Hi,
This new patch series is a rebase on Linus's master branch (or
next-20211110), which includes the new futex_waitv syscall.
Andrew, can you please consider to merge this into your tree?
Overview
========
The final goal of this patch series is to enable the kernel to be a
global policy manager by entrusting processes with access control at
their level. To reach this goal, two complementary parts are required:
* user space needs to be able to know if it can trust some file
descriptor content for a specific usage;
* and the kernel needs to make available some part of the policy
configured by the system administrator.
Primary goal of trusted_for(2)
==============================
This new syscall enables user space to ask the kernel: is this file
descriptor's content trusted to be used for this purpose? The set of
usage currently only contains execution, but other may follow (e.g.
configuration, sensitive data). If the kernel identifies the file
descriptor as trustworthy for this usage, user space should then take
this information into account. The "execution" usage means that the
content of the file descriptor is trusted according to the system policy
to be executed by user space, which means that it interprets the content
or (try to) maps it as executable memory.
A simple system-wide security policy can be set by the system
administrator through a sysctl configuration consistent with the mount
points or the file access rights. The documentation explains the
prerequisites.
It is important to note that this can only enable to extend access
control managed by the kernel. Hence it enables current access control
mechanism to be extended and become a superset of what they can
currently control. Indeed, the security policy could also be delegated
to an LSM, either a MAC system or an integrity system. For instance,
this is required to close a major IMA measurement/appraisal interpreter
integrity gap by bringing the ability to check the use of scripts [1].
Other uses are expected, such as for magic-links [2], SGX integration
[3], bpffs [4].
Complementary W^X protections can be brought by SELinux, IPE [5] and
trampfd [6].
System call description
=======================
trusted_for(int fd, enum trusted_for_usage usage, u32 flags);
@fd is the file descriptor to check.
@usage identifies the user space usage intended for @fd: only
TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION for now, but trusted_for_usage could be extended
to identify other usages (e.g. configuration, sensitive data).
@flags must be 0 for now but it could be used in the future to do
complementary checks (e.g. signature or integrity requirements, origin
of the file).
This system call returns 0 on success, or -EACCES if the kernel policy
denies the specified usage (which should be enforced by the caller).
The first patch contains the full syscall and sysctl documentation.
Prerequisite of its use
=======================
User space needs to adapt to take advantage of this new feature. For
example, the PEP 578 [7] (Runtime Audit Hooks) enables Python 3.8 to be
extended with policy enforcement points related to code interpretation,
which can be used to align with the PowerShell audit features.
Additional Python security improvements (e.g. a limited interpreter
without -c, stdin piping of code) are on their way [8].
Examples
========
The initial idea comes from CLIP OS 4 and the original implementation
has been used for more than 13 years:
https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_doc
Chrome OS has a similar approach:
https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/master/security/noexec_shell_scripts.md
Userland patches can be found here:
https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYEXEC
Actually, there is more than the O_MAYEXEC changes (which matches this search)
e.g., to prevent Python interactive execution. There are patches for
Bash, Wine, Java (Icedtea), Busybox's ash, Perl and Python. There are
also some related patches which do not directly rely on O_MAYEXEC but
which restrict the use of browser plugins and extensions, which may be
seen as scripts too:
https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/tree/master/www-client
An introduction to O_MAYEXEC was given at the Linux Security Summit
Europe 2018 - Linux Kernel Security Contributions by ANSSI:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=chNjCRtPKQY&t=17m15s
The "write xor execute" principle was explained at Kernel Recipes 2018 -
CLIP OS: a defense-in-depth OS:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PjRE0uBtkHU&t=11m14s
See also a first LWN article about O_MAYEXEC and a new one about
trusted_for(2) and its background:
* https://lwn.net/Articles/820000/
* https://lwn.net/Articles/832959/
This can be tested with CONFIG_SYSCTL. I would really appreciate
constructive comments on this patch series.
Previous series:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CALCETrVovr8XNZSroey7pHF46O=kj_c5D9K8h=z2T_cNrpvMig@mail.gmail.com/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CALCETrVeZ0eufFXwfhtaG_j+AdvbzEWE0M3wjXMWVEO7pj+xkw@mail.gmail.com/
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[6] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[7] https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0578/
[8] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Regards,
Mickaël Salaün (3):
fs: Add trusted_for(2) syscall implementation and related sysctl
arch: Wire up trusted_for(2)
selftest/interpreter: Add tests for trusted_for(2) policies
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst | 50 +++
arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 +
arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 2 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 2 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 2 +
arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +
fs/open.c | 110 ++++++
include/linux/fs.h | 1 +
include/linux/syscalls.h | 2 +
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 4 +-
include/uapi/linux/trusted-for.h | 18 +
kernel/sysctl.c | 12 +-
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 +
.../testing/selftests/interpreter/.gitignore | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/Makefile | 21 +
tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/config | 1 +
.../selftests/interpreter/trust_policy_test.c | 362 ++++++++++++++++++
30 files changed, 613 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/trusted-for.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/.gitignore
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/Makefile
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/config
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/trust_policy_test.c
base-commit: cb690f5238d71f543f4ce874aa59237cf53a877c
--
2.32.0
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
The trusted_for() syscall enables user space tasks to check that files
are trusted to be executed or interpreted by user space. This may allow
script interpreters to check execution permission before reading
commands from a file, or dynamic linkers to allow shared object loading.
This may be seen as a way for a trusted task (e.g. interpreter) to check
the trustworthiness of files (e.g. scripts) before extending its control
flow graph with new ones originating from these files.
The security policy is consistently managed by the kernel through the
new sysctl: fs.trusted_for_policy . This enables system administrators
to enforce two complementary security policies according to the
installed system: enforce the noexec mount option, and enforce
executable file permission. Indeed, because of compatibility with
installed systems, only system administrators are able to check that
this new enforcement is in line with the system mount points and file
permissions.
For this to be possible, script interpreters must use trusted_for(2)
with the TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION usage. To be fully effective, these
interpreters also need to handle the other ways to execute code: command
line parameters (e.g., option -e for Perl), module loading (e.g., option
-m for Python), stdin, file sourcing, environment variables,
configuration files, etc. According to the threat model, it may be
acceptable to allow some script interpreters (e.g. Bash) to interpret
commands from stdin, may it be a TTY or a pipe, because it may not be
enough to (directly) perform syscalls.
Even without enforced security policy, user space interpreters can use
this syscall to try as much as possible to enforce the system policy at
their level, knowing that it will not break anything on running systems
which do not care about this feature. However, on systems which want
this feature enforced, there will be knowledgeable people (i.e. system
administrator who configured fs.trusted_for_policy deliberately) to
manage it.
Because trusted_for(2) is a mean to enforce a system-wide security
policy (but not application-centric policies), it does not make sense
for user space to check the sysctl value. Indeed, this new syscall only
enables to extend the system ability to enforce a policy thanks to (some
trusted) user space collaboration. Moreover, additional security
policies could be managed by LSMs. This is a best-effort approach from
the application developer point of view:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
trusted_for(2) with TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION should not be confused with
the O_EXEC flag (for open) which is intended for execute-only, which
obviously doesn't work for scripts. However, a similar behavior could
be implemented in user space with O_PATH:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Being able to restrict execution also enables to protect the kernel by
restricting arbitrary syscalls that an attacker could perform with a
crafted binary or certain script languages. It also improves multilevel
isolation by reducing the ability of an attacker to use side channels
with specific code. These restrictions can natively be enforced for ELF
binaries (with the noexec mount option) but require this kernel
extension to properly handle scripts (e.g. Python, Perl). To get a
consistent execution policy, additional memory restrictions should also
be enforced (e.g. thanks to SELinux).
