The hypervisor can enable various new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63])
and start the SNP guest. Some of these features need guest side
implementation. If any of these features are enabled without guest
side implementation, the behavior of the SNP guest will be undefined.
The SNP guest boot may fail in a non-obvious way making it difficult
to debug.
Instead of allowing the guest to continue and have it fail randomly
later, detect this early and fail gracefully.
SEV_STATUS MSR indicates features which the hypervisor has enabled.
While booting, SNP guests should ascertain that all the enabled
features have guest side implementation. In case any feature is not
implemented in the guest, the guest terminates booting with GHCB
protocol Non-Automatic Exit(NAE) termination request event[1]. Populate
SW_EXITINFO2 with mask of unsupported features that the hypervisor
can easily report to the user.
More details in AMD64 APM[2] Vol 2: 15.34.10 SEV_STATUS MSR
[1] https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf
4.1.13 Termination Request
[2] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/40332_4.05.pdf
Fixes: cbd3d4f7c4e5 ("x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support")
CC: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
CC: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
CC: Michael Roth <[email protected]>
CC: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <[email protected]>
---
Changes:
v3:
* Use GHCB protocol NAE termination event SEV-SNP feature(s)
not supported along with SW_EXITINFO2 containing mask of the
unsupported features. Need handling of this event on the HV.
* Add the SNP features check initialize_identity_maps() when the
boot GHCB page can be initialized and used.
* Fixed sphinx warnings in documentation
v2:
* Updated Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
* Address review feedback from Boris/Tom
v1:
* Dropped _ENABLED from the feature bits
* Use approprate macro/function names and move closer to the function where
it is used.
* More details added to the commit message and comments
* Fixed compilation issue
---
Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 36 +++++++++++++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 10 ++++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 2 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 20 +++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 10 ++++
7 files changed, 138 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
index a1940ebe7be5..b3adc39d7735 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -95,3 +95,39 @@ by supplying mem_encrypt=on on the kernel command line. However, if BIOS does
not enable SME, then Linux will not be able to activate memory encryption, even
if configured to do so by default or the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter
is specified.
+
+Secure Nested Paging (SNP)
+==========================
+
+SEV-SNP introduces new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63]) which can be enabled
+by the hypervisor for security enhancements. Some of these features need
+guest side implementation to function correctly. The below table lists the
+expected guest behavior with various possible scenarios of guest/hypervisor
+SNP feature support.
+
++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
+| Feature Enabled | Guest needs | Guest has | Guest boot |
+| by the HV | implementation| implementation| behaviour |
++=================+===============+===============+==================+
+| No | No | No | Boot |
+| | | | |
++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
+| No | Yes | No | Boot |
+| | | | |
++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
+| No | Yes | Yes | Boot |
+| | | | |
++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
+| Yes | No | No | Boot with |
+| | | | feature enabled |
++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
+| Yes | Yes | No | Graceful boot |
+| | | | failure |
++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
+| Yes | Yes | Yes | Boot with |
+| | | | feature enabled |
++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
+
+More details in AMD64 APM[1] Vol 2: 15.34.10 SEV_STATUS MSR
+
+[1] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/40332_4.05.pdf
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
index a75712991df3..22037443e958 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
@@ -557,6 +557,16 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lrelocated)
/* Pass boot_params to initialize_identity_maps() */
movq (%rsp), %rdi
call initialize_identity_maps
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ /*
+ * Now that the required page table and mappings are done, early boot ghcb
+ * page can be setup and used. Check for SNP guest/HV feature compatibility
+ * and terminate the guest providing exit information in boot ghcb.
