2020-07-09 16:48:05

by Bruno Meneguele

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v5] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime

APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM has been marked as dependent on !ARCH_POLICY in compile
time, enforcing the appraisal whenever the kernel had the arch policy option
enabled.

However it breaks systems where the option is set but the system didn't
boot in a "secure boot" platform. In this scenario, anytime an appraisal
policy (i.e. ima_policy=appraisal_tcb) is used it will be forced, without
giving the user the opportunity to label the filesystem, before enforcing
integrity.

Considering the ARCH_POLICY is only effective when secure boot is actually
enabled this patch remove the compile time dependency and move it to a
runtime decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.

With this patch:

- x86-64 with secure boot enabled

[ 0.004305] Secure boot enabled
...
[ 0.015651] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
[ 0.015682] ima: appraise boot param ignored: secure boot enabled

- powerpc with secure boot disabled

[ 0.000000] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
[ 0.000000] Secure boot mode disabled
...
< nothing about boot param ignored >

System working fine without secure boot and with both options set:

CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=y
CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y

Audit logs pointing to "missing-hash" but still being able to execute due to
ima_appraise=fix:

type=INTEGRITY_DATA msg=audit(07/09/2020 12:30:27.778:1691) : pid=4976
uid=root auid=root ses=2
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=appraise_data
cause=missing-hash comm=bash name=/usr/bin/evmctl dev="dm-0" ino=493150
res=no

Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: d958083a8f64 ("x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86")
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <[email protected]>
---
Changelog:
v5:
- add pr_info() to inform user the ima_appraise= boot param is being
ignored due to secure boot enabled (Nayna)
- add some testing results to commit log
v4:
- instead of change arch_policy loading code, check secure boot state at
"ima_appraise=" parameter handler (Mimi)
v3:
- extend secure boot arch checker to also consider trusted boot
- enforce IMA appraisal when secure boot is effectively enabled (Nayna)
- fix ima_appraise flag assignment by or'ing it (Mimi)
v2:
- pr_info() message prefix correction

security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index edde88dbe576..62dc11a5af01 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS

config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
bool "ima_appraise boot parameter"
- depends on IMA_APPRAISE && !IMA_ARCH_POLICY
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE
default y
help
This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index a9649b04b9f1..884de471b38a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
+ if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
+ pr_info("appraise boot param ignored: secure boot enabled");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
ima_appraise = 0;
else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
--
2.26.2


2020-07-10 17:24:43

by Mimi Zohar

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime

On Thu, 2020-07-09 at 13:46 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM has been marked as dependent on !ARCH_POLICY in compile
> time, enforcing the appraisal whenever the kernel had the arch policy option
> enabled.

> However it breaks systems where the option is set but the system didn't
> boot in a "secure boot" platform. In this scenario, anytime an appraisal
> policy (i.e. ima_policy=appraisal_tcb) is used it will be forced, without
> giving the user the opportunity to label the filesystem, before enforcing
> integrity.
>
> Considering the ARCH_POLICY is only effective when secure boot is actually
> enabled this patch remove the compile time dependency and move it to a
> runtime decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.

Perhaps we could simplify this patch description a bit?

The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different
"ima_appraise=" modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when
IMA architecture specific policies are enabled.  This prevents
properly labeling the filesystem on systems where secure boot is
supported, but not enabled on the platform.  Only when secure boot is
enabled, should these IMA appraise modes be disabled.

This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.

<snip>

> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index a9649b04b9f1..884de471b38a 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
> static int __init default_appraise_setup(c

> har *str)
> {
> #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
> + if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> + pr_info("appraise boot param ignored: secure boot enabled");

Instead of a generic statement, is it possible to include the actual
option being denied?  Perhaps something like: "Secure boot enabled,
ignoring %s boot command line option"

Mimi

> + return 1;
> + }
> +
> if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
> ima_appraise = 0;
> else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)

2020-07-10 18:05:04

by Bruno Meneguele

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime

On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 01:23:24PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2020-07-09 at 13:46 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM has been marked as dependent on !ARCH_POLICY in compile
> > time, enforcing the appraisal whenever the kernel had the arch policy option
> > enabled.
>
> > However it breaks systems where the option is set but the system didn't
> > boot in a "secure boot" platform. In this scenario, anytime an appraisal
> > policy (i.e. ima_policy=appraisal_tcb) is used it will be forced, without
> > giving the user the opportunity to label the filesystem, before enforcing
> > integrity.
> >
> > Considering the ARCH_POLICY is only effective when secure boot is actually
> > enabled this patch remove the compile time dependency and move it to a
> > runtime decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
>
> Perhaps we could simplify this patch description a bit?
>
> The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different
> "ima_appraise=" modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when
> IMA architecture specific policies are enabled. ?This prevents
> properly labeling the filesystem on systems where secure boot is
> supported, but not enabled on the platform. ?Only when secure boot is
> enabled, should these IMA appraise modes be disabled.
>
> This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
> decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
>

Sounds good to me.

> <snip>
>
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > index a9649b04b9f1..884de471b38a 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > @@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
> > static int __init default_appraise_setup(c
>
> > har *str)
> > {
> > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
> > + if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> > + pr_info("appraise boot param ignored: secure boot enabled");
>
> Instead of a generic statement, is it possible to include the actual
> option being denied? ?Perhaps something like: "Secure boot enabled,
> ignoring %s boot command line option"
>
> Mimi
>

Yes, sure.

Thanks!

> > + return 1;
> > + }
> > +
> > if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
> > ima_appraise = 0;
> > else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
>

--
bmeneg
PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt


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2020-07-10 18:37:10

by Bruno Meneguele

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime

On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 03:03:38PM -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 01:23:24PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Thu, 2020-07-09 at 13:46 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > > APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM has been marked as dependent on !ARCH_POLICY in compile
> > > time, enforcing the appraisal whenever the kernel had the arch policy option
> > > enabled.
> >
> > > However it breaks systems where the option is set but the system didn't
> > > boot in a "secure boot" platform. In this scenario, anytime an appraisal
> > > policy (i.e. ima_policy=appraisal_tcb) is used it will be forced, without
> > > giving the user the opportunity to label the filesystem, before enforcing
> > > integrity.
> > >
> > > Considering the ARCH_POLICY is only effective when secure boot is actually
> > > enabled this patch remove the compile time dependency and move it to a
> > > runtime decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
> >
> > Perhaps we could simplify this patch description a bit?
> >
> > The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different
> > "ima_appraise=" modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when
> > IMA architecture specific policies are enabled. ?This prevents
> > properly labeling the filesystem on systems where secure boot is
> > supported, but not enabled on the platform. ?Only when secure boot is
> > enabled, should these IMA appraise modes be disabled.
> >
> > This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
> > decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
> >
>
> Sounds good to me.
>
> > <snip>
> >
> > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > > index a9649b04b9f1..884de471b38a 100644
> > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > > @@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
> > > static int __init default_appraise_setup(c
> >
> > > har *str)
> > > {
> > > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
> > > + if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> > > + pr_info("appraise boot param ignored: secure boot enabled");
> >
> > Instead of a generic statement, is it possible to include the actual
> > option being denied? ?Perhaps something like: "Secure boot enabled,
> > ignoring %s boot command line option"
> >
> > Mimi
> >
>
> Yes, sure.
>

Btw, would it make sense to first make sure we have a valid "str"
option and not something random to print?

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index a9649b04b9f1..1f1175531d3e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -25,6 +25,16 @@ static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
+ else
+ pr_info("invalid \"%s\" appraise option");
+
+ if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
+ if (!is_ima_appraise_enabled()) {
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s boot parameter option",
+ str);
+ ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
+ }
+ }
#endif
return 1;
}


The "else" there I think would make sense as well, at least to give the
user some feedback about a possible mispelling of him (as a separate
patch).

And "if(!is_ima_appraise_enabled())" would avoid to print anything about
"ignoring the option" to the user in case he explicitly set "enforce",
which we know there isn't any real effect but is allowed and shown in
kernel-parameters.txt.

> Thanks!
>
> > > + return 1;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
> > > ima_appraise = 0;
> > > else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
> >
>
> --
> bmeneg
> PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt



--
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2020-07-10 18:56:53

by Mimi Zohar

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime

On Fri, 2020-07-10 at 15:34 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 03:03:38PM -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 01:23:24PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > On Thu, 2020-07-09 at 13:46 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > > > APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM has been marked as dependent on !ARCH_POLICY in compile
> > > > time, enforcing the appraisal whenever the kernel had the arch policy option
> > > > enabled.
> > >
> > > > However it breaks systems where the option is set but the system didn't
> > > > boot in a "secure boot" platform. In this scenario, anytime an appraisal
> > > > policy (i.e. ima_policy=appraisal_tcb) is used it will be forced, without
> > > > giving the user the opportunity to label the filesystem, before enforcing
> > > > integrity.
> > > >
> > > > Considering the ARCH_POLICY is only effective when secure boot is actually
> > > > enabled this patch remove the compile time dependency and move it to a
> > > > runtime decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
> > >
> > > Perhaps we could simplify this patch description a bit?
> > >
> > > The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different
> > > "ima_appraise=" modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when
> > > IMA architecture specific policies are enabled.  This prevents
> > > properly labeling the filesystem on systems where secure boot is
> > > supported, but not enabled on the platform.  Only when secure boot is
> > > enabled, should these IMA appraise modes be disabled.
> > >
> > > This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
> > > decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
> > >
> >
> > Sounds good to me.
> >
> > > <snip>
> > >
> > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > > > index a9649b04b9f1..884de471b38a 100644
> > > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > > > @@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
> > > > static int __init default_appraise_setup(c
> > >
> > > > har *str)
> > > > {
> > > > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
> > > > + if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> > > > + pr_info("appraise boot param ignored: secure boot enabled");
> > >
> > > Instead of a generic statement, is it possible to include the actual
> > > option being denied?  Perhaps something like: "Secure boot enabled,
> > > ignoring %s boot command line option"
> > >
> > > Mimi
> > >
> >
> > Yes, sure.
> >
>
> Btw, would it make sense to first make sure we have a valid "str"
> option and not something random to print?
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index a9649b04b9f1..1f1175531d3e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -25,6 +25,16 @@ static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
> ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
> else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
> ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
> + else
> + pr_info("invalid \"%s\" appraise option");
> +
> + if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> + if (!is_ima_appraise_enabled()) {
> + pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s boot parameter option",
> + str);
> + ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
> + }
> + }

