v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
v2 -> v3: Drop kmsan_memmove_metadata() and strlcpy() patches;
Remove kmsan_get_metadata() stub;
Move kmsan_enable_current() and kmsan_disable_current() to
include/linux/kmsan.h, explain why a counter is needed;
Drop the memset_no_sanitize_memory() patch;
Use __memset() in the SLAB_POISON patch;
Add kmsan-checks.h to the DFLTCC patch;
Add recursion check to the arch_kmsan_get_meta_or_null()
patch (Alexander P.).
Fix inline + __no_kmsan_checks issues.
New patch for s390/irqflags, that resolves a lockdep warning.
New patch for s390/diag, that resolves a false positive when
running on an LPAR.
New patch for STCCTM, same as above.
New patch for check_bytes_and_report() that resolves a false
positive that occurs even on Intel.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
v1 -> v2: Add comments, sort #includes, introduce
memset_no_sanitize_memory() and use it to avoid unpoisoning
of redzones, change vmalloc alignment to _REGION3_SIZE, add
R-bs (Alexander P.).
Fix building
[PATCH 28/33] s390/string: Add KMSAN support
with FORTIFY_SOURCE.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/
Hi,
This series provides the minimal support for Kernel Memory Sanitizer on
s390. Kernel Memory Sanitizer is clang-only instrumentation for finding
accesses to uninitialized memory. The clang support for s390 has already
been merged [1].
With this series, I can successfully boot s390 defconfig and
debug_defconfig with kmsan.panic=1. The tool found one real
s390-specific bug (fixed in master).
Best regards,
Ilya
[1] https://reviews.llvm.org/D148596
Ilya Leoshkevich (34):
ftrace: Unpoison ftrace_regs in ftrace_ops_list_func()
kmsan: Make the tests compatible with kmsan.panic=1
kmsan: Disable KMSAN when DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT is enabled
kmsan: Increase the maximum store size to 4096
kmsan: Fix is_bad_asm_addr() on arches with overlapping address spaces
kmsan: Fix kmsan_copy_to_user() on arches with overlapping address
spaces
kmsan: Remove a useless assignment from
kmsan_vmap_pages_range_noflush()
kmsan: Remove an x86-specific #include from kmsan.h
kmsan: Expose kmsan_get_metadata()
kmsan: Export panic_on_kmsan
kmsan: Allow disabling KMSAN checks for the current task
kmsan: Support SLAB_POISON
kmsan: Use ALIGN_DOWN() in kmsan_get_metadata()
mm: slub: Let KMSAN access metadata
mm: slub: Unpoison the memchr_inv() return value
mm: kfence: Disable KMSAN when checking the canary
lib/zlib: Unpoison DFLTCC output buffers
kmsan: Accept ranges starting with 0 on s390
s390: Turn off KMSAN for boot, vdso and purgatory
s390: Use a larger stack for KMSAN
s390/boot: Add the KMSAN runtime stub
s390/checksum: Add a KMSAN check
s390/cpacf: Unpoison the results of cpacf_trng()
s390/cpumf: Unpoison STCCTM output buffer
s390/diag: Unpoison diag224() output buffer
s390/ftrace: Unpoison ftrace_regs in kprobe_ftrace_handler()
s390/irqflags: Do not instrument arch_local_irq_*() with KMSAN
s390/mm: Define KMSAN metadata for vmalloc and modules
s390/string: Add KMSAN support
s390/traps: Unpoison the kernel_stack_overflow()'s pt_regs
s390/uaccess: Add KMSAN support to put_user() and get_user()
s390/unwind: Disable KMSAN checks
s390: Implement the architecture-specific kmsan functions
kmsan: Enable on s390
Documentation/dev-tools/kmsan.rst | 4 +-
arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/s390/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/s390/boot/Makefile | 3 +
arch/s390/boot/kmsan.c | 6 ++
arch/s390/boot/startup.c | 8 ++
arch/s390/boot/string.c | 16 ++++
arch/s390/include/asm/checksum.h | 2 +
arch/s390/include/asm/cpacf.h | 3 +
arch/s390/include/asm/cpu_mf.h | 6 ++
arch/s390/include/asm/irqflags.h | 18 ++++-
arch/s390/include/asm/kmsan.h | 43 +++++++++++
arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h | 10 +++
arch/s390/include/asm/string.h | 20 +++--
arch/s390/include/asm/thread_info.h | 2 +-
arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h | 111 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
arch/s390/kernel/diag.c | 2 +
arch/s390/kernel/ftrace.c | 2 +
arch/s390/kernel/traps.c | 6 ++
arch/s390/kernel/unwind_bc.c | 4 +
arch/s390/kernel/vdso32/Makefile | 3 +-
arch/s390/kernel/vdso64/Makefile | 3 +-
arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile | 2 +
drivers/s390/char/sclp.c | 2 +-
include/linux/kmsan.h | 33 +++++++++
include/linux/kmsan_types.h | 2 +-
kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 1 +
lib/zlib_dfltcc/dfltcc.h | 1 +
lib/zlib_dfltcc/dfltcc_util.h | 24 ++++++
mm/Kconfig | 1 +
mm/kfence/core.c | 11 ++-
mm/kmsan/core.c | 1 -
mm/kmsan/hooks.c | 23 ++++--
mm/kmsan/init.c | 5 +-
mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c | 11 +--
mm/kmsan/kmsan.h | 9 +--
mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c | 5 ++
mm/kmsan/report.c | 8 +-
mm/kmsan/shadow.c | 9 +--
mm/slub.c | 17 ++++-
40 files changed, 360 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/s390/boot/kmsan.c
create mode 100644 arch/s390/include/asm/kmsan.h
--
2.43.0
Building the kernel with CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG and CONFIG_KMSAN causes
KMSAN to complain about touching redzones in kfree().
Fix by extending the existing KASAN-related metadata_access_enable()
and metadata_access_disable() functions to KMSAN.
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
mm/slub.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index b111bc315e3f..2d29d368894c 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -700,10 +700,12 @@ static int disable_higher_order_debug;
static inline void metadata_access_enable(void)
{
kasan_disable_current();
+ kmsan_disable_current();
}
static inline void metadata_access_disable(void)
{
+ kmsan_enable_current();
kasan_enable_current();
}
--
2.43.0
The inline assembly block in s390's chsc() stores that much.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c b/mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c
index cc3907a9c33a..470b0b4afcc4 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c
@@ -110,11 +110,10 @@ void __msan_instrument_asm_store(void *addr, uintptr_t size)
ua_flags = user_access_save();
/*
- * Most of the accesses are below 32 bytes. The two exceptions so far
- * are clwb() (64 bytes) and FPU state (512 bytes).
- * It's unlikely that the assembly will touch more than 512 bytes.
+ * Most of the accesses are below 32 bytes. The exceptions so far are
+ * clwb() (64 bytes), FPU state (512 bytes) and chsc() (4096 bytes).
*/
- if (size > 512) {
+ if (size > 4096) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "assembly store size too big: %ld\n", size);
size = 8;
}
--
2.43.0
Comparing pointers with TASK_SIZE does not make sense when kernel and
userspace overlap. Assume that we are handling user memory access in
this case.
Reported-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
mm/kmsan/hooks.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
index 5d6e2dee5692..eafc45f937eb 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
@@ -267,7 +267,8 @@ void kmsan_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, size_t to_copy,
return;
ua_flags = user_access_save();
- if ((u64)to < TASK_SIZE) {
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE) ||
+ (u64)to < TASK_SIZE) {
/* This is a user memory access, check it. */
kmsan_internal_check_memory((void *)from, to_copy - left, to,
REASON_COPY_TO_USER);
--
2.43.0
KMSAN relies on memblock returning all available pages to it
(see kmsan_memblock_free_pages()). It partitions these pages into 3
categories: pages available to the buddy allocator, shadow pages and
origin pages. This partitioning is static.
If new pages appear after kmsan_init_runtime(), it is considered
an error. DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT causes this, so mark it as
incompatible with KMSAN.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
mm/Kconfig | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
index 57cd378c73d6..712bcf5f1d20 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -985,6 +985,7 @@ config DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT
depends on SPARSEMEM
depends on !NEED_PER_CPU_KM
depends on 64BIT
+ depends on !KMSAN
select PADATA
help
Ordinarily all struct pages are initialised during early boot in a
--
2.43.0
The value assigned to prot is immediately overwritten on the next line
with PAGE_KERNEL. The right hand side of the assignment has no
side-effects.
Fixes: b073d7f8aee4 ("mm: kmsan: maintain KMSAN metadata for page operations")
Suggested-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
mm/kmsan/shadow.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/shadow.c b/mm/kmsan/shadow.c
index b9d05aff313e..2d57408c78ae 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/shadow.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/shadow.c
@@ -243,7 +243,6 @@ int kmsan_vmap_pages_range_noflush(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
s_pages[i] = shadow_page_for(pages[i]);
o_pages[i] = origin_page_for(pages[i]);
}
- prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) | _PAGE_NX);
prot = PAGE_KERNEL;
origin_start = vmalloc_meta((void *)start, KMSAN_META_ORIGIN);
--
2.43.0
Even though the KMSAN warnings generated by memchr_inv() are suppressed
by metadata_access_enable(), its return value may still be poisoned.
The reason is that the last iteration of memchr_inv() returns
`*start != value ? start : NULL`, where *start is poisoned. Because of
this, somewhat counterintuitively, the shadow value computed by
visitSelectInst() is equal to `(uintptr_t)start`.
The intention behind guarding memchr_inv() behind
metadata_access_enable() is to touch poisoned metadata without
triggering KMSAN, so unpoison its return value.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
mm/slub.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 2d29d368894c..802702748925 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -1076,6 +1076,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab,
metadata_access_enable();
fault = memchr_inv(kasan_reset_tag(start), value, bytes);
metadata_access_disable();
+ kmsan_unpoison_memory(&fault, sizeof(fault));
if (!fault)
return 1;
@@ -1182,6 +1183,7 @@ static void slab_pad_check(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab)
metadata_access_enable();
fault = memchr_inv(kasan_reset_tag(pad), POISON_INUSE, remainder);
metadata_access_disable();
+ kmsan_unpoison_memory(&fault, sizeof(fault));
if (!fault)
return;
while (end > fault && end[-1] == POISON_INUSE)
--
2.43.0
All other sanitizers are disabled for these components as well.