This is a new implementation of a patch initially written by
Vincent Strubel for CLIP OS 4:
https://github.com/clipos-archive/src_platform_clip-patches/blob/f5cb330d6b684752e403b4e41b39f7004d88e561/1901_open_mayexec.patch
This patch has been used for more than 13 years with customized script
interpreters. Some examples (with the original O_MAYEXEC) can be found
here:
https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYEXEC
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Thibaut Sautereau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thibaut Sautereau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
---
Changes since v14:
* Add full syscall documentation (requested by Andrew Morton).
Changes since v13:
* Rename sysctl from "trust_policy" to "trusted_for_policy" (suggested
by Kees Cook).
* Add Acked-by Kees Cook.
Changes since v12:
* Update inode_permission() call to allign with commit 47291baa8ddf
("namei: make permission helpers idmapped mount aware").
* Switch from d_backing_inode(f.file->f_path.dentry) to
file_inode(f.file).
Changes since v10:
* Add enum definition to syscalls.h .
Changes since v9:
* Rename the syscall to trusted_for(2) and the sysctl to fs.trust_policy
* Add a dedicated enum trusted_for_usage with include/uapi/linux/trusted-for.h
* Remove the extra MAY_INTROSPECTION_EXEC bit. LSMs can still implement
this feature themselves.
Changes since v8:
* Add a dedicated syscall introspect_access() (requested by Al Viro).
* Rename MAY_INTERPRETED_EXEC to MAY_INTROSPECTION_EXEC .
* Rename the sysctl fs.interpreted_access to fs.introspection_policy .
* Update documentation.
Changes since v7:
* Replaces openat2/O_MAYEXEC with faccessat2/X_OK/AT_INTERPRETED .
Switching to an FD-based syscall was suggested by Al Viro and Jann
Horn.
* Handle special file descriptors.
* Add a compatibility mode for execute/read check.
* Move the sysctl policy from fs/namei.c to fs/open.c for the new
faccessat2/AT_INTERPRETED.
* Rename the sysctl from fs.open_mayexec_enforce to
fs.interpreted_access .
* Update documentation accordingly.
Changes since v6:
* Allow opening pipes, block devices and character devices with
O_MAYEXEC when there is no enforced policy, but forbid any non-regular
file opened with O_MAYEXEC otherwise (i.e. for any enforced policy).
* Add a paragraph about the non-regular files policy.
* Move path_noexec() calls out of the fast-path (suggested by Kees
Cook).
* Do not set __FMODE_EXEC for now because of inconsistent behavior:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202007160822.CCDB5478@keescook/
* Returns EISDIR when opening a directory with O_MAYEXEC.
* Removed Deven Bowers and Kees Cook Reviewed-by tags because of the
current update.
Changes since v5:
* Remove the static enforcement configuration through Kconfig because it
makes the code more simple like this, and because the current sysctl
configuration can only be set with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, the same way mount
options (i.e. noexec) can be set. If an harden distro wants to
enforce a configuration, it should restrict capabilities or sysctl
configuration. Furthermore, an LSM can easily leverage O_MAYEXEC to
fit its need.
* Move checks from inode_permission() to may_open() and make the error
codes more consistent according to file types (in line with a previous
commit): opening a directory with O_MAYEXEC returns EISDIR and other
non-regular file types may return EACCES.
* In may_open(), when OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_FILE is set, replace explicit
call to generic_permission() with an artificial MAY_EXEC to avoid
double calls. This makes sense especially when an LSM policy forbids
execution of a file.
* Replace the custom proc_omayexec() with
proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(), and then replace the CAP_MAC_ADMIN
check with a CAP_SYS_ADMIN one (suggested by Kees Cook and Stephen
Smalley).
* Use BIT() (suggested by Kees Cook).
* Rename variables (suggested by Kees Cook).
* Reword the kconfig help.
* Import the documentation patch (suggested by Kees Cook):
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
* Update documentation and add LWN.net article.
Changes since v4:
* Add kernel configuration options to enforce O_MAYEXEC at build time,
and disable the sysctl in such case (requested by James Morris).
* Reword commit message.
Changes since v3:
* Switch back to O_MAYEXEC, but only handle it with openat2(2) which
checks unknown flags (suggested by Aleksa Sarai). Cf.
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Changes since v2:
* Replace O_MAYEXEC with RESOLVE_MAYEXEC from openat2(2). This change
enables to not break existing application using bogus O_* flags that
may be ignored by current kernels by using a new dedicated flag, only
usable through openat2(2) (suggested by Jeff Layton). Using this flag
will results in an error if the running kernel does not support it.
User space needs to manage this case, as with other RESOLVE_* flags.
The best effort approach to security (for most common distros) will
simply consists of ignoring such an error and retry without
RESOLVE_MAYEXEC. However, a fully controlled system may which to
error out if such an inconsistency is detected.
* Cosmetic changes.
Changes since v1:
* Set __FMODE_EXEC when using O_MAYEXEC to make this information
available through the new fanotify/FAN_OPEN_EXEC event (suggested by
Jan Kara and Matthew Bobrowski):
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
* Move code from Yama to the FS subsystem (suggested by Kees Cook).
* Make omayexec_inode_permission() static (suggested by Jann Horn).
* Use mode 0600 for the sysctl.
* Only match regular files (not directories nor other types), which
follows the same semantic as commit 73601ea5b7b1 ("fs/open.c: allow
opening only regular files during execve()").
---
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst | 50 +++++++++++
fs/open.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/fs.h | 1 +
include/linux/syscalls.h | 2 +
include/uapi/linux/trusted-for.h | 18 ++++
kernel/sysctl.c | 12 ++-
6 files changed, 191 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/trusted-for.h
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst
index 2a501c9ddc55..e364d6c45790 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/fs:
- suid_dumpable
- super-max
- super-nr
+- trusted_for_policy
aio-nr & aio-max-nr
@@ -382,3 +383,52 @@ Each "watch" costs roughly 90 bytes on a 32bit kernel, and roughly 160 bytes
on a 64bit one.
The current default value for max_user_watches is the 1/25 (4%) of the
available low memory, divided for the "watch" cost in bytes.
+
+
+trusted_for_policy
+------------------
+
+An interpreter can call :manpage:`trusted_for(2)` with a
+``TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION`` usage to check that opened regular files are expected
+to be executable. If the file is not identified as executable, then the
+syscall returns -EACCES. This may allow a script interpreter to check
+executable permission before reading commands from a file, or a dynamic linker
+to only load executable shared objects. One interesting use case is to enforce
+a "write xor execute" policy through interpreters.
+
+The ability to restrict code execution must be thought as a system-wide policy,
+which first starts by restricting mount points with the ``noexec`` option.
+This option is also automatically applied to special filesystems such as /proc .
