Yanming reported a kernel bug in Bugzilla kernel [1], which can be
reproduced. The bug message is:
The kernel message is shown below:
kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:611!
Call Trace:
evict+0x282/0x4e0
__dentry_kill+0x2b2/0x4d0
dput+0x2dd/0x720
do_renameat2+0x596/0x970
__x64_sys_rename+0x78/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215895
The bug is due to fuzzed inode has both inline_data and encrypted flags.
During f2fs_evict_inode(), as the inode was deleted by rename(), it
will cause inline data conversion due to conflicting flags. The page
cache will be polluted and the panic will be triggered in clear_inode().
Try fixing the bug by doing more sanity checks for inline data inode in
sanity_check_inode().
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Ming Yan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
---
v4:
- introduce and use f2fs_post_read_required_ondisk() only for
sanity_check_inode().
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 15 ++++++++++++++-
fs/f2fs/file.c | 2 +-
fs/f2fs/inline.c | 11 ++++++++---
fs/f2fs/inode.c | 3 +--
fs/f2fs/namei.c | 2 +-
5 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
index 7faf230f101f..65442ab03d32 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -4039,7 +4039,7 @@ extern struct kmem_cache *f2fs_inode_entry_slab;
/*
* inline.c
*/
-bool f2fs_may_inline_data(struct inode *inode);
+bool f2fs_may_inline_data(struct inode *inode, bool sanity_check);
bool f2fs_may_inline_dentry(struct inode *inode);
void f2fs_do_read_inline_data(struct page *page, struct page *ipage);
void f2fs_truncate_inline_inode(struct inode *inode,
@@ -4141,6 +4141,19 @@ static inline void f2fs_set_encrypted_inode(struct inode *inode)
#endif
}
+static inline bool f2fs_post_read_required_ondisk(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ /*
+ * used by sanity_check_inode(), when disk layout fields has not
+ * been synchronized to inmem fields.
+ */
+ if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && (file_is_encrypt(inode) ||
+ F2FS_I(inode)->i_flags & F2FS_COMPR_FL ||
+ file_is_verity(inode)))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
/*
* Returns true if the reads of the inode's data need to undergo some
* postprocessing step, like decryption or authenticity verification.
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/file.c b/fs/f2fs/file.c
index 0a554730d2c4..73ba1c6dceaa 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
@@ -796,7 +796,7 @@ int f2fs_truncate(struct inode *inode)
return err;
/* we should check inline_data size */
- if (!f2fs_may_inline_data(inode)) {
+ if (!f2fs_may_inline_data(inode, false)) {
err = f2fs_convert_inline_inode(inode);
if (err)
return err;
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inline.c b/fs/f2fs/inline.c
index a578bf83b803..331ecd8af80c 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/inline.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inline.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
#include "node.h"
#include <trace/events/f2fs.h>
-bool f2fs_may_inline_data(struct inode *inode)
+bool f2fs_may_inline_data(struct inode *inode, bool sanity_check)
{
if (f2fs_is_atomic_file(inode))
return false;
@@ -25,8 +25,13 @@ bool f2fs_may_inline_data(struct inode *inode)
if (i_size_read(inode) > MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode))
return false;
- if (f2fs_post_read_required(inode))
- return false;
+ if (sanity_check) {
+ if (f2fs_post_read_required_ondisk(inode))
+ return false;
+ } else {
+ if (f2fs_post_read_required(inode))
+ return false;
+ }
return true;
}
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
index 2fce8fa0dac8..3384100dde0b 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -276,8 +276,7 @@ static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *node_page)
}
}
- if (f2fs_has_inline_data(inode) &&
- (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))) {
+ if (f2fs_has_inline_data(inode) && !f2fs_may_inline_data(inode, true)) {
set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
f2fs_warn(sbi, "%s: inode (ino=%lx, mode=%u) should not have inline_data, run fsck to fix",
__func__, inode->i_ino, inode->i_mode);
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/namei.c b/fs/f2fs/namei.c
index c549acb52ac4..514088f707ed 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/namei.c
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static struct inode *f2fs_new_inode(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
if (test_opt(sbi, INLINE_XATTR))
set_inode_flag(inode, FI_INLINE_XATTR);
- if (test_opt(sbi, INLINE_DATA) && f2fs_may_inline_data(inode))
+ if (test_opt(sbi, INLINE_DATA) && f2fs_may_inline_data(inode, false))
set_inode_flag(inode, FI_INLINE_DATA);
if (f2fs_may_inline_dentry(inode))
set_inode_flag(inode, FI_INLINE_DENTRY);
--
2.25.1
On 05/17, Chao Yu wrote:
> Yanming reported a kernel bug in Bugzilla kernel [1], which can be
> reproduced. The bug message is:
>
> The kernel message is shown below:
>
> kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:611!