While at it, add a comment to boot and purgatory.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/boot/Makefile | 2 ++
arch/s390/kernel/vdso32/Makefile | 3 ++-
arch/s390/kernel/vdso64/Makefile | 3 ++-
arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile | 2 ++
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/s390/boot/Makefile b/arch/s390/boot/Makefile
index c7c81e5f9218..fb10fcd21221 100644
--- a/arch/s390/boot/Makefile
+++ b/arch/s390/boot/Makefile
@@ -3,11 +3,13 @@
# Makefile for the linux s390-specific parts of the memory manager.
#
+# Tooling runtimes are unavailable and cannot be linked for early boot code
KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
GCOV_PROFILE := n
UBSAN_SANITIZE := n
KASAN_SANITIZE := n
KCSAN_SANITIZE := n
+KMSAN_SANITIZE := n
KBUILD_AFLAGS := $(KBUILD_AFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR)
KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(KBUILD_CFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR)
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/vdso32/Makefile b/arch/s390/kernel/vdso32/Makefile
index caec7db6f966..7cbec6b0b11f 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/vdso32/Makefile
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/vdso32/Makefile
@@ -32,11 +32,12 @@ obj-y += vdso32_wrapper.o
targets += vdso32.lds
CPPFLAGS_vdso32.lds += -P -C -U$(ARCH)
-# Disable gcov profiling, ubsan and kasan for VDSO code
+# Disable gcov profiling, ubsan, kasan and kmsan for VDSO code
GCOV_PROFILE := n
UBSAN_SANITIZE := n
KASAN_SANITIZE := n
KCSAN_SANITIZE := n
+KMSAN_SANITIZE := n
# Force dependency (incbin is bad)
$(obj)/vdso32_wrapper.o : $(obj)/vdso32.so
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/vdso64/Makefile b/arch/s390/kernel/vdso64/Makefile
index e3c9085f8fa7..6f3252712f64 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/vdso64/Makefile
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/vdso64/Makefile
@@ -36,11 +36,12 @@ obj-y += vdso64_wrapper.o
targets += vdso64.lds
CPPFLAGS_vdso64.lds += -P -C -U$(ARCH)
-# Disable gcov profiling, ubsan and kasan for VDSO code
+# Disable gcov profiling, ubsan, kasan and kmsan for VDSO code
GCOV_PROFILE := n
UBSAN_SANITIZE := n
KASAN_SANITIZE := n
KCSAN_SANITIZE := n
+KMSAN_SANITIZE := n
# Force dependency (incbin is bad)
$(obj)/vdso64_wrapper.o : $(obj)/vdso64.so
diff --git a/arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile
index 4e930f566878..4e421914e50f 100644
--- a/arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile
+++ b/arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile
@@ -15,11 +15,13 @@ CFLAGS_sha256.o := -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS -D__NO_FORTIFY
$(obj)/mem.o: $(srctree)/arch/s390/lib/mem.S FORCE
$(call if_changed_rule,as_o_S)
+# Tooling runtimes are unavailable and cannot be linked for purgatory code
KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
GCOV_PROFILE := n
UBSAN_SANITIZE := n
KASAN_SANITIZE := n
KCSAN_SANITIZE := n
+KMSAN_SANITIZE := n
KBUILD_CFLAGS := -fno-strict-aliasing -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-pointer-sign -Wno-sign-compare
--
2.43.0
The constraints of the DFLTCC inline assembly are not precise: they
do not communicate the size of the output buffers to the compiler, so
it cannot automatically instrument it.
Add the manual kmsan_unpoison_memory() calls for the output buffers.
The logic is the same as in [1].
[1] https://github.com/zlib-ng/zlib-ng/commit/1f5ddcc009ac3511e99fc88736a9e1a6381168c5
Reported-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
lib/zlib_dfltcc/dfltcc.h | 1 +
lib/zlib_dfltcc/dfltcc_util.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/zlib_dfltcc/dfltcc.h b/lib/zlib_dfltcc/dfltcc.h
index b96232bdd44d..0f2a16d7a48a 100644
--- a/lib/zlib_dfltcc/dfltcc.h
+++ b/lib/zlib_dfltcc/dfltcc.h
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ struct dfltcc_param_v0 {
uint8_t csb[1152];
};
+static_assert(offsetof(struct dfltcc_param_v0, csb) == 384);
static_assert(sizeof(struct dfltcc_param_v0) == 1536);
#define CVT_CRC32 0
diff --git a/lib/zlib_dfltcc/dfltcc_util.h b/lib/zlib_dfltcc/dfltcc_util.h
index 4a46b5009f0d..e481c6ea09b5 100644
--- a/lib/zlib_dfltcc/dfltcc_util.h
+++ b/lib/zlib_dfltcc/dfltcc_util.h
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
#ifndef DFLTCC_UTIL_H
#define DFLTCC_UTIL_H
+#include "dfltcc.h"
+#include <linux/kmsan-checks.h>
#include <linux/zutil.h>
/*
@@ -20,6 +22,7 @@ typedef enum {
#define DFLTCC_CMPR 2
#define DFLTCC_XPND 4
#define HBT_CIRCULAR (1 << 7)
+#define DFLTCC_FN_MASK ((1 << 7) - 1)
#define HB_BITS 15
#define HB_SIZE (1 << HB_BITS)
@@ -34,6 +37,7 @@ static inline dfltcc_cc dfltcc(
)
{
Byte *t2 = op1 ? *op1 : NULL;
+ unsigned char *orig_t2 = t2;
size_t t3 = len1 ? *len1 : 0;
const Byte *t4 = op2 ? *op2 : NULL;
size_t t5 = len2 ? *len2 : 0;
@@ -59,6 +63,26 @@ static inline dfltcc_cc dfltcc(
: "cc", "memory");
t2 = r2; t3 = r3; t4 = r4; t5 = r5;
+ switch (fn & DFLTCC_FN_MASK) {
+ case DFLTCC_QAF:
+ kmsan_unpoison_memory(param, sizeof(struct dfltcc_qaf_param));
+ break;
+ case DFLTCC_GDHT:
+ kmsan_unpoison_memory(param, offsetof(struct dfltcc_param_v0, csb));
+ break;
+ case DFLTCC_CMPR:
+ kmsan_unpoison_memory(param, sizeof(struct dfltcc_param_v0));
+ kmsan_unpoison_memory(
+ orig_t2,
+ t2 - orig_t2 +
+ (((struct dfltcc_param_v0 *)param)->sbb == 0 ? 0 : 1));
+ break;
+ case DFLTCC_XPND:
+ kmsan_unpoison_memory(param, sizeof(struct dfltcc_param_v0));
+ kmsan_unpoison_memory(orig_t2, t2 - orig_t2);
+ break;
+ }
+
if (op1)
*op1 = t2;
if (len1)
--
2.43.0
On s390 the virtual address 0 is valid (current CPU's lowcore is mapped
there), therefore KMSAN should not complain about it.
Disable the respective check on s390. There doesn't seem to be a
Kconfig option to describe this situation, so explicitly check for
s390.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
mm/kmsan/init.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/init.c b/mm/kmsan/init.c
index ffedf4dbc49d..7a3df4d359f8 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/init.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/init.c
@@ -33,7 +33,10 @@ static void __init kmsan_record_future_shadow_range(void *start, void *end)
bool merged = false;
KMSAN_WARN_ON(future_index == NUM_FUTURE_RANGES);
- KMSAN_WARN_ON((nstart >= nend) || !nstart || !nend);
+ KMSAN_WARN_ON((nstart >= nend) ||
+ /* Virtual address 0 is valid on s390. */
+ (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_S390) && !nstart) ||
+ !nend);
nstart = ALIGN_DOWN(nstart, PAGE_SIZE);
nend = ALIGN(nend, PAGE_SIZE);
--
2.43.0
Diagnose 224 stores 4k bytes, which cannot be deduced from the inline
assembly constraints. This leads to KMSAN false positives.
Unpoison the output buffer manually with kmsan_unpoison_memory().
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/kernel/diag.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/diag.c b/arch/s390/kernel/diag.c
index 92fdc35f028c..fb83a21014d0 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/diag.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/diag.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/kmsan-checks.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
@@ -255,6 +256,7 @@ int diag224(void *ptr)
"1:\n"
EX_TABLE(0b,1b)
: "+d" (rc) :"d" (0), "d" (addr) : "memory");
+ kmsan_unpoison_memory(ptr, PAGE_SIZE);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(diag224);
--
2.43.0
Add a KMSAN check to the CKSM inline assembly, similar to how it was
done for ASAN in commit e42ac7789df6 ("s390/checksum: always use cksm
instruction").
Acked-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/include/asm/checksum.h | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/checksum.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/checksum.h
index 69837eec2ff5..55ba0ddd8eab 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/checksum.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/checksum.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#define _S390_CHECKSUM_H
#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
+#include <linux/kmsan-checks.h>
#include <linux/in6.h>
/*
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ static inline __wsum csum_partial(const void *buff, int len, __wsum sum)
};
kasan_check_read(buff, len);
+ kmsan_check_memory(buff, len);
asm volatile(
"0: cksm %[sum],%[rp]\n"
" jo 0b\n"
--
2.43.0
KMSAN warns about check_canary() accessing the canary.
The reason is that, even though set_canary() is properly instrumented
and sets shadow, slub explicitly poisons the canary's address range
afterwards.