+ */
+ call snp_check_features
+#endif
+
popq %rsi
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
index 62208ec04ca4..0bc3639be1f8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ static inline void console_init(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
+void snp_check_features(void);
void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void);
extern bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address);
void snp_set_page_private(unsigned long paddr);
@@ -143,6 +144,7 @@ static inline void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
if (bp)
bp->cc_blob_address = 0;
}
+static void snp_check_features(void) { }
static inline void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void) { }
static inline bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
index c93930d5ccbd..a26a5d6949c3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
@@ -270,6 +270,65 @@ static void enforce_vmpl0(void)
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0);
}
+/*
+ * SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ is the mask of SNP features that will need
+ * guest side implementation for proper functioning of the guest. If any
+ * of these features are enabled in the hypervisor but are lacking guest
+ * side implementation, the behavior of the guest will be undefined. The
+ * guest could fail in non-obvious way making it difficult to debug.
+ *
+ * As the behavior of reserved feature bits is unknown to be on the
+ * safe side add them to the required features mask.
+ */
+#define SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ (MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_REFLECT_VC | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESTRICTED_INJ | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_ALT_INJ | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMPL_SSS | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMGEXIT_PARAM | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROTECTION | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK)
+
+/*
+ * SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT is the mask of SNP features that are implemented
+ * by the guest kernel. As and when a new feature is implemented in the
+ * guest kernel, a corresponding bit should be added to the mask.
+ */
+#define SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT (0)
+
+void snp_check_features(void)
+{
+ u64 unsupported_features;
+
+ if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Terminate the boot if hypervisor has enabled any feature
+ * lacking guest side implementation.
+ */
+ unsupported_features = sev_status & SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ & ~SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT;
+ if (unsupported_features) {
+ u64 exit_info_1 = SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON(SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON_SET,
+ SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_SNP_FEAT_UNSUPPORTED);
+
+ if (!boot_ghcb && !early_setup_ghcb())
+ sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_FEAT_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(boot_ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(boot_ghcb, exit_info_1);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(boot_ghcb, unsupported_features);
+ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(boot_ghcb));
+ VMGEXIT();
+ while (true)
+ asm volatile("hlt\n" : : : "memory");
+ }
+}
+
void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
{
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 37ff47552bcb..d3fe82c5d6b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -566,6 +566,26 @@
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT)
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT)
+/* SNP feature bits enabled by the hypervisor */
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM BIT_ULL(3)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_REFLECT_VC BIT_ULL(4)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESTRICTED_INJ BIT_ULL(5)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_ALT_INJ BIT_ULL(6)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP BIT_ULL(7)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_PREVENT_HOST_IBS BIT_ULL(8)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_BTB_ISOLATION BIT_ULL(9)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMPL_SSS BIT_ULL(10)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC BIT_ULL(11)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMGEXIT_PARAM BIT_ULL(12)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBS_VIRT BIT_ULL(14)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROTECTION BIT_ULL(16)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROTECTION BIT_ULL(17)
+
+/* SNP feature bits reserved for future use. */
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 BIT_ULL(13)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 BIT_ULL(15)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, 18)
+
#define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL 0xc001011f
/* AMD Collaborative Processor Performance Control MSRs */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
index b8357d6ecd47..db60cbb01b31 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ struct snp_psc_desc {
#define GHCB_SEV_ES_GEN_REQ 0
#define GHCB_SEV_ES_PROT_UNSUPPORTED 1
#define GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED 2
+#define GHCB_SNP_FEAT_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 3
/* Linux-specific reason codes (used with reason set 1) */
#define SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX 1
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
index f69c168391aa..5bd81adfb114 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
@@ -116,6 +116,16 @@
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE 1
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY 2
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES 0x8000fffd
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST 0x8000fffe
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON_SET 0
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_GENERAL 0
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_SEVES 1
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_SNP_FEAT_UNSUPPORTED 2
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON(reason_set, reason_code) \
+ /* SW_EXITINFO1[3:0] */ \
+ (((((u64)reason_set) & 0xf)) | \
+ /* SW_EXITINFO1[11:4] */ \
+ ((((u64)reason_code) & 0xff) << 4))
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT 0x8000ffff
/* Exit code reserved for hypervisor/software use */
--
2.32.0
On 1/11/23 00:45, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
> The hypervisor can enable various new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63])
> and start the SNP guest. Some of these features need guest side
> implementation. If any of these features are enabled without guest
> side implementation, the behavior of the SNP guest will be undefined.
