This series starts by adding support for SA filtering to the bridge,
which is then allowed to be offloaded to switchdev devices. Furthermore
an offloading implementation is supplied for the mv88e6xxx driver.
Public Local Area Networks are often deployed such that there is a
risk of unauthorized or unattended clients getting access to the LAN.
To prevent such access we introduce SA filtering, such that ports
designated as secure ports are set in locked mode, so that only
authorized source MAC addresses are given access by adding them to
the bridges forwarding database. Incoming packets with source MAC
addresses that are not in the forwarding database of the bridge are
discarded. It is then the task of user space daemons to populate the
bridge's forwarding database with static entries of authorized entities.
The most common approach is to use the IEEE 802.1X protocol to take
care of the authorization of allowed users to gain access by opening
for the source address of the authorized host.
With the current use of the bridge parameter in hostapd, there is
a limitation in using this for IEEE 802.1X port authentication. It
depends on hostapd attaching the port on which it has a successful
authentication to the bridge, but that only allows for a single
authentication per port. This patch set allows for the use of
IEEE 802.1X port authentication in a more general network context with
multiple 802.1X aware hosts behind a single port as depicted, which is
a commonly used commercial use-case, as it is only the number of
available entries in the forwarding database that limits the number of
authenticated clients.
+--------------------------------+
| |
| Bridge/Authenticator |
| |
+-------------+------------------+
802.1X port |
|
|
+------+-------+
| |
| Hub/Switch |
| |
+-+----------+-+
| |
+--+--+ +--+--+
| | | |
Hosts | a | | b | . . .
| | | |
+-----+ +-----+
The 802.1X standard involves three different components, a Supplicant
(Host), an Authenticator (Network Access Point) and an Authentication
Server which is typically a Radius server. This patch set thus enables
the bridge module together with an authenticator application to serve
as an Authenticator on designated ports.
For the bridge to become an IEEE 802.1X Authenticator, a solution using
hostapd with the bridge driver can be found at
https://github.com/westermo/hostapd/tree/bridge_driver .
The relevant components work transparently in relation to if it is the
bridge module or the offloaded switchcore case that is in use.
Hans Schultz (5):
net: bridge: Add support for bridge port in locked mode
net: bridge: Add support for offloading of locked port flag
net: dsa: Include BR_PORT_LOCKED in the list of synced brport flags
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Add support for bridge port locked mode
selftests: forwarding: tests of locked port feature
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c | 9 +-
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c | 29 +++
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h | 9 +-
include/linux/if_bridge.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/if_link.h | 1 +
net/bridge/br_input.c | 11 +-
net/bridge/br_netlink.c | 6 +-
net/bridge/br_switchdev.c | 2 +-
net/dsa/port.c | 4 +-
.../testing/selftests/net/forwarding/Makefile | 1 +
.../net/forwarding/bridge_locked_port.sh | 180 ++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh | 8 +
12 files changed, 254 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/bridge_locked_port.sh
--
2.30.2
Various switchcores support setting ports in locked mode, so that
clients behind locked ports cannot send traffic through the port
unless a fdb entry is added with the clients MAC address.
Signed-off-by: Hans Schultz <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
---
net/bridge/br_switchdev.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/bridge/br_switchdev.c b/net/bridge/br_switchdev.c
index f8fbaaa7c501..bf549fc22556 100644
--- a/net/bridge/br_switchdev.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_switchdev.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ bool nbp_switchdev_allowed_egress(const struct net_bridge_port *p,
/* Flags that can be offloaded to hardware */
#define BR_PORT_FLAGS_HW_OFFLOAD (BR_LEARNING | BR_FLOOD | \
- BR_MCAST_FLOOD | BR_BCAST_FLOOD)
+ BR_MCAST_FLOOD | BR_BCAST_FLOOD | BR_PORT_LOCKED)
int br_switchdev_set_port_flag(struct net_bridge_port *p,
unsigned long flags,
--
2.30.2
Supporting bridge ports in locked mode using the drop on lock
feature in Marvell mv88e6xxx switchcores is described in the
'88E6096/88E6097/88E6097F Datasheet', sections 4.4.6, 4.4.7 and
5.1.2.1 (Drop on Lock).
This feature is implemented here facilitated by the locked port flag.