+This prevents files on such mount points to be directly executed by the kernel
+or mapped as executable memory (e.g. libraries). With script interpreters
+using :manpage:`trusted_for(2)`, the executable permission can then be checked
+before reading commands from files. This makes it possible to enforce the
+``noexec`` at the interpreter level, and thus propagates this security policy
+to scripts. To be fully effective, these interpreters also need to handle the
+other ways to execute code: command line parameters (e.g., option ``-e`` for
+Perl), module loading (e.g., option ``-m`` for Python), stdin, file sourcing,
+environment variables, configuration files, etc. According to the threat
+model, it may be acceptable to allow some script interpreters (e.g. Bash) to
+interpret commands from stdin, may it be a TTY or a pipe, because it may not be
+enough to (directly) perform syscalls.
+
+There are two complementary security policies: enforce the ``noexec`` mount
+option, and enforce executable file permission. These policies are handled by
+the ``fs.trusted_for_policy`` sysctl (writable only with ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN``) as
+a bitmask:
+
+1 - Mount restriction: checks that the mount options for the underlying VFS
+ mount do not prevent execution.
+
+2 - File permission restriction: checks that the file is marked as
+ executable for the current process (e.g., POSIX permissions, ACLs).
+
+Note that as long as a policy is enforced, checking any non-regular file with
+:manpage:`trusted_for(2)` returns -EACCES (e.g. TTYs, pipe), even when such a
+file is marked as executable or is on an executable mount point.
+
+Code samples can be found in
+tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/trust_policy_test.c and interpreter patches
+(for the original O_MAYEXEC) are available at
+https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYEXEC .
+See also an overview article: https://lwn.net/Articles/820000/ .
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index f732fb94600c..96a80abec41b 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/dnotify.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/trusted-for.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -480,6 +482,114 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(access, const char __user *, filename, int, mode)
return do_faccessat(AT_FDCWD, filename, mode, 0);
}
+#define TRUST_POLICY_EXEC_MOUNT BIT(0)
+#define TRUST_POLICY_EXEC_FILE BIT(1)
+
+int sysctl_trusted_for_policy __read_mostly;
+
+/**
+ * sys_trusted_for - Check that a FD is trusted for a specific usage
+ *
+ * @fd: File descriptor to check.
+ * @usage: Identify the user space usage intended for the file descriptor (only
+ * TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION for now).
+ * @flags: Must be 0.
+ *
+ * This system call enables user space to ask the kernel: is this file
+ * descriptor's content trusted to be used for this purpose? The set of @usage
+ * currently only contains TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION, but other may follow (e.g.
+ * configuration, sensitive data). If the kernel identifies the file
+ * descriptor as trustworthy for this usage, this call returns 0 and the caller
+ * should then take this information into account.
+ *
+ * The execution usage means that the content of the file descriptor is trusted
+ * according to the system policy to be executed by user space, which means
+ * that it interprets the content or (try to) maps it as executable memory.
+ *
+ * A simple system-wide security policy can be set by the system administrator
+ * through a sysctl configuration consistent with the mount points or the file
+ * access rights: Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst
+ *
+ * @flags could be used in the future to do complementary checks (e.g.
+ * signature or integrity requirements, origin of the file).
+ *
+ * Possible returned errors are:
+ *
+ * - EINVAL: unknown @usage or unknown @flags;
+ * - EBADF: @fd is not a file descriptor for the calling thread;
+ * - EACCES: the requested usage is denied (and user space should enforce it).
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(trusted_for, const int, fd, const enum trusted_for_usage, usage,
+ const u32, flags)
+{
+ int mask, err = -EACCES;
+ struct fd f;
+ struct inode *inode;
+
+ if (flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Only handles execution for now. */
+ if (usage != TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ mask = MAY_EXEC;
+
+ f = fdget(fd);
+ if (!f.file)
+ return -EBADF;
+ inode = file_inode(f.file);
+
+ /*
+ * For compatibility reasons, without a defined security policy, we
+ * must map the execute permission to the read permission. Indeed,
+ * from user space point of view, being able to execute data (e.g.
+ * scripts) implies to be able to read this data.
+ */
+ if ((mask & MAY_EXEC)) {
+ /*
+ * If there is a system-wide execute policy enforced, then
+ * forbids access to non-regular files and special superblocks.
+ */
+ if ((sysctl_trusted_for_policy & (TRUST_POLICY_EXEC_MOUNT |
+ TRUST_POLICY_EXEC_FILE))) {
+ if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ goto out_fd;
+ /*
+ * Denies access to pseudo filesystems that will never
+ * be mountable (e.g. sockfs, pipefs) but can still be
+ * reachable through /proc/self/fd, or memfd-like file
+ * descriptors, or nsfs-like files.
+ *
+ * According to the selftests, SB_NOEXEC seems to be
+ * only used by proc and nsfs filesystems.
+ */
+ if ((f.file->f_path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags &
+ (SB_NOUSER | SB_KERNMOUNT | SB_NOEXEC)))
+ goto out_fd;
+ }
+
+ if ((sysctl_trusted_for_policy & TRUST_POLICY_EXEC_MOUNT) &&
+ path_noexec(&f.file->f_path))
+ goto out_fd;
+ /*
+ * For compatibility reasons, if the system-wide policy doesn't
+ * enforce file permission checks, then replaces the execute
+ * permission request with a read permission request.
+ */
+ if (!(sysctl_trusted_for_policy & TRUST_POLICY_EXEC_FILE))
+ mask &= ~MAY_EXEC;
+ /* To be executed *by* user space, files must be readable. */
+ mask |= MAY_READ;
+ }
+
+ err = inode_permission(file_mnt_user_ns(f.file), inode,
+ mask | MAY_ACCESS);
+
+out_fd:
+ fdput(f);
+ return err;
+}
+
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chdir, const char __user *, filename)
{
struct path path;
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 3afca821df32..caea61fcb283 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ extern int sysctl_protected_symlinks;
extern int sysctl_protected_hardlinks;
extern int sysctl_protected_fifos;
extern int sysctl_protected_regular;
+extern int sysctl_trusted_for_policy;
typedef __kernel_rwf_t rwf_t;
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 528a478dbda8..c535e0e43cc8 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ struct open_how;
struct mount_attr;
struct landlock_ruleset_attr;
enum landlock_rule_type;
+enum trusted_for_usage;
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/aio_abi.h>
@@ -462,6 +463,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fallocate(int fd, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len);
asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode);
asmlinkage long sys_faccessat2(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode,
int flags);
+asmlinkage long sys_trusted_for(int fd, enum trusted_for_usage usage, u32 flags);
asmlinkage long sys_chdir(const char __user *filename);
asmlinkage long sys_fchdir(unsigned int fd);
asmlinkage long sys_chroot(const char __user *filename);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/trusted-for.h b/include/uapi/linux/trusted-for.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..cc4f030c5103
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/trusted-for.h
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
+#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_TRUSTED_FOR_H
+#define _UAPI_LINUX_TRUSTED_FOR_H
+
+/**
+ * enum trusted_for_usage - Usage for which a file descriptor is trusted
+ *
+ * Argument of trusted_for(2).
+ */
+enum trusted_for_usage {
+ /**
+ * @TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION: Check that the data read from a file
+ * descriptor is trusted to be executed or interpreted (e.g. scripts).