> The SNP guest boot may fail in a non-obvious way making it difficult
> to debug.
>
> Instead of allowing the guest to continue and have it fail randomly
> later, detect this early and fail gracefully.
>
> SEV_STATUS MSR indicates features which the hypervisor has enabled.
> While booting, SNP guests should ascertain that all the enabled
> features have guest side implementation. In case any feature is not
> implemented in the guest, the guest terminates booting with GHCB
> protocol Non-Automatic Exit(NAE) termination request event[1]. Populate
> SW_EXITINFO2 with mask of unsupported features that the hypervisor
> can easily report to the user.
>
> More details in AMD64 APM[2] Vol 2: 15.34.10 SEV_STATUS MSR
>
> [1] https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf
> 4.1.13 Termination Request
>
> [2] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/40332_4.05.pdf
>
> Fixes: cbd3d4f7c4e5 ("x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support")
> CC: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
> CC: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
> CC: Michael Roth <[email protected]>
> CC: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
> CC: <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <[email protected]>
>
> ---
>
> Changes:
> v3:
> * Use GHCB protocol NAE termination event SEV-SNP feature(s)
> not supported along with SW_EXITINFO2 containing mask of the
> unsupported features. Need handling of this event on the HV.
> * Add the SNP features check initialize_identity_maps() when the
> boot GHCB page can be initialized and used.
> * Fixed sphinx warnings in documentation
>
> v2:
> * Updated Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> * Address review feedback from Boris/Tom
>
> v1:
> * Dropped _ENABLED from the feature bits
> * Use approprate macro/function names and move closer to the function where
> it is used.
> * More details added to the commit message and comments
> * Fixed compilation issue
> ---
> Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 36 +++++++++++++
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 10 ++++
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 2 +
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 20 +++++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 10 ++++
> 7 files changed, 138 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> index a1940ebe7be5..b3adc39d7735 100644
> --- a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> @@ -95,3 +95,39 @@ by supplying mem_encrypt=on on the kernel command line. However, if BIOS does
> not enable SME, then Linux will not be able to activate memory encryption, even
> if configured to do so by default or the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter
> is specified.
> +
> +Secure Nested Paging (SNP)
> +==========================
> +
> +SEV-SNP introduces new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63]) which can be enabled
> +by the hypervisor for security enhancements. Some of these features need
> +guest side implementation to function correctly. The below table lists the
> +expected guest behavior with various possible scenarios of guest/hypervisor
> +SNP feature support.
> +
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +| Feature Enabled | Guest needs | Guest has | Guest boot |
> +| by the HV | implementation| implementation| behaviour |
> ++=================+===============+===============+==================+
> +| No | No | No | Boot |
> +| | | | |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +| No | Yes | No | Boot |
> +| | | | |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +| No | Yes | Yes | Boot |
> +| | | | |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +| Yes | No | No | Boot with |
> +| | | | feature enabled |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +| Yes | Yes | No | Graceful boot |
> +| | | | failure |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +| Yes | Yes | Yes | Boot with |
> +| | | | feature enabled |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +
> +More details in AMD64 APM[1] Vol 2: 15.34.10 SEV_STATUS MSR
> +
> +[1] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/40332_4.05.pdf
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> index a75712991df3..22037443e958 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> @@ -557,6 +557,16 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lrelocated)
> /* Pass boot_params to initialize_identity_maps() */
> movq (%rsp), %rdi
> call initialize_identity_maps
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> + /*
> + * Now that the required page table and mappings are done, early boot ghcb
> + * page can be setup and used. Check for SNP guest/HV feature compatibility
> + * and terminate the guest providing exit information in boot ghcb.
> + */
How about a more concise comment...
/*
* Now that the required page table mappings are established and a
* GHCB can be used, check for SNP guest/HV feature compatibility.