Signed-off-by: Hans Schultz <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c | 9 ++++++++-
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h | 9 ++++++++-
3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c
index 58ca684d73f7..eed3713b97ae 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c
@@ -5881,7 +5881,7 @@ static int mv88e6xxx_port_pre_bridge_flags(struct dsa_switch *ds, int port,
const struct mv88e6xxx_ops *ops;
if (flags.mask & ~(BR_LEARNING | BR_FLOOD | BR_MCAST_FLOOD |
- BR_BCAST_FLOOD))
+ BR_BCAST_FLOOD | BR_PORT_LOCKED))
return -EINVAL;
ops = chip->info->ops;
@@ -5939,6 +5939,13 @@ static int mv88e6xxx_port_bridge_flags(struct dsa_switch *ds, int port,
goto out;
}
+ if (flags.mask & BR_PORT_LOCKED) {
+ bool locked = !!(flags.val & BR_PORT_LOCKED);
+
+ err = mv88e6xxx_port_set_lock(chip, port, locked);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
out:
mv88e6xxx_reg_unlock(chip);
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c
index ab41619a809b..b71061009fd4 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c
@@ -1234,6 +1234,35 @@ int mv88e6xxx_port_set_mirror(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
return err;
}
+int mv88e6xxx_port_set_lock(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
+ bool locked)
+{
+ u16 reg;
+ int err;
+
+ err = mv88e6xxx_port_read(chip, port, MV88E6XXX_PORT_CTL0, ®);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ reg &= ~MV88E6XXX_PORT_CTL0_SA_FILT_MASK;
+ if (locked)
+ reg |= MV88E6XXX_PORT_CTL0_SA_FILT_DROP_ON_LOCK;
+
+ err = mv88e6xxx_port_write(chip, port, MV88E6XXX_PORT_CTL0, reg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = mv88e6xxx_port_read(chip, port, MV88E6XXX_PORT_ASSOC_VECTOR, ®);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ reg &= ~MV88E6XXX_PORT_ASSOC_VECTOR_LOCKED_PORT;
+ if (locked)
+ reg |= MV88E6XXX_PORT_ASSOC_VECTOR_LOCKED_PORT;
+
+ return mv88e6xxx_port_write(chip, port, MV88E6XXX_PORT_ASSOC_VECTOR, reg);
+}
+
int mv88e6xxx_port_set_8021q_mode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
u16 mode)
{
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h
index 03382b66f800..3f70557f0d48 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h
@@ -142,7 +142,11 @@
/* Offset 0x04: Port Control Register */
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_CTL0 0x04
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_CTL0_USE_CORE_TAG 0x8000
-#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_CTL0_DROP_ON_LOCK 0x4000
+#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_CTL0_SA_FILT_MASK 0xc000
+#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_CTL0_SA_FILT_DISABLED 0x0000
+#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_CTL0_SA_FILT_DROP_ON_LOCK 0x4000
+#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_CTL0_SA_FILT_DROP_ON_UNLOCK 0x8000
+#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_CTL0_SA_FILT_DROP_ON_CPU 0xc000
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_CTL0_EGRESS_MODE_MASK 0x3000
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_CTL0_EGRESS_MODE_UNMODIFIED 0x0000
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_CTL0_EGRESS_MODE_UNTAGGED 0x1000
@@ -365,6 +369,9 @@ int mv88e6xxx_port_set_fid(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, u16 fid);
int mv88e6xxx_port_get_pvid(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, u16 *pvid);
int mv88e6xxx_port_set_pvid(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, u16 pvid);
+int mv88e6xxx_port_set_lock(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
+ bool locked);
+
int mv88e6xxx_port_set_8021q_mode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
u16 mode);
int mv88e6095_port_tag_remap(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
--
2.30.2
In a 802.1X scenario, clients connected to a bridge port shall not
be allowed to have traffic forwarded until fully authenticated.
A static fdb entry of the clients MAC address for the bridge port
unlocks the client and allows bidirectional communication.
This scenario is facilitated with setting the bridge port in locked
mode, which is also supported by various switchcore chipsets.