Providing feedback is probably a good idea.  However, the
"arch_ima_get_secureboot" test can't come after setting
"ima_appraise."

Mimi

> #endif
> return 1;
> }
>
>
> The "else" there I think would make sense as well, at least to give the
> user some feedback about a possible mispelling of him (as a separate
> patch).
>
> And "if(!is_ima_appraise_enabled())" would avoid to print anything about
> "ignoring the option" to the user in case he explicitly set "enforce",
> which we know there isn't any real effect but is allowed and shown in
> kernel-parameters.txt.
>
> > Thanks!
> >
> > > > + return 1;
> > > > + }
> > > > +
> > > > if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
> > > > ima_appraise = 0;
> > > > else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
> > >
> >
> > --
> > bmeneg
> > PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt
>
>
>

2020-07-10 19:26:31

by Bruno Meneguele

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime

On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 02:54:48PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Fri, 2020-07-10 at 15:34 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 03:03:38PM -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > > On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 01:23:24PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > > On Thu, 2020-07-09 at 13:46 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > > > > APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM has been marked as dependent on !ARCH_POLICY in compile
> > > > > time, enforcing the appraisal whenever the kernel had the arch policy option
> > > > > enabled.
> > > >
> > > > > However it breaks systems where the option is set but the system didn't
> > > > > boot in a "secure boot" platform. In this scenario, anytime an appraisal
> > > > > policy (i.e. ima_policy=appraisal_tcb) is used it will be forced, without
> > > > > giving the user the opportunity to label the filesystem, before enforcing
> > > > > integrity.
> > > > >
> > > > > Considering the ARCH_POLICY is only effective when secure boot is actually
> > > > > enabled this patch remove the compile time dependency and move it to a
> > > > > runtime decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
> > > >
> > > > Perhaps we could simplify this patch description a bit?
> > > >
> > > > The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different
> > > > "ima_appraise=" modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when
> > > > IMA architecture specific policies are enabled. ?This prevents
> > > > properly labeling the filesystem on systems where secure boot is
> > > > supported, but not enabled on the platform. ?Only when secure boot is
> > > > enabled, should these IMA appraise modes be disabled.
> > > >
> > > > This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
> > > > decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Sounds good to me.
> > >
> > > > <snip>
> > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > > > > index a9649b04b9f1..884de471b38a 100644
> > > > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > > > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > > > > @@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
> > > > > static int __init default_appraise_setup(c
> > > >
> > > > > har *str)
> > > > > {
> > > > > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
> > > > > + if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> > > > > + pr_info("appraise boot param ignored: secure boot enabled");
> > > >
> > > > Instead of a generic statement, is it possible to include the actual
> > > > option being denied? ?Perhaps something like: "Secure boot enabled,
> > > > ignoring %s boot command line option"
> > > >
> > > > Mimi
> > > >
> > >
> > > Yes, sure.
> > >
> >
> > Btw, would it make sense to first make sure we have a valid "str"
> > option and not something random to print?
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > index a9649b04b9f1..1f1175531d3e 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > @@ -25,6 +25,16 @@ static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
> > ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
> > else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
> > ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
> > + else
> > + pr_info("invalid \"%s\" appraise option");
> > +
> > + if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> > + if (!is_ima_appraise_enabled()) {
> > + pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s boot parameter option",
> > + str);
> > + ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
> > + }
> > + }
>
> Providing feedback is probably a good idea. ?However, the
> "arch_ima_get_secureboot" test can't come after setting
> "ima_appraise."
>

Sorry, but I'm not sure if I got the reason to why it can't be done
after: would it be basically to prevent any further processing about
ima_appraise as a matter of security principle? Or maybe to keep the
dependency between secureboot and bootparam truly strict?

Or are there something else I'm missing?

