Adds an SMC call that will pass an OP-TEE binary image to EL3 and
instruct it to load it as the BL32 payload. This works in conjunction
with a feature added to Trusted Firmware for ARMv8 and above
architectures that supports this.
The main purpose of this change is to facilitate updating the OP-TEE
component on devices via a rootfs change rather than having to do a
firmware update. Further details are linked to in the Kconfig file.
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke <[email protected]>
---
Changes in v9:
- Add CPU hotplug callback to init on all cores at startup
Changes in v8:
- Renamed params and fixed alignment issue
Changes in v7:
- Added documentation to Documentation/staging/tee.rst
Changes in v6:
- Expanded Kconfig documentation
Changes in v5:
- Renamed config option
- Added runtime warning when config is used
Changes in v4:
- Update commit message
- Added more documentation
- Renamed config option, added ARM64 dependency
Changes in v3:
- Removed state tracking for driver reload
- Check UID of service to verify it needs image load
Changes in v2:
- Fixed compile issue when feature is disabled
- Addressed minor comments
- Added state tracking for driver reload
Documentation/staging/tee.rst | 41 +++++++++++
drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig | 17 +++++
drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h | 12 +++
drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 24 ++++++
drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 228 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/staging/tee.rst b/Documentation/staging/tee.rst
index 498343c7ab08..315aa8e35e6b 100644
--- a/Documentation/staging/tee.rst
+++ b/Documentation/staging/tee.rst
@@ -214,6 +214,47 @@ call is done from the thread assisting the interrupt handler. This is a
building block for OP-TEE OS in secure world to implement the top half and
bottom half style of device drivers.
+OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE Kconfig option
+----------------------------------------
+
+The OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE Kconfig option enables the ability to load the
+BL32 OP-TEE image from the kernel after the kernel boots, rather than loading
+it from the firmware before the kernel boots. This also requires enabling the
+corresponding option in Trusted Firmware for Arm. The documentation there
+explains the security threat associated with enabling this as well as
+mitigations at the firmware and platform level.
+https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/threat_model/threat_model.html
+
+There are additional attack vectors/mitigations for the kernel that should be
+addressed when using this option.
+
+1. Boot chain security.
+ Attack vector: Replace the OP-TEE OS image in the rootfs to gain control of
+ the system.
+ Migitation: There must be boot chain security that verifies the kernel and
+ rootfs, otherwise an attacker can modify the loaded OP-TEE
+ binary by modifying it in the rootfs.
+3. Alternate boot modes.
+ Attack vector: Using an alternate boot mode (i.e. recovery mode), the OP-TEE
+ driver isn't loaded, leaving the SMC hole open.
+ Mitigation: If there are alternate methods of booting the device, such as a
+ recovery mode, it should be ensured that the same mitigations are
+ applied in that mode.
+3. Attacks prior to SMC invocation.
+ Attack vector: Code that is executed prior to issuing the SMC call to load
+ OP-TEE can be exploited to then load an alternate OS image.
+ Mitigation: The OP-TEE driver must be loaded before any potential attack
+ vectors are opened up. This should include mounting of any
+ modifiable filesystems, opening of network ports or communicating
+ with external devices (e.g. USB).
+4. Blocking SMC call to load OP-TEE.
+ Attack vector: Prevent the driver from being probed, so the SMC call to load
+ OP-TEE isn't executed when desired, leaving it open to being
+ executed later and loading a modified OS.
+ Mitigation: It is recommended to build the OP-TEE driver as an included
+ driver rather than a module to prevent exploits that may cause
+ the module to not be loaded.
+
AMD-TEE driver
==============
diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig
index f121c224e682..70898bbd5809 100644
--- a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig
@@ -7,3 +7,20 @@ config OPTEE
help
This implements the OP-TEE Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
driver.
+
+config OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE
+ bool "Load OP-TEE image as firmware"
+ default n
+ depends on OPTEE && ARM64
+ help
+ This loads the BL32 image for OP-TEE as firmware when the driver is
+ probed. This returns -EPROBE_DEFER until the firmware is loadable from
+ the filesystem which is determined by checking the system_state until
+ it is in SYSTEM_RUNNING. This also requires enabling the corresponding
+ option in Trusted Firmware for Arm. The documentation there explains
+ the security threat associated with enabling this as well as
+ mitigations at the firmware and platform level.
+ https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/threat_model/threat_model.html
+
+ Additional documentation on kernel security risks are at
+ Documentation/staging/tee.rst.
diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h
index 70e9cc2ee96b..e8840a82b983 100644
--- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h
+++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h
@@ -241,11 +241,23 @@ struct optee_msg_arg {
* 384fb3e0-e7f8-11e3-af63-0002a5d5c51b.
* Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_UID_0, OPTEE_MSG_UID_1,
* OPTEE_MSG_UID_2, OPTEE_MSG_UID_3.
+ *
+ * In the case where the OP-TEE image is loaded by the kernel, this will
+ * initially return an alternate UID to reflect that we are communicating with
+ * the TF-A image loading service at that time instead of OP-TEE. That UID is:
+ * a3fbeab1-1246-315d-c7c4-06b9c03cbea4.
+ * Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0,
+ * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1, OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2,
+ * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3.
*/
#define OPTEE_MSG_UID_0 0x384fb3e0
#define OPTEE_MSG_UID_1 0xe7f811e3
#define OPTEE_MSG_UID_2 0xaf630002
#define OPTEE_MSG_UID_3 0xa5d5c51b
+#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 0xa3fbeab1
+#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 0x1246315d
+#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 0xc7c406b9
+#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3 0xc03cbea4
#define OPTEE_MSG_FUNCID_CALLS_UID 0xFF01
/*
diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h
index 73b5e7760d10..7d9fa426505b 100644
--- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h
+++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h
@@ -104,6 +104,30 @@ struct optee_smc_call_get_os_revision_result {
unsigned long reserved1;
};
+/*
+ * Load Trusted OS from optee/tee.bin in the Linux firmware.
+ *
+ * WARNING: Use this cautiously as it could lead to insecure loading of the
+ * Trusted OS.
+ * This SMC instructs EL3 to load a binary and execute it as the Trusted OS.
+ *
+ * Call register usage:
+ * a0 SMC Function ID, OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE
+ * a1 Upper 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload
+ * a2 Lower 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload
+ * a3 Upper 32bit of the physical address for the payload
+ * a4 Lower 32bit of the physical address for the payload
+ *
+ * The payload is in the OP-TEE image format.
+ *
+ * Returns result in a0, 0 on success and an error code otherwise.
+ */
+#define OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE 2
+#define OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE \
+ ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \
+ ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_TRUSTED_OS_END, \
+ OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE)
+
/*
* Call with struct optee_msg_arg as argument
*
diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c
index a1c1fa1a9c28..fcbcd0c0c3aa 100644
--- a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c
+++ b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c
@@ -7,10 +7,13 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
+#include <linux/cpuhotplug.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/firmware.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/irqdomain.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/of.h>
@@ -1149,6 +1152,22 @@ static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn)
return false;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE
+static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn)
+{
+ struct arm_smccc_res res;
+
+ invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALLS_UID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res);
+
+ if (res.a0 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 &&
+ res.a1 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 &&
+ res.a2 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 &&
+ res.a3 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3)
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
+
static void optee_msg_get_os_revision(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn)
{
union {
@@ -1354,6 +1373,117 @@ static void optee_shutdown(struct platform_device *pdev)
optee_disable_shm_cache(optee);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE
+
+#define OPTEE_FW_IMAGE "optee/tee.bin"
+
+static optee_invoke_fn *cpuhp_invoke_fn;
+
+static int optee_cpuhp_probe(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * Invoking a call on a CPU will cause OP-TEE to perform the required
+ * setup for that CPU. Just invoke the call to get the UID since that
+ * has no side effects.
+ */
+ if (optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(cpuhp_invoke_fn))
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *pdev,
+ optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn)
+{
+ const struct firmware *fw = NULL;
+ struct arm_smccc_res res;
+ phys_addr_t data_pa;
+ u8 *data_buf = NULL;
+ u64 data_size;
+ u32 data_pa_high, data_pa_low;
+ u32 data_size_high, data_size_low;
+ int rc;
+ int hp_state;
+
+ if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(invoke_fn))
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = request_firmware(&fw, OPTEE_FW_IMAGE, &pdev->dev);
+ if (rc) {
+ /*
+ * The firmware in the rootfs will not be accessible until we
+ * are in the SYSTEM_RUNNING state, so return EPROBE_DEFER until
+ * that point.
+ */
+ if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING)
+ return -EPROBE_DEFER;
+ goto fw_err;
+ }
+
+ data_size = fw->size;
+ /*
+ * This uses the GFP_DMA flag to ensure we are allocated memory in the
+ * 32-bit space since TF-A cannot map memory beyond the 32-bit boundary.
