2018-12-22 17:51:13

by Gustavo A. R. Silva

Subject: [PATCH] phonet: af_phonet: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability

protocol is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

net/phonet/af_phonet.c:48 phonet_proto_get() warn: potential spectre issue 'proto_tab' [w] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing protocol before using it to index proto_tab.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
---
net/phonet/af_phonet.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/phonet/af_phonet.c b/net/phonet/af_phonet.c
index 3b0ef691f5b1..d4b2abd78858 100644
--- a/net/phonet/af_phonet.c
+++ b/net/phonet/af_phonet.c
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
#include <net/phonet/phonet.h>
#include <net/phonet/pn_dev.h>

+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
/* Transport protocol registration */
static const struct phonet_protocol *proto_tab[PHONET_NPROTO] __read_mostly;

@@ -43,6 +45,7 @@ static const struct phonet_protocol *phonet_proto_get(unsigned int protocol)

if (protocol >= PHONET_NPROTO)
return NULL;
+ protocol = array_index_nospec(protocol, PHONET_NPROTO);

rcu_read_lock();
pp = rcu_dereference(proto_tab[protocol]);
--
2.20.1

2018-12-23 16:29:39

by Rémi Denis-Courmont

Subject: Re: [PATCH] phonet: af_phonet: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability

Le vendredi 21 d?cembre 2018, 23:41:17 EET Gustavo A. R. Silva a ?crit :
> protocol is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

No objections but AFAIR, only privileged userspace can trigger that code so
the impact is kinda limited.

--
R?mi Denis-Courmont

2018-12-23 16:33:46

by David Miller

Subject: Re: [PATCH] phonet: af_phonet: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability

From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 21 Dec 2018 15:41:17 -0600

> protocol is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>
> net/phonet/af_phonet.c:48 phonet_proto_get() warn: potential spectre issue 'proto_tab' [w] (local cap)
>
> Fix this by sanitizing protocol before using it to index proto_tab.
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>

Applied, thanks.