There is a potential race condition in hci_cmd_sync_work and
hci_cmd_sync_clear, and could lead to use-after-free. For instance,
hci_cmd_sync_work is added to the 'req_workqueue' after cancel_work_sync
The entry of 'cmd_sync_work_list' may be freed in hci_cmd_sync_clear, and
causing kernel panic when it is used in 'hci_cmd_sync_work'.
Here's the call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5d3
? hci_cmd_sync_work+0x282/0x320
kasan_report+0xaa/0x120
? hci_cmd_sync_work+0x282/0x320
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x282/0x320
process_one_work+0x77b/0x11c0
? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8e/0xf0
worker_thread+0x544/0x1180
? poll_idle+0x1e0/0x1e0
kthread+0x285/0x320
? process_one_work+0x11c0/0x11c0
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x30/0x30
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 266:
kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
__kasan_kmalloc+0xae/0xe0
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x191/0x350
hci_cmd_sync_queue+0x97/0x2b0
hci_update_passive_scan+0x176/0x1d0
le_conn_complete_evt+0x1b5/0x1a00
hci_le_conn_complete_evt+0x234/0x340
hci_le_meta_evt+0x231/0x4e0
hci_event_packet+0x4c5/0xf00
hci_rx_work+0x37d/0x880
process_one_work+0x77b/0x11c0
worker_thread+0x544/0x1180
kthread+0x285/0x320
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Freed by task 269:
kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x40
kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x40
____kasan_slab_free+0x176/0x1c0
__kasan_slab_free+0x12/0x20
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x95/0x1a0
kfree+0xba/0x2f0
hci_cmd_sync_clear+0x14c/0x210
hci_unregister_dev+0xff/0x440
vhci_release+0x7b/0xf0
__fput+0x1f3/0x970
____fput+0xe/0x20
task_work_run+0xd4/0x160
do_exit+0x8b0/0x22a0
do_group_exit+0xba/0x2a0
get_signal+0x1e4a/0x25b0
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x93/0x1f80
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xf5/0x1a0
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x50
ret_from_fork+0x15/0x30
v2:
- Fixed code style issues
Signed-off-by: Min Li <[email protected]>
---
net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c
index 117eedb6f709..3103daf49d63 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c
@@ -643,6 +643,7 @@ void hci_cmd_sync_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev)
cancel_work_sync(&hdev->cmd_sync_work);
cancel_work_sync(&hdev->reenable_adv_work);
+ mutex_lock(&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &hdev->cmd_sync_work_list, list) {
if (entry->destroy)
entry->destroy(hdev, entry->data, -ECANCELED);
@@ -650,6 +651,7 @@ void hci_cmd_sync_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev)
list_del(&entry->list);
kfree(entry);
}
+ mutex_unlock(&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock);
}
void __hci_cmd_sync_cancel(struct hci_dev *hdev, int err)
--
2.25.1
Hello:
This patch was applied to bluetooth/bluetooth-next.git (master)
by Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>:
On Sat, 4 Mar 2023 21:50:35 +0800 you wrote:
> There is a potential race condition in hci_cmd_sync_work and
> hci_cmd_sync_clear, and could lead to use-after-free. For instance,
> hci_cmd_sync_work is added to the 'req_workqueue' after cancel_work_sync
> The entry of 'cmd_sync_work_list' may be freed in hci_cmd_sync_clear, and
> causing kernel panic when it is used in 'hci_cmd_sync_work'.
>
> Here's the call trace:
>
> [...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [v2,1/1] Bluetooth: fix race condition in hci_cmd_sync_clear
https://git.kernel.org/bluetooth/bluetooth-next/c/83ce39248d6d
You are awesome, thank you!
--
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