Unpoisoning the canary is not the right thing to do: only
check_canary() is supposed to ever touch it. Instead, disable KMSAN
checks around canary read accesses.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
mm/kfence/core.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
index 3872528d0963..96138e704c5a 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/core.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
@@ -305,8 +305,14 @@ metadata_update_state(struct kfence_metadata *meta, enum kfence_object_state nex
WRITE_ONCE(meta->state, next);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
+#define CHECK_CANARY_ATTRIBUTES noinline __no_kmsan_checks
+#else
+#define CHECK_CANARY_ATTRIBUTES inline
+#endif
+
/* Check canary byte at @addr. */
-static inline bool check_canary_byte(u8 *addr)
+static CHECK_CANARY_ATTRIBUTES bool check_canary_byte(u8 *addr)
{
struct kfence_metadata *meta;
unsigned long flags;
@@ -341,7 +347,8 @@ static inline void set_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
*((u64 *)addr) = KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN_U64;
}
-static inline void check_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
+static CHECK_CANARY_ATTRIBUTES void
+check_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
{
const unsigned long pageaddr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE);
unsigned long addr = pageaddr;
--
2.43.0
Replace the x86-specific asm/pgtable_64_types.h #include with the
linux/pgtable.h one, which all architectures have.
While at it, sort the headers alphabetically for the sake of
consistency with other KMSAN code.
Fixes: f80be4571b19 ("kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core")
Suggested-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
mm/kmsan/kmsan.h | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/kmsan.h b/mm/kmsan/kmsan.h
index a14744205435..adf443bcffe8 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/kmsan.h
+++ b/mm/kmsan/kmsan.h
@@ -10,14 +10,14 @@
#ifndef __MM_KMSAN_KMSAN_H
#define __MM_KMSAN_KMSAN_H
-#include <asm/pgtable_64_types.h>
#include <linux/irqflags.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/nmi.h>
+#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
-#include <linux/nmi.h>
-#include <linux/mm.h>
-#include <linux/printk.h>
#define KMSAN_ALLOCA_MAGIC_ORIGIN 0xabcd0100
#define KMSAN_CHAIN_MAGIC_ORIGIN 0xabcd0200
--
2.43.0
Each s390 CPU has lowcore pages associated with it. Each CPU sees its
own lowcore at virtual address 0 through a hardware mechanism called
prefixing. Additionally, all lowcores are mapped to non-0 virtual
addresses stored in the lowcore_ptr[] array.
When lowcore is accessed through virtual address 0, one needs to
resolve metadata for lowcore_ptr[raw_smp_processor_id()].
Expose kmsan_get_metadata() to make it possible to do this from the
arch code.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/kmsan.h | 9 +++++++++
mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c | 1 +
mm/kmsan/kmsan.h | 1 -
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/kmsan.h b/include/linux/kmsan.h
index e0c23a32cdf0..fe6c2212bdb1 100644
--- a/include/linux/kmsan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kmsan.h
@@ -230,6 +230,15 @@ void kmsan_handle_urb(const struct urb *urb, bool is_out);
*/
void kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs(const struct pt_regs *regs);
+/**
+ * kmsan_get_metadata() - Return a pointer to KMSAN shadow or origins.
+ * @addr: kernel address.
+ * @is_origin: whether to return origins or shadow.
+ *
+ * Return NULL if metadata cannot be found.
+ */
+void *kmsan_get_metadata(void *addr, bool is_origin);
+
#else
static inline void kmsan_init_shadow(void)
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c b/mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c
index 8a1bbbc723ab..94b49fac9d8b 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include "kmsan.h"
#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/kmsan.h>
#include <linux/kmsan_string.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/kmsan.h b/mm/kmsan/kmsan.h
index adf443bcffe8..34b83c301d57 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/kmsan.h
+++ b/mm/kmsan/kmsan.h
@@ -66,7 +66,6 @@ struct shadow_origin_ptr {
struct shadow_origin_ptr kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr(void *addr, u64 size,
bool store);
-void *kmsan_get_metadata(void *addr, bool is_origin);
void __init kmsan_init_alloc_meta_for_range(void *start, void *end);
enum kmsan_bug_reason {
--
2.43.0
s390 uses assembly code to initialize ftrace_regs and call
kprobe_ftrace_handler(). Therefore, from the KMSAN's point of view,
ftrace_regs is poisoned on kprobe_ftrace_handler() entry. This causes
KMSAN warnings when running the ftrace testsuite.
Fix by trusting the assembly code and always unpoisoning ftrace_regs in
kprobe_ftrace_handler().
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/kernel/ftrace.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ftrace.c
index c46381ea04ec..3cc5e6d011a9 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/ftrace.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kmsan-checks.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
#include <trace/syscall.h>
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
@@ -300,6 +301,7 @@ void kprobe_ftrace_handler(unsigned long ip, unsigned long parent_ip,
if (bit < 0)
return;
+ kmsan_unpoison_memory(fregs, sizeof(*fregs));
regs = ftrace_get_regs(fregs);
p = get_kprobe((kprobe_opcode_t *)ip);
if (!regs || unlikely(!p) || kprobe_disabled(p))
--
2.43.0
Prevent KMSAN from complaining about buffers filled by cpacf_trng()
being uninitialized.
Tested-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/include/asm/cpacf.h | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/cpacf.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/cpacf.h
index b378e2b57ad8..2bb6b4e7e082 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/cpacf.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/cpacf.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#define _ASM_S390_CPACF_H
#include <asm/facility.h>
+#include <linux/kmsan-checks.h>
/*
* Instruction opcodes for the CPACF instructions
@@ -473,6 +474,8 @@ static inline void cpacf_trng(u8 *ucbuf, unsigned long ucbuf_len,
: [ucbuf] "+&d" (u.pair), [cbuf] "+&d" (c.pair)
: [fc] "K" (CPACF_PRNO_TRNG), [opc] "i" (CPACF_PRNO)
: "cc", "memory", "0");
+ kmsan_unpoison_memory(ucbuf, ucbuf_len);
+ kmsan_unpoison_memory(cbuf, cbuf_len);
}
/**
--
2.43.0
stcctm() uses the "Q" constraint for dest, therefore KMSAN does not
understand that it fills multiple doublewords pointed to by dest, not
just one. This results in false positives.
Unpoison the whole dest manually with kmsan_unpoison_memory().
Reported-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/include/asm/cpu_mf.h | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/cpu_mf.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/cpu_mf.h
index a0de5b9b02ea..9e4bbc3e53f8 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/cpu_mf.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/cpu_mf.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#define _ASM_S390_CPU_MF_H
#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/kmsan-checks.h>
#include <asm/asm-extable.h>
#include <asm/facility.h>
@@ -239,6 +240,11 @@ static __always_inline int stcctm(enum stcctm_ctr_set set, u64 range, u64 *dest)
: "=d" (cc)
: "Q" (*dest), "d" (range), "i" (set)
: "cc", "memory");
+ /*
+ * If cc == 2, less than RANGE counters are stored, but it's not easy
+ * to tell how many. Always unpoison the whole range for simplicity.
+ */
+ kmsan_unpoison_memory(dest, range * sizeof(u64));
return cc;
}
--
2.43.0
Like for KASAN, it's useful to temporarily disable KMSAN checks around,
e.g., redzone accesses. Introduce kmsan_disable_current() and
kmsan_enable_current(), which are similar to their KASAN counterparts.
Make them reentrant in order to handle memory allocations in interrupt
context. Repurpose the allow_reporting field for this.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/dev-tools/kmsan.rst | 4 ++--
include/linux/kmsan.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/kmsan_types.h | 2 +-
mm/kmsan/core.c | 1 -
mm/kmsan/hooks.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
mm/kmsan/report.c | 7 ++++---
6 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kmsan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kmsan.rst
index 323eedad53cd..022a823f5f1b 100644
--- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kmsan.rst
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kmsan.rst
@@ -338,11 +338,11 @@ Per-task KMSAN state
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Every task_struct has an associated KMSAN task state that holds the KMSAN
-context (see above) and a per-task flag disallowing KMSAN reports::
+context (see above) and a per-task counter disallowing KMSAN reports::
struct kmsan_context {
...
- bool allow_reporting;
+ unsigned int depth;
struct kmsan_context_state cstate;
...
}
diff --git a/include/linux/kmsan.h b/include/linux/kmsan.h
index fe6c2212bdb1..23de1b3d6aee 100644
--- a/include/linux/kmsan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kmsan.h
@@ -239,6 +239,22 @@ void kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs(const struct pt_regs *regs);
*/
void *kmsan_get_metadata(void *addr, bool is_origin);
+/*
+ * kmsan_enable_current(): Enable KMSAN for the current task.
+ *
+ * Each kmsan_enable_current() current call must be preceded by a
+ * kmsan_disable_current() call. These call pairs may be nested.
+ */
+void kmsan_enable_current(void);
+
+/*
+ * kmsan_disable_current(): Disable KMSAN for the current task.
+ *
+ * Each kmsan_disable_current() current call must be followed by a
+ * kmsan_enable_current() call. These call pairs may be nested.
