2020-10-06 01:03:40

by Sasha Levin

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/hyper-v: guard against cpu mask changes in hyperv_flush_tlb_others()

cpumask can change underneath us, which is generally safe except when we
call into hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(): if cpumask ends up empty we pass
num_cpu_possible() into hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(), causing it to read
garbage. As reported by KASAN:

[ 83.504763] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hyperv_flush_tlb_others (include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h:128 arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c:112)
[ 83.908636] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888267c01370 by task kworker/u8:2/106
[ 84.196669] CPU: 0 PID: 106 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Tainted: G W 5.4.60 #1
[ 84.196669] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS 090008 12/07/2018
[ 84.196669] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-8:0)
[ 84.196669] Call Trace:
[ 84.196669] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:120)
[ 84.196669] print_address_description.constprop.0 (mm/kasan/report.c:375)
[ 84.196669] __kasan_report.cold (mm/kasan/report.c:507)
[ 84.196669] kasan_report (arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h:71 mm/kasan/common.c:635)
[ 84.196669] hyperv_flush_tlb_others (include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h:128 arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c:112)
[ 84.196669] flush_tlb_mm_range (arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:68 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:798)
[ 84.196669] ptep_clear_flush (arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h:586 mm/pgtable-generic.c:88)

Fixes: 0e4c88f37693 ("x86/hyper-v: Use cheaper HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_{LIST,SPACE} hypercalls when possible")
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
index 5208ba49c89a9..6cac9f5857af4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
@@ -109,7 +109,14 @@ static void hyperv_flush_tlb_others(const struct cpumask *cpus,
* must. We will also check all VP numbers when walking the
* supplied CPU set to remain correct in all cases.
*/
- if (hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(cpumask_last(cpus)) >= 64)
+ int last = cpumask_last(cpus);
+
+ if (last >= num_possible_cpus()) {
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(last) >= 64)
goto do_ex_hypercall;

for_each_cpu(cpu, cpus) {
--
2.25.1


2020-10-13 12:02:30

by Wei Liu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/hyper-v: guard against cpu mask changes in hyperv_flush_tlb_others()

On Mon, Oct 05, 2020 at 07:37:38PM -0400, Sasha Levin wrote:
> cpumask can change underneath us, which is generally safe except when we
> call into hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(): if cpumask ends up empty we pass
> num_cpu_possible() into hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(), causing it to read
> garbage. As reported by KASAN:
>
> [ 83.504763] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hyperv_flush_tlb_others (include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h:128 arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c:112)
> [ 83.908636] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888267c01370 by task kworker/u8:2/106
> [ 84.196669] CPU: 0 PID: 106 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Tainted: G W 5.4.60 #1
> [ 84.196669] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS 090008 12/07/2018
> [ 84.196669] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-8:0)
> [ 84.196669] Call Trace:
> [ 84.196669] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:120)
> [ 84.196669] print_address_description.constprop.0 (mm/kasan/report.c:375)
> [ 84.196669] __kasan_report.cold (mm/kasan/report.c:507)
> [ 84.196669] kasan_report (arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h:71 mm/kasan/common.c:635)
> [ 84.196669] hyperv_flush_tlb_others (include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h:128 arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c:112)
> [ 84.196669] flush_tlb_mm_range (arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:68 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:798)
> [ 84.196669] ptep_clear_flush (arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h:586 mm/pgtable-generic.c:88)
>

What is the easiest way to reproduce this? Just enable KASAN in the
guest and run it normally? I want to have a chance to verify my earlier
reply.

Thanks,
Wei.