Signed-off-by: Hans Schultz <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/if_bridge.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/if_link.h | 1 +
net/bridge/br_input.c | 11 ++++++++++-
net/bridge/br_netlink.c | 6 +++++-
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/if_bridge.h b/include/linux/if_bridge.h
index 509e18c7e740..3aae023a9353 100644
--- a/include/linux/if_bridge.h
+++ b/include/linux/if_bridge.h
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ struct br_ip_list {
#define BR_MRP_LOST_CONT BIT(18)
#define BR_MRP_LOST_IN_CONT BIT(19)
#define BR_TX_FWD_OFFLOAD BIT(20)
+#define BR_PORT_LOCKED BIT(21)
#define BR_DEFAULT_AGEING_TIME (300 * HZ)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
index 6218f93f5c1a..a45cc0a1f415 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
@@ -537,6 +537,7 @@ enum {
IFLA_BRPORT_MRP_IN_OPEN,
IFLA_BRPORT_MCAST_EHT_HOSTS_LIMIT,
IFLA_BRPORT_MCAST_EHT_HOSTS_CNT,
+ IFLA_BRPORT_LOCKED,
__IFLA_BRPORT_MAX
};
#define IFLA_BRPORT_MAX (__IFLA_BRPORT_MAX - 1)
diff --git a/net/bridge/br_input.c b/net/bridge/br_input.c
index b50382f957c1..e0c13fcc50ed 100644
--- a/net/bridge/br_input.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_input.c
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ int br_handle_frame_finish(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb
if (!p || p->state == BR_STATE_DISABLED)
goto drop;
+ br = p->br;
brmctx = &p->br->multicast_ctx;
pmctx = &p->multicast_ctx;
state = p->state;
@@ -88,10 +89,18 @@ int br_handle_frame_finish(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb
&state, &vlan))
goto out;
+ if (p->flags & BR_PORT_LOCKED) {
+ struct net_bridge_fdb_entry *fdb_src =
+ br_fdb_find_rcu(br, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, vid);
+
+ if (!fdb_src || READ_ONCE(fdb_src->dst) != p ||
+ test_bit(BR_FDB_LOCAL, &fdb_src->flags))
+ goto drop;
+ }
+
nbp_switchdev_frame_mark(p, skb);
/* insert into forwarding database after filtering to avoid spoofing */
- br = p->br;
if (p->flags & BR_LEARNING)
br_fdb_update(br, p, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, vid, 0);
diff --git a/net/bridge/br_netlink.c b/net/bridge/br_netlink.c
index 2ff83d84230d..7d4432ca9a20 100644
--- a/net/bridge/br_netlink.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_netlink.c
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ static inline size_t br_port_info_size(void)
+ nla_total_size(1) /* IFLA_BRPORT_VLAN_TUNNEL */
+ nla_total_size(1) /* IFLA_BRPORT_NEIGH_SUPPRESS */
+ nla_total_size(1) /* IFLA_BRPORT_ISOLATED */
+ + nla_total_size(1) /* IFLA_BRPORT_LOCKED */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct ifla_bridge_id)) /* IFLA_BRPORT_ROOT_ID */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct ifla_bridge_id)) /* IFLA_BRPORT_BRIDGE_ID */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(u16)) /* IFLA_BRPORT_DESIGNATED_PORT */
@@ -269,7 +270,8 @@ static int br_port_fill_attrs(struct sk_buff *skb,
BR_MRP_LOST_CONT)) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_BRPORT_MRP_IN_OPEN,
!!(p->flags & BR_MRP_LOST_IN_CONT)) ||
- nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_BRPORT_ISOLATED, !!(p->flags & BR_ISOLATED)))
+ nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_BRPORT_ISOLATED, !!(p->flags & BR_ISOLATED)) ||
+ nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_BRPORT_LOCKED, !!(p->flags & BR_PORT_LOCKED)))
return -EMSGSIZE;
timerval = br_timer_value(&p->message_age_timer);
@@ -827,6 +829,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy br_port_policy[IFLA_BRPORT_MAX + 1] = {
[IFLA_BRPORT_GROUP_FWD_MASK] = { .type = NLA_U16 },
[IFLA_BRPORT_NEIGH_SUPPRESS] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
[IFLA_BRPORT_ISOLATED] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
+ [IFLA_BRPORT_LOCKED] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
[IFLA_BRPORT_BACKUP_PORT] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[IFLA_BRPORT_MCAST_EHT_HOSTS_LIMIT] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
};
@@ -893,6 +896,7 @@ static int br_setport(struct net_bridge_port *p, struct nlattr *tb[],
br_set_port_flag(p, tb, IFLA_BRPORT_VLAN_TUNNEL, BR_VLAN_TUNNEL);
br_set_port_flag(p, tb, IFLA_BRPORT_NEIGH_SUPPRESS, BR_NEIGH_SUPPRESS);
br_set_port_flag(p, tb, IFLA_BRPORT_ISOLATED, BR_ISOLATED);
+ br_set_port_flag(p, tb, IFLA_BRPORT_LOCKED, BR_PORT_LOCKED);
changed_mask = old_flags ^ p->flags;
--
2.30.2
Ensures that the DSA switch driver gets notified of changes to the
BR_PORT_LOCKED flag as well, for the case when a DSA port joins or
leaves a LAG that is a bridge port.