+ */
+void kmsan_disable_current(void);
+
#else
static inline void kmsan_init_shadow(void)
@@ -338,6 +354,14 @@ static inline void kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs(const struct pt_regs *regs)
{
}
+static inline void kmsan_enable_current(void)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void kmsan_disable_current(void)
+{
+}
+
#endif
#endif /* _LINUX_KMSAN_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/kmsan_types.h b/include/linux/kmsan_types.h
index 8bfa6c98176d..27bb146ece95 100644
--- a/include/linux/kmsan_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/kmsan_types.h
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ struct kmsan_context_state {
struct kmsan_ctx {
struct kmsan_context_state cstate;
int kmsan_in_runtime;
- bool allow_reporting;
+ unsigned int depth;
};
#endif /* _LINUX_KMSAN_TYPES_H */
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/core.c b/mm/kmsan/core.c
index c19f47af0424..68c68b30441d 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/core.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/core.c
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ void kmsan_internal_task_create(struct task_struct *task)
struct thread_info *info = current_thread_info();
__memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
- ctx->allow_reporting = true;
kmsan_internal_unpoison_memory(info, sizeof(*info), false);
}
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
index eafc45f937eb..3acf010c9814 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
@@ -39,12 +39,10 @@ void kmsan_task_create(struct task_struct *task)
void kmsan_task_exit(struct task_struct *task)
{
- struct kmsan_ctx *ctx = &task->kmsan_ctx;
-
if (!kmsan_enabled || kmsan_in_runtime())
return;
- ctx->allow_reporting = false;
+ kmsan_disable_current();
}
void kmsan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, gfp_t flags)
@@ -423,3 +421,17 @@ void kmsan_check_memory(const void *addr, size_t size)
REASON_ANY);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmsan_check_memory);
+
+void kmsan_enable_current(void)
+{
+ KMSAN_WARN_ON(current->kmsan_ctx.depth == 0);
+ current->kmsan_ctx.depth--;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmsan_enable_current);
+
+void kmsan_disable_current(void)
+{
+ current->kmsan_ctx.depth++;
+ KMSAN_WARN_ON(current->kmsan_ctx.depth == 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmsan_disable_current);
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/report.c b/mm/kmsan/report.c
index c79d3b0d2d0d..92e73ec61435 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/report.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/console.h>
+#include <linux/kmsan.h>
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
@@ -158,12 +159,12 @@ void kmsan_report(depot_stack_handle_t origin, void *address, int size,
if (!kmsan_enabled)
return;
- if (!current->kmsan_ctx.allow_reporting)
+ if (current->kmsan_ctx.depth)
return;
if (!origin)
return;
- current->kmsan_ctx.allow_reporting = false;
+ kmsan_disable_current();
ua_flags = user_access_save();
raw_spin_lock(&kmsan_report_lock);
pr_err("=====================================================\n");
@@ -216,5 +217,5 @@ void kmsan_report(depot_stack_handle_t origin, void *address, int size,
if (panic_on_kmsan)
panic("kmsan.panic set ...\n");
user_access_restore(ua_flags);
- current->kmsan_ctx.allow_reporting = true;
+ kmsan_enable_current();
}
--
2.43.0
When building the kmsan test as a module, modpost fails with the
following error message:
ERROR: modpost: "panic_on_kmsan" [mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.ko] undefined!
Export panic_on_kmsan in order to improve the KMSAN usability for
modules.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
mm/kmsan/report.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/report.c b/mm/kmsan/report.c
index 02736ec757f2..c79d3b0d2d0d 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/report.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(kmsan_report_lock);
/* Protected by kmsan_report_lock */
static char report_local_descr[DESCR_SIZE];
int panic_on_kmsan __read_mostly;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(panic_on_kmsan);
#ifdef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX
#undef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX
--
2.43.0
Add KMSAN support for the s390 implementations of the string functions.
Do this similar to how it's already done for KASAN, except that the
optimized memset{16,32,64}() functions need to be disabled: it's
important for KMSAN to know that they initialized something.
The way boot code is built with regard to string functions is
problematic, since most files think it's configured with sanitizers,
but boot/string.c doesn't. This creates various problems with the
memset64() definitions, depending on whether the code is built with
sanitizers or fortify. This should probably be streamlined, but in the
meantime resolve the issues by introducing the IN_BOOT_STRING_C macro,
similar to the existing IN_ARCH_STRING_C macro.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/boot/string.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
arch/s390/include/asm/string.h | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/s390/boot/string.c b/arch/s390/boot/string.c
index faccb33b462c..f6b9b1df48a8 100644
--- a/arch/s390/boot/string.c
+++ b/arch/s390/boot/string.c
@@ -1,11 +1,18 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#define IN_BOOT_STRING_C 1
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#undef CONFIG_KASAN
#undef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
+#undef CONFIG_KMSAN
#include "../lib/string.c"
+/*
+ * Duplicate some functions from the common lib/string.c
+ * instead of fully including it.
+ */
+
int strncmp(const char *cs, const char *ct, size_t count)
{
unsigned char c1, c2;
@@ -22,6 +29,15 @@ int strncmp(const char *cs, const char *ct, size_t count)
return 0;
}
+void *memset64(uint64_t *s, uint64_t v, size_t count)
+{
+ uint64_t *xs = s;
+
+ while (count--)
+ *xs++ = v;
+ return s;
+}
+
char *skip_spaces(const char *str)
{
while (isspace(*str))
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/string.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/string.h
index 351685de53d2..2ab868cbae6c 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/string.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/string.h
@@ -15,15 +15,12 @@
#define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCPY /* gcc builtin & arch function */
#define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMMOVE /* gcc builtin & arch function */
#define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET /* gcc builtin & arch function */
-#define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET16 /* arch function */
-#define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET32 /* arch function */
-#define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET64 /* arch function */
void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n);
void *memset(void *s, int c, size_t n);
void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n);
-#ifndef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if !defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && !defined(CONFIG_KMSAN)
#define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCHR /* inline & arch function */
#define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCMP /* arch function */
#define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSCAN /* inline & arch function */
@@ -36,6 +33,9 @@ void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n);
#define __HAVE_ARCH_STRNCPY /* arch function */
#define __HAVE_ARCH_STRNLEN /* inline & arch function */
#define __HAVE_ARCH_STRSTR /* arch function */
+#define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET16 /* arch function */
+#define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET32 /* arch function */
+#define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET64 /* arch function */
/* Prototypes for non-inlined arch strings functions. */
int memcmp(const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t n);
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ size_t strlcat(char *dest, const char *src, size_t n);
char *strncat(char *dest, const char *src, size_t n);
char *strncpy(char *dest, const char *src, size_t n);
char *strstr(const char *s1, const char *s2);
-#endif /* !CONFIG_KASAN */
+#endif /* !defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && !defined(CONFIG_KMSAN) */
#undef __HAVE_ARCH_STRCHR
#undef __HAVE_ARCH_STRNCHR
@@ -74,20 +74,30 @@ void *__memset16(uint16_t *s, uint16_t v, size_t count);
void *__memset32(uint32_t *s, uint32_t v, size_t count);
void *__memset64(uint64_t *s, uint64_t v, size_t count);
+#ifdef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET16
static inline void *memset16(uint16_t *s, uint16_t v, size_t count)
{
return __memset16(s, v, count * sizeof(v));
}
+#endif
+#ifdef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET32
static inline void *memset32(uint32_t *s, uint32_t v, size_t count)
{
return __memset32(s, v, count * sizeof(v));
}
+#endif
+#ifdef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET64
+#ifdef IN_BOOT_STRING_C
+void *memset64(uint64_t *s, uint64_t v, size_t count);
+#else
static inline void *memset64(uint64_t *s, uint64_t v, size_t count)
{
return __memset64(s, v, count * sizeof(v));
}
+#endif
+#endif
#if !defined(IN_ARCH_STRING_C) && (!defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE) || defined(__NO_FORTIFY))
--
2.43.0
KMSAN generates the following false positives on s390x:
[ 6.063666] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lockdep_hardirqs_enabled())
[ ...]
[ 6.577050] Call Trace:
[ 6.619637] [<000000000690d2de>] check_flags+0x1fe/0x210
[ 6.665411] ([<000000000690d2da>] check_flags+0x1fa/0x210)
[ 6.707478] [<00000000006cec1a>] lock_acquire+0x2ca/0xce0
[ 6.749959] [<00000000069820ea>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xea/0x190
[ 6.794912] [<00000000041fc988>] __stack_depot_save+0x218/0x5b0
[ 6.838420] [<000000000197affe>] __msan_poison_alloca+0xfe/0x1a0
[ 6.882985] [<0000000007c5827c>] start_kernel+0x70c/0xd50
[ 6.927454] [<0000000000100036>] startup_continue+0x36/0x40
Between trace_hardirqs_on() and `stosm __mask, 3` lockdep thinks that
interrupts are on, but on the CPU they are still off. KMSAN
instrumentation takes spinlocks, giving lockdep a chance to see and
complain about this discrepancy.
KMSAN instrumentation is inserted in order to poison the __mask
variable. Disable instrumentation in the respective functions. They are
very small and it's easy to see that no important metadata updates are
lost because of this.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/include/asm/irqflags.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
drivers/s390/char/sclp.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/irqflags.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/irqflags.h
index 02427b205c11..7353a88b2ae2 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/irqflags.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/irqflags.h
@@ -37,12 +37,19 @@ static __always_inline void __arch_local_irq_ssm(unsigned long flags)
asm volatile("ssm %0" : : "Q" (flags) : "memory");
}
-static __always_inline unsigned long arch_local_save_flags(void)
+#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
+#define ARCH_LOCAL_IRQ_ATTRIBUTES \
+ noinline notrace __no_sanitize_memory __maybe_unused
+#else
+#define ARCH_LOCAL_IRQ_ATTRIBUTES __always_inline
+#endif
+
+static ARCH_LOCAL_IRQ_ATTRIBUTES unsigned long arch_local_save_flags(void)
{
return __arch_local_irq_stnsm(0xff);
}
-static __always_inline unsigned long arch_local_irq_save(void)
+static ARCH_LOCAL_IRQ_ATTRIBUTES unsigned long arch_local_irq_save(void)
{
return __arch_local_irq_stnsm(0xfc);
}
@@ -52,7 +59,12 @@ static __always_inline void arch_local_irq_disable(void)
arch_local_irq_save();
}
-static __always_inline void arch_local_irq_enable(void)
+static ARCH_LOCAL_IRQ_ATTRIBUTES void arch_local_irq_enable_external(void)
+{
+ __arch_local_irq_stosm(0x01);
+}
+
+static ARCH_LOCAL_IRQ_ATTRIBUTES void arch_local_irq_enable(void)
{
__arch_local_irq_stosm(0x03);
}
diff --git a/drivers/s390/char/sclp.c b/drivers/s390/char/sclp.c
index d53ee34d398f..fb1d9949adca 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/char/sclp.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/char/sclp.c
@@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ sclp_sync_wait(void)
cr0_sync.val = cr0.val & ~CR0_IRQ_SUBCLASS_MASK;
cr0_sync.val |= 1UL << (63 - 54);
local_ctl_load(0, &cr0_sync);
- __arch_local_irq_stosm(0x01);
+ arch_local_irq_enable_external();
/* Loop until driver state indicates finished request */
while (sclp_running_state != sclp_running_state_idle) {
/* Check for expired request timer */
--
2.43.0
Avoid false KMSAN negatives with SLUB_DEBUG by allowing
kmsan_slab_free() to poison the freed memory, and by preventing
init_object() from unpoisoning new allocations by using __memset().
