2020-04-29 13:55:30

by Waiman Long

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v3] mm/slub: Fix incorrect interpretation of s->offset

In a couple of places in the slub memory allocator, the code uses
"s->offset" as a check to see if the free pointer is put right after the
object. That check is no longer true with commit 3202fa62fb43 ("slub:
relocate freelist pointer to middle of object").

As a result, echoing "1" into the validate sysfs file, e.g. of dentry,
may cause a bunch of "Freepointer corrupt" error reports like the
following to appear with the system in panic afterwards.

[ 38.579769] =============================================================================
[ 38.580845] BUG dentry(666:pmcd.service) (Tainted: G B): Freepointer corrupt
[ 38.581948] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

To fix it, use the check "s->offset == s->inuse" in the new helper
function freeptr_outside_object() instead. Also add another helper function
get_info_end() to return the end of info block (inuse + free pointer
if not overlapping with object).

Fixes: 3202fa62fb43 ("slub: relocate freelist pointer to middle of object")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
---
mm/slub.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

[v3: Change function name to freeptr_outside_object(), update check & add comment]

diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 9bf44955c4f1..b762450fc9f0 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -551,15 +551,32 @@ static void print_section(char *level, char *text, u8 *addr,
metadata_access_disable();
}

+/*
+ * See comment in calculate_sizes().
+ */
+static inline bool freeptr_outside_object(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+ return s->offset >= s->inuse;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return offset of the end of info block which is inuse + free pointer if
+ * not overlapping with object.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+ if (freeptr_outside_object(s))
+ return s->inuse + sizeof(void *);
+ else
+ return s->inuse;
+}
+
static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
enum track_item alloc)
{
struct track *p;

- if (s->offset)
- p = object + s->offset + sizeof(void *);
- else
- p = object + s->inuse;
+ p = object + get_info_end(s);

return p + alloc;
}
@@ -686,10 +703,7 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
print_section(KERN_ERR, "Redzone ", p + s->object_size,
s->inuse - s->object_size);

- if (s->offset)
- off = s->offset + sizeof(void *);
- else
- off = s->inuse;
+ off = get_info_end(s);

if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
@@ -782,7 +796,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
* object address
* Bytes of the object to be managed.
* If the freepointer may overlay the object then the free
- * pointer is the first word of the object.
+ * pointer is at the middle of the object.
*
* Poisoning uses 0x6b (POISON_FREE) and the last byte is
* 0xa5 (POISON_END)
@@ -816,11 +830,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,

static int check_pad_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
{
- unsigned long off = s->inuse; /* The end of info */
-
- if (s->offset)
- /* Freepointer is placed after the object. */
- off += sizeof(void *);
+ unsigned long off = get_info_end(s); /* The end of info */

if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
/* We also have user information there */
@@ -907,7 +917,7 @@ static int check_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
check_pad_bytes(s, page, p);
}

- if (!s->offset && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE)
+ if (!freeptr_outside_object(s) && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE)
/*
* Object and freepointer overlap. Cannot check
* freepointer while object is allocated.
@@ -3587,6 +3597,11 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order)
*
* This is the case if we do RCU, have a constructor or
* destructor or are poisoning the objects.
+ *
+ * The assumption that s->offset >= s->inuse means free
+ * pointer is outside of the object is used in the
+ * freeptr_outside_object() function. If that is no
+ * longer true, the function needs to be modified.
*/
s->offset = size;
size += sizeof(void *);
--
2.18.1


2020-04-29 13:59:21

by Waiman Long

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] mm/slub: Fix incorrect interpretation of s->offset

On 4/29/20 9:53 AM, Waiman Long wrote:
> In a couple of places in the slub memory allocator, the code uses
> "s->offset" as a check to see if the free pointer is put right after the
> object. That check is no longer true with commit 3202fa62fb43 ("slub:
> relocate freelist pointer to middle of object").
>
> As a result, echoing "1" into the validate sysfs file, e.g. of dentry,
> may cause a bunch of "Freepointer corrupt" error reports like the
> following to appear with the system in panic afterwards.
>
> [ 38.579769] =============================================================================
> [ 38.580845] BUG dentry(666:pmcd.service) (Tainted: G B): Freepointer corrupt
> [ 38.581948] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> To fix it, use the check "s->offset == s->inuse" in the new helper

Sorry, forgot to change the commit log to ">=". Anyway, this is a
serious bug that needs to be fixed before v5.7 is released.

Cheers,
Longman

2020-04-29 15:58:31

by Matthew Wilcox

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] mm/slub: Fix incorrect interpretation of s->offset

On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 09:53:28AM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
> As a result, echoing "1" into the validate sysfs file, e.g. of dentry,
> may cause a bunch of "Freepointer corrupt" error reports like the
> following to appear with the system in panic afterwards.
>
> [ 38.579769] =============================================================================
> [ 38.580845] BUG dentry(666:pmcd.service) (Tainted: G B): Freepointer corrupt
> [ 38.581948] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

I might trim the timestamp and the === and --- from the commit message ...

> To fix it, use the check "s->offset == s->inuse" in the new helper
> function freeptr_outside_object() instead. Also add another helper function
> get_info_end() to return the end of info block (inuse + free pointer
> if not overlapping with object).
>
> Fixes: 3202fa62fb43 ("slub: relocate freelist pointer to middle of object")
> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]>

But the patch looks great.

Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>

2020-04-29 16:48:43

by Markus Elfring

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] mm/slub: Fix incorrect interpretation of s->offset

> In a couple of places in the slub memory allocator, the code uses
> "s->offset" as a check to see if the free pointer is put right after the
> object. That check is no longer true with commit 3202fa62fb43 ("slub:
> relocate freelist pointer to middle of object").

Will any further collateral evolution become interesting?



> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -551,15 +551,32 @@ static void print_section(char *level, char *text, u8 *addr,

> +static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s)
> +{
> + if (freeptr_outside_object(s))
> + return s->inuse + sizeof(void *);
> + else
> + return s->inuse;
> +}

How do you think about the following source code variants?

+ return freeptr_outside_object(s)
+ ? s->inuse + sizeof(void *)
+ : s->inuse;


> static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
> enum track_item alloc)
> {
> struct track *p;
>
> - if (s->offset)
> - p = object + s->offset + sizeof(void *);
> - else
> - p = object + s->inuse;
> + p = object + get_info_end(s);
>
> return p + alloc;
> }

+ struct track *p = object + get_info_end(s);

return p + alloc;


Regards,
Markus

2020-04-29 18:29:53

by Matthew Wilcox

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] mm/slub: Fix incorrect interpretation of s->offset

On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 06:42:55PM +0200, Markus Elfring wrote:
> > In a couple of places in the slub memory allocator, the code uses
> > "s->offset" as a check to see if the free pointer is put right after the
> > object. That check is no longer true with commit 3202fa62fb43 ("slub:
> > relocate freelist pointer to middle of object").
>
> Will any further collateral evolution become interesting?

What do you mean by this question?

> > +static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s)
> > +{
> > + if (freeptr_outside_object(s))
> > + return s->inuse + sizeof(void *);
> > + else
> > + return s->inuse;
> > +}
>
> How do you think about the following source code variants?
>
> + return freeptr_outside_object(s)
> + ? s->inuse + sizeof(void *)
> + : s->inuse;

That is less clear than the version Wayman posted.

> > static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
> > enum track_item alloc)
> > {
> > struct track *p;
> >
> > - if (s->offset)
> > - p = object + s->offset + sizeof(void *);
> > - else
> > - p = object + s->inuse;
> > + p = object + get_info_end(s);
> >
> > return p + alloc;
> > }
>
> + struct track *p = object + get_info_end(s);
>
> return p + alloc;

Yes, I think that's an improvement.

