> frame can be 0 when XPN cipher suite is used, so fixed the function
> `macsec_validate_skb` to fail on PN=0 only if XPN is off.
>
> Signed-off-by: Era Mayflower <[email protected]>
Applied.