There are two alternatives to this approach. First, init_object()
can be marked with __no_sanitize_memory. This annotation should be used
with great care, because it drops all instrumentation from the
function, and any shadow writes will be lost. Even though this is not a
concern with the current init_object() implementation, this may change
in the future.
Second, kmsan_poison_memory() calls may be added after memset() calls.
The downside is that init_object() is called from
free_debug_processing(), in which case poisoning will erase the
distinction between simply uninitialized memory and UAF.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
mm/kmsan/hooks.c | 2 +-
mm/slub.c | 13 +++++++++----
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
index 3acf010c9814..21004eeee240 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ void kmsan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
return;
/* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the RCU period */
- if (unlikely(s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)))
+ if (unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
return;
/*
* If there's a constructor, freed memory must remain in the same state
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 63d281dfacdb..b111bc315e3f 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -1030,7 +1030,12 @@ static void init_object(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, u8 val)
unsigned int poison_size = s->object_size;
if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
- memset(p - s->red_left_pad, val, s->red_left_pad);
+ /*
+ * Use __memset() here and below in order to avoid overwriting
+ * the KMSAN shadow. Keeping the shadow makes it possible to
+ * distinguish uninit-value from use-after-free.
+ */
+ __memset(p - s->red_left_pad, val, s->red_left_pad);
if (slub_debug_orig_size(s) && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE) {
/*
@@ -1043,12 +1048,12 @@ static void init_object(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, u8 val)
}
if (s->flags & __OBJECT_POISON) {
- memset(p, POISON_FREE, poison_size - 1);
- p[poison_size - 1] = POISON_END;
+ __memset(p, POISON_FREE, poison_size - 1);
+ __memset(p + poison_size - 1, POISON_END, 1);
}
if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE)
- memset(p + poison_size, val, s->inuse - poison_size);
+ __memset(p + poison_size, val, s->inuse - poison_size);
}
static void restore_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, char *message, u8 data,
--
2.43.0
This is normally done by the generic entry code, but the
kernel_stack_overflow() flow bypasses it.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/kernel/traps.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c b/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c
index 1d2aa448d103..f299b1203a20 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/entry-common.h>
+#include <linux/kmsan.h>
#include <asm/asm-extable.h>
#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
#include <asm/vtime.h>
@@ -260,6 +261,11 @@ static void monitor_event_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
void kernel_stack_overflow(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
+ /*
+ * Normally regs are unpoisoned by the generic entry code, but
+ * kernel_stack_overflow() is a rare case that is called bypassing it.
+ */
+ kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs(regs);
bust_spinlocks(1);
printk("Kernel stack overflow.\n");
show_regs(regs);
--
2.43.0
The unwind code can read uninitialized frames. Furthermore, even in
the good case, KMSAN does not emit shadow for backchains. Therefore
disable it for the unwinding functions.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/kernel/unwind_bc.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/unwind_bc.c b/arch/s390/kernel/unwind_bc.c
index 0ece156fdd7c..cd44be2b6ce8 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/unwind_bc.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/unwind_bc.c
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ static inline bool is_final_pt_regs(struct unwind_state *state,
READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(regs->psw.mask) & PSW_MASK_PSTATE;
}
+/* Avoid KMSAN false positives from touching uninitialized frames. */
+__no_kmsan_checks
bool unwind_next_frame(struct unwind_state *state)
{
struct stack_info *info = &state->stack_info;
@@ -118,6 +120,8 @@ bool unwind_next_frame(struct unwind_state *state)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unwind_next_frame);
+/* Avoid KMSAN false positives from touching uninitialized frames. */
+__no_kmsan_checks
void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state *state, struct task_struct *task,
struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long first_frame)
{
--
2.43.0
put_user() uses inline assembly with precise constraints, so Clang is
in principle capable of instrumenting it automatically. Unfortunately,
one of the constraints contains a dereferenced user pointer, and Clang
does not currently distinguish user and kernel pointers. Therefore
KMSAN attempts to access shadow for user pointers, which is not a right
thing to do.
An obvious fix to add __no_sanitize_memory to __put_user_fn() does not
work, since it's __always_inline. And __always_inline cannot be removed
due to the __put_user_bad() trick.
A different obvious fix of using the "a" instead of the "+Q" constraint
degrades the code quality, which is very important here, since it's a
hot path.
Instead, repurpose the __put_user_asm() macro to define
__put_user_{char,short,int,long}_noinstr() functions and mark them with
__no_sanitize_memory. For the non-KMSAN builds make them
__always_inline in order to keep the generated code quality. Also
define __put_user_{char,short,int,long}() functions, which call the
aforementioned ones and which *are* instrumented, because they call
KMSAN hooks, which may be implemented as macros.
The same applies to get_user() as well.
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h | 111 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 79 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 81ae8a98e7ec..c3c26dd1fc04 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -78,13 +78,24 @@ union oac {
int __noreturn __put_user_bad(void);
-#define __put_user_asm(to, from, size) \
-({ \
+#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
+#define GET_PUT_USER_NOINSTR_ATTRIBUTES \
+ noinline __maybe_unused __no_sanitize_memory
+#else
+#define GET_PUT_USER_NOINSTR_ATTRIBUTES __always_inline
+#endif
+
+#define DEFINE_PUT_USER(type) \
+static GET_PUT_USER_NOINSTR_ATTRIBUTES int \
+__put_user_##type##_noinstr(unsigned type __user *to, \
+ unsigned type *from, \
+ unsigned long size) \
+{ \
union oac __oac_spec = { \
.oac1.as = PSW_BITS_AS_SECONDARY, \
.oac1.a = 1, \
}; \
- int __rc; \
+ int rc; \
\
asm volatile( \
" lr 0,%[spec]\n" \
@@ -93,12 +104,28 @@ int __noreturn __put_user_bad(void);
"2:\n" \
EX_TABLE_UA_STORE(0b, 2b, %[rc]) \
EX_TABLE_UA_STORE(1b, 2b, %[rc]) \
- : [rc] "=&d" (__rc), [_to] "+Q" (*(to)) \
+ : [rc] "=&d" (rc), [_to] "+Q" (*(to)) \
: [_size] "d" (size), [_from] "Q" (*(from)), \
[spec] "d" (__oac_spec.val) \
: "cc", "0"); \
- __rc; \
-})
+ return rc; \
+} \
+ \
+static __always_inline int \
+__put_user_##type(unsigned type __user *to, unsigned type *from, \
+ unsigned long size) \
+{ \
+ int rc; \
+ \
+ rc = __put_user_##type##_noinstr(to, from, size); \
+ instrument_put_user(*from, to, size); \
+ return rc; \
+}
+
+DEFINE_PUT_USER(char);
+DEFINE_PUT_USER(short);
+DEFINE_PUT_USER(int);
+DEFINE_PUT_USER(long);
static __always_inline int __put_user_fn(void *x, void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
{
@@ -106,24 +133,24 @@ static __always_inline int __put_user_fn(void *x, void __user *ptr, unsigned lon
switch (size) {
case 1:
- rc = __put_user_asm((unsigned char __user *)ptr,
- (unsigned char *)x,
- size);
+ rc = __put_user_char((unsigned char __user *)ptr,
+ (unsigned char *)x,
+ size);
break;
case 2:
- rc = __put_user_asm((unsigned short __user *)ptr,
- (unsigned short *)x,
- size);
+ rc = __put_user_short((unsigned short __user *)ptr,
+ (unsigned short *)x,
+ size);
break;
case 4:
- rc = __put_user_asm((unsigned int __user *)ptr,
+ rc = __put_user_int((unsigned int __user *)ptr,
(unsigned int *)x,
size);
break;
case 8:
- rc = __put_user_asm((unsigned long __user *)ptr,
- (unsigned long *)x,
- size);
+ rc = __put_user_long((unsigned long __user *)ptr,
+ (unsigned long *)x,
+ size);
break;
default:
__put_user_bad();
@@ -134,13 +161,17 @@ static __always_inline int __put_user_fn(void *x, void __user *ptr, unsigned lon
int __noreturn __get_user_bad(void);
-#define __get_user_asm(to, from, size) \
-({ \
+#define DEFINE_GET_USER(type) \
+static GET_PUT_USER_NOINSTR_ATTRIBUTES int \
+__get_user_##type##_noinstr(unsigned type *to, \
+ unsigned type __user *from, \
+ unsigned long size) \
+{ \
union oac __oac_spec = { \
.oac2.as = PSW_BITS_AS_SECONDARY, \
.oac2.a = 1, \
}; \
- int __rc; \
+ int rc; \
\
asm volatile( \
" lr 0,%[spec]\n" \
@@ -149,13 +180,29 @@ int __noreturn __get_user_bad(void);
"2:\n" \
EX_TABLE_UA_LOAD_MEM(0b, 2b, %[rc], %[_to], %[_ksize]) \
EX_TABLE_UA_LOAD_MEM(1b, 2b, %[rc], %[_to], %[_ksize]) \
- : [rc] "=&d" (__rc), "=Q" (*(to)) \
+ : [rc] "=&d" (rc), "=Q" (*(to)) \
: [_size] "d" (size), [_from] "Q" (*(from)), \
[spec] "d" (__oac_spec.val), [_to] "a" (to), \
[_ksize] "K" (size) \
: "cc", "0"); \
- __rc; \
-})
+ return rc; \
+} \
+ \
+static __always_inline int \
+__get_user_##type(unsigned type *to, unsigned type __user *from, \
+ unsigned long size) \
+{ \
+ int rc; \
+ \
+ rc = __get_user_##type##_noinstr(to, from, size); \
+ instrument_get_user(*to); \
+ return rc; \
+}
+
+DEFINE_GET_USER(char);
+DEFINE_GET_USER(short);
+DEFINE_GET_USER(int);
+DEFINE_GET_USER(long);
static __always_inline int __get_user_fn(void *x, const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
{
@@ -163,24 +210,24 @@ static __always_inline int __get_user_fn(void *x, const void __user *ptr, unsign
switch (size) {
case 1:
- rc = __get_user_asm((unsigned char *)x,
- (unsigned char __user *)ptr,
- size);
+ rc = __get_user_char((unsigned char *)x,
+ (unsigned char __user *)ptr,
+ size);
break;
case 2:
- rc = __get_user_asm((unsigned short *)x,
- (unsigned short __user *)ptr,
- size);
+ rc = __get_user_short((unsigned short *)x,
+ (unsigned short __user *)ptr,
+ size);
break;
case 4:
- rc = __get_user_asm((unsigned int *)x,
+ rc = __get_user_int((unsigned int *)x,
(unsigned int __user *)ptr,
size);
break;
case 8:
- rc = __get_user_asm((unsigned long *)x,
- (unsigned long __user *)ptr,
- size);
+ rc = __get_user_long((unsigned long *)x,
+ (unsigned long __user *)ptr,
+ size);
break;
default:
__get_user_bad();
--
2.43.0
arch_kmsan_get_meta_or_null() finds the lowcore shadow by querying the
prefix and calling kmsan_get_metadata() again.
kmsan_virt_addr_valid() delegates to virt_addr_valid().