Signed-off-by: Hans Schultz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]>
---
net/dsa/port.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/dsa/port.c b/net/dsa/port.c
index bd78192e0e47..01ed22ed74a1 100644
--- a/net/dsa/port.c
+++ b/net/dsa/port.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static int dsa_port_inherit_brport_flags(struct dsa_port *dp,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
const unsigned long mask = BR_LEARNING | BR_FLOOD | BR_MCAST_FLOOD |
- BR_BCAST_FLOOD;
+ BR_BCAST_FLOOD | BR_PORT_LOCKED;
struct net_device *brport_dev = dsa_port_to_bridge_port(dp);
int flag, err;
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static void dsa_port_clear_brport_flags(struct dsa_port *dp)
{
const unsigned long val = BR_FLOOD | BR_MCAST_FLOOD | BR_BCAST_FLOOD;
const unsigned long mask = BR_LEARNING | BR_FLOOD | BR_MCAST_FLOOD |
- BR_BCAST_FLOOD;
+ BR_BCAST_FLOOD | BR_PORT_LOCKED;
int flag, err;
for_each_set_bit(flag, &mask, 32) {
--
2.30.2
These tests check that the basic locked port feature works, so that
no 'host' can communicate (ping) through a locked port unless the
MAC address of the 'host' interface is in the forwarding database of
the bridge.
Signed-off-by: Hans Schultz <[email protected]>
---
.../testing/selftests/net/forwarding/Makefile | 1 +
.../net/forwarding/bridge_locked_port.sh | 180 ++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh | 8 +
3 files changed, 189 insertions(+)
create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/bridge_locked_port.sh
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/Makefile
index 72ee644d47bf..8fa97ae9af9e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ OR MIT
TEST_PROGS = bridge_igmp.sh \
+ bridge_locked_port.sh \
bridge_port_isolation.sh \
bridge_sticky_fdb.sh \
bridge_vlan_aware.sh \
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/bridge_locked_port.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/bridge_locked_port.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..a8800e531d07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/bridge_locked_port.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+ALL_TESTS="locked_port_ipv4 locked_port_ipv6 locked_port_vlan"
+NUM_NETIFS=4
+CHECK_TC="no"
+source lib.sh
+
+h1_create()
+{
+ simple_if_init $h1 192.0.2.1/24 2001:db8:1::1/64
+ vrf_create "vrf-vlan-h1"
+ ip link set dev vrf-vlan-h1 up
+ vlan_create $h1 100 vrf-vlan-h1 198.51.100.1/24 ::ffff:c633:6401/64
+}
+
+h1_destroy()
+{
+ vlan_destroy $h1 100
+ simple_if_fini $h1 192.0.2.1/24 2001:db8:1::1/64
+}
+
+h2_create()
+{
+ simple_if_init $h2 192.0.2.2/24 2001:db8:1::2/64
+ vrf_create "vrf-vlan-h2"
+ ip link set dev vrf-vlan-h2 up
+ vlan_create $h2 100 vrf-vlan-h2 198.51.100.2/24 ::ffff:c633:6402/64
+}
+
+h2_destroy()
+{
+ vlan_destroy $h2 100
+ simple_if_fini $h2 192.0.2.2/24 2001:db8:1::2/64
+}
+
+switch_create()
+{
+ ip link add dev br0 type bridge vlan_filtering 1
+
+ ip link set dev $swp1 master br0
+ ip link set dev $swp2 master br0
+
+ ip link set dev br0 up
+ ip link set dev $swp1 up
+ ip link set dev $swp2 up
+
+ bridge link set dev $swp1 learning off
+}
+