+ */
+ TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION = 1,
+};
+
+#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_TRUSTED_FOR_H */
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 083be6af29d7..002dc830c165 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ static int sixty = 60;
static int __maybe_unused neg_one = -1;
static int __maybe_unused two = 2;
+static int __maybe_unused three = 3;
static int __maybe_unused four = 4;
static unsigned long zero_ul;
static unsigned long one_ul = 1;
@@ -936,7 +937,6 @@ static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
return err;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK
static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
@@ -945,7 +945,6 @@ static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
return proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}
-#endif
/**
* struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param - proc_dointvec_minmax() range checking structure
@@ -3357,6 +3356,15 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = &two,
},
+ {
+ .procname = "trusted_for_policy",
+ .data = &sysctl_trusted_for_policy,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0600,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
+ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
+ .extra2 = &three,
+ },
#if defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC) || defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC_MODULE)
{
.procname = "binfmt_misc",
--
2.32.0
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Wire up trusted_for(2) for all architectures.
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thibaut Sautereau <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
---
Changes since v15:
* Update syscall IDs to align with the new futex_waitv.
Changes since v13:
* Add Reviewed-by Kees Cook.
Changes since v12:
* Update syscall IDs to align with the new ones.
Changes since v11:
* Add Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
* Rebase and leave space for watch_mount(2) and epoll_pwait2(2) from
-next.
Changes since v9:
* Rename introspect_access(2) to trusted_for(2).
* Increase syscall number to leave space for memfd_secret(2) in -next.
Changes since v7:
* New patch for the new syscall.
* Increase syscall numbers by 2 to leave space for new ones (in
linux-next): watch_mount(2) and process_madvise(2).
---
arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 ++
arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 ++
arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 ++
arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 ++
arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 ++
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 2 ++
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 2 ++
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 2 ++
arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 ++
arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 ++
arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 ++
arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 ++
arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 ++
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 ++
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 4 +++-
19 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index e4a041cd5715..7943ed6455a2 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -488,3 +488,5 @@
556 common landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self
# 557 reserved for memfd_secret
558 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
+# 559 reserved for futex_waitv
+560 common trusted_for sys_trusted_for
diff --git a/arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl b/arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl
index 543100151f2b..ccfd831bcb96 100644
--- a/arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl
@@ -463,3 +463,4 @@
# 447 reserved for memfd_secret
448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv
+450 common trusted_for sys_trusted_for
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h
index 6bdb5f5db438..4e65da3445c7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
#define __ARM_NR_compat_set_tls (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 5)
#define __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 0x800)
-#define __NR_compat_syscalls 450
+#define __NR_compat_syscalls 451
#endif
#define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h
index 41ea1195e44b..0e69743609ff 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h
@@ -905,6 +905,8 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_landlock_restrict_self, sys_landlock_restrict_self)
__SYSCALL(__NR_process_mrelease, sys_process_mrelease)
#define __NR_futex_waitv 449
__SYSCALL(__NR_futex_waitv, sys_futex_waitv)
+#define __NR_trusted_for 450
+__SYSCALL(__NR_trusted_for, sys_trusted_for)
/*
* Please add new compat syscalls above this comment and update
diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index 6fea1844fb95..362c1e837bd6 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -369,3 +369,5 @@
446 common landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self
# 447 reserved for memfd_secret
448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
+# 449 reserved for futex_waitv
+450 common trusted_for sys_trusted_for
diff --git a/arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index 7976dff8f879..90306947817d 100644
--- a/arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -448,3 +448,5 @@
446 common landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self
# 447 reserved for memfd_secret
448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
+# 449 reserved for futex_waitv
+450 common trusted_for sys_trusted_for
diff --git a/arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index 6b0e11362bd2..8b19bbdaaf70 100644
--- a/arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -454,3 +454,5 @@
446 common landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self
# 447 reserved for memfd_secret
448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
+# 449 reserved for futex_waitv
+450 common trusted_for sys_trusted_for
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl b/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl
index 70e32de2bcaa..1a84e8d1c776 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl
@@ -387,3 +387,5 @@
446 n32 landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self
# 447 reserved for memfd_secret
448 n32 process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
+# 449 reserved for futex_waitv
+450 n32 trusted_for sys_trusted_for
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl b/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl
index 1ca7bc337932..ced3db574de3 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl
@@ -363,3 +363,5 @@
446 n64 landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self
# 447 reserved for memfd_secret
448 n64 process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
+# 449 reserved for futex_waitv
+450 n64 trusted_for sys_trusted_for
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl b/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl
index a61c35edaa74..94b77adc6165 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl
@@ -436,3 +436,5 @@
446 o32 landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self
# 447 reserved for memfd_secret
448 o32 process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
+# 449 reserved for futex_waitv
+450 o32 trusted_for sys_trusted_for
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index bf751e0732b7..11de0c191a0e 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -446,3 +446,5 @@
446 common landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self
# 447 reserved for memfd_secret
448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
+# 449 reserved for futex_waitv
+450 common trusted_for sys_trusted_for
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index 7bef917cc84e..b7337d3843a7 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -528,3 +528,5 @@
446 common landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self
# 447 reserved for memfd_secret
448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
+# 449 reserved for futex_waitv
+450 common trusted_for sys_trusted_for
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index df5261e5cfe1..98bab648cda6 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -451,3 +451,5 @@
446 common landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self
# 447 reserved for memfd_secret
448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
+# 449 reserved for futex_waitv
+450 common trusted_for sys_trusted_for sys_trusted_for
diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index 208f131659c5..88c6cb3de23b 100644
--- a/arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -451,3 +451,5 @@
446 common landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self
# 447 reserved for memfd_secret
448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
+# 449 reserved for futex_waitv
+450 common trusted_for sys_trusted_for
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index c37764dc764d..b0db960c5897 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -494,3 +494,5 @@
446 common landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self
# 447 reserved for memfd_secret
448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
+# 449 reserved for futex_waitv
+450 common trusted_for sys_trusted_for
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
index 7e25543693de..2f230c04f8a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -454,3 +454,4 @@
447 i386 memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret
448 i386 process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
449 i386 futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv
+450 i386 trusted_for sys_trusted_for
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index fe8f8dd157b4..678ab13ee1c1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -371,6 +371,7 @@
447 common memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret
448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv
+450 common trusted_for sys_trusted_for
#
# Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
diff --git a/arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index 104b327f8ac9..9dab1dfffc95 100644
--- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -419,3 +419,5 @@
446 common landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self
# 447 reserved for memfd_secret
448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
+# 449 reserved for futex_waitv
+450 common trusted_for sys_trusted_for
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
index 4557a8b6086f..ded7a49616f2 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
@@ -882,9 +882,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_process_mrelease, sys_process_mrelease)
#define __NR_futex_waitv 449
__SYSCALL(__NR_futex_waitv, sys_futex_waitv)
+#define __NR_trusted_for 450
+__SYSCALL(__NR_trusted_for, sys_trusted_for)
#undef __NR_syscalls
-#define __NR_syscalls 450
+#define __NR_syscalls 451
/*
* 32 bit systems traditionally used different
--
2.32.0
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Test that checks performed by trusted_for(2) on file descriptors are
consistent with noexec mount points and file execute permissions,
according to the policy configured with the fs.trust_policy sysctl.
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thibaut Sautereau <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
---
Changes since v14:
* Add Reviewed-by Kees Cook.
Changes since v13:
* Move -I to CFLAGS (suggested by Kees Cook).
* Update sysctl name.
Changes since v12:
* Fix Makefile's license.
Changes since v10:
* Update selftest Makefile.
Changes since v9:
* Rename the syscall and the sysctl.
* Update tests for enum trusted_for_usage
Changes since v8:
* Update with the dedicated syscall introspect_access(2) and the renamed
fs.introspection_policy sysctl.
* Remove check symlink which can't be use as is anymore.
* Use socketpair(2) to test UNIX socket.
Changes since v7:
* Update tests with faccessat2/AT_INTERPRETED, including new ones to
check that setting R_OK or W_OK returns EINVAL.
* Add tests for memfd, pipefs and nsfs.
* Rename and move back tests to a standalone directory.
Changes since v6:
* Add full combination tests for all file types, including block
devices, character devices, fifos, sockets and symlinks.
* Properly save and restore initial sysctl value for all tests.
Changes since v5:
* Refactor with FIXTURE_VARIANT, which make the tests much more easy to
read and maintain.
* Save and restore initial sysctl value (suggested by Kees Cook).
* Test with a sysctl value of 0.
* Check errno in sysctl_access_write test.
* Update tests for the CAP_SYS_ADMIN switch.
* Update tests to check -EISDIR (replacing -EACCES).
* Replace FIXTURE_DATA() with FIXTURE() (spotted by Kees Cook).
* Use global const strings.
Changes since v3:
* Replace RESOLVE_MAYEXEC with O_MAYEXEC.
* Add tests to check that O_MAYEXEC is ignored by open(2) and openat(2).
Changes since v2:
* Move tests from exec/ to openat2/ .
* Replace O_MAYEXEC with RESOLVE_MAYEXEC from openat2(2).
* Cleanup tests.
Changes since v1:
* Move tests from yama/ to exec/ .
* Fix _GNU_SOURCE in kselftest_harness.h .
* Add a new test sysctl_access_write to check if CAP_MAC_ADMIN is taken
into account.
* Test directory execution which is always forbidden since commit
73601ea5b7b1 ("fs/open.c: allow opening only regular files during
execve()"), and also check that even the root user can not bypass file
execution checks.
* Make sure delete_workspace() always as enough right to succeed.
* Cosmetic cleanup.
---
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 +
.../testing/selftests/interpreter/.gitignore | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/Makefile | 21 +
tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/config | 1 +
.../selftests/interpreter/trust_policy_test.c | 362 ++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 387 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/.gitignore
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/Makefile
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/config
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/trust_policy_test.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile
index c852eb40c4f7..3a032a545f74 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ TARGETS += ftrace
TARGETS += futex
TARGETS += gpio
TARGETS += intel_pstate
+TARGETS += interpreter
TARGETS += ipc
TARGETS += ir
TARGETS += kcmp
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..82a4846cbc4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*_test
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7402fdb6533f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+CFLAGS += -Wall -O2 -I$(khdr_dir)
+LDLIBS += -lcap
+
+src_test := $(wildcard *_test.c)
+TEST_GEN_PROGS := $(src_test:.c=)
+
+KSFT_KHDR_INSTALL := 1
+include ../lib.mk
+
+khdr_dir = $(top_srcdir)/usr/include
+
+$(khdr_dir)/asm-generic/unistd.h: khdr
+ @:
+
+$(khdr_dir)/linux/trusted-for.h: khdr
+ @:
+
+$(OUTPUT)/%_test: %_test.c $(khdr_dir)/asm-generic/unistd.h $(khdr_dir)/linux/trusted-for.h ../kselftest_harness.h
+ $(LINK.c) $< $(LDLIBS) -o $@
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/config b/tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/config
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..dd53c266bf52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/config
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+CONFIG_SYSCTL=y
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/trust_policy_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/trust_policy_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b59f07f537ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/trust_policy_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Test trusted_for(2) with fs.trusted_for_policy sysctl
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ *
+ * Author: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/trusted-for.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/capability.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "../kselftest_harness.h"
+
+#ifndef trusted_for
+static int trusted_for(const int fd, const enum trusted_for_usage usage,
+ const __u32 flags)
+{
+ errno = 0;
+ return syscall(__NR_trusted_for, fd, usage, flags);
+}
+#endif
+
+static const char sysctl_path[] = "/proc/sys/fs/trusted_for_policy";
+
+static const char workdir_path[] = "./test-mount";
+static const char reg_file_path[] = "./test-mount/regular_file";
+static const char dir_path[] = "./test-mount/directory";
+static const char block_dev_path[] = "./test-mount/block_device";
+static const char char_dev_path[] = "./test-mount/character_device";
+static const char fifo_path[] = "./test-mount/fifo";
+
+static void ignore_dac(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int override)
+{
+ cap_t caps;
+ const cap_value_t cap_val[2] = {
+ CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE,
+ CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH,
+ };
+
+ caps = cap_get_proc();
+ ASSERT_NE(NULL, caps);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 2, cap_val,
+ override ? CAP_SET : CAP_CLEAR));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, cap_set_proc(caps));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, cap_free(caps));
+}
+
+static void ignore_sys_admin(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int override)
+{
+ cap_t caps;
+ const cap_value_t cap_val[1] = {
+ CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ };
+
+ caps = cap_get_proc();
+ ASSERT_NE(NULL, caps);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, cap_val,
+ override ? CAP_SET : CAP_CLEAR));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, cap_set_proc(caps));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, cap_free(caps));
+}
+
+static void test_omx(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ const char *const path, const int err_access)
+{
+ int flags = O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC;
+ int fd, access_ret, access_errno;
+
+ /* Do not block on pipes. */
+ if (path == fifo_path)
+ flags |= O_NONBLOCK;
+
+ fd = open(path, flags);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ access_ret = trusted_for(fd, TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION, 0);
+ access_errno = errno;
+ if (err_access) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(err_access, access_errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Wrong error for trusted_for(2) with %s: %s",
+ path, strerror(access_errno));
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, access_ret);
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, access_ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Access denied for %s: %s", path, strerror(access_errno));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Tests unsupported trusted usage. */
+ access_ret = trusted_for(fd, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, access_ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ access_ret = trusted_for(fd, 2, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, access_ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+}
+
+static void test_policy_fd(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, const int fd,
+ const bool has_policy)
+{
+ const int ret = trusted_for(fd, TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION, 0);
+
+ if (has_policy) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Wrong error for trusted_for(2) with FD: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Access denied for FD: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+FIXTURE(access) {
+ char initial_sysctl_value;
+ int memfd, pipefd;
+ int pipe_fds[2], socket_fds[2];
+};
+
+static void test_file_types(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, FIXTURE_DATA(access) *self,
+ const int err_code, const bool has_policy)
+{
+ /* Tests are performed on a tmpfs mount point. */
+ test_omx(_metadata, reg_file_path, err_code);
+ test_omx(_metadata, dir_path, has_policy ? EACCES : 0);
+ test_omx(_metadata, block_dev_path, has_policy ? EACCES : 0);
+ test_omx(_metadata, char_dev_path, has_policy ? EACCES : 0);
+ test_omx(_metadata, fifo_path, has_policy ? EACCES : 0);
+
+ /* Checks that exec is denied for any socket FD. */
+ test_policy_fd(_metadata, self->socket_fds[0], has_policy);
+
+ /* Checks that exec is denied for any memfd. */
+ test_policy_fd(_metadata, self->memfd, has_policy);
+
+ /* Checks that exec is denied for any pipefs FD. */
+ test_policy_fd(_metadata, self->pipefd, has_policy);
+}
+
+static void test_files(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, FIXTURE_DATA(access) *self,
+ const int err_code, const bool has_policy)
+{
+ /* Tests as root. */
+ ignore_dac(_metadata, 1);
+ test_file_types(_metadata, self, err_code, has_policy);
+
+ /* Tests without bypass. */
+ ignore_dac(_metadata, 0);
+ test_file_types(_metadata, self, err_code, has_policy);
+}
+
+static void sysctl_write_char(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, const char value)
+{
+ int fd;
+
+ fd = open(sysctl_path, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, write(fd, &value, 1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+}
+
+static char sysctl_read_char(struct __test_metadata *_metadata)
+{
+ int fd;
+ char sysctl_value;
+
+ fd = open(sysctl_path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, read(fd, &sysctl_value, 1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+ return sysctl_value;
+}
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(access) {
+ const bool mount_exec;
+ const bool file_exec;
+ const int sysctl_err_code[3];
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(access, mount_exec_file_exec) {
+ .mount_exec = true,
+ .file_exec = true,
+ .sysctl_err_code = {0, 0, 0},
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(access, mount_exec_file_noexec)
+{
+ .mount_exec = true,
+ .file_exec = false,
+ .sysctl_err_code = {0, EACCES, EACCES},
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(access, mount_noexec_file_exec)
+{
+ .mount_exec = false,
+ .file_exec = true,
+ .sysctl_err_code = {EACCES, 0, EACCES},
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(access, mount_noexec_file_noexec)
+{
+ .mount_exec = false,
+ .file_exec = false,
+ .sysctl_err_code = {EACCES, EACCES, EACCES},
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(access)
+{
+ int procfd_path_size;
+ static const char path_template[] = "/proc/self/fd/%d";
+ char procfd_path[sizeof(path_template) + 10];
+
+ /*
+ * Cleans previous workspace if any error previously happened (don't
+ * check errors).
+ */
+ umount(workdir_path);
+ rmdir(workdir_path);
+
+ /* Creates a clean mount point. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(workdir_path, 00700));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mount("test", workdir_path, "tmpfs", MS_MGC_VAL |
+ (variant->mount_exec ? 0 : MS_NOEXEC),
+ "mode=0700,size=4k"));
+
+ /* Creates a regular file. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(reg_file_path, S_IFREG | (variant->file_exec ? 0500 : 0400), 0));
+ /* Creates a directory. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(dir_path, variant->file_exec ? 0500 : 0400));
+ /* Creates a character device: /dev/null. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(char_dev_path, S_IFCHR | 0400, makedev(1, 3)));
+ /* Creates a block device: /dev/loop0 */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(block_dev_path, S_IFBLK | 0400, makedev(7, 0)));
+ /* Creates a fifo. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(fifo_path, S_IFIFO | 0400, 0));
+
+ /* Creates a regular file without user mount point. */
+ self->memfd = memfd_create("test-interpreted", MFD_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, self->memfd);
+ /* Sets mode, which must be ignored by the exec check. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, fchmod(self->memfd, variant->file_exec ? 0500 : 0400));
+
+ /* Creates a pipefs file descriptor. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(self->pipe_fds));
+ procfd_path_size = snprintf(procfd_path, sizeof(procfd_path),
+ path_template, self->pipe_fds[0]);
+ ASSERT_LT(procfd_path_size, sizeof(procfd_path));
+ self->pipefd = open(procfd_path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, self->pipefd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, fchmod(self->pipefd, variant->file_exec ? 0500 : 0400));
+
+ /* Creates a socket file descriptor. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, self->socket_fds));
+
+ /* Saves initial sysctl value. */
+ self->initial_sysctl_value = sysctl_read_char(_metadata);
+
+ /* Prepares for sysctl writes. */
+ ignore_sys_admin(_metadata, 1);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(access)
+{
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(self->memfd));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(self->pipefd));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(self->pipe_fds[0]));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(self->pipe_fds[1]));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(self->socket_fds[0]));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(self->socket_fds[1]));
+
+ /* Restores initial sysctl value. */
+ sysctl_write_char(_metadata, self->initial_sysctl_value);
+
+ /* There is no need to unlink the test files. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, umount(workdir_path));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, rmdir(workdir_path));
+}
+
+TEST_F(access, sysctl_0)
+{
+ /* Do not enforce anything. */
+ sysctl_write_char(_metadata, '0');
+ test_files(_metadata, self, 0, false);
+}
+
+TEST_F(access, sysctl_1)
+{
+ /* Enforces mount exec check. */
+ sysctl_write_char(_metadata, '1');
+ test_files(_metadata, self, variant->sysctl_err_code[0], true);
+}
+
+TEST_F(access, sysctl_2)
+{
+ /* Enforces file exec check. */
+ sysctl_write_char(_metadata, '2');
+ test_files(_metadata, self, variant->sysctl_err_code[1], true);
+}
+
+TEST_F(access, sysctl_3)
+{
+ /* Enforces mount and file exec check. */
+ sysctl_write_char(_metadata, '3');
+ test_files(_metadata, self, variant->sysctl_err_code[2], true);
+}
+
+FIXTURE(cleanup) {
+ char initial_sysctl_value;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(cleanup)
+{
+ /* Saves initial sysctl value. */
+ self->initial_sysctl_value = sysctl_read_char(_metadata);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(cleanup)
+{
+ /* Restores initial sysctl value. */
+ ignore_sys_admin(_metadata, 1);
+ sysctl_write_char(_metadata, self->initial_sysctl_value);
+}
+
+TEST_F(cleanup, sysctl_access_write)
+{
+ int fd;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ ignore_sys_admin(_metadata, 1);
+ sysctl_write_char(_metadata, '0');
+
+ ignore_sys_admin(_metadata, 0);
+ fd = open(sysctl_path, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+ ret = write(fd, "0", 1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+}
+
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
--
2.32.0
Hi Mickaël,
On 11/10/21 20:06, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
> index f732fb94600c..96a80abec41b 100644
> --- a/fs/open.c
> +++ b/fs/open.c
> @@ -480,6 +482,114 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(access, const char __user *, filename, int, mode)
> return do_faccessat(AT_FDCWD, filename, mode, 0);
> }
>
> +#define TRUST_POLICY_EXEC_MOUNT BIT(0)
> +#define TRUST_POLICY_EXEC_FILE BIT(1)
> +
> +int sysctl_trusted_for_policy __read_mostly;
> +
> +/**
...
> + */
> +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(trusted_for, const int, fd, const enum trusted_for_usage, usage,
Please, don't use enums for interfaces. They are implementation defined
types, and vary between compilers and within the same compiler also
depending on optimization flags.
C17::6.7.2.2.4:
[
Each enumerated type shall be compatible with char,
a signed integer type, or an unsigned integer type.
The choice of type is implementation-defined,130)
but shall be capable of representing the values of
all the members of the enumeration.
]
See also:
<https://stackoverflow.com/questions/366017/what-is-the-size-of-an-enum-in-c>
So, please use only standard integer types for interfaces.
And in the case of enums, since the language specifies that enumeration
constants (the macro-like identifiers) are of type int, it makes sense
for functions to use int.
C17::6.7.2.2.3:
[
The identifiers in an enumerator list are declared as constants
that have type int and may appear wherever such are permitted.
]
I'd use an int for the API/ABI, even if it's expected to be assigned
values of 'enum trusted_for_usage' (that should be specified in the
manual page in DESCRIPTION, but not in SYNOPSIS, which should specify int).
TL;DR:
ISO C specifies that for the following code:
enum foo {BAR};
enum foo foobar;
typeof(foo) shall be int
typeof(foobar) is implementation-defined
Since foobar = BAR; assigns an int, the best thing to do to avoid
implementation-defined behavior, is to declare foobar as int too.
> diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> index 528a478dbda8..c535e0e43cc8 100644
> --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
> +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> @@ -462,6 +463,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fallocate(int fd, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len);
> asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode);
> asmlinkage long sys_faccessat2(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode,
> int flags);
> +asmlinkage long sys_trusted_for(int fd, enum trusted_for_usage usage, u32 flags);
Same here.
> asmlinkage long sys_chdir(const char __user *filename);
> asmlinkage long sys_fchdir(unsigned int fd);
> asmlinkage long sys_chroot(const char __user *filename);
Thanks,
Alex
--
Alejandro Colomar
Linux man-pages comaintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
http://www.alejandro-colomar.es/
--
Alejandro Colomar
Linux man-pages comaintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
http://www.alejandro-colomar.es/
On 12/11/2021 20:16, Alejandro Colomar (man-pages) wrote:
> Hi Mickaël,
Hi Alejandro,
>
> On 11/10/21 20:06, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
>> index f732fb94600c..96a80abec41b 100644
>> --- a/fs/open.c
>> +++ b/fs/open.c
>> @@ -480,6 +482,114 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(access, const char __user *,
>> filename, int, mode)
>> return do_faccessat(AT_FDCWD, filename, mode, 0);
>> }
>> +#define TRUST_POLICY_EXEC_MOUNT BIT(0)
>> +#define TRUST_POLICY_EXEC_FILE BIT(1)
>> +
>> +int sysctl_trusted_for_policy __read_mostly;
>> +
>> +/**
> ...
>> + */
>> +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(trusted_for, const int, fd, const enum
>> trusted_for_usage, usage,
>
> Please, don't use enums for interfaces. They are implementation defined
> types, and vary between compilers and within the same compiler also
> depending on optimization flags.
>
> C17::6.7.2.2.4:
> [
> Each enumerated type shall be compatible with char,
> a signed integer type, or an unsigned integer type.
> The choice of type is implementation-defined,130)
> but shall be capable of representing the values of
> all the members of the enumeration.
> ]
>
> See also:
> <https://stackoverflow.com/questions/366017/what-is-the-size-of-an-enum-in-c>
>
>
> So, please use only standard integer types for interfaces.
>
> And in the case of enums, since the language specifies that enumeration
> constants (the macro-like identifiers) are of type int, it makes sense
> for functions to use int.
>
> C17::6.7.2.2.3:
> [
> The identifiers in an enumerator list are declared as constants
> that have type int and may appear wherever such are permitted.
> ]
>
> I'd use an int for the API/ABI, even if it's expected to be assigned
> values of 'enum trusted_for_usage' (that should be specified in the
> manual page in DESCRIPTION, but not in SYNOPSIS, which should specify int).
>
>
>
> TL;DR:
>
> ISO C specifies that for the following code:
>
> enum foo {BAR};
>
> enum foo foobar;
>
> typeof(foo) shall be int
> typeof(foobar) is implementation-defined
I tested with some version of GCC (from 4.9 to 11) and clang (10 and 11)
with different optimizations and the related sizes are at least the same
as for the int type.
>
> Since foobar = BAR; assigns an int, the best thing to do to avoid
> implementation-defined behavior, is to declare foobar as int too.
OK, so it should be enough to change the syscall argument type from enum
trusted_for_usage to int, but we can keep the UAPI with the enum (i.e.
we don't need to change the value to #define TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION 1) right?
>
>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
>> index 528a478dbda8..c535e0e43cc8 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
>> @@ -462,6 +463,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fallocate(int fd, int mode,
>> loff_t offset, loff_t len);
>> asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
>> int mode);
>> asmlinkage long sys_faccessat2(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
>> int mode,
>> int flags);
>> +asmlinkage long sys_trusted_for(int fd, enum trusted_for_usage usage,
>> u32 flags);
>
> Same here.
>
>> asmlinkage long sys_chdir(const char __user *filename);
>> asmlinkage long sys_fchdir(unsigned int fd);
>> asmlinkage long sys_chroot(const char __user *filename);
>
> Thanks,
> Alex
>
>
Hi Mickaël,
On 11/13/21 14:02, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> TL;DR:
>>
>> ISO C specifies that for the following code:
>>
>> enum foo {BAR};
>>
>> enum foo foobar;
>>
>> typeof(foo) shall be int
>> typeof(foobar) is implementation-defined
>
> I tested with some version of GCC (from 4.9 to 11) and clang (10 and 11)
> with different optimizations and the related sizes are at least the same
> as for the int type.
GCC has -fshort-enums to make enum types be as short as possible. I
expected -Os to turn this on, since it saves space, but it doesn't.
Still, not relying on enum == int is better, IMO.
>
>>
>> Since foobar = BAR; assigns an int, the best thing to do to avoid
>> implementation-defined behavior, is to declare foobar as int too.
>
> OK, so it should be enough to change the syscall argument type from enum
> trusted_for_usage to int, but we can keep the UAPI with the enum (i.e.
> we don't need to change the value to #define TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION 1) right?
Correct. The enumerations are guaranteed to be int (except in case of
UB, see below), so they'll be (almost) the same as a #define after the
preprocessor.
If you do
enum foo {
FOO = 1L << INT_WIDTH
};
since that doesn't fit in either int or unsigned int,
it is Undefined Behavior,
and here GCC decides to use long for FOO.
+++++++++ UB example ++++++++++++++
$ cat foo.c
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdio.h>
enum foo {
FOO = 1L << UINT_WIDTH
};
int main(void)
{
printf("\tsizeof(enum foo) = %zu\n", sizeof(enum foo));
printf("\tsizeof(FOO) = %zu\n", sizeof(FOO));
}
$ cc foo.c -Wall -Wextra -Werror -Wpedantic -pedantic-errors -std=c2x
foo.c:6:23: error: ISO C restricts enumerator values to range of 'int'
[-Wpedantic]
6 | FOO = 1L << UINT_WIDTH
| ^~
$ cc foo.c -Wall -Wextra -Werror -std=c2x
$ ./a.out
sizeof(enum foo) = 8
sizeof(FOO) = 8
+++++++++++++ -fshort-enums example +++++++++++++++
$ cat foo.c
#include <stdio.h>
enum foo {
FOO = 1
};
int main(void)
{
printf("\tsizeof(enum foo) = %zu\n", sizeof(enum foo));
printf("\tsizeof(FOO) = %zu\n", sizeof(FOO));
}
$ cc foo.c -Wall -Wextra -Werror -Wpedantic -pedantic-errors -fshort-enums
$ ./a.out
sizeof(enum foo) = 1
sizeof(FOO) = 4
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Cheers,
Alex
>
>>
>>
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
>>> index 528a478dbda8..c535e0e43cc8 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
>>> @@ -462,6 +463,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fallocate(int fd, int mode,
>>> loff_t offset, loff_t len);
>>> asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
>>> int mode);
>>> asmlinkage long sys_faccessat2(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
>>> int mode,
>>> int flags);
>>> +asmlinkage long sys_trusted_for(int fd, enum trusted_for_usage usage,
>>> u32 flags);
>>
>> Same here.
>>
>>> asmlinkage long sys_chdir(const char __user *filename);
>>> asmlinkage long sys_fchdir(unsigned int fd);
>>> asmlinkage long sys_chroot(const char __user *filename);
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Alex
>>
>>
--
Alejandro Colomar
Linux man-pages comaintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
http://www.alejandro-colomar.es/
On 13/11/2021 20:56, Alejandro Colomar (man-pages) wrote:
> Hi Mickaël,
>
> On 11/13/21 14:02, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>> TL;DR:
>>>
>>> ISO C specifies that for the following code:
>>>
>>> enum foo {BAR};
>>>
>>> enum foo foobar;
>>>
>>> typeof(foo) shall be int
>>> typeof(foobar) is implementation-defined
>>
>> I tested with some version of GCC (from 4.9 to 11) and clang (10 and 11)
>> with different optimizations and the related sizes are at least the same
>> as for the int type.
>
> GCC has -fshort-enums to make enum types be as short as possible. I
> expected -Os to turn this on, since it saves space, but it doesn't.
>
> Still, not relying on enum == int is better, IMO.
>
>>
>>>
>>> Since foobar = BAR; assigns an int, the best thing to do to avoid
>>> implementation-defined behavior, is to declare foobar as int too.
>>
>> OK, so it should be enough to change the syscall argument type from enum
>> trusted_for_usage to int, but we can keep the UAPI with the enum (i.e.
>> we don't need to change the value to #define TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION 1)
>> right?
>
> Correct. The enumerations are guaranteed to be int (except in case of
> UB, see below), so they'll be (almost) the same as a #define after the
> preprocessor.
Thanks for the detailed explanation! I'll send a new patch taking into
account your suggestion.
>
>
> If you do
>
> enum foo {
> FOO = 1L << INT_WIDTH
> };
>
> since that doesn't fit in either int or unsigned int,
> it is Undefined Behavior,
> and here GCC decides to use long for FOO.
>
> +++++++++ UB example ++++++++++++++
>
> $ cat foo.c
> #include <limits.h>
> #include <stdio.h>
>
>
> enum foo {
> FOO = 1L << UINT_WIDTH
> };
>
> int main(void)
> {
> printf("\tsizeof(enum foo) = %zu\n", sizeof(enum foo));
> printf("\tsizeof(FOO) = %zu\n", sizeof(FOO));
> }
>
> $ cc foo.c -Wall -Wextra -Werror -Wpedantic -pedantic-errors -std=c2x
> foo.c:6:23: error: ISO C restricts enumerator values to range of 'int'
> [-Wpedantic]
> 6 | FOO = 1L << UINT_WIDTH
> | ^~
> $ cc foo.c -Wall -Wextra -Werror -std=c2x
> $ ./a.out
> sizeof(enum foo) = 8
> sizeof(FOO) = 8
>
> +++++++++++++ -fshort-enums example +++++++++++++++
>
> $ cat foo.c
> #include <stdio.h>
>
>
> enum foo {
> FOO = 1
> };
>
> int main(void)
> {
> printf("\tsizeof(enum foo) = %zu\n", sizeof(enum foo));
> printf("\tsizeof(FOO) = %zu\n", sizeof(FOO));
> }
>
> $ cc foo.c -Wall -Wextra -Werror -Wpedantic -pedantic-errors -fshort-enums
> $ ./a.out
> sizeof(enum foo) = 1
> sizeof(FOO) = 4
>
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>
> Cheers,
> Alex
>
>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
>>>> index 528a478dbda8..c535e0e43cc8 100644
>>>> --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
>>>> +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
>>>> @@ -462,6 +463,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fallocate(int fd, int mode,
>>>> loff_t offset, loff_t len);
>>>> asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
>>>> int mode);
>>>> asmlinkage long sys_faccessat2(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
>>>> int mode,
>>>> int flags);
>>>> +asmlinkage long sys_trusted_for(int fd, enum trusted_for_usage usage,
>>>> u32 flags);
>>>
>>> Same here.
>>>
>>>> asmlinkage long sys_chdir(const char __user *filename);
>>>> asmlinkage long sys_fchdir(unsigned int fd);
>>>> asmlinkage long sys_chroot(const char __user *filename);
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Alex
>>>
>>>
>
Hi Alejandro,
On Sat, Nov 13, 2021 at 8:56 PM Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)
<[email protected]> wrote:
> On 11/13/21 14:02, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> >> TL;DR:
> >>
> >> ISO C specifies that for the following code:
> >>
> >> enum foo {BAR};
> >>
> >> enum foo foobar;
> >>
> >> typeof(foo) shall be int
> >> typeof(foobar) is implementation-defined
> >
> > I tested with some version of GCC (from 4.9 to 11) and clang (10 and 11)
> > with different optimizations and the related sizes are at least the same
> > as for the int type.
>
> GCC has -fshort-enums to make enum types be as short as possible. I
> expected -Os to turn this on, since it saves space, but it doesn't.
Changing optimization level must not change the ABI, else debugging
would become even more of a nightmare.
Gr{oetje,eeting}s,
Geert
--
Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- [email protected]
In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But
when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that.
-- Linus Torvalds
Hi Geert,
On 11/14/21 16:32, Geert Uytterhoeven wrote:
> Hi Alejandro,
>
> On Sat, Nov 13, 2021 at 8:56 PM Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)
> <[email protected]> wrote:
>> On 11/13/21 14:02, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>>> TL;DR:
>>>>
>>>> ISO C specifies that for the following code:
>>>>
>>>> enum foo {BAR};
>>>>
>>>> enum foo foobar;
>>>>
>>>> typeof(foo) shall be int
>>>> typeof(foobar) is implementation-defined
>>>
>>> I tested with some version of GCC (from 4.9 to 11) and clang (10 and 11)
>>> with different optimizations and the related sizes are at least the same
>>> as for the int type.
>>
>> GCC has -fshort-enums to make enum types be as short as possible. I
>> expected -Os to turn this on, since it saves space, but it doesn't.
>
> Changing optimization level must not change the ABI, else debugging
> would become even more of a nightmare.
I agree, but if you invoke implementation-defined,
then it's not (only) the compiler's fault.
Instead of not allowing GCC to enable -fshort-enums ever,
one can write ISO C-complying code in the parts that
will be exposed as an interface,
by just using int.
That allows using -fshort-enums
for whatever reasons it might be good.
Not saying that the kernel wants to enable it,
but it costs nothing to write non-implementation-defined code
that doesn't forbid it.
It's comparable to passing a struct (not a pointer to it)
to a function.
If you change the size of the struct,
you screw the interface.
Better pass pointers, or standard types.
Cheers,
Alex
--
Alejandro Colomar
Linux man-pages comaintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
http://www.alejandro-colomar.es/