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/include/asm/kmsan.h | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 43 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/s390/include/asm/kmsan.h
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/kmsan.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/kmsan.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e572686d340c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/kmsan.h
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_S390_KMSAN_H
+#define _ASM_S390_KMSAN_H
+
+#include <asm/lowcore.h>
+#include <asm/page.h>
+#include <linux/kmsan.h>
+#include <linux/mmzone.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+
+#ifndef MODULE
+
+static inline bool is_lowcore_addr(void *addr)
+{
+ return addr >= (void *)&S390_lowcore &&
+ addr < (void *)(&S390_lowcore + 1);
+}
+
+static inline void *arch_kmsan_get_meta_or_null(void *addr, bool is_origin)
+{
+ if (is_lowcore_addr(addr)) {
+ /*
+ * Different lowcores accessed via S390_lowcore are described
+ * by the same struct page. Resolve the prefix manually in
+ * order to get a distinct struct page.
+ */
+ addr += (void *)lowcore_ptr[raw_smp_processor_id()] -
+ (void *)&S390_lowcore;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_lowcore_addr(addr)))
+ return NULL;
+ return kmsan_get_metadata(addr, is_origin);
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline bool kmsan_virt_addr_valid(void *addr)
+{
+ return virt_addr_valid(addr);
+}
+
+#endif /* !MODULE */
+
+#endif /* _ASM_S390_KMSAN_H */
--
2.43.0
It's useful to have both tests and kmsan.panic=1 during development,
but right now the warnings, that the tests cause, lead to kernel
panics.
Temporarily set kmsan.panic=0 for the duration of the KMSAN testing.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c b/mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c
index 07d3a3a5a9c5..9bfd11674fe3 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c
@@ -659,9 +659,13 @@ static void test_exit(struct kunit *test)
{
}
+static int orig_panic_on_kmsan;
+
static int kmsan_suite_init(struct kunit_suite *suite)
{
register_trace_console(probe_console, NULL);
+ orig_panic_on_kmsan = panic_on_kmsan;
+ panic_on_kmsan = 0;
return 0;
}
@@ -669,6 +673,7 @@ static void kmsan_suite_exit(struct kunit_suite *suite)
{
unregister_trace_console(probe_console, NULL);
tracepoint_synchronize_unregister();
+ panic_on_kmsan = orig_panic_on_kmsan;
}
static struct kunit_suite kmsan_test_suite = {
--
2.43.0
Comparing pointers with TASK_SIZE does not make sense when kernel and
userspace overlap. Skip the comparison when this is the case.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c b/mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c
index 470b0b4afcc4..8a1bbbc723ab 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@
static inline bool is_bad_asm_addr(void *addr, uintptr_t size, bool is_store)
{
- if ((u64)addr < TASK_SIZE)
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE) &&
+ (u64)addr < TASK_SIZE)
return true;
if (!kmsan_get_metadata(addr, KMSAN_META_SHADOW))
return true;
--
2.43.0
Now that everything else is in place, enable KMSAN in Kconfig.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index 3bec98d20283..160ad2220c53 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ config S390
select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN
select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC
select HAVE_ARCH_KCSAN
+ select HAVE_ARCH_KMSAN
select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE
select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
--
2.43.0
Adjust the stack size for the KMSAN-enabled kernel like it was done
for the KASAN-enabled one in commit 7fef92ccadd7 ("s390/kasan: double
the stack size"). Both tools have similar requirements.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/s390/include/asm/thread_info.h | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/s390/Makefile b/arch/s390/Makefile
index 73873e451686..a7f5386d25ad 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Makefile
+++ b/arch/s390/Makefile
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR += $(if $(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF4), $(call cc-option
KBUILD_CFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR += $(if $(CONFIG_CC_NO_ARRAY_BOUNDS),-Wno-array-bounds)
UTS_MACHINE := s390x
-STACK_SIZE := $(if $(CONFIG_KASAN),65536,16384)
+STACK_SIZE := $(if $(CONFIG_KASAN),65536,$(if $(CONFIG_KMSAN),65536,16384))
CHECKFLAGS += -D__s390__ -D__s390x__
export LD_BFD
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/thread_info.h
index a674c7d25da5..d02a709717b8 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
/*
* General size of kernel stacks
*/
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) || defined(CONFIG_KMSAN)
#define THREAD_SIZE_ORDER 4
#else
#define THREAD_SIZE_ORDER 2
--
2.43.0
Improve the readability by replacing the custom aligning logic with
ALIGN_DOWN(). Unlike other places where a similar sequence is used,
there is no size parameter that needs to be adjusted, so the standard
macro fits.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
mm/kmsan/shadow.c | 8 +++-----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/shadow.c b/mm/kmsan/shadow.c
index 2d57408c78ae..9c58f081d84f 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/shadow.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/shadow.c
@@ -123,14 +123,12 @@ struct shadow_origin_ptr kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr(void *address, u64 size,
*/
void *kmsan_get_metadata(void *address, bool is_origin)
{
- u64 addr = (u64)address, pad, off;
+ u64 addr = (u64)address, off;
struct page *page;
void *ret;
- if (is_origin && !IS_ALIGNED(addr, KMSAN_ORIGIN_SIZE)) {
- pad = addr % KMSAN_ORIGIN_SIZE;
- addr -= pad;
- }
+ if (is_origin)
+ addr = ALIGN_DOWN(addr, KMSAN_ORIGIN_SIZE);
address = (void *)addr;
if (kmsan_internal_is_vmalloc_addr(address) ||
kmsan_internal_is_module_addr(address))
--
2.43.0
The pages for the KMSAN metadata associated with most kernel mappings
are taken from memblock by the common code. However, vmalloc and module
metadata needs to be defined by the architectures.
Be a little bit more careful than x86: allocate exactly MODULES_LEN
for the module shadow and origins, and then take 2/3 of vmalloc for
the vmalloc shadow and origins. This ensures that users passing small
vmalloc= values on the command line do not cause module metadata
collisions.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/boot/startup.c | 8 ++++++++
arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h | 10 ++++++++++
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/s390/boot/startup.c b/arch/s390/boot/startup.c
index 8104e0e3d188..e37e7ffda430 100644
--- a/arch/s390/boot/startup.c
+++ b/arch/s390/boot/startup.c
@@ -253,9 +253,17 @@ static unsigned long setup_kernel_memory_layout(void)
MODULES_END = round_down(__abs_lowcore, _SEGMENT_SIZE);
MODULES_VADDR = MODULES_END - MODULES_LEN;
VMALLOC_END = MODULES_VADDR;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
+ VMALLOC_END -= MODULES_LEN * 2;
+#endif
/* allow vmalloc area to occupy up to about 1/2 of the rest virtual space left */
vmalloc_size = min(vmalloc_size, round_down(VMALLOC_END / 2, _REGION3_SIZE));
+#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
+ /* take 2/3 of vmalloc area for KMSAN shadow and origins */
+ vmalloc_size = round_down(vmalloc_size / 3, _REGION3_SIZE);
+ VMALLOC_END -= vmalloc_size * 2;
+#endif
VMALLOC_START = VMALLOC_END - vmalloc_size;
/* split remaining virtual space between 1:1 mapping & vmemmap array */
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 601e87fa8a9a..d764abeb9e6d 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -107,6 +107,16 @@ static inline int is_module_addr(void *addr)
return 1;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
+#define KMSAN_VMALLOC_SIZE (VMALLOC_END - VMALLOC_START)
+#define KMSAN_VMALLOC_SHADOW_START VMALLOC_END
+#define KMSAN_VMALLOC_ORIGIN_START (KMSAN_VMALLOC_SHADOW_START + \
+ KMSAN_VMALLOC_SIZE)
+#define KMSAN_MODULES_SHADOW_START (KMSAN_VMALLOC_ORIGIN_START + \
+ KMSAN_VMALLOC_SIZE)
+#define KMSAN_MODULES_ORIGIN_START (KMSAN_MODULES_SHADOW_START + MODULES_LEN)
+#endif
+
/*
* A 64 bit pagetable entry of S390 has following format:
* | PFRA |0IPC| OS |
--
2.43.0
It should be possible to have inline functions in the s390 header
files, which call kmsan_unpoison_memory(). The problem is that these
header files might be included by the decompressor, which does not
contain KMSAN runtime, causing linker errors.
Not compiling these calls if __SANITIZE_MEMORY__ is not defined -
either by changing kmsan-checks.h or at the call sites - may cause
unintended side effects, since calling these functions from an
uninstrumented code that is linked into the kernel is valid use case.
One might want to explicitly distinguish between the kernel and the
decompressor. Checking for a decompressor-specific #define is quite
heavy-handed, and will have to be done at all call sites.