> Call Trace:
> evict+0x282/0x4e0
> __dentry_kill+0x2b2/0x4d0
> dput+0x2dd/0x720
> do_renameat2+0x596/0x970
> __x64_sys_rename+0x78/0x90
> do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
>
> [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215895
>
> The bug is due to fuzzed inode has both inline_data and encrypted flags.
> During f2fs_evict_inode(), as the inode was deleted by rename(), it
> will cause inline data conversion due to conflicting flags. The page
> cache will be polluted and the panic will be triggered in clear_inode().
>
> Try fixing the bug by doing more sanity checks for inline data inode in
> sanity_check_inode().
>
> Cc: [email protected]
> Reported-by: Ming Yan <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
> ---
> v4:
> - introduce and use f2fs_post_read_required_ondisk() only for
Can we do like this?
---
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 1 +
fs/f2fs/inline.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
fs/f2fs/inode.c | 3 +--
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
index e9e32bc814df..000468bf06ca 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -4019,6 +4019,7 @@ extern struct kmem_cache *f2fs_inode_entry_slab;
* inline.c
*/
bool f2fs_may_inline_data(struct inode *inode);
+bool f2fs_sanity_check_inline_data(struct inode *inode);
bool f2fs_may_inline_dentry(struct inode *inode);
void f2fs_do_read_inline_data(struct page *page, struct page *ipage);
void f2fs_truncate_inline_inode(struct inode *inode,
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inline.c b/fs/f2fs/inline.c
index a578bf83b803..daf8c0e0a6b6 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/inline.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inline.c
@@ -14,21 +14,41 @@
#include "node.h"
#include <trace/events/f2fs.h>
-bool f2fs_may_inline_data(struct inode *inode)
+static bool support_inline_data(struct inode *inode)
{
if (f2fs_is_atomic_file(inode))
return false;
-
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
return false;
-
if (i_size_read(inode) > MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode))
return false;
+ return true;
+}
- if (f2fs_post_read_required(inode))
+bool f2fs_may_inline_data(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ if (!support_inline_data(inode))
return false;
- return true;
+ return !(f2fs_encrypted_file(inode) || fsverity_active(inode) ||
+ f2fs_compressed_file(inode));
+}
+
+bool f2fs_sanity_check_inline_data(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ if (!f2fs_has_inline_data(inode))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!support_inline_data(inode))
+ return true;
+
+ /*
+ * used by sanity_check_inode(), when disk layout fields has not
+ * been synchronized to inmem fields.
+ */
+ return (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
+ (file_is_encrypt(inode) || file_is_verity(inode) ||
+ (F2FS_I(inode)->i_flags & F2FS_COMPR_FL)));
}
bool f2fs_may_inline_dentry(struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
index 2fce8fa0dac8..938961a9084e 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -276,8 +276,7 @@ static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *node_page)
}
}
- if (f2fs_has_inline_data(inode) &&
- (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))) {
+ if (f2fs_sanity_check_inline_data(inode)) {
set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
f2fs_warn(sbi, "%s: inode (ino=%lx, mode=%u) should not have inline_data, run fsck to fix",
__func__, inode->i_ino, inode->i_mode);
--
2.36.0.550.gb090851708-goog
On 2022/5/18 2:18, Jaegeuk Kim wrote:
> On 05/17, Chao Yu wrote:
>> Yanming reported a kernel bug in Bugzilla kernel [1], which can be
>> reproduced. The bug message is:
>>
>> The kernel message is shown below:
>>
>> kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:611!
