From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>
Changes from V2 [4]
Rebased on tip-tree/core/entry
From Thomas Gleixner
Address bisectability
Drop Patch:
x86/entry: Move nmi entry/exit into common code
From Greg KH
Remove WARN_ON's
From Dan Williams
Add __must_check to pks_key_alloc()
New patch: x86/pks: Add PKS defines and config options
Split from Enable patch to build on through the series
Fix compile errors
Changes from V1
Rebase to TIP master; resolve conflicts and test
Clean up some kernel docs updates missed in V1
Add irqentry_state_t kernel doc for PKRS field
Removed redundant irq_state->pkrs
This is only needed when we add the global state and somehow
ended up in this patch series. That will come back when we add
the global functionality in.
From Thomas Gleixner
Update commit messages
Add kernel doc for struct irqentry_state_t
From Dave Hansen add flags to pks_key_alloc()
Changes from RFC V3[3]
Rebase to TIP master
Update test error output
Standardize on 'irq_state' for state variables
From Dave Hansen
Update commit messages
Add/clean up comments
Add X86_FEATURE_PKS to disabled-features.h and remove some
explicit CONFIG checks
Move saved_pkrs member of thread_struct
Remove superfluous preempt_disable()
s/irq_save_pks/irq_save_set_pks/
Ensure PKRS is not seen in faults if not configured or not
supported
s/pks_mknoaccess/pks_mk_noaccess/
s/pks_mkread/pks_mk_readonly/
s/pks_mkrdwr/pks_mk_readwrite/
Change pks_key_alloc return to -EOPNOTSUPP when not supported
From Peter Zijlstra
Clean up Attribution
Remove superfluous preempt_disable()
Add union to differentiate exit_rcu/lockdep use in
irqentry_state_t
From Thomas Gleixner
Add preliminary clean up patch and adjust series as needed
Introduce a new page protection mechanism for supervisor pages, Protection Key
Supervisor (PKS).
2 use cases for PKS are being developed, trusted keys and PMEM. Trusted keys
is a newer use case which is still being explored. PMEM was submitted as part
of the RFC (v2) series[1]. However, since then it was found that some callers
of kmap() require a global implementation of PKS. Specifically some users of
kmap() expect mappings to be available to all kernel threads. While global use
of PKS is rare it needs to be included for correctness. Unfortunately the
kmap() updates required a large patch series to make the needed changes at the
various kmap() call sites so that patch set has been split out. Because the
global PKS feature is only required for that use case it will be deferred to
that set as well.[2] This patch set is being submitted as a precursor to both
of the use cases.
For an overview of the entire PKS ecosystem, a git tree including this series
and 2 proposed use cases can be found here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
PKS enables protections on 'domains' of supervisor pages to limit supervisor
mode access to those pages beyond the normal paging protections. PKS works in
a similar fashion to user space pkeys, PKU. As with PKU, supervisor pkeys are
checked in addition to normal paging protections and Access or Writes can be
disabled via a MSR update without TLB flushes when permissions change. Also
like PKU, a page mapping is assigned to a domain by setting pkey bits in the
page table entry for that mapping.
Access is controlled through a PKRS register which is updated via WRMSR/RDMSR.
XSAVE is not supported for the PKRS MSR. Therefore the implementation
saves/restores the MSR across context switches and during exceptions. Nested
exceptions are supported by each exception getting a new PKS state.
For consistent behavior with current paging protections, pkey 0 is reserved and
configured to allow full access via the pkey mechanism, thus preserving the
default paging protections on mappings with the default pkey value of 0.
Other keys, (1-15) are allocated by an allocator which prepares us for key
contention from day one. Kernel users should be prepared for the allocator to
fail either because of key exhaustion or due to PKS not being supported on the
arch and/or CPU instance.
The following are key attributes of PKS.
