Coding style issues found were rectified
Signed-off-by: Anant Thazhemadam <[email protected]>
---
drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_security.c | 92 ++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_security.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_security.c
index 21f6652dd69f..3111f4a899ee 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_security.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_security.c
@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ static __le32 getcrc32(u8 *buf, int len)
}
/*
- Need to consider the fragment situation
-*/
+ * Need to consider the fragment situation
+ */
void rtw_wep_encrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pxmitframe)
{
int curfragnum, length;
@@ -429,9 +429,9 @@ static const unsigned short Sbox1[2][256] = { /* Sbox for hash (can be in ROM)
0x2DB6, 0x3C22, 0x1592, 0xC920, 0x8749, 0xAAFF, 0x5078, 0xA57A,
0x038F, 0x59F8, 0x0980, 0x1A17, 0x65DA, 0xD731, 0x84C6, 0xD0B8,
0x82C3, 0x29B0, 0x5A77, 0x1E11, 0x7BCB, 0xA8FC, 0x6DD6, 0x2C3A,
- },
+},
- { /* second half of table is unsigned char-reversed version of first! */
+{ /* second half of table is unsigned char-reversed version of first! */
0xA5C6, 0x84F8, 0x99EE, 0x8DF6, 0x0DFF, 0xBDD6, 0xB1DE, 0x5491,
0x5060, 0x0302, 0xA9CE, 0x7D56, 0x19E7, 0x62B5, 0xE64D, 0x9AEC,
0x458F, 0x9D1F, 0x4089, 0x87FA, 0x15EF, 0xEBB2, 0xC98E, 0x0BFB,
@@ -464,26 +464,26 @@ static const unsigned short Sbox1[2][256] = { /* Sbox for hash (can be in ROM)
0xB62D, 0x223C, 0x9215, 0x20C9, 0x4987, 0xFFAA, 0x7850, 0x7AA5,
0x8F03, 0xF859, 0x8009, 0x171A, 0xDA65, 0x31D7, 0xC684, 0xB8D0,
0xC382, 0xB029, 0x775A, 0x111E, 0xCB7B, 0xFCA8, 0xD66D, 0x3A2C,
- }
+}
};
- /*
-**********************************************************************
-* Routine: Phase 1 -- generate P1K, given TA, TK, IV32
-*
-* Inputs:
-* tk[] = temporal key [128 bits]
-* ta[] = transmitter's MAC address [ 48 bits]
-* iv32 = upper 32 bits of IV [ 32 bits]
-* Output:
-* p1k[] = Phase 1 key [ 80 bits]
-*
-* Note:
-* This function only needs to be called every 2**16 packets,
-* although in theory it could be called every packet.
-*
-**********************************************************************
-*/
+/*
+ **********************************************************************
+ * Routine: Phase 1 -- generate P1K, given TA, TK, IV32
+ *
+ * Inputs:
+ * tk[] = temporal key [128 bits]
+ * ta[] = transmitter's MAC address [ 48 bits]
+ * iv32 = upper 32 bits of IV [ 32 bits]
+ * Output:
+ * p1k[] = Phase 1 key [ 80 bits]
+ *
+ * Note:
+ * This function only needs to be called every 2**16 packets,
+ * although in theory it could be called every packet.
+ *
+ **********************************************************************
+ */
static void phase1(u16 *p1k, const u8 *tk, const u8 *ta, u32 iv32)
{
int i;
@@ -507,28 +507,28 @@ static void phase1(u16 *p1k, const u8 *tk, const u8 *ta, u32 iv32)
}
/*
-**********************************************************************
-* Routine: Phase 2 -- generate RC4KEY, given TK, P1K, IV16
-*
-* Inputs:
-* tk[] = Temporal key [128 bits]
-* p1k[] = Phase 1 output key [ 80 bits]
-* iv16 = low 16 bits of IV counter [ 16 bits]
-* Output:
-* rc4key[] = the key used to encrypt the packet [128 bits]
-*
-* Note:
-* The value {TA, IV32, IV16} for Phase1/Phase2 must be unique
-* across all packets using the same key TK value. Then, for a
-* given value of TK[], this TKIP48 construction guarantees that
-* the final RC4KEY value is unique across all packets.
-*
-* Suggested implementation optimization: if PPK[] is "overlaid"
-* appropriately on RC4KEY[], there is no need for the final
-* for loop below that copies the PPK[] result into RC4KEY[].