2020-05-01 21:32:02

by Rafael Aquini

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] mm/slub: Fix incorrect interpretation of s->offset

On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 09:53:28AM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
> In a couple of places in the slub memory allocator, the code uses
> "s->offset" as a check to see if the free pointer is put right after the
> object. That check is no longer true with commit 3202fa62fb43 ("slub:
> relocate freelist pointer to middle of object").
>
> As a result, echoing "1" into the validate sysfs file, e.g. of dentry,
> may cause a bunch of "Freepointer corrupt" error reports like the
> following to appear with the system in panic afterwards.
>
> [ 38.579769] =============================================================================
> [ 38.580845] BUG dentry(666:pmcd.service) (Tainted: G B): Freepointer corrupt
> [ 38.581948] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> To fix it, use the check "s->offset == s->inuse" in the new helper
> function freeptr_outside_object() instead. Also add another helper function
> get_info_end() to return the end of info block (inuse + free pointer
> if not overlapping with object).
>
> Fixes: 3202fa62fb43 ("slub: relocate freelist pointer to middle of object")
> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
> ---
> mm/slub.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
> 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> [v3: Change function name to freeptr_outside_object(), update check & add comment]
>
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index 9bf44955c4f1..b762450fc9f0 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -551,15 +551,32 @@ static void print_section(char *level, char *text, u8 *addr,
> metadata_access_disable();
> }
>
> +/*
> + * See comment in calculate_sizes().
> + */
> +static inline bool freeptr_outside_object(struct kmem_cache *s)
> +{
> + return s->offset >= s->inuse;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Return offset of the end of info block which is inuse + free pointer if
> + * not overlapping with object.
> + */
> +static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s)
> +{
> + if (freeptr_outside_object(s))
> + return s->inuse + sizeof(void *);
> + else
> + return s->inuse;
> +}
> +
> static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
> enum track_item alloc)
> {
> struct track *p;
>
> - if (s->offset)
> - p = object + s->offset + sizeof(void *);
> - else
> - p = object + s->inuse;
> + p = object + get_info_end(s);
>
> return p + alloc;
> }
> @@ -686,10 +703,7 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
> print_section(KERN_ERR, "Redzone ", p + s->object_size,
> s->inuse - s->object_size);
>
> - if (s->offset)
> - off = s->offset + sizeof(void *);
> - else
> - off = s->inuse;
> + off = get_info_end(s);
>
> if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
> off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
> @@ -782,7 +796,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
> * object address
> * Bytes of the object to be managed.
> * If the freepointer may overlay the object then the free
> - * pointer is the first word of the object.
> + * pointer is at the middle of the object.
> *
> * Poisoning uses 0x6b (POISON_FREE) and the last byte is
> * 0xa5 (POISON_END)
> @@ -816,11 +830,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
>
> static int check_pad_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
> {
> - unsigned long off = s->inuse; /* The end of info */
> -
> - if (s->offset)
> - /* Freepointer is placed after the object. */
> - off += sizeof(void *);
> + unsigned long off = get_info_end(s); /* The end of info */
>
> if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
> /* We also have user information there */
> @@ -907,7 +917,7 @@ static int check_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
> check_pad_bytes(s, page, p);
> }
>
> - if (!s->offset && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE)
> + if (!freeptr_outside_object(s) && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE)
> /*
> * Object and freepointer overlap. Cannot check
> * freepointer while object is allocated.
> @@ -3587,6 +3597,11 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order)
> *
> * This is the case if we do RCU, have a constructor or
> * destructor or are poisoning the objects.
> + *
> + * The assumption that s->offset >= s->inuse means free
> + * pointer is outside of the object is used in the
> + * freeptr_outside_object() function. If that is no
> + * longer true, the function needs to be modified.
> */
> s->offset = size;
> size += sizeof(void *);
> --
> 2.18.1
>
>
Acked-by: Rafael Aquini <[email protected]>