*/
> + call snp_check_features
> +#endif
> +
> popq %rsi
>
> /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
> index 62208ec04ca4..0bc3639be1f8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
> @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ static inline void console_init(void)
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
> +void snp_check_features(void);
> void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void);
> extern bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address);
> void snp_set_page_private(unsigned long paddr);
> @@ -143,6 +144,7 @@ static inline void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
> if (bp)
> bp->cc_blob_address = 0;
> }
> +static void snp_check_features(void) { }
Unneeded since you're wrapping the call in a #ifdef check.
> static inline void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void) { }
> static inline bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
> {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> index c93930d5ccbd..a26a5d6949c3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> @@ -270,6 +270,65 @@ static void enforce_vmpl0(void)
> sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0);
> }
>
> +/*
> + * SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ is the mask of SNP features that will need
> + * guest side implementation for proper functioning of the guest. If any
> + * of these features are enabled in the hypervisor but are lacking guest
> + * side implementation, the behavior of the guest will be undefined. The
> + * guest could fail in non-obvious way making it difficult to debug.
> + *
> + * As the behavior of reserved feature bits is unknown to be on the
> + * safe side add them to the required features mask.
> + */
> +#define SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ (MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM | \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_REFLECT_VC | \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESTRICTED_INJ | \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_ALT_INJ | \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP | \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMPL_SSS | \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC | \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMGEXIT_PARAM | \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROTECTION | \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 | \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 | \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK)
Should these be indented one extra space to line up with MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM?
> +
> +/*
> + * SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT is the mask of SNP features that are implemented
> + * by the guest kernel. As and when a new feature is implemented in the
> + * guest kernel, a corresponding bit should be added to the mask.
> + */
> +#define SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT (0)
> +
> +void snp_check_features(void)
> +{
> + u64 unsupported_features;
> +
> + if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
> + return;
> +
> + /*
> + * Terminate the boot if hypervisor has enabled any feature
> + * lacking guest side implementation.
> + */
> + unsupported_features = sev_status & SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ & ~SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT;
> + if (unsupported_features) {
> + u64 exit_info_1 = SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON(SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON_SET,
This should be SEV_TERM_SET_GEN (or see below).
> + SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_SNP_FEAT_UNSUPPORTED);
> +
> + if (!boot_ghcb && !early_setup_ghcb())
> + sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_FEAT_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
> +
You need to call vc_ghcb_invalidate() before doing any ghcb_set*() calls.
> + ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(boot_ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST);
> + ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(boot_ghcb, exit_info_1);
> + ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(boot_ghcb, unsupported_features);
Add a blank line here.
> + sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(boot_ghcb));
> + VMGEXIT();
Add a blank line here.
> + while (true)
> + asm volatile("hlt\n" : : : "memory");
> + }
> +}
> +
> void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
> {
> unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> index 37ff47552bcb..d3fe82c5d6b6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -566,6 +566,26 @@
> #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT)
> #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT)
>
> +/* SNP feature bits enabled by the hypervisor */
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM BIT_ULL(3)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_REFLECT_VC BIT_ULL(4)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESTRICTED_INJ BIT_ULL(5)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_ALT_INJ BIT_ULL(6)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP BIT_ULL(7)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_PREVENT_HOST_IBS BIT_ULL(8)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_BTB_ISOLATION BIT_ULL(9)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMPL_SSS BIT_ULL(10)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC BIT_ULL(11)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMGEXIT_PARAM BIT_ULL(12)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBS_VIRT BIT_ULL(14)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROTECTION BIT_ULL(16)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROTECTION BIT_ULL(17)
> +
> +/* SNP feature bits reserved for future use. */
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 BIT_ULL(13)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 BIT_ULL(15)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, 18)
> +
> #define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL 0xc001011f
>
> /* AMD Collaborative Processor Performance Control MSRs */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
> index b8357d6ecd47..db60cbb01b31 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
> @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ struct snp_psc_desc {
> #define GHCB_SEV_ES_GEN_REQ 0
> #define GHCB_SEV_ES_PROT_UNSUPPORTED 1
> #define GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED 2
> +#define GHCB_SNP_FEAT_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 3
No, you can't create a new value to the SEV_TERM_SET_GEN without modifying
the GHCB spec. So please use GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED if using the
SEV_TERM_SET_GEN set or else add a new value to be used with the
SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX set.
