Over the last few years we've seen many critical vulnerabilities in
io_uring[1] which could be exploited by an unprivileged process to gain
control over the kernel. This patch introduces a new sysctl which disables
the creation of new io_uring instances system-wide.
The goal of this patch is to give distros, system admins, and cloud
providers a way to reduce the risk of privilege escalation through io_uring
where disabling it with seccomp or at compile time is not practical. For
example a distro or cloud provider might want to disable io_uring by
default and have users enable it again if they need to run a program that
requires it. The new sysctl is designed to let a user with root on the
machine enable and disable io_uring systemwide at runtime without requiring
a kernel recompilation or a reboot.
[1] Link: https://goo.gle/limit-iouring
---
v2:
* Documentation style fixes
* Add a third level that only disables io_uring for unprivileged
processes
Matteo Rizzo (1):
Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 19 +++++++++++++
io_uring/io_uring.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
--
2.41.0.162.gfafddb0af9-goog