-*
-**********************************************************************
-*/
+ **********************************************************************
+ * Routine: Phase 2 -- generate RC4KEY, given TK, P1K, IV16
+ *
+ * Inputs:
+ * tk[] = Temporal key [128 bits]
+ * p1k[] = Phase 1 output key [ 80 bits]
+ * iv16 = low 16 bits of IV counter [ 16 bits]
+ * Output:
+ * rc4key[] = the key used to encrypt the packet [128 bits]
+ *
+ * Note:
+ * The value {TA, IV32, IV16} for Phase1/Phase2 must be unique
+ * across all packets using the same key TK value. Then, for a
+ * given value of TK[], this TKIP48 construction guarantees that
+ * the final RC4KEY value is unique across all packets.
+ *
+ * Suggested implementation optimization: if PPK[] is "overlaid"
+ * appropriately on RC4KEY[], there is no need for the final
+ * for loop below that copies the PPK[] result into RC4KEY[].
+ *
+ **********************************************************************
+ */
static void phase2(u8 *rc4key, const u8 *tk, const u16 *p1k, u16 iv16)
{
int i;
@@ -718,7 +718,9 @@ u32 rtw_tkip_decrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *precvframe)
res = _FAIL;
}
} else {
- RT_TRACE(_module_rtl871x_security_c_, _drv_err_, ("%s: stainfo==NULL!!!\n",__func__));
+ RT_TRACE(_module_rtl871x_security_c_, _drv_err_,
+ ("%s: stainfo==NULL!!!\n", __func__)
+ );
res = _FAIL;
}
}
--
2.25.1
On Sat, Jul 25, 2020 at 01:55:19AM +0530, Anant Thazhemadam wrote:
> Coding style issues found were rectified
>
> Signed-off-by: Anant Thazhemadam <[email protected]>
> ---
> drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_security.c | 92 ++++++++++---------
> 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_security.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_security.c
> index 21f6652dd69f..3111f4a899ee 100644
> --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_security.c
> +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_security.c
> @@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ static __le32 getcrc32(u8 *buf, int len)
> }
>
> /*
> - Need to consider the fragment situation
> -*/
> + * Need to consider the fragment situation
> + */
> void rtw_wep_encrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pxmitframe)
> {
> int curfragnum, length;
> @@ -429,9 +429,9 @@ static const unsigned short Sbox1[2][256] = { /* Sbox for hash (can be in ROM)
> 0x2DB6, 0x3C22, 0x1592, 0xC920, 0x8749, 0xAAFF, 0x5078, 0xA57A,
> 0x038F, 0x59F8, 0x0980, 0x1A17, 0x65DA, 0xD731, 0x84C6, 0xD0B8,
> 0x82C3, 0x29B0, 0x5A77, 0x1E11, 0x7BCB, 0xA8FC, 0x6DD6, 0x2C3A,
> - },
> +},
>
> - { /* second half of table is unsigned char-reversed version of first! */
> +{ /* second half of table is unsigned char-reversed version of first! */
> 0xA5C6, 0x84F8, 0x99EE, 0x8DF6, 0x0DFF, 0xBDD6, 0xB1DE, 0x5491,
> 0x5060, 0x0302, 0xA9CE, 0x7D56, 0x19E7, 0x62B5, 0xE64D, 0x9AEC,
> 0x458F, 0x9D1F, 0x4089, 0x87FA, 0x15EF, 0xEBB2, 0xC98E, 0x0BFB,
> @@ -464,26 +464,26 @@ static const unsigned short Sbox1[2][256] = { /* Sbox for hash (can be in ROM)
> 0xB62D, 0x223C, 0x9215, 0x20C9, 0x4987, 0xFFAA, 0x7850, 0x7AA5,
> 0x8F03, 0xF859, 0x8009, 0x171A, 0xDA65, 0x31D7, 0xC684, 0xB8D0,
> 0xC382, 0xB029, 0x775A, 0x111E, 0xCB7B, 0xFCA8, 0xD66D, 0x3A2C,
> - }
> +}
> };
>
> - /*
> -**********************************************************************
> -* Routine: Phase 1 -- generate P1K, given TA, TK, IV32
> -*
> -* Inputs:
> -* tk[] = temporal key [128 bits]
> -* ta[] = transmitter's MAC address [ 48 bits]
> -* iv32 = upper 32 bits of IV [ 32 bits]
> -* Output:
> -* p1k[] = Phase 1 key [ 80 bits]
> -*
> -* Note:
> -* This function only needs to be called every 2**16 packets,
> -* although in theory it could be called every packet.