+ */
+ data_buf = kmalloc(fw->size, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
+ if (!data_buf) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto fw_err;
+ }
+ memcpy(data_buf, fw->data, fw->size);
+ data_pa = virt_to_phys(data_buf);
+ reg_pair_from_64(&data_pa_high, &data_pa_low, data_pa);
+ reg_pair_from_64(&data_size_high, &data_size_low, data_size);
+ goto fw_load;
+
+fw_err:
+ pr_warn("image loading failed\n");
+ data_pa_high = data_pa_low = data_size_high = data_size_low = 0;
+
+fw_load:
+ /*
+ * Always invoke the SMC, even if loading the image fails, to indicate
+ * to EL3 that we have passed the point where it should allow invoking
+ * this SMC.
+ */
+ pr_warn("OP-TEE image loaded from kernel, this can be insecure");
+ invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE, data_size_high, data_size_low,
+ data_pa_high, data_pa_low, 0, 0, 0, &res);
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = res.a0;
+ if (fw)
+ release_firmware(fw);
+ kfree(data_buf);
+
+ if (!rc) {
+ /*
+ * We need to initialize OP-TEE on all other running cores as
+ * well. Any cores that aren't running yet will get initialized
+ * when they are brought up by the power management functions in
+ * TF-A which are registered by the OP-TEE SPD. Due to that we
+ * can un-register the callback right after registering it.
+ */
+ cpuhp_invoke_fn = invoke_fn;
+ hp_state = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "optee:probe",
+ optee_cpuhp_probe, NULL);
+ if (hp_state < 0) {
+ pr_warn("Failed with CPU hotplug setup for OP-TEE");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ cpuhp_remove_state(hp_state);
+ cpuhp_invoke_fn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+#else
+static inline int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *pdev,
+ optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn;
@@ -1372,6 +1502,10 @@ static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
if (IS_ERR(invoke_fn))
return PTR_ERR(invoke_fn);
+ rc = optee_load_fw(pdev, invoke_fn);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(invoke_fn)) {
pr_warn("api uid mismatch\n");
return -EINVAL;
--
2.40.0.rc1.284.g88254d51c5-goog
Hi Jeffrey,
Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on linus/master]
[also build test WARNING on v6.3-rc2 next-20230315]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Jeffrey-Kardatzke/tee-optee-Add-SMC-for-loading-OP-TEE-image/20230315-045847
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230314135704.v9.1.I8e7f9b01d9ac940507d78e15368e200a6a69bedb%40changeid
patch subject: [PATCH v9] tee: optee: Add SMC for loading OP-TEE image
reproduce:
# https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/cab42c7807bc48ef664573253d3f37c6bf7c1d08
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Jeffrey-Kardatzke/tee-optee-Add-SMC-for-loading-OP-TEE-image/20230315-045847
git checkout cab42c7807bc48ef664573253d3f37c6bf7c1d08
make menuconfig
# enable CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST, CONFIG_WARN_MISSING_DOCUMENTS, CONFIG_WARN_ABI_ERRORS
make htmldocs
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag where applicable
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
| Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> Documentation/staging/tee.rst:233: WARNING: Unexpected indentation.
>> Documentation/staging/tee.rst:234: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent.
>> Documentation/staging/tee.rst:237: WARNING: Enumerated list ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent.
vim +233 Documentation/staging/tee.rst
230
231 1. Boot chain security.
232 Attack vector: Replace the OP-TEE OS image in the rootfs to gain control of
> 233 the system.
> 234 Migitation: There must be boot chain security that verifies the kernel and
235 rootfs, otherwise an attacker can modify the loaded OP-TEE
236 binary by modifying it in the rootfs.
> 237 3. Alternate boot modes.
238 Attack vector: Using an alternate boot mode (i.e. recovery mode), the OP-TEE
239 driver isn't loaded, leaving the SMC hole open.
240 Mitigation: If there are alternate methods of booting the device, such as a
241 recovery mode, it should be ensured that the same mitigations are
242 applied in that mode.
243 3. Attacks prior to SMC invocation.
244 Attack vector: Code that is executed prior to issuing the SMC call to load
245 OP-TEE can be exploited to then load an alternate OS image.
246 Mitigation: The OP-TEE driver must be loaded before any potential attack
247 vectors are opened up. This should include mounting of any
248 modifiable filesystems, opening of network ports or communicating
249 with external devices (e.g. USB).
250 4. Blocking SMC call to load OP-TEE.
251 Attack vector: Prevent the driver from being probed, so the SMC call to load
252 OP-TEE isn't executed when desired, leaving it open to being
253 executed later and loading a modified OS.
254 Mitigation: It is recommended to build the OP-TEE driver as an included
255 driver rather than a module to prevent exploits that may cause
256 the module to not be loaded.
257
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests