2021-12-15 17:28:24

by Greg KH

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 00/18] 5.4.166-rc1 review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.166 release.
There are 18 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Fri, 17 Dec 2021 17:20:14 +0000.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.166-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 5.4.166-rc1

Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
arm: ioremap: don't abuse pfn_valid() to check if pfn is in RAM

Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
arm: extend pfn_valid to take into account freed memory map alignment

Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
memblock: ensure there is no overflow in memblock_overlaps_region()

Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
memblock: align freed memory map on pageblock boundaries with SPARSEMEM

Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
memblock: free_unused_memmap: use pageblock units instead of MAX_ORDER

Armin Wolf <[email protected]>
hwmon: (dell-smm) Fix warning on /proc/i8k creation error

Bui Quang Minh <[email protected]>
bpf: Fix integer overflow in argument calculation for bpf_map_area_alloc

Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>
selinux: fix race condition when computing ocontext SIDs

Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: x86: Ignore sparse banks size for an "all CPUs", non-sparse IPI req

Chen Jun <[email protected]>
tracing: Fix a kmemleak false positive in tracing_map

Perry Yuan <[email protected]>
drm/amd/display: add connector type check for CRC source set

Mustapha Ghaddar <[email protected]>
drm/amd/display: Fix for the no Audio bug with Tiled Displays

Harshit Mogalapalli <[email protected]>
net: netlink: af_netlink: Prevent empty skb by adding a check on len.

Ondrej Jirman <[email protected]>
i2c: rk3x: Handle a spurious start completion interrupt flag

Helge Deller <[email protected]>
parisc/agp: Annotate parisc agp init functions with __init

Erik Ekman <[email protected]>
net/mlx4_en: Update reported link modes for 1/10G

Philip Chen <[email protected]>
drm/msm/dsi: set default num_data_lanes

Tadeusz Struk <[email protected]>
nfc: fix segfault in nfc_genl_dump_devices_done


-------------

Diffstat:

Makefile | 4 +-
arch/arm/mm/init.c | 37 +++--
arch/arm/mm/ioremap.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c | 7 +-
drivers/char/agp/parisc-agp.c | 6 +-
.../gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_crc.c | 8 ++
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_resource.c | 4 +
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dsi/dsi_host.c | 2 +
drivers/hwmon/dell-smm-hwmon.c | 7 +-
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-rk3x.c | 4 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_ethtool.c | 6 +-
kernel/bpf/devmap.c | 4 +-
kernel/trace/tracing_map.c | 3 +
mm/memblock.c | 3 +-
net/core/sock_map.c | 2 +-
net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 5 +
net/nfc/netlink.c | 6 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 159 +++++++++++----------
18 files changed, 166 insertions(+), 105 deletions(-)




2021-12-15 17:28:27

by Greg KH

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 10/18] KVM: x86: Ignore sparse banks size for an "all CPUs", non-sparse IPI req

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit 3244867af8c065e51969f1bffe732d3ebfd9a7d2 upstream.

Do not bail early if there are no bits set in the sparse banks for a
non-sparse, a.k.a. "all CPUs", IPI request. Per the Hyper-V spec, it is
legal to have a variable length of '0', e.g. VP_SET's BankContents in
this case, if the request can be serviced without the extra info.

It is possible that for a given invocation of a hypercall that does
accept variable sized input headers that all the header input fits
entirely within the fixed size header. In such cases the variable sized
input header is zero-sized and the corresponding bits in the hypercall
input should be set to zero.

Bailing early results in KVM failing to send IPIs to all CPUs as expected
by the guest.

Fixes: 214ff83d4473 ("KVM: x86: hyperv: implement PV IPI send hypercalls")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
@@ -1501,11 +1501,13 @@ static u64 kvm_hv_send_ipi(struct kvm_vc

all_cpus = send_ipi_ex.vp_set.format == HV_GENERIC_SET_ALL;

+ if (all_cpus)
+ goto check_and_send_ipi;
+
if (!sparse_banks_len)
goto ret_success;

- if (!all_cpus &&
- kvm_read_guest(kvm,
+ if (kvm_read_guest(kvm,
ingpa + offsetof(struct hv_send_ipi_ex,
vp_set.bank_contents),
sparse_banks,
@@ -1513,6 +1515,7 @@ static u64 kvm_hv_send_ipi(struct kvm_vc
return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
}

+check_and_send_ipi:
if ((vector < HV_IPI_LOW_VECTOR) || (vector > HV_IPI_HIGH_VECTOR))
return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;




2021-12-15 17:28:42

by Greg KH

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 11/18] selinux: fix race condition when computing ocontext SIDs

From: Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>

commit cbfcd13be5cb2a07868afe67520ed181956579a7 upstream.

Current code contains a lot of racy patterns when converting an
ocontext's context structure to an SID. This is being done in a "lazy"
fashion, such that the SID is looked up in the SID table only when it's
first needed and then cached in the "sid" field of the ocontext
structure. However, this is done without any locking or memory barriers
and is thus unsafe.

Between commits 24ed7fdae669 ("selinux: use separate table for initial
SID lookup") and 66f8e2f03c02 ("selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash
table"), this race condition lead to an actual observable bug, because a
pointer to the shared sid field was passed directly to
sidtab_context_to_sid(), which was using this location to also store an
intermediate value, which could have been read by other threads and
interpreted as an SID. In practice this caused e.g. new mounts to get a
wrong (seemingly random) filesystem context, leading to strange denials.
This bug has been spotted in the wild at least twice, see [1] and [2].

Fix the race condition by making all the racy functions use a common
helper that ensures the ocontext::sid accesses are made safely using the
appropriate SMP constructs.

Note that security_netif_sid() was populating the sid field of both
contexts stored in the ocontext, but only the first one was actually
used. The SELinux wiki's documentation on the "netifcon" policy
statement [3] suggests that using only the first context is intentional.
I kept only the handling of the first context here, as there is really
no point in doing the SID lookup for the unused one.

I wasn't able to reproduce the bug mentioned above on any kernel that
includes commit 66f8e2f03c02, even though it has been reported that the
issue occurs with that commit, too, just less frequently. Thus, I wasn't
able to verify that this patch fixes the issue, but it makes sense to
avoid the race condition regardless.

[1] https://github.com/containers/container-selinux/issues/89
[2] https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/thread/6DMTAMHIOAOEMUAVTULJD45JZU7IBAFM/
[3] https://selinuxproject.org/page/NetworkStatements#netifcon

Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Xinjie Zheng <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sujithra Periasamy <[email protected]>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
[vijayb: Backport contextual differences are due to v5.10 RCU related
changes are not in 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Vijay Balakrishna <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 159 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 87 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)

--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2251,6 +2251,43 @@ size_t security_policydb_len(struct seli
}

/**
+ * ocontext_to_sid - Helper to safely get sid for an ocontext
+ * @sidtab: SID table
+ * @c: ocontext structure
+ * @index: index of the context entry (0 or 1)
+ * @out_sid: pointer to the resulting SID value
+ *
+ * For all ocontexts except OCON_ISID the SID fields are populated
+ * on-demand when needed. Since updating the SID value is an SMP-sensitive
+ * operation, this helper must be used to do that safely.
+ *
+ * WARNING: This function may return -ESTALE, indicating that the caller
+ * must retry the operation after re-acquiring the policy pointer!
+ */
+static int ocontext_to_sid(struct sidtab *sidtab, struct ocontext *c,
+ size_t index, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ int rc;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ /* Ensure the associated sidtab entry is visible to this thread. */
+ sid = smp_load_acquire(&c->sid[index]);
+ if (!sid) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[index], &sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure the new sidtab entry is visible to other threads
+ * when they see the SID.
+ */
+ smp_store_release(&c->sid[index], sid);
+ }
+ *out_sid = sid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
* security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
* @protocol: protocol number
* @port: port number
@@ -2262,10 +2299,12 @@ int security_port_sid(struct selinux_sta
struct policydb *policydb;
struct sidtab *sidtab;
struct ocontext *c;
- int rc = 0;
+ int rc;

read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);

+retry:
+ rc = 0;
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;

@@ -2279,14 +2318,11 @@ int security_port_sid(struct selinux_sta
}

if (c) {
- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
- &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- }
- *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE)
+ goto retry;
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else {
*out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
}
@@ -2308,10 +2344,12 @@ int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_
struct policydb *policydb;
struct sidtab *sidtab;
struct ocontext *c;
- int rc = 0;
+ int rc;

read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);

+retry:
+ rc = 0;
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;

@@ -2326,14 +2364,11 @@ int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_
}

if (c) {
- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
- &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- }
- *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE)
+ goto retry;
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else
*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;

@@ -2354,10 +2389,12 @@ int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selin
struct policydb *policydb;
struct sidtab *sidtab;
struct ocontext *c;
- int rc = 0;
+ int rc;

read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);

+retry:
+ rc = 0;
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;

@@ -2373,14 +2410,11 @@ int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selin
}

if (c) {
- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
- &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- }
- *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE)
+ goto retry;
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else
*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;

@@ -2399,11 +2433,13 @@ int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_st
{
struct policydb *policydb;
struct sidtab *sidtab;
- int rc = 0;
+ int rc;
struct ocontext *c;

read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);

+retry:
+ rc = 0;
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;

@@ -2415,19 +2451,11 @@ int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_st
}

if (c) {
- if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
- &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
- &c->context[1],
- &c->sid[1]);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- }
- *if_sid = c->sid[0];
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, if_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE)
+ goto retry;
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else
*if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;

@@ -2469,6 +2497,7 @@ int security_node_sid(struct selinux_sta

read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);

+retry:
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;

@@ -2511,14 +2540,11 @@ int security_node_sid(struct selinux_sta
}

if (c) {
- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
- &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- }
- *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE)
+ goto retry;
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else {
*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
}
@@ -2677,7 +2703,7 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(s
u16 sclass;
struct genfs *genfs;
struct ocontext *c;
- int rc, cmp = 0;
+ int cmp = 0;

while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
path++;
@@ -2691,9 +2717,8 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(s
break;
}

- rc = -ENOENT;
if (!genfs || cmp)
- goto out;
+ return -ENOENT;

for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
len = strlen(c->u.name);
@@ -2702,20 +2727,10 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(s
break;
}

- rc = -ENOENT;
if (!c)
- goto out;
+ return -ENOENT;

- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- }
-
- *sid = c->sid[0];
- rc = 0;
-out:
- return rc;
+ return ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, sid);
}

/**
@@ -2750,13 +2765,15 @@ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state
{
struct policydb *policydb;
struct sidtab *sidtab;
- int rc = 0;
+ int rc;
struct ocontext *c;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;

read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);

+retry:
+ rc = 0;
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;

@@ -2769,13 +2786,11 @@ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state

if (c) {
sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- }
- sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, &sbsec->sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE)
+ goto retry;
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else {
rc = __security_genfs_sid(state, fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
&sbsec->sid);



2021-12-15 17:28:44

by Greg KH

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 12/18] bpf: Fix integer overflow in argument calculation for bpf_map_area_alloc

From: Bui Quang Minh <[email protected]>

commit 7dd5d437c258bbf4cc15b35229e5208b87b8b4e0 upstream.

In 32-bit architecture, the result of sizeof() is a 32-bit integer so
the expression becomes the multiplication between 2 32-bit integer which
can potentially leads to integer overflow. As a result,
bpf_map_area_alloc() allocates less memory than needed.

Fix this by casting 1 operand to u64.

Fixes: 0d2c4f964050 ("bpf: Eliminate rlimit-based memory accounting for sockmap and sockhash maps")
Fixes: 99c51064fb06 ("devmap: Use bpf_map_area_alloc() for allocating hash buckets")
Fixes: 546ac1ffb70d ("bpf: add devmap, a map for storing net device references")
Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
kernel/bpf/devmap.c | 4 ++--
net/core/sock_map.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static struct hlist_head *dev_map_create
int i;
struct hlist_head *hash;

- hash = bpf_map_area_alloc(entries * sizeof(*hash), numa_node);
+ hash = bpf_map_area_alloc((u64) entries * sizeof(*hash), numa_node);
if (hash != NULL)
for (i = 0; i < entries; i++)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&hash[i]);
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static int dev_map_init_map(struct bpf_d

spin_lock_init(&dtab->index_lock);
} else {
- dtab->netdev_map = bpf_map_area_alloc(dtab->map.max_entries *
+ dtab->netdev_map = bpf_map_area_alloc((u64) dtab->map.max_entries *
sizeof(struct bpf_dtab_netdev *),
dtab->map.numa_node);
if (!dtab->netdev_map)
--- a/net/core/sock_map.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_map.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *sock_map_alloc(un
if (err)
goto free_stab;

- stab->sks = bpf_map_area_alloc(stab->map.max_entries *
+ stab->sks = bpf_map_area_alloc((u64) stab->map.max_entries *
sizeof(struct sock *),
stab->map.numa_node);
if (stab->sks)



2021-12-15 17:28:50

by Greg KH

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 15/18] memblock: align freed memory map on pageblock boundaries with SPARSEMEM

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

commit f921f53e089a12a192808ac4319f28727b35dc0f upstream.

When CONFIG_SPARSEMEM=y the ranges of the memory map that are freed are not
aligned to the pageblock boundaries which breaks assumptions about
homogeneity of the memory map throughout core mm code.

Make sure that the freed memory map is always aligned on pageblock
boundaries regardless of the memory model selection.

Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[backport upstream modification in mm/memblock.c to arch/arm/mm/init.c]
Signed-off-by: Mark-PK Tsai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/mm/init.c | 8 +++++---
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
@@ -371,14 +371,14 @@ static void __init free_unused_memmap(vo
*/
start = min(start,
ALIGN(prev_end, PAGES_PER_SECTION));
-#else
+#endif
/*
* Align down here since many operations in VM subsystem
* presume that there are no holes in the memory map inside
* a pageblock
*/
start = round_down(start, pageblock_nr_pages);
-#endif
+
/*
* If we had a previous bank, and there is a space
* between the current bank and the previous, free it.
@@ -396,9 +396,11 @@ static void __init free_unused_memmap(vo
}

#ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM
- if (!IS_ALIGNED(prev_end, PAGES_PER_SECTION))
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(prev_end, PAGES_PER_SECTION)) {
+ prev_end = ALIGN(prev_end, pageblock_nr_pages);
free_memmap(prev_end,
ALIGN(prev_end, PAGES_PER_SECTION));
+ }
#endif
}




2021-12-15 17:28:50

by Greg KH

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 16/18] memblock: ensure there is no overflow in memblock_overlaps_region()

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

commit 023accf5cdc1e504a9b04187ec23ff156fe53d90 upstream.

There maybe an overflow in memblock_overlaps_region() if it is called with
base and size such that

base + size > PHYS_ADDR_MAX

Make sure that memblock_overlaps_region() caps the size to prevent such
overflow and remove now duplicated call to memblock_cap_size() from
memblock_is_region_reserved().

Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Mark-PK Tsai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
mm/memblock.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/mm/memblock.c
+++ b/mm/memblock.c
@@ -164,6 +164,8 @@ bool __init_memblock memblock_overlaps_r
{
unsigned long i;

+ memblock_cap_size(base, &size);
+
for (i = 0; i < type->cnt; i++)
if (memblock_addrs_overlap(base, size, type->regions[i].base,
type->regions[i].size))
@@ -1760,7 +1762,6 @@ bool __init_memblock memblock_is_region_
*/
bool __init_memblock memblock_is_region_reserved(phys_addr_t base, phys_addr_t size)
{
- memblock_cap_size(base, &size);
return memblock_overlaps_region(&memblock.reserved, base, size);
}




2021-12-15 17:28:53

by Greg KH

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 17/18] arm: extend pfn_valid to take into account freed memory map alignment

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

commit a4d5613c4dc6d413e0733e37db9d116a2a36b9f3 upstream.

When unused memory map is freed the preserved part of the memory map is
extended to match pageblock boundaries because lots of core mm
functionality relies on homogeneity of the memory map within pageblock
boundaries.

Since pfn_valid() is used to check whether there is a valid memory map
entry for a PFN, make it return true also for PFNs that have memory map
entries even if there is no actual memory populated there.

Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Mark-PK Tsai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/mm/init.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/arm/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
@@ -176,11 +176,22 @@ static void __init zone_sizes_init(unsig
int pfn_valid(unsigned long pfn)
{
phys_addr_t addr = __pfn_to_phys(pfn);
+ unsigned long pageblock_size = PAGE_SIZE * pageblock_nr_pages;

if (__phys_to_pfn(addr) != pfn)
return 0;

- return memblock_is_map_memory(__pfn_to_phys(pfn));
+ /*
+ * If address less than pageblock_size bytes away from a present
+ * memory chunk there still will be a memory map entry for it
+ * because we round freed memory map to the pageblock boundaries.
+ */
+ if (memblock_overlaps_region(&memblock.memory,
+ ALIGN_DOWN(addr, pageblock_size),
+ pageblock_size))
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(pfn_valid);
#endif



2021-12-15 17:29:29

by Greg KH

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 01/18] nfc: fix segfault in nfc_genl_dump_devices_done

From: Tadeusz Struk <[email protected]>

commit fd79a0cbf0b2e34bcc45b13acf962e2032a82203 upstream.

When kmalloc in nfc_genl_dump_devices() fails then
nfc_genl_dump_devices_done() segfaults as below

KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 0 PID: 25 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc4-01180-g2a987e65025e-dirty #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-6.fc35 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events netlink_sock_destruct_work
RIP: 0010:klist_iter_exit+0x26/0x80
Call Trace:
<TASK>
class_dev_iter_exit+0x15/0x20
nfc_genl_dump_devices_done+0x3b/0x50
genl_lock_done+0x84/0xd0
netlink_sock_destruct+0x8f/0x270
__sk_destruct+0x64/0x3b0
sk_destruct+0xa8/0xd0
__sk_free+0x2e8/0x3d0
sk_free+0x51/0x90
netlink_sock_destruct_work+0x1c/0x20
process_one_work+0x411/0x710
worker_thread+0x6fd/0xa80

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=fc0fa5a53db9edd261d56e74325419faf18bd0df
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/nfc/netlink.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/nfc/netlink.c
+++ b/net/nfc/netlink.c
@@ -644,8 +644,10 @@ static int nfc_genl_dump_devices_done(st
{
struct class_dev_iter *iter = (struct class_dev_iter *) cb->args[0];

- nfc_device_iter_exit(iter);
- kfree(iter);
+ if (iter) {
+ nfc_device_iter_exit(iter);
+ kfree(iter);
+ }

return 0;
}



2021-12-15 17:29:36

by Greg KH

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 13/18] hwmon: (dell-smm) Fix warning on /proc/i8k creation error

From: Armin Wolf <[email protected]>

commit dbd3e6eaf3d813939b28e8a66e29d81cdc836445 upstream.

The removal function is called regardless of whether
/proc/i8k was created successfully or not, the later
causing a WARN() on module removal.
Fix that by only registering the removal function
if /proc/i8k was created successfully.

Tested on a Inspiron 3505.

Fixes: 039ae58503f3 ("hwmon: Allow to compile dell-smm-hwmon driver without /proc/i8k")
Signed-off-by: Armin Wolf <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Pali Rohár <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/hwmon/dell-smm-hwmon.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hwmon/dell-smm-hwmon.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/dell-smm-hwmon.c
@@ -588,15 +588,18 @@ static const struct file_operations i8k_
.unlocked_ioctl = i8k_ioctl,
};

+static struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
+
static void __init i8k_init_procfs(void)
{
/* Register the proc entry */
- proc_create("i8k", 0, NULL, &i8k_fops);
+ entry = proc_create("i8k", 0, NULL, &i8k_fops);
}

static void __exit i8k_exit_procfs(void)
{
- remove_proc_entry("i8k", NULL);
+ if (entry)
+ remove_proc_entry("i8k", NULL);
}

#else



2021-12-15 17:29:38

by Greg KH

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 06/18] net: netlink: af_netlink: Prevent empty skb by adding a check on len.

From: Harshit Mogalapalli <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f123cffdd8fe8ea6c7fded4b88516a42798797d0 ]

Adding a check on len parameter to avoid empty skb. This prevents a
division error in netem_enqueue function which is caused when skb->len=0
and skb->data_len=0 in the randomized corruption step as shown below.

skb->data[prandom_u32() % skb_headlen(skb)] ^= 1<<(prandom_u32() % 8);

Crash Report:
[ 343.170349] netdevsim netdevsim0 netdevsim3: set [1, 0] type 2 family
0 port 6081 - 0
[ 343.216110] netem: version 1.3
[ 343.235841] divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 343.236680] CPU: 3 PID: 4288 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 5.16.0-rc1+
[ 343.237569] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
[ 343.238707] RIP: 0010:netem_enqueue+0x1590/0x33c0 [sch_netem]
[ 343.239499] Code: 89 85 58 ff ff ff e8 5f 5d e9 d3 48 8b b5 48 ff ff
ff 8b 8d 50 ff ff ff 8b 85 58 ff ff ff 48 8b bd 70 ff ff ff 31 d2 2b 4f
74 <f7> f1 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 01 d5 4c 89 e9 48 c1 e9 03
[ 343.241883] RSP: 0018:ffff88800bcd7368 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 343.242589] RAX: 00000000ba7c0a9c RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX:
0000000000000000
[ 343.243542] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88800f8edb10 RDI:
ffff88800f8eda40
[ 343.244474] RBP: ffff88800bcd7458 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
ffffffff94fb8445
[ 343.245403] R10: ffffffff94fb8336 R11: ffffffff94fb8445 R12:
0000000000000000
[ 343.246355] R13: ffff88800a5a7000 R14: ffff88800a5b5800 R15:
0000000000000020
[ 343.247291] FS: 00007fdde2bd7700(0000) GS:ffff888109780000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 343.248350] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 343.249120] CR2: 00000000200000c0 CR3: 000000000ef4c000 CR4:
00000000000006e0
[ 343.250076] Call Trace:
[ 343.250423] <TASK>
[ 343.250713] ? memcpy+0x4d/0x60
[ 343.251162] ? netem_init+0xa0/0xa0 [sch_netem]
[ 343.251795] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x21/0x60
[ 343.252443] netem_enqueue+0xe28/0x33c0 [sch_netem]
[ 343.253102] ? stack_trace_save+0x87/0xb0
[ 343.253655] ? filter_irq_stacks+0xb0/0xb0
[ 343.254220] ? netem_init+0xa0/0xa0 [sch_netem]
[ 343.254837] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 343.255418] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x88/0xd6
[ 343.255953] dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x50/0x180
[ 343.256508] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1a7e/0x3090
[ 343.257083] ? netdev_core_pick_tx+0x300/0x300
[ 343.257690] ? check_kcov_mode+0x10/0x40
[ 343.258219] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x29/0x40
[ 343.258899] ? __kasan_init_slab_obj+0x24/0x30
[ 343.259529] ? setup_object.isra.71+0x23/0x90
[ 343.260121] ? new_slab+0x26e/0x4b0
[ 343.260609] ? kasan_poison+0x3a/0x50
[ 343.261118] ? kasan_unpoison+0x28/0x50
[ 343.261637] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x71/0x90
[ 343.262214] ? memcpy+0x4d/0x60
[ 343.262674] ? write_comp_data+0x2f/0x90
[ 343.263209] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 343.263802] ? __skb_clone+0x5d6/0x840
[ 343.264329] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x21/0x60
[ 343.264958] dev_queue_xmit+0x1c/0x20
[ 343.265470] netlink_deliver_tap+0x652/0x9c0
[ 343.266067] netlink_unicast+0x5a0/0x7f0
[ 343.266608] ? netlink_attachskb+0x860/0x860
[ 343.267183] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x21/0x60
[ 343.267820] ? write_comp_data+0x2f/0x90
[ 343.268367] netlink_sendmsg+0x922/0xe80
[ 343.268899] ? netlink_unicast+0x7f0/0x7f0
[ 343.269472] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x21/0x60
[ 343.270099] ? write_comp_data+0x2f/0x90
[ 343.270644] ? netlink_unicast+0x7f0/0x7f0
[ 343.271210] sock_sendmsg+0x155/0x190
[ 343.271721] ____sys_sendmsg+0x75f/0x8f0
[ 343.272262] ? kernel_sendmsg+0x60/0x60
[ 343.272788] ? write_comp_data+0x2f/0x90
[ 343.273332] ? write_comp_data+0x2f/0x90
[ 343.273869] ___sys_sendmsg+0x10f/0x190
[ 343.274405] ? sendmsg_copy_msghdr+0x80/0x80
[ 343.274984] ? slab_post_alloc_hook+0x70/0x230
[ 343.275597] ? futex_wait_setup+0x240/0x240
[ 343.276175] ? security_file_alloc+0x3e/0x170
[ 343.276779] ? write_comp_data+0x2f/0x90
[ 343.277313] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x21/0x60
[ 343.277969] ? write_comp_data+0x2f/0x90
[ 343.278515] ? __fget_files+0x1ad/0x260
[ 343.279048] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x21/0x60
[ 343.279685] ? write_comp_data+0x2f/0x90
[ 343.280234] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x21/0x60
[ 343.280874] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0xd1/0x190
[ 343.281481] __sys_sendmsg+0x118/0x200
[ 343.281998] ? __sys_sendmsg_sock+0x40/0x40
[ 343.282578] ? alloc_fd+0x229/0x5e0
[ 343.283070] ? write_comp_data+0x2f/0x90
[ 343.283610] ? write_comp_data+0x2f/0x90
[ 343.284135] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x21/0x60
[ 343.284776] ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0xb8/0xf0
[ 343.285450] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x7d/0xc0
[ 343.285981] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x4d/0x70
[ 343.286664] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[ 343.287158] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 343.287850] RIP: 0033:0x7fdde24cf289
[ 343.288344] Code: 01 00 48 81 c4 80 00 00 00 e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00
48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f
05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d b7 db 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 343.290729] RSP: 002b:00007fdde2bd6d98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000002e
[ 343.291730] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX:
00007fdde24cf289
[ 343.292673] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI:
0000000000000004
[ 343.293618] RBP: 00007fdde2bd6e20 R08: 0000000100000001 R09:
0000000000000000
[ 343.294557] R10: 0000000100000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
0000000000000000
[ 343.295493] R13: 0000000000021000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15:
00007fdde2bd7700
[ 343.296432] </TASK>
[ 343.296735] Modules linked in: sch_netem ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip
sit ip_tunnel geneve macsec macvtap tap ipvlan macvlan 8021q garp mrp
hsr wireguard libchacha20poly1305 chacha_x86_64 poly1305_x86_64
ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel libblake2s blake2s_x86_64 libblake2s_generic
curve25519_x86_64 libcurve25519_generic libchacha xfrm_interface
xfrm6_tunnel tunnel4 veth netdevsim psample batman_adv nlmon dummy team
bonding tls vcan ip6_gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 gre tun ip6t_rpfilter
ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 xt_conntrack ip_set
ebtable_nat ebtable_broute ip6table_nat ip6table_mangle
ip6table_security ip6table_raw iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack
nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_mangle iptable_security
iptable_raw ebtable_filter ebtables rfkill ip6table_filter ip6_tables
iptable_filter ppdev bochs drm_vram_helper drm_ttm_helper ttm
drm_kms_helper cec parport_pc drm joydev floppy parport sg syscopyarea
sysfillrect sysimgblt i2c_piix4 qemu_fw_cfg fb_sys_fops pcspkr
[ 343.297459] ip_tables xfs virtio_net net_failover failover sd_mod
sr_mod cdrom t10_pi ata_generic pata_acpi ata_piix libata virtio_pci
virtio_pci_legacy_dev serio_raw virtio_pci_modern_dev dm_mirror
dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[ 343.311074] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 343.311532] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 343.312040] ---[ end trace a2e3db5a6ae05099 ]---
[ 343.312691] RIP: 0010:netem_enqueue+0x1590/0x33c0 [sch_netem]
[ 343.313481] Code: 89 85 58 ff ff ff e8 5f 5d e9 d3 48 8b b5 48 ff ff
ff 8b 8d 50 ff ff ff 8b 85 58 ff ff ff 48 8b bd 70 ff ff ff 31 d2 2b 4f
74 <f7> f1 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 01 d5 4c 89 e9 48 c1 e9 03
[ 343.315893] RSP: 0018:ffff88800bcd7368 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 343.316622] RAX: 00000000ba7c0a9c RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX:
0000000000000000
[ 343.317585] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88800f8edb10 RDI:
ffff88800f8eda40
[ 343.318549] RBP: ffff88800bcd7458 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
ffffffff94fb8445
[ 343.319503] R10: ffffffff94fb8336 R11: ffffffff94fb8445 R12:
0000000000000000
[ 343.320455] R13: ffff88800a5a7000 R14: ffff88800a5b5800 R15:
0000000000000020
[ 343.321414] FS: 00007fdde2bd7700(0000) GS:ffff888109780000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 343.322489] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 343.323283] CR2: 00000000200000c0 CR3: 000000000ef4c000 CR4:
00000000000006e0
[ 343.324264] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 343.333717] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 343.334175] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 343.334653] Kernel Offset: 0x13600000 from 0xffffffff81000000
(relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
[ 343.336027] Rebooting in 86400 seconds..

Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index cb35680db9b29..891e029ad0f89 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -1862,6 +1862,11 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;

+ if (len == 0) {
+ pr_warn_once("Zero length message leads to an empty skb\n");
+ return -ENODATA;
+ }
+
err = scm_send(sock, msg, &scm, true);
if (err < 0)
return err;
--
2.33.0




2021-12-15 17:29:43

by Greg KH

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 04/18] parisc/agp: Annotate parisc agp init functions with __init

From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8d88382b7436551a9ebb78475c546b670790cbf6 ]

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/char/agp/parisc-agp.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/agp/parisc-agp.c b/drivers/char/agp/parisc-agp.c
index ed3c4c42fc23b..d68d05d5d3838 100644
--- a/drivers/char/agp/parisc-agp.c
+++ b/drivers/char/agp/parisc-agp.c
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ agp_ioc_init(void __iomem *ioc_regs)
return 0;
}

-static int
+static int __init
lba_find_capability(int cap)
{
struct _parisc_agp_info *info = &parisc_agp_info;
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ parisc_agp_setup(void __iomem *ioc_hpa, void __iomem *lba_hpa)
return error;
}

-static int
+static int __init
find_quicksilver(struct device *dev, void *data)
{
struct parisc_device **lba = data;
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ find_quicksilver(struct device *dev, void *data)
return 0;
}

-static int
+static int __init
parisc_agp_init(void)
{
extern struct sba_device *sba_list;
--
2.33.0




2021-12-15 17:29:46

by Greg KH

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 08/18] drm/amd/display: add connector type check for CRC source set

From: Perry Yuan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2da34b7bb59e1caa9a336e0e20a76b8b6a4abea2 ]

[Why]
IGT bypass test will set crc source as DPRX,and display DM didn`t check
connection type, it run the test on the HDMI connector ,then the kernel
will be crashed because aux->transfer is set null for HDMI connection.
This patch will skip the invalid connection test and fix kernel crash issue.

[How]
Check the connector type while setting the pipe crc source as DPRX or
auto,if the type is not DP or eDP, the crtc crc source will not be set
and report error code to IGT test,IGT will show the this subtest as no
valid crtc/connector combinations found.

116.779714] [IGT] amd_bypass: starting subtest 8bpc-bypass-mode
[ 117.730996] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[ 117.731001] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
[ 117.731003] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
[ 117.731004] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 117.731006] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 117.731009] CPU: 11 PID: 2428 Comm: amd_bypass Tainted: G OE 5.11.0-34-generic #36~20.04.1-Ubuntu
[ 117.731011] Hardware name: AMD CZN/, BIOS AB.FD 09/07/2021
[ 117.731012] RIP: 0010:0x0
[ 117.731015] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.
[ 117.731016] RSP: 0018:ffffa8d64225bab8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 117.731017] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000020 RCX: ffffa8d64225bb5e
[ 117.731018] RDX: ffff93151d921880 RSI: ffffa8d64225bac8 RDI: ffff931511a1a9d8
[ 117.731022] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 117.731023] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000010d5a4000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0
[ 117.731023] PKRU: 55555554
[ 117.731024] Call Trace:
[ 117.731027] drm_dp_dpcd_access+0x72/0x110 [drm_kms_helper]
[ 117.731036] drm_dp_dpcd_read+0xb7/0xf0 [drm_kms_helper]
[ 117.731040] drm_dp_start_crc+0x38/0xb0 [drm_kms_helper]
[ 117.731047] amdgpu_dm_crtc_set_crc_source+0x1ae/0x3e0 [amdgpu]
[ 117.731149] crtc_crc_open+0x174/0x220 [drm]
[ 117.731162] full_proxy_open+0x168/0x1f0
[ 117.731165] ? open_proxy_open+0x100/0x100

BugLink: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/1546
Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Siqueira <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Perry Yuan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_crc.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_crc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_crc.c
index f0b001b3af578..883ee517673bd 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_crc.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_crc.c
@@ -221,6 +221,14 @@ int amdgpu_dm_crtc_set_crc_source(struct drm_crtc *crtc, const char *src_name)
ret = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
+
+ if ((aconn->base.connector_type != DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DisplayPort) &&
+ (aconn->base.connector_type != DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_eDP)) {
+ DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("No DP connector available for CRC source\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
}

if (amdgpu_dm_crtc_configure_crc_source(crtc, crtc_state, source)) {
--
2.33.0




2021-12-15 17:29:48

by Greg KH

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 18/18] arm: ioremap: dont abuse pfn_valid() to check if pfn is in RAM

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

commit 024591f9a6e0164ec23301784d1e6d8f6cacbe59 upstream.

The semantics of pfn_valid() is to check presence of the memory map for a
PFN and not whether a PFN is in RAM. The memory map may be present for a
hole in the physical memory and if such hole corresponds to an MMIO range,
__arm_ioremap_pfn_caller() will produce a WARN() and fail:

[ 2.863406] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at arch/arm/mm/ioremap.c:287 __arm_ioremap_pfn_caller+0xf0/0x1dc
[ 2.864812] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.13.0-09882-ga180bd1d7e16 #1
[ 2.865263] Hardware name: Generic DT based system
[ 2.865711] Backtrace:
[ 2.866063] [<80b07e58>] (dump_backtrace) from [<80b080ac>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[ 2.866633] r7:00000009 r6:0000011f r5:60000153 r4:80ddd1c0
[ 2.866922] [<80b0808c>] (show_stack) from [<80b18df0>] (dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x74)
[ 2.867117] [<80b18d98>] (dump_stack_lvl) from [<80b18e20>] (dump_stack+0x14/0x1c)
[ 2.867309] r5:80118cac r4:80dc6774
[ 2.867404] [<80b18e0c>] (dump_stack) from [<80122fcc>] (__warn+0xe4/0x150)
[ 2.867583] [<80122ee8>] (__warn) from [<80b08850>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x88/0xc0)
[ 2.867774] r7:0000011f r6:80dc6774 r5:00000000 r4:814c4000
[ 2.867917] [<80b087cc>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<80118cac>] (__arm_ioremap_pfn_caller+0xf0/0x1dc)
[ 2.868158] r9:00000001 r8:9ef00000 r7:80e8b0d4 r6:0009ef00 r5:00000000 r4:00100000
[ 2.868346] [<80118bbc>] (__arm_ioremap_pfn_caller) from [<80118df8>] (__arm_ioremap_caller+0x60/0x68)
[ 2.868581] r9:9ef00000 r8:821b6dc0 r7:00100000 r6:00000000 r5:815d1010 r4:80118d98
[ 2.868761] [<80118d98>] (__arm_ioremap_caller) from [<80118fcc>] (ioremap+0x28/0x30)
[ 2.868958] [<80118fa4>] (ioremap) from [<8062871c>] (__devm_ioremap_resource+0x154/0x1c8)
[ 2.869169] r5:815d1010 r4:814c5d2c
[ 2.869263] [<806285c8>] (__devm_ioremap_resource) from [<8062899c>] (devm_ioremap_resource+0x14/0x18)
[ 2.869495] r9:9e9f57a0 r8:814c4000 r7:815d1000 r6:815d1010 r5:8177c078 r4:815cf400
[ 2.869676] [<80628988>] (devm_ioremap_resource) from [<8091c6e4>] (fsi_master_acf_probe+0x1a8/0x5d8)
[ 2.869909] [<8091c53c>] (fsi_master_acf_probe) from [<80723dbc>] (platform_probe+0x68/0xc8)
[ 2.870124] r9:80e9dadc r8:00000000 r7:815d1010 r6:810c1000 r5:815d1010 r4:00000000
[ 2.870306] [<80723d54>] (platform_probe) from [<80721208>] (really_probe+0x1cc/0x470)
[ 2.870512] r7:815d1010 r6:810c1000 r5:00000000 r4:815d1010
[ 2.870651] [<8072103c>] (really_probe) from [<807215cc>] (__driver_probe_device+0x120/0x1fc)
[ 2.870872] r7:815d1010 r6:810c1000 r5:810c1000 r4:815d1010
[ 2.871013] [<807214ac>] (__driver_probe_device) from [<807216e8>] (driver_probe_device+0x40/0xd8)
[ 2.871244] r9:80e9dadc r8:00000000 r7:815d1010 r6:810c1000 r5:812feaa0 r4:812fe994
[ 2.871428] [<807216a8>] (driver_probe_device) from [<80721a58>] (__driver_attach+0xa8/0x1d4)
[ 2.871647] r9:80e9dadc r8:00000000 r7:00000000 r6:810c1000 r5:815d1054 r4:815d1010
[ 2.871830] [<807219b0>] (__driver_attach) from [<8071ee8c>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x88/0xc8)
[ 2.872040] r7:00000000 r6:814c4000 r5:807219b0 r4:810c1000
[ 2.872194] [<8071ee04>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<80722208>] (driver_attach+0x28/0x30)
[ 2.872418] r7:810a2aa0 r6:00000000 r5:821b6000 r4:810c1000
[ 2.872570] [<807221e0>] (driver_attach) from [<8071f80c>] (bus_add_driver+0x114/0x200)
[ 2.872788] [<8071f6f8>] (bus_add_driver) from [<80722ec4>] (driver_register+0x98/0x128)
[ 2.873011] r7:81011d0c r6:814c4000 r5:00000000 r4:810c1000
[ 2.873167] [<80722e2c>] (driver_register) from [<80725240>] (__platform_driver_register+0x2c/0x34)
[ 2.873408] r5:814dcb80 r4:80f2a764
[ 2.873513] [<80725214>] (__platform_driver_register) from [<80f2a784>] (fsi_master_acf_init+0x20/0x28)
[ 2.873766] [<80f2a764>] (fsi_master_acf_init) from [<80f014a8>] (do_one_initcall+0x108/0x290)
[ 2.874007] [<80f013a0>] (do_one_initcall) from [<80f01840>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x1ac/0x230)
[ 2.874248] r9:80e9dadc r8:80f3987c r7:80f3985c r6:00000007 r5:814dcb80 r4:80f627a4
[ 2.874456] [<80f01694>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<80b19f44>] (kernel_init+0x20/0x138)
[ 2.874691] r10:00000000 r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:80b19f24
[ 2.874894] r4:00000000
[ 2.874977] [<80b19f24>] (kernel_init) from [<80100170>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24)
[ 2.875231] Exception stack(0x814c5fb0 to 0x814c5ff8)
[ 2.875535] 5fa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[ 2.875849] 5fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[ 2.876133] 5fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000
[ 2.876363] r5:80b19f24 r4:00000000
[ 2.876683] ---[ end trace b2f74b8536829970 ]---
[ 2.876911] fsi-master-acf gpio-fsi: ioremap failed for resource [mem 0x9ef00000-0x9effffff]
[ 2.877492] fsi-master-acf gpio-fsi: Error -12 mapping coldfire memory
[ 2.877689] fsi-master-acf: probe of gpio-fsi failed with error -12

Use memblock_is_map_memory() instead of pfn_valid() to check if a PFN is in
RAM or not.

Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Fixes: a4d5613c4dc6 ("arm: extend pfn_valid to take into account freed memory map alignment")
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Mark-PK Tsai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/mm/ioremap.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/arm/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/sizes.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>

#include <asm/cp15.h>
#include <asm/cputype.h>
@@ -301,7 +302,8 @@ static void __iomem * __arm_ioremap_pfn_
* Don't allow RAM to be mapped with mismatched attributes - this
* causes problems with ARMv6+
*/
- if (WARN_ON(pfn_valid(pfn) && mtype != MT_MEMORY_RW))
+ if (WARN_ON(memblock_is_map_memory(PFN_PHYS(pfn)) &&
+ mtype != MT_MEMORY_RW))
return NULL;

area = get_vm_area_caller(size, VM_IOREMAP, caller);



2021-12-15 21:53:00

by Shuah Khan

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.4 00/18] 5.4.166-rc1 review

On 12/15/21 10:21 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.166 release.
> There are 18 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Fri, 17 Dec 2021 17:20:14 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.166-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

Tested-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>

thanks,
-- Shuah


2021-12-15 22:47:56

by Florian Fainelli

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.4 00/18] 5.4.166-rc1 review

On 12/15/21 9:21 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.166 release.
> There are 18 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Fri, 17 Dec 2021 17:20:14 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.166-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h

On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels:

Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
--
Florian

2021-12-16 11:47:44

by Naresh Kamboju

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.4 00/18] 5.4.166-rc1 review

On Wed, 15 Dec 2021 at 22:56, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.166 release.
> There are 18 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Fri, 17 Dec 2021 17:20:14 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.166-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <[email protected]>

## Build
* kernel: 5.4.166-rc1
* git: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
* git branch: linux-5.4.y
* git commit: b780ab989d6045e3a7f03d21348c50a4ac4fb2c5
* git describe: v5.4.165-19-gb780ab989d60
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-5.4.y/build/v5.4.165-19-gb780ab989d60

## No Test Regressions (compared to v5.4.164-89-gc50f1e613033)

## No Test Fixes (compared to v5.4.164-89-gc50f1e613033)

## Test result summary
total: 82641, pass: 68845, fail: 666, skip: 12220, xfail: 910

## Build Summary
* arc: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 258 total, 254 passed, 4 failed
* arm64: 36 total, 31 passed, 5 failed
* dragonboard-410c: 2 total, 1 passed, 1 failed
* hi6220-hikey: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* i386: 20 total, 20 passed, 0 failed
* juno-r2: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* mips: 34 total, 34 passed, 0 failed
* parisc: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 52 total, 48 passed, 4 failed
* riscv: 24 total, 24 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* sh: 24 total, 24 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* x15: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* x86: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 36 total, 36 passed, 0 failed

## Test suites summary
* fwts
* igt-gpu-tools
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-arm64
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.btitest.bti_c_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.btitest.bti_j_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.btitest.bti_jc_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.btitest.bti_none_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.btitest.nohint_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.btitest.paciasp_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.nobtitest.bti_c_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.nobtitest.bti_j_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.nobtitest.bti_jc_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.nobtitest.bti_none_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.nobtitest.nohint_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.nobtitest.paciasp_func
* kselftest-bpf
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-drivers
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-memfd
* kselftest-memory-hotplug
* kselftest-mincore
* kselftest-mount
* kselftest-mqueue
* kselftest-net
* kselftest-netfilter
* kselftest-nsfs
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-pid_namespace
* kselftest-pidfd
* kselftest-proc
* kselftest-pstore
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-vm
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kvm-unit-tests
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* linux-log-parser
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-controllers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-tracing-tests
* network-basic-tests
* packetdrill
* perf
* rcutorture
* ssuite
* v4l2-compliance

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

2021-12-16 18:07:36

by Guenter Roeck

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.4 00/18] 5.4.166-rc1 review

On Wed, Dec 15, 2021 at 06:21:21PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.166 release.
> There are 18 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Fri, 17 Dec 2021 17:20:14 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>

Build results:
total: 157 pass: 157 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 444 pass: 444 fail: 0

Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>

Guenter

2021-12-17 00:53:55

by Zou Wei

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.4 00/18] 5.4.166-rc1 review



On 2021/12/16 1:21, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.166 release.
> There are 18 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Fri, 17 Dec 2021 17:20:14 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.166-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>

Tested on arm64 and x86 for 5.4.166-rc1,

Kernel repo:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Branch: linux-5.4.y
Version: 5.4.166-rc1
Commit: b780ab989d6045e3a7f03d21348c50a4ac4fb2c5
Compiler: gcc version 7.3.0 (GCC)

arm64:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Testcase Result Summary:
total: 9013
passed: 9013
failed: 0
timeout: 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------

x86:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Testcase Result Summary:
total: 9013
passed: 9013
failed: 0
timeout: 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------

Tested-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>