Hello,
syzbot found the following issue on:
HEAD commit: d64c6f96 Merge tag 'net-5.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/..
git tree: upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=10bc5613500000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=aca0dc5c721fe9e5
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e86f7c428c8c50db65b4
compiler: gcc (GCC) 10.1.0-syz 20200507
syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=169378a7500000
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=144692cb500000
The issue was bisected to:
commit 2f78788b55baa3410b1ec91a576286abe1ad4d6a
Author: Jakub Jelinek <[email protected]>
Date: Wed Dec 16 04:43:37 2020 +0000
ilog2: improve ilog2 for constant arguments
bisection log: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=1584f137500000
final oops: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=1784f137500000
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1384f137500000
IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: 2f78788b55ba ("ilog2: improve ilog2 for constant arguments")
detected buffer overflow in strlen
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/string.c:1149!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 8713 Comm: syz-executor731 Not tainted 5.10.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0xf/0x11 lib/string.c:1149
Code: b5 78 a3 04 48 c7 c7 c0 8f c2 89 58 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 30 ba ee ff 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 80 90 c2 89 e8 21 ba ee ff <0f> 0b e8 90 f9 97 f8 0f b6 f3 48 c7 c7 20 f4 10 8c e8 41 e8 fc fa
RSP: 0018:ffffc900020af500 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000022 RBX: ffff888011c26768 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff88801bad0000 RSI: ffffffff815a6925 RDI: fffff52000415e92
RBP: ffff88801be7c220 R08: 0000000000000022 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff815a4d7b R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88801180ec00
R13: ffff888011c26700 R14: 1ffff92000415ea2 R15: 0000000000000010
FS: 0000000000812880(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000006dcf60 CR3: 00000000141ee000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
strlen include/linux/string.h:325 [inline]
strlcpy include/linux/string.h:348 [inline]
xt_rateest_tg_checkentry+0x2a5/0x6b0 net/netfilter/xt_RATEEST.c:143
xt_check_target+0x26c/0x9e0 net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1019
check_target net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:529 [inline]
find_check_entry.constprop.0+0x7f1/0x9e0 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:572
translate_table+0xc8b/0x1750 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:734
do_replace net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1152 [inline]
do_ip6t_set_ctl+0x553/0xb70 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1636
nf_setsockopt+0x83/0xe0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101
ipv6_setsockopt+0x122/0x180 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1008
tcp_setsockopt+0x136/0x2440 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3597
__sys_setsockopt+0x2db/0x610 net/socket.c:2115
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2126 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2123 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xba/0x150 net/socket.c:2123
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x4493d9
Code: e8 0c ca 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 9b cb fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fff679a3898 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000200002c0 RCX: 00000000004493d9
RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000029 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007fff679a38b0 R08: 0000000000000470 R09: 00000000000000c2
R10: 0000000020000080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000112d5
R13: 00000000006d7dc8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace e17a915ca7e8b666 ]---
RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0xf/0x11 lib/string.c:1149
Code: b5 78 a3 04 48 c7 c7 c0 8f c2 89 58 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 30 ba ee ff 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 80 90 c2 89 e8 21 ba ee ff <0f> 0b e8 90 f9 97 f8 0f b6 f3 48 c7 c7 20 f4 10 8c e8 41 e8 fc fa
RSP: 0018:ffffc900020af500 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000022 RBX: ffff888011c26768 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff88801bad0000 RSI: ffffffff815a6925 RDI: fffff52000415e92
RBP: ffff88801be7c220 R08: 0000000000000022 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff815a4d7b R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88801180ec00
R13: ffff888011c26700 R14: 1ffff92000415ea2 R15: 0000000000000010
FS: 0000000000812880(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000006dcf60 CR3: 00000000141ee000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
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For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection
syzbot can test patches for this issue, for details see:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches
On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 6:44 AM syzbot
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> The issue was bisected to:
>
> commit 2f78788b55ba ("ilog2: improve ilog2 for constant arguments")
That looks unlikely, although possibly some constant folding
improvement might make the fortify code notice something with it.
> detected buffer overflow in strlen
> ------------[ cut here ]------------
> kernel BUG at lib/string.c:1149!