2020-05-01 22:06:57

by Kees Cook

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] mm/slub: Fix incorrect interpretation of s->offset

On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 09:53:28AM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
> In a couple of places in the slub memory allocator, the code uses
> "s->offset" as a check to see if the free pointer is put right after the
> object. That check is no longer true with commit 3202fa62fb43 ("slub:
> relocate freelist pointer to middle of object").
>
> As a result, echoing "1" into the validate sysfs file, e.g. of dentry,
> may cause a bunch of "Freepointer corrupt" error reports like the
> following to appear with the system in panic afterwards.
>
> [ 38.579769] =============================================================================
> [ 38.580845] BUG dentry(666:pmcd.service) (Tainted: G B): Freepointer corrupt
> [ 38.581948] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> To fix it, use the check "s->offset == s->inuse" in the new helper
> function freeptr_outside_object() instead. Also add another helper function
> get_info_end() to return the end of info block (inuse + free pointer
> if not overlapping with object).
>
> Fixes: 3202fa62fb43 ("slub: relocate freelist pointer to middle of object")
> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]>

Thanks! Nice catch. :)

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

-Kees

> ---
> mm/slub.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
> 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> [v3: Change function name to freeptr_outside_object(), update check & add comment]
>
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index 9bf44955c4f1..b762450fc9f0 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -551,15 +551,32 @@ static void print_section(char *level, char *text, u8 *addr,
> metadata_access_disable();
> }
>
> +/*
> + * See comment in calculate_sizes().
> + */
> +static inline bool freeptr_outside_object(struct kmem_cache *s)
> +{
> + return s->offset >= s->inuse;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Return offset of the end of info block which is inuse + free pointer if
> + * not overlapping with object.
> + */
> +static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s)
> +{
> + if (freeptr_outside_object(s))
> + return s->inuse + sizeof(void *);
> + else
> + return s->inuse;
> +}
> +
> static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
> enum track_item alloc)
> {
> struct track *p;
>
> - if (s->offset)
> - p = object + s->offset + sizeof(void *);
> - else
> - p = object + s->inuse;
> + p = object + get_info_end(s);
>
> return p + alloc;
> }
> @@ -686,10 +703,7 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
> print_section(KERN_ERR, "Redzone ", p + s->object_size,
> s->inuse - s->object_size);
>
> - if (s->offset)
> - off = s->offset + sizeof(void *);
> - else
> - off = s->inuse;
> + off = get_info_end(s);
>
> if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
> off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
> @@ -782,7 +796,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
> * object address
> * Bytes of the object to be managed.
> * If the freepointer may overlay the object then the free
> - * pointer is the first word of the object.
> + * pointer is at the middle of the object.
> *
> * Poisoning uses 0x6b (POISON_FREE) and the last byte is
> * 0xa5 (POISON_END)
> @@ -816,11 +830,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
>
> static int check_pad_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
> {
> - unsigned long off = s->inuse; /* The end of info */
> -
> - if (s->offset)
> - /* Freepointer is placed after the object. */
> - off += sizeof(void *);
> + unsigned long off = get_info_end(s); /* The end of info */
>
> if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
> /* We also have user information there */
> @@ -907,7 +917,7 @@ static int check_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
> check_pad_bytes(s, page, p);
> }
>
> - if (!s->offset && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE)
> + if (!freeptr_outside_object(s) && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE)
> /*
> * Object and freepointer overlap. Cannot check
> * freepointer while object is allocated.
> @@ -3587,6 +3597,11 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order)
> *
> * This is the case if we do RCU, have a constructor or
> * destructor or are poisoning the objects.
> + *
> + * The assumption that s->offset >= s->inuse means free
> + * pointer is outside of the object is used in the
> + * freeptr_outside_object() function. If that is no
> + * longer true, the function needs to be modified.
> */
> s->offset = size;
> size += sizeof(void *);
> --
> 2.18.1
>

--
Kees Cook