> Mimi
>
> > #endif
> > return 1;
> > }
> >
> >
> > The "else" there I think would make sense as well, at least to give the
> > user some feedback about a possible mispelling of him (as a separate
> > patch).
> >
> > And "if(!is_ima_appraise_enabled())" would avoid to print anything about
> > "ignoring the option" to the user in case he explicitly set "enforce",
> > which we know there isn't any real effect but is allowed and shown in
> > kernel-parameters.txt.
> >
> > > Thanks!
> > >
> > > > > + return 1;
> > > > > + }
> > > > > +
> > > > > if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
> > > > > ima_appraise = 0;
> > > > > else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
> > > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > bmeneg
> > > PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt
> >
> >
> >
>

--
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2020-07-13 15:07:16

by Bruno Meneguele

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime

On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 04:25:16PM -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 02:54:48PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Fri, 2020-07-10 at 15:34 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > > On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 03:03:38PM -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 01:23:24PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, 2020-07-09 at 13:46 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > > > > > APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM has been marked as dependent on !ARCH_POLICY in compile
> > > > > > time, enforcing the appraisal whenever the kernel had the arch policy option
> > > > > > enabled.
> > > > >
> > > > > > However it breaks systems where the option is set but the system didn't
> > > > > > boot in a "secure boot" platform. In this scenario, anytime an appraisal
> > > > > > policy (i.e. ima_policy=appraisal_tcb) is used it will be forced, without
> > > > > > giving the user the opportunity to label the filesystem, before enforcing
> > > > > > integrity.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Considering the ARCH_POLICY is only effective when secure boot is actually
> > > > > > enabled this patch remove the compile time dependency and move it to a
> > > > > > runtime decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
> > > > >
> > > > > Perhaps we could simplify this patch description a bit?
> > > > >
> > > > > The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different
> > > > > "ima_appraise=" modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when
> > > > > IMA architecture specific policies are enabled. ?This prevents
> > > > > properly labeling the filesystem on systems where secure boot is
> > > > > supported, but not enabled on the platform. ?Only when secure boot is
> > > > > enabled, should these IMA appraise modes be disabled.
> > > > >
> > > > > This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
> > > > > decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > Sounds good to me.
> > > >
> > > > > <snip>
> > > > >
> > > > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > > > > > index a9649b04b9f1..884de471b38a 100644
> > > > > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > > > > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > > > > > @@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
> > > > > > static int __init default_appraise_setup(c
> > > > >
> > > > > > har *str)
> > > > > > {
> > > > > > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
> > > > > > + if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> > > > > > + pr_info("appraise boot param ignored: secure boot enabled");
> > > > >
> > > > > Instead of a generic statement, is it possible to include the actual
> > > > > option being denied? ?Perhaps something like: "Secure boot enabled,
> > > > > ignoring %s boot command line option"
> > > > >
> > > > > Mimi
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > Yes, sure.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Btw, would it make sense to first make sure we have a valid "str"
> > > option and not something random to print?
> > >
> > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > > index a9649b04b9f1..1f1175531d3e 100644
> > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > > @@ -25,6 +25,16 @@ static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
> > > ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
> > > else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
> > > ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
> > > + else
> > > + pr_info("invalid \"%s\" appraise option");
> > > +
> > > + if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> > > + if (!is_ima_appraise_enabled()) {
> > > + pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s boot parameter option",
> > > + str);
> > > + ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
> > > + }
> > > + }
> >
> > Providing feedback is probably a good idea. ?However, the
> > "arch_ima_get_secureboot" test can't come after setting
> > "ima_appraise."
> >
>
> Sorry, but I'm not sure if I got the reason to why it can't be done
> after: would it be basically to prevent any further processing about
> ima_appraise as a matter of security principle? Or maybe to keep the
> dependency between secureboot and bootparam truly strict?
>
> Or are there something else I'm missing?
>

I'm going to send a v6 with the pr_info() placed in the beginning
directly printing 'str', thus we can have the actual issue solved.

Then later I send another patches to handle the other cases of limiting
'str' printing and also giving the user a feedback about invalid
ima_appraise= options. So we can discuss further on that.

Thanks Mimi.

> > Mimi
> >
> > > #endif
> > > return 1;
> > > }
> > >
> > >
> > > The "else" there I think would make sense as well, at least to give the
> > > user some feedback about a possible mispelling of him (as a separate
> > > patch).
> > >
> > > And "if(!is_ima_appraise_enabled())" would avoid to print anything about
> > > "ignoring the option" to the user in case he explicitly set "enforce",
> > > which we know there isn't any real effect but is allowed and shown in
> > > kernel-parameters.txt.
> > >
> > > > Thanks!
> > > >
> > > > > > + return 1;
> > > > > > + }
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
> > > > > > ima_appraise = 0;
> > > > > > else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > bmeneg
> > > > PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
>
> --
> bmeneg
> PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt



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PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt


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