>
> /* Linux-specific reason codes (used with reason set 1) */
> #define SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX 1
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
> index f69c168391aa..5bd81adfb114 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
> @@ -116,6 +116,16 @@
> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE 1
> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY 2
> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES 0x8000fffd
> +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST 0x8000fffe
> +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON_SET 0
> +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_GENERAL 0
> +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_SEVES 1
> +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_SNP_FEAT_UNSUPPORTED 2
This NAE event uses the same reason code set information as the MSR
protocol, so the above 4 definitions are not needed or the definitions in
sev-common.h should be redefined to use these defines, e.g.:
#define SEV_TERM_SET_GEN SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON_SET
#define GHCB_SEV_ES_GEN_REQ SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_GENERAL
...
Thanks,
Tom
> +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON(reason_set, reason_code) \
> + /* SW_EXITINFO1[3:0] */ \
> + (((((u64)reason_set) & 0xf)) | \
> + /* SW_EXITINFO1[11:4] */ \
> + ((((u64)reason_code) & 0xff) << 4))
> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT 0x8000ffff
>
> /* Exit code reserved for hypervisor/software use */
On 11/01/23 21:11, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 1/11/23 00:45, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
>> The hypervisor can enable various new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63])
>> and start the SNP guest. Some of these features need guest side
>> implementation. If any of these features are enabled without guest
>> side implementation, the behavior of the SNP guest will be undefined.
>> The SNP guest boot may fail in a non-obvious way making it difficult
>> to debug.
>>
>> Instead of allowing the guest to continue and have it fail randomly
>> later, detect this early and fail gracefully.
>>
>> SEV_STATUS MSR indicates features which the hypervisor has enabled.
>> While booting, SNP guests should ascertain that all the enabled
>> features have guest side implementation. In case any feature is not
>> implemented in the guest, the guest terminates booting with GHCB
>> protocol Non-Automatic Exit(NAE) termination request event[1]. Populate
>> SW_EXITINFO2 with mask of unsupported features that the hypervisor
>> can easily report to the user.
>>
>> More details in AMD64 APM[2] Vol 2: 15.34.10 SEV_STATUS MSR
>>
>> [1] https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf
>> 4.1.13 Termination Request
>>
>> [2] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/40332_4.05.pdf
>>
>> Fixes: cbd3d4f7c4e5 ("x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support")
>> CC: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
>> CC: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
>> CC: Michael Roth <[email protected]>
>> CC: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
>> CC: <[email protected]>
>> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <[email protected]>
>>
>> ---
>>
>> Changes:
>> v3:
>> * Use GHCB protocol NAE termination event SEV-SNP feature(s)
>> not supported along with SW_EXITINFO2 containing mask of the
>> unsupported features. Need handling of this event on the HV.
>> * Add the SNP features check initialize_identity_maps() when the
>> boot GHCB page can be initialized and used.
>> * Fixed sphinx warnings in documentation
>>
>> v2:
>> * Updated Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
>> * Address review feedback from Boris/Tom
>>
>> v1:
>> * Dropped _ENABLED from the feature bits
>> * Use approprate macro/function names and move closer to the function where
>> it is used.
>> * More details added to the commit message and comments
>> * Fixed compilation issue
>> ---
>> Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 36 +++++++++++++
>> arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 10 ++++
>> arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 2 +
>> arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++
>> arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 20 +++++++
>> arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h | 1 +
>> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 10 ++++
>> 7 files changed, 138 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
>> index a1940ebe7be5..b3adc39d7735 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
>> +++ b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
>> @@ -95,3 +95,39 @@ by supplying mem_encrypt=on on the kernel command line. However, if BIOS does
>> not enable SME, then Linux will not be able to activate memory encryption, even
>> if configured to do so by default or the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter
>> is specified.