+switch_destroy()
+{
+ ip link set dev $swp2 down
+ ip link set dev $swp1 down
+
+ ip link del dev br0
+}
+
+setup_prepare()
+{
+ h1=${NETIFS[p1]}
+ swp1=${NETIFS[p2]}
+
+ swp2=${NETIFS[p3]}
+ h2=${NETIFS[p4]}
+
+ vrf_prepare
+
+ h1_create
+ h2_create
+
+ switch_create
+}
+
+cleanup()
+{
+ pre_cleanup
+
+ switch_destroy
+
+ h2_destroy
+ h1_destroy
+
+ vrf_cleanup
+}
+
+locked_port_ipv4()
+{
+ RET=0
+
+ check_locked_port_support || return 0
+
+ ping_do $h1 192.0.2.2
+ check_err $? "Ping did not work before locking port"
+
+ bridge link set dev $swp1 locked on
+
+ ping_do $h1 192.0.2.2
+ check_fail $? "Ping worked after locking port, but before adding FDB entry"
+
+ bridge fdb add `mac_get $h1` dev $swp1 master static
+
+ ping_do $h1 192.0.2.2
+ check_err $? "Ping did not work after locking port and adding FDB entry"
+
+ bridge link set dev $swp1 locked off
+ bridge fdb del `mac_get $h1` dev $swp1 master static
+
+ ping_do $h1 192.0.2.2
+ check_err $? "Ping did not work after unlocking port and removing FDB entry."
+
+ log_test "Locked port ipv4"
+}
+
+locked_port_vlan()
+{
+ RET=0
+
+ check_locked_port_support || return 0
+
+ bridge vlan add vid 100 dev $swp1
+ bridge vlan add vid 100 dev $swp2
+
+ ping_do $h1.100 198.51.100.2
+ check_err $? "Ping through vlan did not work before locking port"
+
+ bridge link set dev $swp1 locked on
+ ping_do $h1.100 198.51.100.2
+ check_fail $? "Ping through vlan worked after locking port, but before adding FDB entry"
+
+ bridge fdb add `mac_get $h1` dev $swp1 vlan 100 master static
+
+ ping_do $h1.100 198.51.100.2
+ check_err $? "Ping through vlan did not work after locking port and adding FDB entry"
+
+ bridge link set dev $swp1 locked off
+ bridge fdb del `mac_get $h1` dev $swp1 vlan 100 master static
+
+ ping_do $h1.100 198.51.100.2
+ check_err $? "Ping through vlan did not work after unlocking port and removing FDB entry"
+
+ bridge vlan del vid 100 dev $swp1
+ bridge vlan del vid 100 dev $swp2
+ log_test "Locked port vlan"
+}
+
+locked_port_ipv6()
+{
+ RET=0
+ check_locked_port_support || return 0
+
+ ping6_do $h1 2001:db8:1::2
+ check_err $? "Ping6 did not work before locking port"
+
+ bridge link set dev $swp1 locked on
+
+ ping6_do $h1 2001:db8:1::2
+ check_fail $? "Ping6 worked after locking port, but before adding FDB entry"
+
+ bridge fdb add `mac_get $h1` dev $swp1 master static
+ ping6_do $h1 2001:db8:1::2
+ check_err $? "Ping6 did not work after locking port and adding FDB entry"
+
+ bridge link set dev $swp1 locked off
+ bridge fdb del `mac_get $h1` dev $swp1 master static
+
+ ping6_do $h1 2001:db8:1::2
+ check_err $? "Ping6 did not work after unlocking port and removing FDB entry"
+
+ log_test "Locked port ipv6"
+}
+
+trap cleanup EXIT
+
+setup_prepare
+setup_wait
+
+tests_run
+
+exit $EXIT_STATUS
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh
index 7da783d6f453..c26b603abb4d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh
@@ -125,6 +125,14 @@ check_ethtool_lanes_support()
fi
}
+check_locked_port_support()
+{
+ if ! bridge -d link show | grep -q " locked"; then
+ echo "SKIP: iproute2 too old; Locked port feature not supported."