A more generic approach is to provide a dummy kmsan_unpoison_memory()
definition. This produces some runtime overhead, but only when building
with CONFIG_KMSAN. The benefit is that it does not disturb the existing
KMSAN build logic and call sites don't need to be changed.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/boot/Makefile | 1 +
arch/s390/boot/kmsan.c | 6 ++++++
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/s390/boot/kmsan.c
diff --git a/arch/s390/boot/Makefile b/arch/s390/boot/Makefile
index fb10fcd21221..096216a72e98 100644
--- a/arch/s390/boot/Makefile
+++ b/arch/s390/boot/Makefile
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ obj-$(findstring y, $(CONFIG_PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST) $(CONFIG_PGSTE)) +=
obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o
obj-y += $(if $(CONFIG_KERNEL_UNCOMPRESSED),,decompressor.o) info.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KERNEL_ZSTD) += clz_ctz.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KMSAN) += kmsan.o
obj-all := $(obj-y) piggy.o syms.o
targets := bzImage section_cmp.boot.data section_cmp.boot.preserved.data $(obj-y)
diff --git a/arch/s390/boot/kmsan.c b/arch/s390/boot/kmsan.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e7b3ac48143e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/boot/kmsan.c
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/kmsan-checks.h>
+
+void kmsan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
+{
+}
--
2.43.0
On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 12:37 AM Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> stcctm() uses the "Q" constraint for dest, therefore KMSAN does not
> understand that it fills multiple doublewords pointed to by dest, not
> just one. This results in false positives.
>
> Unpoison the whole dest manually with kmsan_unpoison_memory().
>
> Reported-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 12:37 AM Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> arch_kmsan_get_meta_or_null() finds the lowcore shadow by querying the
> prefix and calling kmsan_get_metadata() again.
>
> kmsan_virt_addr_valid() delegates to virt_addr_valid().
>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 12:24:48AM +0100, Ilya Leoshkevich wrote:
> The pages for the KMSAN metadata associated with most kernel mappings
> are taken from memblock by the common code. However, vmalloc and module
> metadata needs to be defined by the architectures.
>
> Be a little bit more careful than x86: allocate exactly MODULES_LEN
> for the module shadow and origins, and then take 2/3 of vmalloc for
> the vmalloc shadow and origins. This ensures that users passing small
> vmalloc= values on the command line do not cause module metadata
> collisions.
>
> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/s390/boot/startup.c | 8 ++++++++
> arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h | 10 ++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/s390/boot/startup.c b/arch/s390/boot/startup.c
> index 8104e0e3d188..e37e7ffda430 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/boot/startup.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/boot/startup.c
> @@ -253,9 +253,17 @@ static unsigned long setup_kernel_memory_layout(void)
> MODULES_END = round_down(__abs_lowcore, _SEGMENT_SIZE);
> MODULES_VADDR = MODULES_END - MODULES_LEN;
> VMALLOC_END = MODULES_VADDR;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
> + VMALLOC_END -= MODULES_LEN * 2;
> +#endif
>
> /* allow vmalloc area to occupy up to about 1/2 of the rest virtual space left */
> vmalloc_size = min(vmalloc_size, round_down(VMALLOC_END / 2, _REGION3_SIZE));
Since commit 2a65c6e1ad06 ("s390/boot: always align vmalloc area on segment boundary")
vmalloc_size is aligned on _SEGMENT_SIZE boundary.
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
> + /* take 2/3 of vmalloc area for KMSAN shadow and origins */
> + vmalloc_size = round_down(vmalloc_size / 3, _REGION3_SIZE);
And thus, the alignment here should be _SEGMENT_SIZE as well.
> + VMALLOC_END -= vmalloc_size * 2;
> +#endif
> VMALLOC_START = VMALLOC_END - vmalloc_size;
>
> /* split remaining virtual space between 1:1 mapping & vmemmap array */
...
With the above fixup:
Acked-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Thanks!
On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 12:36 AM Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> KMSAN generates the following false positives on s390x:
>
> [ 6.063666] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lockdep_hardirqs_enabled())
> [ ...]
> [ 6.577050] Call Trace:
> [ 6.619637] [<000000000690d2de>] check_flags+0x1fe/0x210
> [ 6.665411] ([<000000000690d2da>] check_flags+0x1fa/0x210)
> [ 6.707478] [<00000000006cec1a>] lock_acquire+0x2ca/0xce0
> [ 6.749959] [<00000000069820ea>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xea/0x190
> [ 6.794912] [<00000000041fc988>] __stack_depot_save+0x218/0x5b0
> [ 6.838420] [<000000000197affe>] __msan_poison_alloca+0xfe/0x1a0
> [ 6.882985] [<0000000007c5827c>] start_kernel+0x70c/0xd50
> [ 6.927454] [<0000000000100036>] startup_continue+0x36/0x40
>
> Between trace_hardirqs_on() and `stosm __mask, 3` lockdep thinks that
> interrupts are on, but on the CPU they are still off. KMSAN
> instrumentation takes spinlocks, giving lockdep a chance to see and
> complain about this discrepancy.
>
> KMSAN instrumentation is inserted in order to poison the __mask
> variable. Disable instrumentation in the respective functions. They are
> very small and it's easy to see that no important metadata updates are
> lost because of this.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 12:36 AM Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> The constraints of the DFLTCC inline assembly are not precise: they
> do not communicate the size of the output buffers to the compiler, so
> it cannot automatically instrument it.
>
> Add the manual kmsan_unpoison_memory() calls for the output buffers.
> The logic is the same as in [1].
>
> [1] https://github.com/zlib-ng/zlib-ng/commit/1f5ddcc009ac3511e99fc88736a9e1a6381168c5
>
> Reported-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
> @@ -34,6 +37,7 @@ static inline dfltcc_cc dfltcc(
> )
> {
> Byte *t2 = op1 ? *op1 : NULL;
> + unsigned char *orig_t2 = t2;
> size_t t3 = len1 ? *len1 : 0;
> const Byte *t4 = op2 ? *op2 : NULL;
> size_t t5 = len2 ? *len2 : 0;
> @@ -59,6 +63,26 @@ static inline dfltcc_cc dfltcc(
> : "cc", "memory");
> t2 = r2; t3 = r3; t4 = r4; t5 = r5;
>
> + switch (fn & DFLTCC_FN_MASK) {
It might be a good idea to add a comment explaining what this block of
code does.
(And that it is no-op in non-KMSAN builds)
On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 12:24:43AM +0100, Ilya Leoshkevich wrote:
> Prevent KMSAN from complaining about buffers filled by cpacf_trng()
> being uninitialized.
>
> Tested-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/s390/include/asm/cpacf.h | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 12:24:44AM +0100, Ilya Leoshkevich wrote:
> stcctm() uses the "Q" constraint for dest, therefore KMSAN does not
> understand that it fills multiple doublewords pointed to by dest, not
> just one. This results in false positives.
>
> Unpoison the whole dest manually with kmsan_unpoison_memory().
>
> Reported-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/s390/include/asm/cpu_mf.h | 6 ++++++
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 12:24:46AM +0100, Ilya Leoshkevich wrote:
> s390 uses assembly code to initialize ftrace_regs and call
> kprobe_ftrace_handler(). Therefore, from the KMSAN's point of view,
> ftrace_regs is poisoned on kprobe_ftrace_handler() entry. This causes
> KMSAN warnings when running the ftrace testsuite.
>
> Fix by trusting the assembly code and always unpoisoning ftrace_regs in
> kprobe_ftrace_handler().
>
> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/s390/kernel/ftrace.c | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 12:24:45AM +0100, Ilya Leoshkevich wrote:
> Diagnose 224 stores 4k bytes, which cannot be deduced from the inline
> assembly constraints. This leads to KMSAN false positives.
>
> Unpoison the output buffer manually with kmsan_unpoison_memory().
>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/s390/kernel/diag.c | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/diag.c b/arch/s390/kernel/diag.c
> index 92fdc35f028c..fb83a21014d0 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/kernel/diag.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/diag.c
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
> #include <linux/export.h>
> #include <linux/init.h>
> #include <linux/cpu.h>
> +#include <linux/kmsan-checks.h>
> #include <linux/seq_file.h>
> #include <linux/debugfs.h>
> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
> @@ -255,6 +256,7 @@ int diag224(void *ptr)
> "1:\n"
> EX_TABLE(0b,1b)
> : "+d" (rc) :"d" (0), "d" (addr) : "memory");
> + kmsan_unpoison_memory(ptr, PAGE_SIZE);
Wouldn't it be better to adjust the inline assembly instead?
Something like this:
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/diag.c b/arch/s390/kernel/diag.c
index 92fdc35f028c..b1b0acda50c6 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/diag.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/diag.c
@@ -247,14 +247,18 @@ int diag224(void *ptr)
{
unsigned long addr = __pa(ptr);
int rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ struct _d {
+ char _d[4096];
+ };
diag_stat_inc(DIAG_STAT_X224);
- asm volatile(
- " diag %1,%2,0x224\n"
- "0: lhi %0,0x0\n"
+ asm volatile("\n"
+ " diag %[type],%[addr],0x224\n"
+ "0: lhi %[rc],0\n"
"1:\n"
EX_TABLE(0b,1b)
- : "+d" (rc) :"d" (0), "d" (addr) : "memory");
+ : [rc] "+d" (rc), "=m" (*(struct _d *)ptr)
+ : [type] "d" (0), [addr] "d" (addr));
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(diag224);
On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 12:24:47AM +0100, Ilya Leoshkevich wrote:
> KMSAN generates the following false positives on s390x:
>
> [ 6.063666] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lockdep_hardirqs_enabled())
> [ ...]
> [ 6.577050] Call Trace:
> [ 6.619637] [<000000000690d2de>] check_flags+0x1fe/0x210
> [ 6.665411] ([<000000000690d2da>] check_flags+0x1fa/0x210)
> [ 6.707478] [<00000000006cec1a>] lock_acquire+0x2ca/0xce0
> [ 6.749959] [<00000000069820ea>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xea/0x190
> [ 6.794912] [<00000000041fc988>] __stack_depot_save+0x218/0x5b0
> [ 6.838420] [<000000000197affe>] __msan_poison_alloca+0xfe/0x1a0
> [ 6.882985] [<0000000007c5827c>] start_kernel+0x70c/0xd50
> [ 6.927454] [<0000000000100036>] startup_continue+0x36/0x40
>
> Between trace_hardirqs_on() and `stosm __mask, 3` lockdep thinks that
> interrupts are on, but on the CPU they are still off. KMSAN
> instrumentation takes spinlocks, giving lockdep a chance to see and
> complain about this discrepancy.