>> +
>> +Secure Nested Paging (SNP)
>> +==========================
>> +
>> +SEV-SNP introduces new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63]) which can be enabled
>> +by the hypervisor for security enhancements. Some of these features need
>> +guest side implementation to function correctly. The below table lists the
>> +expected guest behavior with various possible scenarios of guest/hypervisor
>> +SNP feature support.
>> +
>> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
>> +| Feature Enabled | Guest needs | Guest has | Guest boot |
>> +| by the HV | implementation| implementation| behaviour |
>> ++=================+===============+===============+==================+
>> +| No | No | No | Boot |
>> +| | | | |
>> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
>> +| No | Yes | No | Boot |
>> +| | | | |
>> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
>> +| No | Yes | Yes | Boot |
>> +| | | | |
>> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
>> +| Yes | No | No | Boot with |
>> +| | | | feature enabled |
>> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
>> +| Yes | Yes | No | Graceful boot |
>> +| | | | failure |
>> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
>> +| Yes | Yes | Yes | Boot with |
>> +| | | | feature enabled |
>> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
>> +
>> +More details in AMD64 APM[1] Vol 2: 15.34.10 SEV_STATUS MSR
>> +
>> +[1] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/40332_4.05.pdf
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
>> index a75712991df3..22037443e958 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
>> @@ -557,6 +557,16 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lrelocated)
>> /* Pass boot_params to initialize_identity_maps() */
>> movq (%rsp), %rdi
>> call initialize_identity_maps
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>> + /*
>> + * Now that the required page table and mappings are done, early boot ghcb
>> + * page can be setup and used. Check for SNP guest/HV feature compatibility
>> + * and terminate the guest providing exit information in boot ghcb.
>> + */
>
> How about a more concise comment...>
> /*
> * Now that the required page table mappings are established and a
> * GHCB can be used, check for SNP guest/HV feature compatibility.
> */
Yes, better.
>> + call snp_check_features
>> +#endif
>> +
>> popq %rsi
>> /*
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
>> index 62208ec04ca4..0bc3639be1f8 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
>> @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ static inline void console_init(void)
>> #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>> void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
>> +void snp_check_features(void);
>> void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void);
>> extern bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address);
>> void snp_set_page_private(unsigned long paddr);
>> @@ -143,6 +144,7 @@ static inline void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>> if (bp)
>> bp->cc_blob_address = 0;
>> }
>> +static void snp_check_features(void) { }
>
> Unneeded since you're wrapping the call in a #ifdef check.
Will drop it.
>
>> static inline void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void) { }
>> static inline bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
>> {
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
>> index c93930d5ccbd..a26a5d6949c3 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
>> @@ -270,6 +270,65 @@ static void enforce_vmpl0(void)
>> sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0);
>> }
>> +/*
>> + * SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ is the mask of SNP features that will need
>> + * guest side implementation for proper functioning of the guest. If any
>> + * of these features are enabled in the hypervisor but are lacking guest
>> + * side implementation, the behavior of the guest will be undefined. The
>> + * guest could fail in non-obvious way making it difficult to debug.
>> + *
>> + * As the behavior of reserved feature bits is unknown to be on the
>> + * safe side add them to the required features mask.
>> + */
>> +#define SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ (MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM | \
>> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_REFLECT_VC | \
>> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESTRICTED_INJ | \
>> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_ALT_INJ | \
>> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP | \
>> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMPL_SSS | \
>> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC | \
>> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMGEXIT_PARAM | \
>> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROTECTION | \
>> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 | \
>> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 | \
>> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK)
>
> Should these be indented one extra space to line up with MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM?
Boris in his comment on v2 had it indented till tab, I had used same intendation.