1) Fast switching of permissions
1a) Prevents access without page table manipulations
1b) No TLB flushes required
2) Works on a per thread basis
PKS is available with 4 and 5 level paging. Like PKRU it consumes 4 bits from
the PTE to store the pkey within the entry.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Fenghua Yu (2):
x86/pks: Add PKS kernel API
x86/pks: Enable Protection Keys Supervisor (PKS)
Ira Weiny (8):
x86/pkeys: Create pkeys_common.h
x86/fpu: Refactor arch_set_user_pkey_access() for PKS support
x86/pks: Add PKS defines and Kconfig options
x86/pks: Preserve the PKRS MSR on context switch
x86/entry: Pass irqentry_state_t by reference
x86/entry: Preserve PKRS MSR across exceptions
x86/fault: Report the PKRS state on fault
x86/pks: Add PKS test code
Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst | 103 ++-
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/common.c | 46 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 25 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 13 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 12 +
arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h | 15 +
arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h | 40 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 18 +-
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 15 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 22 +-
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 6 +-
arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 26 +
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 21 +-
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 87 ++-
arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c | 196 +++++-
include/linux/entry-common.h | 31 +-
include/linux/pgtable.h | 4 +
include/linux/pkeys.h | 24 +
kernel/entry/common.c | 44 +-
lib/Kconfig.debug | 12 +
lib/Makefile | 3 +
lib/pks/Makefile | 3 +
lib/pks/pks_test.c | 692 ++++++++++++++++++++
mm/Kconfig | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile | 3 +-
tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_pks.c | 66 ++
33 files changed, 1410 insertions(+), 140 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h
create mode 100644 lib/pks/Makefile
create mode 100644 lib/pks/pks_test.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_pks.c
--
2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9
Thomas,
Is there any chance of this landing before the kmap stuff gets sorted out?
It would be nice to have this in 5.11 to build off of.
Ira
On Fri, Nov 06, 2020 at 03:28:58PM -0800, 'Ira Weiny' wrote:
> From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>
>
> Changes from V2 [4]
> Rebased on tip-tree/core/entry
> From Thomas Gleixner
> Address bisectability
> Drop Patch:
> x86/entry: Move nmi entry/exit into common code
> From Greg KH
> Remove WARN_ON's
> From Dan Williams
> Add __must_check to pks_key_alloc()
> New patch: x86/pks: Add PKS defines and config options
> Split from Enable patch to build on through the series
> Fix compile errors
>
> Changes from V1
> Rebase to TIP master; resolve conflicts and test
> Clean up some kernel docs updates missed in V1
> Add irqentry_state_t kernel doc for PKRS field
> Removed redundant irq_state->pkrs
> This is only needed when we add the global state and somehow
> ended up in this patch series. That will come back when we add
> the global functionality in.
> From Thomas Gleixner
> Update commit messages
> Add kernel doc for struct irqentry_state_t
> From Dave Hansen add flags to pks_key_alloc()
>
> Changes from RFC V3[3]
> Rebase to TIP master
> Update test error output
> Standardize on 'irq_state' for state variables
> From Dave Hansen
> Update commit messages
> Add/clean up comments
> Add X86_FEATURE_PKS to disabled-features.h and remove some
> explicit CONFIG checks
> Move saved_pkrs member of thread_struct
> Remove superfluous preempt_disable()
> s/irq_save_pks/irq_save_set_pks/
> Ensure PKRS is not seen in faults if not configured or not
> supported
> s/pks_mknoaccess/pks_mk_noaccess/
> s/pks_mkread/pks_mk_readonly/
> s/pks_mkrdwr/pks_mk_readwrite/
> Change pks_key_alloc return to -EOPNOTSUPP when not supported
> From Peter Zijlstra
> Clean up Attribution
> Remove superfluous preempt_disable()
> Add union to differentiate exit_rcu/lockdep use in
> irqentry_state_t
> From Thomas Gleixner
> Add preliminary clean up patch and adjust series as needed
>
>
> Introduce a new page protection mechanism for supervisor pages, Protection Key
> Supervisor (PKS).
>
> 2 use cases for PKS are being developed, trusted keys and PMEM. Trusted keys
> is a newer use case which is still being explored. PMEM was submitted as part
> of the RFC (v2) series[1]. However, since then it was found that some callers
> of kmap() require a global implementation of PKS. Specifically some users of
> kmap() expect mappings to be available to all kernel threads. While global use
> of PKS is rare it needs to be included for correctness. Unfortunately the
> kmap() updates required a large patch series to make the needed changes at the
> various kmap() call sites so that patch set has been split out. Because the
> global PKS feature is only required for that use case it will be deferred to
> that set as well.[2] This patch set is being submitted as a precursor to both
> of the use cases.
>
> For an overview of the entire PKS ecosystem, a git tree including this series
> and 2 proposed use cases can be found here:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
>
>
> PKS enables protections on 'domains' of supervisor pages to limit supervisor
> mode access to those pages beyond the normal paging protections. PKS works in
> a similar fashion to user space pkeys, PKU. As with PKU, supervisor pkeys are
> checked in addition to normal paging protections and Access or Writes can be
> disabled via a MSR update without TLB flushes when permissions change. Also
> like PKU, a page mapping is assigned to a domain by setting pkey bits in the
> page table entry for that mapping.
>
> Access is controlled through a PKRS register which is updated via WRMSR/RDMSR.
>
> XSAVE is not supported for the PKRS MSR. Therefore the implementation
> saves/restores the MSR across context switches and during exceptions. Nested
> exceptions are supported by each exception getting a new PKS state.
>
> For consistent behavior with current paging protections, pkey 0 is reserved and
> configured to allow full access via the pkey mechanism, thus preserving the
> default paging protections on mappings with the default pkey value of 0.
>
> Other keys, (1-15) are allocated by an allocator which prepares us for key
> contention from day one. Kernel users should be prepared for the allocator to
> fail either because of key exhaustion or due to PKS not being supported on the
> arch and/or CPU instance.
>
> The following are key attributes of PKS.
>
> 1) Fast switching of permissions
> 1a) Prevents access without page table manipulations
> 1b) No TLB flushes required
> 2) Works on a per thread basis
>
> PKS is available with 4 and 5 level paging. Like PKRU it consumes 4 bits from
> the PTE to store the pkey within the entry.
>
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
> [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
> [4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
>
> Fenghua Yu (2):
> x86/pks: Add PKS kernel API
> x86/pks: Enable Protection Keys Supervisor (PKS)
>
> Ira Weiny (8):
> x86/pkeys: Create pkeys_common.h
> x86/fpu: Refactor arch_set_user_pkey_access() for PKS support
> x86/pks: Add PKS defines and Kconfig options
> x86/pks: Preserve the PKRS MSR on context switch
> x86/entry: Pass irqentry_state_t by reference
> x86/entry: Preserve PKRS MSR across exceptions
> x86/fault: Report the PKRS state on fault
> x86/pks: Add PKS test code
>
> Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst | 103 ++-
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
> arch/x86/entry/common.c | 46 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 25 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 13 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 12 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h | 15 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h | 40 ++
> arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 18 +-
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 +
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 15 +
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c | 4 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 22 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 6 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c | 4 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 26 +
> arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 21 +-
> arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 87 ++-
> arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c | 196 +++++-
> include/linux/entry-common.h | 31 +-
> include/linux/pgtable.h | 4 +
> include/linux/pkeys.h | 24 +
> kernel/entry/common.c | 44 +-
> lib/Kconfig.debug | 12 +
> lib/Makefile | 3 +
> lib/pks/Makefile | 3 +
> lib/pks/pks_test.c | 692 ++++++++++++++++++++
> mm/Kconfig | 2 +
> tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile | 3 +-
> tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_pks.c | 66 ++
> 33 files changed, 1410 insertions(+), 140 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h
> create mode 100644 lib/pks/Makefile
> create mode 100644 lib/pks/pks_test.c
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_pks.c
>
> --
> 2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9
>
Ira,
On Mon, Dec 07 2020 at 14:14, Ira Weiny wrote:
> Is there any chance of this landing before the kmap stuff gets sorted out?
I have marked this as needs an update because the change log of 5/10
sucks. https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
> It would be nice to have this in 5.11 to build off of.
It would be nice if people follow up on review request :)
Thanks,
tglx
On Tue, Dec 08, 2020 at 04:55:54PM +0100, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Ira,
>
> On Mon, Dec 07 2020 at 14:14, Ira Weiny wrote:
> > Is there any chance of this landing before the kmap stuff gets sorted out?
>
> I have marked this as needs an update because the change log of 5/10
> sucks. https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
>
> > It would be nice to have this in 5.11 to build off of.
>
> It would be nice if people follow up on review request :)
I did, but just as an update to that patch.[1] Sorry if this caused you to
miss the response. It would have been better for me to ping you on that patch.
:-/
I was trying to avoid a whole new series just for that single commit message.
Is that generally ok?
Is that commit message still lacking?
Ira
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/[email protected]/