There were questions about the presence and cause of unsolicited syscall events
in the logs containing NETFILTER_CFG records and sometimes unaccompanied
NETFILTER_CFG records.
During testing at least the following list of events trigger NETFILTER_CFG
records and the syscalls related (There may be more events that will trigger
this message type.):
init_module, finit_module: modprobe
delete_module: rmmod
setsockopt: iptables-restore, ip6tables-restore, ebtables-restore
unshare: (h?)ostnamed, updatedb
clone: libvirtd
kernel threads garbage collecting empty ebtables
The syscall events unsolicited by any audit rule were found to be caused by a
missing !audit_dummy_context() check before issuing a NETFILTER_CFG
record. In fact, since this is a configuration change it is required,
and we always want the accompanying syscall record even with no rules
present, so this has been addressed by ghak120.
The vast majority of unaccompanied records are caused by the fedora default
rule: "-a never,task" and the occasional early startup one is I believe caused
by the iptables filter table module hard linked into the kernel rather than a
loadable module.
A couple of other factors should help eliminate unaccompanied records
which include commit cb74ed278f80 ("audit: always enable syscall
auditing when supported and audit is enabled") which makes sure that
when audit is enabled, so automatically is syscall auditing, and ghak66
which addressed initializing audit before PID 1.
Ebtables module initialization to register tables doesn't generate records
because it was never hooked in to audit. Recommend adding audit hooks to log
this covered by ghak43 covered by patch 1.
Table unregistration was never logged, which is now covered by ghak44 in
patch 2. Unaccompanied records were caused by kernel threads
automatically unregistering empty ebtables, which necessitates adding
subject credentials covered in patch 3.
Seemingly duplicate records are not actually exact duplicates that are caused
by netfilter table initialization in different network namespaces from the same
syscall. Recommend adding the network namespace ID (proc inode and dev)
to the record to make this obvious (address later with ghak79 after nsid
patches).
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/25
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/35
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/43
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/44
Changelog:
v3
- rebase on v5.6-rc1 audit/next
- change audit_nf_cfg to audit_log_nfcfg
- squash 2,3,4,5 to 1 and update patch descriptions
- add subject credentials to cover garbage collecting kernel threads
v2
- Rebase (audit/next 5.5-rc1) to get audit_context access and ebt_register_table ret code
- Split x_tables and ebtables updates
- Check audit_dummy_context
- Store struct audit_nfcfg params in audit_context, abstract to audit_nf_cfg() call
- Restore back to "table, family, entries" from "family, table, entries"
- Log unregistration of tables
- Add "op=" at the end of the AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG record
- Defer nsid patch (ghak79) to once nsid patchset upstreamed (ghak32)
- Add ghak refs
- Ditch NETFILTER_CFGSOLO record
Richard Guy Briggs (3):
audit: tidy and extend netfilter_cfg x_tables and ebtables logging
netfilter: add audit table unregister actions
audit: add subj creds to NETFILTER_CFG record to cover async
unregister
include/linux/audit.h | 20 +++++++++++++++++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 14 ++++++--------
net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 14 +++++---------
4 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
--
1.8.3.1
Audit the action of unregistering ebtables and x_tables.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/44
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/auditsc.c | 5 +++--
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 2 ++
net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 2 ++
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index f4aed2b9be8d..17427c41cc29 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ struct audit_ntp_data {
enum audit_nfcfgop {
AUDIT_XT_OP_REGISTER,
AUDIT_XT_OP_REPLACE,
+ AUDIT_XT_OP_UNREGISTER,
};
extern int is_audit_feature_set(int which);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index f4e342125dd9..dbb056feccb9 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -136,8 +136,9 @@ struct audit_nfcfgop_tab {
};
const struct audit_nfcfgop_tab audit_nfcfgs[] = {
- { AUDIT_XT_OP_REGISTER, "register" },
- { AUDIT_XT_OP_REPLACE, "replace" },
+ { AUDIT_XT_OP_REGISTER, "register" },
+ { AUDIT_XT_OP_REPLACE, "replace" },
+ { AUDIT_XT_OP_UNREGISTER, "unregister" },
};
static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
index 55f9409c3ee0..b3a2e6ea516c 100644
--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
+++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
@@ -1124,6 +1124,8 @@ static void __ebt_unregister_table(struct net *net, struct ebt_table *table)
mutex_lock(&ebt_mutex);
list_del(&table->list);
mutex_unlock(&ebt_mutex);
+ audit_log_nfcfg(table->name, AF_BRIDGE, table->private->nentries,
+ AUDIT_XT_OP_UNREGISTER);
EBT_ENTRY_ITERATE(table->private->entries, table->private->entries_size,
ebt_cleanup_entry, net, NULL);
if (table->private->nentries)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
index db5cbcf43748..e43720a7783b 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
@@ -1472,6 +1472,8 @@ void *xt_unregister_table(struct xt_table *table)
private = table->private;
list_del(&table->list);
mutex_unlock(&xt[table->af].mutex);
+ audit_log_nfcfg(table->name, table->af, private->number,
+ AUDIT_XT_OP_UNREGISTER);
kfree(table);
return private;
--
1.8.3.1
Some table unregister actions seem to be initiated by the kernel to
garbage collect unused tables that are not initiated by any userspace
actions. It was found to be necessary to add the subject credentials to
cover this case to reveal the source of these actions. A sample record:
type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-03-11 21:25:21.491:269) : table=nat family=bridge entries=0 op=unregister pid=153 uid=root auid=unset tty=(none) ses=unset subj=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 comm=kworker/u4:2 exe=(null)
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
---
kernel/auditsc.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index dbb056feccb9..6c233076dfb7 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2557,12 +2557,30 @@ void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,
enum audit_nfcfgop op)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ const struct cred *cred;
+ struct tty_struct *tty;
+ char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG);
if (!ab)
return;
audit_log_format(ab, "table=%s family=%u entries=%u op=%s",
name, af, nentries, audit_nfcfgs[op].s);
+
+ cred = current_cred();
+ tty = audit_get_tty();
+ audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%u uid=%u auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
+ task_pid_nr(current),
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+ tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
+ audit_get_sessionid(current));
+ audit_put_tty(tty);
+ audit_log_task_context(ab); /* subj= */
+ audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
+ audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm); /* exe= */
+
audit_log_end(ab);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_log_nfcfg);
--
1.8.3.1
On 2020-03-17 17:30, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> Some table unregister actions seem to be initiated by the kernel to
> garbage collect unused tables that are not initiated by any userspace
> actions. It was found to be necessary to add the subject credentials to
> cover this case to reveal the source of these actions. A sample record:
>
> type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-03-11 21:25:21.491:269) : table=nat family=bridge entries=0 op=unregister pid=153 uid=root auid=unset tty=(none) ses=unset subj=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 comm=kworker/u4:2 exe=(null)
Given the precedent set by bpf unload, I'd really rather drop this patch
that adds subject credentials.
Similarly with ghak25's subject credentials, but they were already
present and that would change an existing record format, so it isn't
quite as justifiable in that case.
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> ---
> kernel/auditsc.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index dbb056feccb9..6c233076dfb7 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -2557,12 +2557,30 @@ void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,
> enum audit_nfcfgop op)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> + const struct cred *cred;
> + struct tty_struct *tty;
> + char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
>
> ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG);
> if (!ab)
> return;
> audit_log_format(ab, "table=%s family=%u entries=%u op=%s",
> name, af, nentries, audit_nfcfgs[op].s);
> +
> + cred = current_cred();
> + tty = audit_get_tty();
> + audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%u uid=%u auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
> + task_pid_nr(current),
> + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
> + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
> + tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
> + audit_get_sessionid(current));
> + audit_put_tty(tty);
> + audit_log_task_context(ab); /* subj= */
> + audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
> + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
> + audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm); /* exe= */
> +
> audit_log_end(ab);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_log_nfcfg);
> --
> 1.8.3.1
>
> --
> Linux-audit mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On Wed, Mar 18, 2020 at 9:12 AM Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 2020-03-17 17:30, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > Some table unregister actions seem to be initiated by the kernel to
> > garbage collect unused tables that are not initiated by any userspace
> > actions. It was found to be necessary to add the subject credentials to
> > cover this case to reveal the source of these actions. A sample record:
> >
> > type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-03-11 21:25:21.491:269) : table=nat family=bridge entries=0 op=unregister pid=153 uid=root auid=unset tty=(none) ses=unset subj=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 comm=kworker/u4:2 exe=(null)
>
> Given the precedent set by bpf unload, I'd really rather drop this patch
> that adds subject credentials.
>
> Similarly with ghak25's subject credentials, but they were already
> present and that would change an existing record format, so it isn't
> quite as justifiable in that case.
Your comments have me confused - do you want this patch (v3 3/3)
considered for merging or no?
--
paul moore
http://www.paul-moore.com
On 2020-03-18 17:22, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 18, 2020 at 9:12 AM Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 2020-03-17 17:30, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > Some table unregister actions seem to be initiated by the kernel to
> > > garbage collect unused tables that are not initiated by any userspace
> > > actions. It was found to be necessary to add the subject credentials to
> > > cover this case to reveal the source of these actions. A sample record:
> > >
> > > type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-03-11 21:25:21.491:269) : table=nat family=bridge entries=0 op=unregister pid=153 uid=root auid=unset tty=(none) ses=unset subj=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 comm=kworker/u4:2 exe=(null)
> >
> > Given the precedent set by bpf unload, I'd really rather drop this patch
> > that adds subject credentials.
> >
> > Similarly with ghak25's subject credentials, but they were already
> > present and that would change an existing record format, so it isn't
> > quite as justifiable in that case.
>
> Your comments have me confused - do you want this patch (v3 3/3)
> considered for merging or no?
I would like it considered for merging if you think it will be required
to provide enough information about the event that happenned. In the
bpf unload case, there is a program number to provide a link to a
previous load action. In this case, we won't know for sure what caused
the table to be unloaded if the number of entries was empty. I'm still
trying to decide if it matters. For the sake of caution I think it
should be included. I don't like it, but I think it needs to be
included.
> paul moore
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On Wed, Mar 18, 2020 at 5:33 PM Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 2020-03-18 17:22, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 18, 2020 at 9:12 AM Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 2020-03-17 17:30, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > > Some table unregister actions seem to be initiated by the kernel to
> > > > garbage collect unused tables that are not initiated by any userspace
> > > > actions. It was found to be necessary to add the subject credentials to
> > > > cover this case to reveal the source of these actions. A sample record:
> > > >
> > > > type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-03-11 21:25:21.491:269) : table=nat family=bridge entries=0 op=unregister pid=153 uid=root auid=unset tty=(none) ses=unset subj=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 comm=kworker/u4:2 exe=(null)
> > >
> > > Given the precedent set by bpf unload, I'd really rather drop this patch
> > > that adds subject credentials.
> > >
> > > Similarly with ghak25's subject credentials, but they were already
> > > present and that would change an existing record format, so it isn't
> > > quite as justifiable in that case.
> >
> > Your comments have me confused - do you want this patch (v3 3/3)
> > considered for merging or no?
>
> I would like it considered for merging if you think it will be required
> to provide enough information about the event that happenned. In the
> bpf unload case, there is a program number to provide a link to a
> previous load action. In this case, we won't know for sure what caused
> the table to be unloaded if the number of entries was empty. I'm still
> trying to decide if it matters. For the sake of caution I think it
> should be included. I don't like it, but I think it needs to be
> included.
I'm in the middle of building patches 1/3 and 2/3, assuming all goes
well I'll merge them into audit/next (expect mail soon), however I'm
going back and forth on this patch. Like you I kinda don't like it,
and with both of us not in love with this patch I have to ask if there
is certification requirement for this? I know about the generic
subj/obj requirements, but in the case where there is no associated
task/syscall/etc. information it isn't like the extra fields supplied
in this patch are going to have much information in that regard; it's
really the *absence* of that information which is telling. Which
brings me to wonder if simply the lack of any associated records in
this event is enough? Before when we weren't associating records into
a single event it would have been a problem, but the way things
currently are, if there are no other records (and you have configured
that) then I think you have everything you need to know.
Thoughts?
--
paul moore
http://www.paul-moore.com
On Friday, April 17, 2020 5:53:47 PM EDT Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 18, 2020 at 5:33 PM Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 2020-03-18 17:22, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > On Wed, Mar 18, 2020 at 9:12 AM Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
wrote:
> > > > On 2020-03-17 17:30, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > > > Some table unregister actions seem to be initiated by the kernel to
> > > > > garbage collect unused tables that are not initiated by any
> > > > > userspace actions. It was found to be necessary to add the subject
> > > > > credentials to cover this case to reveal the source of these
> > > > > actions. A sample record:
> > > > > type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-03-11 21:25:21.491:269) :
> > > > > table=nat family=bridge entries=0 op=unregister pid=153 uid=root
> > > > > auid=unset tty=(none) ses=unset
> > > > > subj=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 comm=kworker/u4:2 exe=(null)
If this is the kernel, why is pid not 0? And if pid is 0, then isn't
exe=/boot/vmlinuz-X.Y.Z-blah?
> > > > Given the precedent set by bpf unload, I'd really rather drop this
> > > > patch that adds subject credentials.
<snip>
> I'm in the middle of building patches 1/3 and 2/3, assuming all goes
> well I'll merge them into audit/next (expect mail soon), however I'm
> going back and forth on this patch. Like you I kinda don't like it,
> and with both of us not in love with this patch I have to ask if there
> is certification requirement for this?
Yes, any change to information flow must be auditable.
> I know about the generic
> subj/obj requirements, but in the case where there is no associated
> task/syscall/etc. information it isn't like the extra fields supplied
> in this patch are going to have much information in that regard; it's
> really the *absence* of that information which is telling.
Exactly. But if someone does a search based on the fields, they need to be
able to find this record. For example, suppose I want to know what actions
have been performed by kernel_t, I can run a search and find this event.
> Which brings me to wonder if simply the lack of any associated records in
> this event is enough? Before when we weren't associating records into
> a single event it would have been a problem, but the way things
> currently are, if there are no other records (and you have configured
> that) then I think you have everything you need to know.
>
> Thoughts?
You can't search on the absense of information. There are some fields that
have meaning. It's OK if they are unset. It happens for daemons, too. But we
don't remove the fields because of it. It tells part of the story.
-Steve
On 2020-04-21 11:15, Steve Grubb wrote:
> On Friday, April 17, 2020 5:53:47 PM EDT Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 18, 2020 at 5:33 PM Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 2020-03-18 17:22, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Mar 18, 2020 at 9:12 AM Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> wrote:
> > > > > On 2020-03-17 17:30, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > > > > Some table unregister actions seem to be initiated by the kernel to
> > > > > > garbage collect unused tables that are not initiated by any
> > > > > > userspace actions. It was found to be necessary to add the subject
> > > > > > credentials to cover this case to reveal the source of these
> > > > > > actions. A sample record:
> > > > > > type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-03-11 21:25:21.491:269) :
> > > > > > table=nat family=bridge entries=0 op=unregister pid=153 uid=root
> > > > > > auid=unset tty=(none) ses=unset
> > > > > > subj=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 comm=kworker/u4:2 exe=(null)
>
> If this is the kernel, why is pid not 0? And if pid is 0, then isn't
> exe=/boot/vmlinuz-X.Y.Z-blah?
It isn't PID 0 because it is a kernel thread.
> > > > > Given the precedent set by bpf unload, I'd really rather drop this
> > > > > patch that adds subject credentials.
>
> <snip>
>
> > I'm in the middle of building patches 1/3 and 2/3, assuming all goes
> > well I'll merge them into audit/next (expect mail soon), however I'm
> > going back and forth on this patch. Like you I kinda don't like it,
> > and with both of us not in love with this patch I have to ask if there
> > is certification requirement for this?
>
> Yes, any change to information flow must be auditable.
>
> > I know about the generic
> > subj/obj requirements, but in the case where there is no associated
> > task/syscall/etc. information it isn't like the extra fields supplied
> > in this patch are going to have much information in that regard; it's
> > really the *absence* of that information which is telling.
>
> Exactly. But if someone does a search based on the fields, they need to be
> able to find this record. For example, suppose I want to know what actions
> have been performed by kernel_t, I can run a search and find this event.
>
> > Which brings me to wonder if simply the lack of any associated records in
> > this event is enough? Before when we weren't associating records into
> > a single event it would have been a problem, but the way things
> > currently are, if there are no other records (and you have configured
> > that) then I think you have everything you need to know.
> >
> > Thoughts?
>
> You can't search on the absense of information. There are some fields that
> have meaning. It's OK if they are unset. It happens for daemons, too. But we
> don't remove the fields because of it. It tells part of the story.
>
> -Steve
>
>
> --
> Linux-audit mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On 2020-04-17 17:53, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 18, 2020 at 5:33 PM Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 2020-03-18 17:22, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > On Wed, Mar 18, 2020 at 9:12 AM Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > > On 2020-03-17 17:30, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > > > Some table unregister actions seem to be initiated by the kernel to
> > > > > garbage collect unused tables that are not initiated by any userspace
> > > > > actions. It was found to be necessary to add the subject credentials to
> > > > > cover this case to reveal the source of these actions. A sample record:
> > > > >
> > > > > type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-03-11 21:25:21.491:269) : table=nat family=bridge entries=0 op=unregister pid=153 uid=root auid=unset tty=(none) ses=unset subj=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 comm=kworker/u4:2 exe=(null)
> > > >
> > > > Given the precedent set by bpf unload, I'd really rather drop this patch
> > > > that adds subject credentials.
> > > >
> > > > Similarly with ghak25's subject credentials, but they were already
> > > > present and that would change an existing record format, so it isn't
> > > > quite as justifiable in that case.
> > >
> > > Your comments have me confused - do you want this patch (v3 3/3)
> > > considered for merging or no?
> >
> > I would like it considered for merging if you think it will be required
> > to provide enough information about the event that happenned. In the
> > bpf unload case, there is a program number to provide a link to a
> > previous load action. In this case, we won't know for sure what caused
> > the table to be unloaded if the number of entries was empty. I'm still
> > trying to decide if it matters. For the sake of caution I think it
> > should be included. I don't like it, but I think it needs to be
> > included.
>
> I'm in the middle of building patches 1/3 and 2/3, assuming all goes
> well I'll merge them into audit/next (expect mail soon), however I'm
> going back and forth on this patch. Like you I kinda don't like it,
> and with both of us not in love with this patch I have to ask if there
> is certification requirement for this? I know about the generic
> subj/obj requirements, but in the case where there is no associated
> task/syscall/etc. information it isn't like the extra fields supplied
> in this patch are going to have much information in that regard; it's
> really the *absence* of that information which is telling. Which
> brings me to wonder if simply the lack of any associated records in
> this event is enough? Before when we weren't associating records into
> a single event it would have been a problem, but the way things
> currently are, if there are no other records (and you have configured
> that) then I think you have everything you need to know.
>
> Thoughts?
I'm good dropping that third patch, but Steve's perspective is more
authoritative here.
I'll respin patch 1/3 and 2/3 to fix the checkpatch.pl errors if you
prefer (was erroneously mentioned in ghak28 feedback).
> paul moore
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635