+ return $ksft_skip
+ fi
+}
+
if [[ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]]; then
echo "SKIP: need root privileges"
exit $ksft_skip
--
2.30.2
On Tue, Feb 22, 2022 at 02:28:18PM +0100, Hans Schultz wrote:
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/bridge_locked_port.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/bridge_locked_port.sh
> new file mode 100755
> index 000000000000..a8800e531d07
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/bridge_locked_port.sh
> @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
> +#!/bin/bash
> +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +
> +ALL_TESTS="locked_port_ipv4 locked_port_ipv6 locked_port_vlan"
> +NUM_NETIFS=4
> +CHECK_TC="no"
> +source lib.sh
> +
> +h1_create()
> +{
> + simple_if_init $h1 192.0.2.1/24 2001:db8:1::1/64
> + vrf_create "vrf-vlan-h1"
> + ip link set dev vrf-vlan-h1 up
> + vlan_create $h1 100 vrf-vlan-h1 198.51.100.1/24 ::ffff:c633:6401/64
Hi,
Why did you change it from 2001:db8:3::1/64 to ::ffff:c633:6401/64? It
was actually OK the first time...
Anyway, looking at locked_port_vlan() I see that you are only testing
IPv4 so you can just drop this address:
vlan_create $h1 100 vrf-vlan-h1 198.51.100.1/24
Same for $h2
LGTM otherwise. Feel free to add my tag to the next version
> +}
On tis, feb 22, 2022 at 19:00, Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 22, 2022 at 02:28:18PM +0100, Hans Schultz wrote:
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/bridge_locked_port.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/bridge_locked_port.sh
>> new file mode 100755
>> index 000000000000..a8800e531d07
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/bridge_locked_port.sh
>> @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
>> +#!/bin/bash
>> +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>> +
>> +ALL_TESTS="locked_port_ipv4 locked_port_ipv6 locked_port_vlan"
>> +NUM_NETIFS=4
>> +CHECK_TC="no"
>> +source lib.sh
>> +
>> +h1_create()
>> +{
>> + simple_if_init $h1 192.0.2.1/24 2001:db8:1::1/64
>> + vrf_create "vrf-vlan-h1"
>> + ip link set dev vrf-vlan-h1 up
>> + vlan_create $h1 100 vrf-vlan-h1 198.51.100.1/24 ::ffff:c633:6401/64
>
> Hi,
>
> Why did you change it from 2001:db8:3::1/64 to ::ffff:c633:6401/64? It
> was actually OK the first time...
I used an online converter (https://iplocation.io/ipv4-to-ipv6) to
convert 198.51.100.1 into an 'equivalent' ipv6 address even though I
know they are of different spaces.
>
> Anyway, looking at locked_port_vlan() I see that you are only testing
> IPv4 so you can just drop this address:
>
> vlan_create $h1 100 vrf-vlan-h1 198.51.100.1/24
>
> Same for $h2
>
> LGTM otherwise. Feel free to add my tag to the next version
>
>
>> +}
On tis, feb 22, 2022 at 11:15, Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Tue, 22 Feb 2022 14:28:13 +0100 Hans Schultz wrote:
>> This series starts by adding support for SA filtering to the bridge,
>> which is then allowed to be offloaded to switchdev devices. Furthermore
>> an offloading implementation is supplied for the mv88e6xxx driver.
>>
>> Public Local Area Networks are often deployed such that there is a
>> risk of unauthorized or unattended clients getting access to the LAN.
>> To prevent such access we introduce SA filtering, such that ports
>> designated as secure ports are set in locked mode, so that only
>> authorized source MAC addresses are given access by adding them to
>> the bridges forwarding database. Incoming packets with source MAC
>> addresses that are not in the forwarding database of the bridge are
>> discarded. It is then the task of user space daemons to populate the
>> bridge's forwarding database with static entries of authorized entities.
>>
>> The most common approach is to use the IEEE 802.1X protocol to take
>> care of the authorization of allowed users to gain access by opening
>> for the source address of the authorized host.
>>
>> With the current use of the bridge parameter in hostapd, there is
>> a limitation in using this for IEEE 802.1X port authentication. It
>> depends on hostapd attaching the port on which it has a successful
>> authentication to the bridge, but that only allows for a single
>> authentication per port. This patch set allows for the use of
>> IEEE 802.1X port authentication in a more general network context with
>> multiple 802.1X aware hosts behind a single port as depicted, which is
>> a commonly used commercial use-case, as it is only the number of
>> available entries in the forwarding database that limits the number of
>> authenticated clients.