> -*
> -**********************************************************************
> -*/
> +/*
> + **********************************************************************
> + * Routine: Phase 1 -- generate P1K, given TA, TK, IV32
> + *
> + * Inputs:
> + * tk[] = temporal key [128 bits]
> + * ta[] = transmitter's MAC address [ 48 bits]
> + * iv32 = upper 32 bits of IV [ 32 bits]
> + * Output:
> + * p1k[] = Phase 1 key [ 80 bits]
> + *
> + * Note:
> + * This function only needs to be called every 2**16 packets,
> + * although in theory it could be called every packet.
> + *
> + **********************************************************************
> + */
> static void phase1(u16 *p1k, const u8 *tk, const u8 *ta, u32 iv32)
> {
> int i;
> @@ -507,28 +507,28 @@ static void phase1(u16 *p1k, const u8 *tk, const u8 *ta, u32 iv32)
> }
>
> /*
> -**********************************************************************
> -* Routine: Phase 2 -- generate RC4KEY, given TK, P1K, IV16
> -*
> -* Inputs:
> -* tk[] = Temporal key [128 bits]
> -* p1k[] = Phase 1 output key [ 80 bits]
> -* iv16 = low 16 bits of IV counter [ 16 bits]
> -* Output:
> -* rc4key[] = the key used to encrypt the packet [128 bits]
> -*
> -* Note:
> -* The value {TA, IV32, IV16} for Phase1/Phase2 must be unique
> -* across all packets using the same key TK value. Then, for a
> -* given value of TK[], this TKIP48 construction guarantees that
> -* the final RC4KEY value is unique across all packets.
> -*
> -* Suggested implementation optimization: if PPK[] is "overlaid"
> -* appropriately on RC4KEY[], there is no need for the final
> -* for loop below that copies the PPK[] result into RC4KEY[].
> -*
> -**********************************************************************
> -*/
> + **********************************************************************
> + * Routine: Phase 2 -- generate RC4KEY, given TK, P1K, IV16
> + *
> + * Inputs:
> + * tk[] = Temporal key [128 bits]
> + * p1k[] = Phase 1 output key [ 80 bits]
> + * iv16 = low 16 bits of IV counter [ 16 bits]
> + * Output:
> + * rc4key[] = the key used to encrypt the packet [128 bits]
> + *
> + * Note:
> + * The value {TA, IV32, IV16} for Phase1/Phase2 must be unique
> + * across all packets using the same key TK value. Then, for a
> + * given value of TK[], this TKIP48 construction guarantees that
> + * the final RC4KEY value is unique across all packets.
> + *
> + * Suggested implementation optimization: if PPK[] is "overlaid"
> + * appropriately on RC4KEY[], there is no need for the final
> + * for loop below that copies the PPK[] result into RC4KEY[].
> + *
> + **********************************************************************
> + */
> static void phase2(u8 *rc4key, const u8 *tk, const u16 *p1k, u16 iv16)
> {
> int i;
> @@ -718,7 +718,9 @@ u32 rtw_tkip_decrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *precvframe)
> res = _FAIL;
> }
> } else {
> - RT_TRACE(_module_rtl871x_security_c_, _drv_err_, ("%s: stainfo==NULL!!!\n",__func__));
> + RT_TRACE(_module_rtl871x_security_c_, _drv_err_,
> + ("%s: stainfo==NULL!!!\n", __func__)
> + );
> res = _FAIL;
> }
> }
> --
> 2.25.1
>
Hi,
This is the friendly patch-bot of Greg Kroah-Hartman. You have sent him
a patch that has triggered this response. He used to manually respond
to these common problems, but in order to save his sanity (he kept
writing the same thing over and over, yet to different people), I was
created. Hopefully you will not take offence and will fix the problem
in your patch and resubmit it so that it can be accepted into the Linux
kernel tree.
You are receiving this message because of the following common error(s)
as indicated below:
- Your patch did many different things all at once, making it difficult
to review. All Linux kernel patches need to only do one thing at a
time. If you need to do multiple things (such as clean up all coding
style issues in a file/driver), do it in a sequence of patches, each
one doing only one thing. This will make it easier to review the
patches to ensure that they are correct, and to help alleviate any
merge issues that larger patches can cause.
- You did not specify a description of why the patch is needed, or
possibly, any description at all, in the email body. Please read the
section entitled "The canonical patch format" in the kernel file,
Documentation/SubmittingPatches for what is needed in order to
properly describe the change.
- You did not write a descriptive Subject: for the patch, allowing Greg,
and everyone else, to know what this patch is all about. Please read
the section entitled "The canonical patch format" in the kernel file,
Documentation/SubmittingPatches for what a proper Subject: line should
look like.
If you wish to discuss this problem further, or you have questions about
how to resolve this issue, please feel free to respond to this email and
Greg will reply once he has dug out from the pending patches received
from other developers.
thanks,
greg k-h's patch email bot