> Call Trace:
> strlen include/linux/string.h:325 [inline]
> strlcpy include/linux/string.h:348 [inline]
> xt_rateest_tg_checkentry+0x2a5/0x6b0 net/netfilter/xt_RATEEST.c:143
Honestly, this just looks like the traditional bug in "strlcpy()".
That BSD function is complete garbage, exactly because it doesn't
limit the source length. People tend to _think_ it does ("what's that
size_t argument for?") but strlcpy() only limits the *destination*
size, and the source is always read fully.
So it's a completely useless function if you can't implicitly trust
the source string - but that is almost always why people think they
should use it!
Nobody should use it. I really would like to remove it, and let
everybody know how incredibly broken sh*t that function is.
Can we please have everybody stop using strlcpy(). But in this
particular case, it's that xt_rateest_tg_checkentry() in
net/netfilter/xt_RATEEST.c
That said, this may be a real FORTIFY report if that info->name is
*supposed* to be trustworthy? The xt_RATETEST code does use
"info->name" a few lines earlier when it does
est = __xt_rateest_lookup(xn, info->name);
or maybe the bisection is right, and this points to some problem with
__builtin_clzll?
Linus
Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 6:44 AM syzbot
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > The issue was bisected to:
> >
> > commit 2f78788b55ba ("ilog2: improve ilog2 for constant arguments")
>
> That looks unlikely, although possibly some constant folding
> improvement might make the fortify code notice something with it.
>
> > detected buffer overflow in strlen
> > ------------[ cut here ]------------
> > kernel BUG at lib/string.c:1149!
> > Call Trace:
> > strlen include/linux/string.h:325 [inline]
> > strlcpy include/linux/string.h:348 [inline]
> > xt_rateest_tg_checkentry+0x2a5/0x6b0 net/netfilter/xt_RATEEST.c:143
>
> Honestly, this just looks like the traditional bug in "strlcpy()".
Yes, thats exactly what this is, no idea why the bisection points
at ilog2 changes.
> That BSD function is complete garbage, exactly because it doesn't
> limit the source length. People tend to _think_ it does ("what's that
> size_t argument for?") but strlcpy() only limits the *destination*
> size, and the source is always read fully.
Right, I'll send a patch shortly.
On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 11:07 PM Florian Westphal <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 6:44 AM syzbot
> > <[email protected]> wrote:
> > >
> > > The issue was bisected to:
> > >
> > > commit 2f78788b55ba ("ilog2: improve ilog2 for constant arguments")
> >
> > That looks unlikely, although possibly some constant folding
> > improvement might make the fortify code notice something with it.
> >
> > > detected buffer overflow in strlen
> > > ------------[ cut here ]------------
> > > kernel BUG at lib/string.c:1149!
> > > Call Trace:
> > > strlen include/linux/string.h:325 [inline]
> > > strlcpy include/linux/string.h:348 [inline]
> > > xt_rateest_tg_checkentry+0x2a5/0x6b0 net/netfilter/xt_RATEEST.c:143
> >
> > Honestly, this just looks like the traditional bug in "strlcpy()".
>
> Yes, thats exactly what this is, no idea why the bisection points
> at ilog2 changes.
The end result is usually clear from the bisection log:
> bisection log: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=1584f137500000
In this case it looks like the most common cause of diverted bisection
-- interference from other kernel bugs, this __queue_work issue that
happened on ilog2 commit:
[03f4935135b9efeb780b970ba023c201f81cf4e6] checkpatch: fix unescaped left brace
testing commit 03f4935135b9efeb780b970ba023c201f81cf4e6 with gcc (GCC) 8.1.0
all runs: crashed: kernel BUG at lib/string.c:LINE!
# git bisect bad 03f4935135b9efeb780b970ba023c201f81cf4e6
Bisecting: 21 revisions left to test after this (roughly 5 steps)
[2f78788b55baa3410b1ec91a576286abe1ad4d6a] ilog2: improve ilog2 for
constant arguments
testing commit 2f78788b55baa3410b1ec91a576286abe1ad4d6a with gcc (GCC) 8.1.0
run #0: crashed: WARNING in __queue_work
# git bisect bad 2f78788b55baa3410b1ec91a576286abe1ad4d6a
> > That BSD function is complete garbage, exactly because it doesn't
> > limit the source length. People tend to _think_ it does ("what's that
> > size_t argument for?") but strlcpy() only limits the *destination*
> > size, and the source is always read fully.
>
> Right, I'll send a patch shortly.