>
> KMSAN instrumentation is inserted in order to poison the __mask
> variable. Disable instrumentation in the respective functions. They are
> very small and it's easy to see that no important metadata updates are
> lost because of this.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/s390/include/asm/irqflags.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
> drivers/s390/char/sclp.c | 2 +-
> 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/irqflags.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/irqflags.h
> index 02427b205c11..7353a88b2ae2 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/irqflags.h
> +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/irqflags.h
> @@ -37,12 +37,19 @@ static __always_inline void __arch_local_irq_ssm(unsigned long flags)
> asm volatile("ssm %0" : : "Q" (flags) : "memory");
> }
>
> -static __always_inline unsigned long arch_local_save_flags(void)
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
> +#define ARCH_LOCAL_IRQ_ATTRIBUTES \
> + noinline notrace __no_sanitize_memory __maybe_unused
> +#else
> +#define ARCH_LOCAL_IRQ_ATTRIBUTES __always_inline
> +#endif
> +
> +static ARCH_LOCAL_IRQ_ATTRIBUTES unsigned long arch_local_save_flags(void)
> {
Please change this to lower case and long single lines, so it matches the
more common patterns:
#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
#define __arch_local_irq_attributes noinline notrace __no_sanitize_memory __maybe_unused
#else
#define __arch_local_irq_attributes __always_inline
#endif
static __arch_local_irq_attributes unsigned long arch_local_save_flags(void)
...
On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 12:24:48AM +0100, Ilya Leoshkevich wrote:
> The pages for the KMSAN metadata associated with most kernel mappings
> are taken from memblock by the common code. However, vmalloc and module
> metadata needs to be defined by the architectures.
>
> Be a little bit more careful than x86: allocate exactly MODULES_LEN
> for the module shadow and origins, and then take 2/3 of vmalloc for
> the vmalloc shadow and origins. This ensures that users passing small
> vmalloc= values on the command line do not cause module metadata
> collisions.
>
> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/s390/boot/startup.c | 8 ++++++++
> arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h | 10 ++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/s390/boot/startup.c b/arch/s390/boot/startup.c
> index 8104e0e3d188..e37e7ffda430 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/boot/startup.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/boot/startup.c
> @@ -253,9 +253,17 @@ static unsigned long setup_kernel_memory_layout(void)
> MODULES_END = round_down(__abs_lowcore, _SEGMENT_SIZE);
> MODULES_VADDR = MODULES_END - MODULES_LEN;
> VMALLOC_END = MODULES_VADDR;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
> + VMALLOC_END -= MODULES_LEN * 2;
> +#endif
>
> /* allow vmalloc area to occupy up to about 1/2 of the rest virtual space left */
> vmalloc_size = min(vmalloc_size, round_down(VMALLOC_END / 2, _REGION3_SIZE));
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
> + /* take 2/3 of vmalloc area for KMSAN shadow and origins */
> + vmalloc_size = round_down(vmalloc_size / 3, _REGION3_SIZE);
> + VMALLOC_END -= vmalloc_size * 2;
> +#endif
Please use
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KMSAN))
above, since this way we get more compile time checks.
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
> +#define KMSAN_VMALLOC_SIZE (VMALLOC_END - VMALLOC_START)
> +#define KMSAN_VMALLOC_SHADOW_START VMALLOC_END
> +#define KMSAN_VMALLOC_ORIGIN_START (KMSAN_VMALLOC_SHADOW_START + \
> + KMSAN_VMALLOC_SIZE)
> +#define KMSAN_MODULES_SHADOW_START (KMSAN_VMALLOC_ORIGIN_START + \
> + KMSAN_VMALLOC_SIZE)
Long single lines for these, please :)
With that, and Alexander Gordeev's comments addressed:
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 12:24:50AM +0100, Ilya Leoshkevich wrote:
> This is normally done by the generic entry code, but the
> kernel_stack_overflow() flow bypasses it.
>
> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/s390/kernel/traps.c | 6 ++++++
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 12:24:52AM +0100, Ilya Leoshkevich wrote:
> The unwind code can read uninitialized frames. Furthermore, even in
> the good case, KMSAN does not emit shadow for backchains. Therefore
> disable it for the unwinding functions.
>
> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/s390/kernel/unwind_bc.c | 4 ++++
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 12:24:49AM +0100, Ilya Leoshkevich wrote:
> Add KMSAN support for the s390 implementations of the string functions.
> Do this similar to how it's already done for KASAN, except that the
> optimized memset{16,32,64}() functions need to be disabled: it's
> important for KMSAN to know that they initialized something.
>
> The way boot code is built with regard to string functions is
> problematic, since most files think it's configured with sanitizers,
> but boot/string.c doesn't. This creates various problems with the
> memset64() definitions, depending on whether the code is built with
> sanitizers or fortify. This should probably be streamlined, but in the
> meantime resolve the issues by introducing the IN_BOOT_STRING_C macro,
> similar to the existing IN_ARCH_STRING_C macro.
>
> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/s390/boot/string.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> arch/s390/include/asm/string.h | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
> 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 12:24:53AM +0100, Ilya Leoshkevich wrote:
> arch_kmsan_get_meta_or_null() finds the lowcore shadow by querying the
> prefix and calling kmsan_get_metadata() again.
>
> kmsan_virt_addr_valid() delegates to virt_addr_valid().
>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/s390/include/asm/kmsan.h | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+)
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 12:24:54AM +0100, Ilya Leoshkevich wrote:
> Now that everything else is in place, enable KMSAN in Kconfig.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
On 12/14/23 00:24, Ilya Leoshkevich wrote:
> Even though the KMSAN warnings generated by memchr_inv() are suppressed
> by metadata_access_enable(), its return value may still be poisoned.
>
> The reason is that the last iteration of memchr_inv() returns
> `*start != value ? start : NULL`, where *start is poisoned. Because of
> this, somewhat counterintuitively, the shadow value computed by
> visitSelectInst() is equal to `(uintptr_t)start`.
>
> The intention behind guarding memchr_inv() behind
> metadata_access_enable() is to touch poisoned metadata without
> triggering KMSAN, so unpoison its return value.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
> ---
> mm/slub.c | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index 2d29d368894c..802702748925 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -1076,6 +1076,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab,
> metadata_access_enable();
> fault = memchr_inv(kasan_reset_tag(start), value, bytes);
> metadata_access_disable();
> + kmsan_unpoison_memory(&fault, sizeof(fault));
> if (!fault)
> return 1;
>
> @@ -1182,6 +1183,7 @@ static void slab_pad_check(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab)
> metadata_access_enable();
> fault = memchr_inv(kasan_reset_tag(pad), POISON_INUSE, remainder);
> metadata_access_disable();
> + kmsan_unpoison_memory(&fault, sizeof(fault));
> if (!fault)
> return;
> while (end > fault && end[-1] == POISON_INUSE)
On Tue, Jan 02, 2024 at 04:05:31PM +0100, Heiko Carstens wrote:
Hi Heiko,
...
> > @@ -253,9 +253,17 @@ static unsigned long setup_kernel_memory_layout(void)
> > MODULES_END = round_down(__abs_lowcore, _SEGMENT_SIZE);
> > MODULES_VADDR = MODULES_END - MODULES_LEN;
> > VMALLOC_END = MODULES_VADDR;
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
> > + VMALLOC_END -= MODULES_LEN * 2;
> > +#endif
> >
> > /* allow vmalloc area to occupy up to about 1/2 of the rest virtual space left */
> > vmalloc_size = min(vmalloc_size, round_down(VMALLOC_END / 2, _REGION3_SIZE));
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
> > + /* take 2/3 of vmalloc area for KMSAN shadow and origins */
> > + vmalloc_size = round_down(vmalloc_size / 3, _REGION3_SIZE);
> > + VMALLOC_END -= vmalloc_size * 2;
> > +#endif
>
> Please use
>
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KMSAN))
>
> above, since this way we get more compile time checks.
This way we will get a mixture of CONFIG_KASAN and CONFIG_KMSAN
#ifdef vs IS_ENABLED() checks within one function. I guess, we
would rather address it with a separate cleanup?
Thanks!
On Thu, Jan 04, 2024 at 11:03:42AM +0100, Alexander Gordeev wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 02, 2024 at 04:05:31PM +0100, Heiko Carstens wrote:
> Hi Heiko,
> ...
> > > @@ -253,9 +253,17 @@ static unsigned long setup_kernel_memory_layout(void)
> > > MODULES_END = round_down(__abs_lowcore, _SEGMENT_SIZE);
> > > MODULES_VADDR = MODULES_END - MODULES_LEN;
> > > VMALLOC_END = MODULES_VADDR;
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
> > > + VMALLOC_END -= MODULES_LEN * 2;
> > > +#endif
> > >
> > > /* allow vmalloc area to occupy up to about 1/2 of the rest virtual space left */
> > > vmalloc_size = min(vmalloc_size, round_down(VMALLOC_END / 2, _REGION3_SIZE));
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
> > > + /* take 2/3 of vmalloc area for KMSAN shadow and origins */
> > > + vmalloc_size = round_down(vmalloc_size / 3, _REGION3_SIZE);
> > > + VMALLOC_END -= vmalloc_size * 2;
> > > +#endif
> >
> > Please use
> >
> > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KMSAN))
> >
> > above, since this way we get more compile time checks.
>
> This way we will get a mixture of CONFIG_KASAN and CONFIG_KMSAN
> #ifdef vs IS_ENABLED() checks within one function. I guess, we
> would rather address it with a separate cleanup?
I don't think so, since you can't convert the CONFIG_KASAN ifdef to
IS_ENABLED() here: it won't compile.
But IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KMSAN) should work. I highly prefer IS_ENABLED() over
ifdef since it allows for better compile time checks, and you won't be
surprised by code that doesn't compile if you just change a config option.
We've seen that way too often.