This change is used to relieve CVE-2020-26555. The description of
the CVE:
Bluetooth legacy BR/EDR PIN code pairing in Bluetooth Core Specification
1.0B through 5.2 may permit an unauthenticated nearby device to spoof
the BD_ADDR of the peer device to complete pairing without knowledge
of the PIN. [1]
The detail of this attack is in IEEE paper:
BlueMirror: Reflections on Bluetooth Pairing and Provisioning Protocols
[2]
It's a reflection attack. The paper mentioned that attacker can induce
the attacked target to generate null link key (zero key) without PIN
code. In BR/EDR, the key generation is actually handled in the controller
which is below HCI.
A condition of this attack is that attacker should change the
BR_ADDR of his hacking device (Host B) to equal to the BR_ADDR with
the target device being attacked (Host A).
Thus, we reject the connection with device which has same BD_ADDR
both on HCI_Create_Connection and HCI_Connection_Request to prevent
the attack. A similar implementation also shows in btstack project.
[3][4]
Link: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-26555 [1]
Link: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9474325/authors#authors [2]
Link: https://github.com/bluekitchen/btstack/blob/master/src/hci.c#L3523 [3]
Link: https://github.com/bluekitchen/btstack/blob/master/src/hci.c#L7297 [4]
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <[email protected]>
---
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 7 +++++++
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 8 ++++++++
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
index 056f9516e46d..583d2e18314e 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
@@ -1611,6 +1611,13 @@ struct hci_conn *hci_connect_acl(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst,
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
+ /* Reject outgoing connection to device with same BD ADDR against CVE-2020-26555 */
+ if (!bacmp(&hdev->bdaddr, dst))
+ {
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Reject connection to the device with same BD_ADDR %pMR\n", dst);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+ }
+
acl = hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(hdev, ACL_LINK, dst);
if (!acl) {
acl = hci_conn_add(hdev, ACL_LINK, dst, HCI_ROLE_MASTER);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index a20a94e85b1a..d66718190dc5 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -3268,6 +3268,14 @@ static void hci_conn_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "bdaddr %pMR type 0x%x", &ev->bdaddr, ev->link_type);
+ /* Reject incoming connection from device with same BD ADDR against CVE-2020-26555 */
+ if (!bacmp(&hdev->bdaddr, &ev->bdaddr))
+ {
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Reject connection from the device with same BD_ADDR %pMR\n", &ev->bdaddr);
+ hci_reject_conn(hdev, &ev->bdaddr);
+ return;
+ }
+
mask |= hci_proto_connect_ind(hdev, &ev->bdaddr, ev->link_type,
&flags);
--
2.35.3