In the current implementation, ctx->async_wait.completion is completed
after spin_lock_bh, which causes tls_sw_release_resources_tx to
continue executing and return to tls_sk_proto_cleanup, then return
to tls_sk_proto_close, and after that enter tls_sw_free_ctx_tx to kfree
the entire struct tls_sw_context_tx (including ctx->encrypt_compl_lock).
Since ctx->encrypt_compl_lock has been freed, subsequent spin_unlock_bh
will result in slab-use-after-free error. Due to SMP, even using
spin_lock_bh does not prevent tls_sw_release_resources_tx from continuing
on other CPUs. After tls_sw_release_resources_tx is woken up, there is no
attempt to hold ctx->encrypt_compl_lock again, therefore everything
described above is possible.
The fix is to put complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion) after
spin_unlock_bh, making the release after the unlock. Since complete is
only executed if pending is 0, which means this is the last record, there
is no need to worry about race condition causing duplicate completes.
Since tls_sw_release_resources_tx freed all un-sent records in the
ctx->tx_list, subsequent schedule transmission is meaningless, and
the entire struct tls_sw_context_tx has been freed (including
ctx->tx_bitmask and ctx->tx_work.work), continuing to execute
subsequent code will cause use-after-free, so return directly.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=29c22ea2d6b2c5fd2eae
Signed-off-by: Juntong Deng <[email protected]>
---
V1 -> V2: Fix possible use-after-free caused by test_and_set_bit
net/tls/tls_sw.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 270712b8d391..b21f5fecc84e 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -441,6 +441,7 @@ static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err)
struct sk_msg *msg_en;
bool ready = false;
struct sock *sk;
+ int async_notify;
int pending;
msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
@@ -482,10 +483,13 @@ static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err)
spin_lock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
pending = atomic_dec_return(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
+ async_notify = ctx->async_notify;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
- if (!pending && ctx->async_notify)
+ if (!pending && async_notify) {
complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
- spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
+ return;
+ }
if (!ready)
return;
--
2.39.2
On Wed, 18 Oct 2023 00:22:15 +0800 Juntong Deng wrote:
> In the current implementation, ctx->async_wait.completion is completed
> after spin_lock_bh, which causes tls_sw_release_resources_tx to
> continue executing and return to tls_sk_proto_cleanup, then return
> to tls_sk_proto_close, and after that enter tls_sw_free_ctx_tx to kfree
> the entire struct tls_sw_context_tx (including ctx->encrypt_compl_lock).
>
> Since ctx->encrypt_compl_lock has been freed, subsequent spin_unlock_bh
> will result in slab-use-after-free error. Due to SMP, even using
> spin_lock_bh does not prevent tls_sw_release_resources_tx from continuing
> on other CPUs. After tls_sw_release_resources_tx is woken up, there is no
> attempt to hold ctx->encrypt_compl_lock again, therefore everything
> described above is possible.
Whoever triggered the Tx should wait for all outstanding encryption
to finish before exiting sendmsg() (or alike). This looks like
a band-aid. Sabrina is working on fixes for the async code, lets
get those in first before attempting spot fixes.
--
pw-bot: cr