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT is the mask of SNP features that are implemented
>> + * by the guest kernel. As and when a new feature is implemented in the
>> + * guest kernel, a corresponding bit should be added to the mask.
>> + */
>> +#define SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT (0)
>> +
>> +void snp_check_features(void)
>> +{
>> + u64 unsupported_features;
>> +
>> + if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
>> + return;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Terminate the boot if hypervisor has enabled any feature
>> + * lacking guest side implementation.
>> + */
>> + unsupported_features = sev_status & SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ & ~SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT;
>> + if (unsupported_features) {
>> + u64 exit_info_1 = SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON(SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON_SET,
>
> This should be SEV_TERM_SET_GEN (or see below).
Yes, will use reason set as SEV_TERM_SET_GEN and reason code as GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED.
>
>> + SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_SNP_FEAT_UNSUPPORTED);
>> +
>> + if (!boot_ghcb && !early_setup_ghcb())
>> + sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_FEAT_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
>> +
>
> You need to call vc_ghcb_invalidate() before doing any ghcb_set*() calls.
Ack.
>
>> + ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(boot_ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST);
>> + ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(boot_ghcb, exit_info_1);
>> + ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(boot_ghcb, unsupported_features);
>
> Add a blank line here.
Ok
>
>> + sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(boot_ghcb));
>> + VMGEXIT();
>
> Add a blank line here.
>
Ok
>> + while (true)
>> + asm volatile("hlt\n" : : : "memory");
>> + }
>> +}
>> +
>> void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>> {
>> unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> index 37ff47552bcb..d3fe82c5d6b6 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> @@ -566,6 +566,26 @@
>> #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT)
>> #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT)
>> +/* SNP feature bits enabled by the hypervisor */
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM BIT_ULL(3)
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_REFLECT_VC BIT_ULL(4)
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESTRICTED_INJ BIT_ULL(5)
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_ALT_INJ BIT_ULL(6)
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP BIT_ULL(7)
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_PREVENT_HOST_IBS BIT_ULL(8)
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_BTB_ISOLATION BIT_ULL(9)
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMPL_SSS BIT_ULL(10)
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC BIT_ULL(11)
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMGEXIT_PARAM BIT_ULL(12)
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBS_VIRT BIT_ULL(14)
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROTECTION BIT_ULL(16)
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROTECTION BIT_ULL(17)
>> +
>> +/* SNP feature bits reserved for future use. */
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 BIT_ULL(13)
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 BIT_ULL(15)
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, 18)
>> +
>> #define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL 0xc001011f
>> /* AMD Collaborative Processor Performance Control MSRs */
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
>> index b8357d6ecd47..db60cbb01b31 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
>> @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ struct snp_psc_desc {
>> #define GHCB_SEV_ES_GEN_REQ 0
>> #define GHCB_SEV_ES_PROT_UNSUPPORTED 1
>> #define GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED 2
>> +#define GHCB_SNP_FEAT_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 3
>
> No, you can't create a new value to the SEV_TERM_SET_GEN without modifying the GHCB spec. So please use GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED if using the SEV_TERM_SET_GEN set or else add a new value to be used with the SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX set.
Agree, this anyways is not used now.
>
>> /* Linux-specific reason codes (used with reason set 1) */
>> #define SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX 1
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
>> index f69c168391aa..5bd81adfb114 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
>> @@ -116,6 +116,16 @@
>> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE 1
>> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY 2
>> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES 0x8000fffd
>> +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST 0x8000fffe
>> +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON_SET 0
>> +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_GENERAL 0
>> +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_SEVES 1
>> +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_SNP_FEAT_UNSUPPORTED 2
>
> This NAE event uses the same reason code set information as the MSR protocol, so the above 4 definitions are not needed or the definitions in sev-common.h should be redefined to use these defines, e.g.:
>
> #define SEV_TERM_SET_GEN SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON_SET
> #define GHCB_SEV_ES_GEN_REQ SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_GENERAL
> ...
Will use the defines from sev-common.h
Regards
Nikunj