>>
>> +--------------------------------+
>> | |
>> | Bridge/Authenticator |
>> | |
>> +-------------+------------------+
>> 802.1X port |
>> |
>> |
>> +------+-------+
>> | |
>> | Hub/Switch |
>> | |
>> +-+----------+-+
>> | |
>> +--+--+ +--+--+
>> | | | |
>> Hosts | a | | b | . . .
>> | | | |
>> +-----+ +-----+
>>
>> The 802.1X standard involves three different components, a Supplicant
>> (Host), an Authenticator (Network Access Point) and an Authentication
>> Server which is typically a Radius server. This patch set thus enables
>> the bridge module together with an authenticator application to serve
>> as an Authenticator on designated ports.
>>
>>
>> For the bridge to become an IEEE 802.1X Authenticator, a solution using
>> hostapd with the bridge driver can be found at
>> https://github.com/westermo/hostapd/tree/bridge_driver .
>>
>>
>> The relevant components work transparently in relation to if it is the
>> bridge module or the offloaded switchcore case that is in use.
>
> You still haven't answer my question. Is the data plane clear text in
> the deployment you describe?
Sorry, I didn't understand your question in the first instance. So as
802.1X is only about authentication/authorization, the port when opened
for a host is like any other switch port and thus communication is in
the clear.
I have not looked much into macsec (but know ipsec), and that is a
crypto (key) based connection mechanism, but that is a totally different
ballgame, and I think it would for most practical cases require hardware
encryption.
On Tue, 22 Feb 2022 14:28:13 +0100 Hans Schultz wrote:
> This series starts by adding support for SA filtering to the bridge,
> which is then allowed to be offloaded to switchdev devices. Furthermore
> an offloading implementation is supplied for the mv88e6xxx driver.
>
> Public Local Area Networks are often deployed such that there is a
> risk of unauthorized or unattended clients getting access to the LAN.
> To prevent such access we introduce SA filtering, such that ports
> designated as secure ports are set in locked mode, so that only
> authorized source MAC addresses are given access by adding them to
> the bridges forwarding database. Incoming packets with source MAC
> addresses that are not in the forwarding database of the bridge are
> discarded. It is then the task of user space daemons to populate the
> bridge's forwarding database with static entries of authorized entities.
>
> The most common approach is to use the IEEE 802.1X protocol to take
> care of the authorization of allowed users to gain access by opening
> for the source address of the authorized host.
>
> With the current use of the bridge parameter in hostapd, there is
> a limitation in using this for IEEE 802.1X port authentication. It
> depends on hostapd attaching the port on which it has a successful
> authentication to the bridge, but that only allows for a single
> authentication per port. This patch set allows for the use of
> IEEE 802.1X port authentication in a more general network context with
> multiple 802.1X aware hosts behind a single port as depicted, which is
> a commonly used commercial use-case, as it is only the number of
> available entries in the forwarding database that limits the number of
> authenticated clients.
>
> +--------------------------------+
> | |
> | Bridge/Authenticator |
> | |
> +-------------+------------------+
> 802.1X port |
> |
> |
> +------+-------+
> | |
> | Hub/Switch |
> | |
> +-+----------+-+
> | |
> +--+--+ +--+--+
> | | | |
> Hosts | a | | b | . . .
> | | | |
> +-----+ +-----+
>
> The 802.1X standard involves three different components, a Supplicant
> (Host), an Authenticator (Network Access Point) and an Authentication
> Server which is typically a Radius server. This patch set thus enables
> the bridge module together with an authenticator application to serve
> as an Authenticator on designated ports.
>
>
> For the bridge to become an IEEE 802.1X Authenticator, a solution using
> hostapd with the bridge driver can be found at
> https://github.com/westermo/hostapd/tree/bridge_driver .
>
>
> The relevant components work transparently in relation to if it is the
> bridge module or the offloaded switchcore case that is in use.
You still haven't answer my question. Is the data plane clear text in
the deployment you describe?
On Wed, 23 Feb 2022 09:40:59 +0100 Hans Schultz wrote:
> > You still haven't answer my question. Is the data plane clear text in
> > the deployment you describe?
>
> Sorry, I didn't understand your question in the first instance. So as
> 802.1X is only about authentication/authorization, the port when opened
> for a host is like any other switch port and thus communication is in
> the clear.
Alright, thanks for clarifying!
> I have not looked much into macsec (but know ipsec), and that is a
> crypto (key) based connection mechanism, but that is a totally different
> ballgame, and I think it would for most practical cases require hardware
> encryption.