>> Call Trace:
>> evict+0x282/0x4e0
>> __dentry_kill+0x2b2/0x4d0
>> dput+0x2dd/0x720
>> do_renameat2+0x596/0x970
>> __x64_sys_rename+0x78/0x90
>> do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
>>
>> [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215895
>>
>> The bug is due to fuzzed inode has both inline_data and encrypted flags.
>> During f2fs_evict_inode(), as the inode was deleted by rename(), it
>> will cause inline data conversion due to conflicting flags. The page
>> cache will be polluted and the panic will be triggered in clear_inode().
>>
>> Try fixing the bug by doing more sanity checks for inline data inode in
>> sanity_check_inode().
>>
>> Cc: [email protected]
>> Reported-by: Ming Yan <[email protected]>
>> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
>> ---
>> v4:
>> - introduce and use f2fs_post_read_required_ondisk() only for
>
> Can we do like this?
>
> ---
> fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 1 +
> fs/f2fs/inline.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> fs/f2fs/inode.c | 3 +--
> 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
> index e9e32bc814df..000468bf06ca 100644
> --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
> +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
> @@ -4019,6 +4019,7 @@ extern struct kmem_cache *f2fs_inode_entry_slab;
> * inline.c
> */
> bool f2fs_may_inline_data(struct inode *inode);
> +bool f2fs_sanity_check_inline_data(struct inode *inode);
> bool f2fs_may_inline_dentry(struct inode *inode);
> void f2fs_do_read_inline_data(struct page *page, struct page *ipage);
> void f2fs_truncate_inline_inode(struct inode *inode,
> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inline.c b/fs/f2fs/inline.c
> index a578bf83b803..daf8c0e0a6b6 100644
> --- a/fs/f2fs/inline.c
> +++ b/fs/f2fs/inline.c
> @@ -14,21 +14,41 @@
> #include "node.h"
> #include <trace/events/f2fs.h>
>
> -bool f2fs_may_inline_data(struct inode *inode)
> +static bool support_inline_data(struct inode *inode)
> {
> if (f2fs_is_atomic_file(inode))
> return false;
> -
> if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
> return false;
> -
> if (i_size_read(inode) > MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode))
> return false;
> + return true;
> +}
>
> - if (f2fs_post_read_required(inode))
> +bool f2fs_may_inline_data(struct inode *inode)
> +{
> + if (!support_inline_data(inode))
> return false;
>
> - return true;
> + return !(f2fs_encrypted_file(inode) || fsverity_active(inode) ||
> + f2fs_compressed_file(inode));
!f2fs_post_read_required(), otherwise looks good!
Thanks,
> +}
> +
> +bool f2fs_sanity_check_inline_data(struct inode *inode)
> +{
> + if (!f2fs_has_inline_data(inode))
> + return false;
> +
> + if (!support_inline_data(inode))
> + return true;
> +
> + /*
> + * used by sanity_check_inode(), when disk layout fields has not
> + * been synchronized to inmem fields.
> + */
> + return (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
> + (file_is_encrypt(inode) || file_is_verity(inode) ||
> + (F2FS_I(inode)->i_flags & F2FS_COMPR_FL)));
> }
>
> bool f2fs_may_inline_dentry(struct inode *inode)
> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
> index 2fce8fa0dac8..938961a9084e 100644
> --- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
> @@ -276,8 +276,7 @@ static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *node_page)
> }
> }
>
> - if (f2fs_has_inline_data(inode) &&
> - (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))) {
> + if (f2fs_sanity_check_inline_data(inode)) {
> set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
> f2fs_warn(sbi, "%s: inode (ino=%lx, mode=%u) should not have inline_data, run fsck to fix",
> __func__, inode->i_ino, inode->i_mode);