Subject: [PATCH v6 0/3] LSM: security module information improvements
Changes from v5:
Rebased on 4.9-rc2
Changes from v4:
Use kasprintf instead of kzalloc() ... sprintf in more places.
More in the documentation.
Separate module information in contexts with ",". (not yet visible)
Changes from v3:
Use kasprintf instead of kzalloc() ... sprintf.
Create interfaces that make it possible to deal with process
attributes in the face of multiple "major" security modules.
Patch 1/3 adds /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which provides
a list of the active security modules on the system.
$ cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm
capability,yama,loadpin,smack
Patch 2/3 adds a subdirectory in /proc/.../attr for each
security module that exports process attribute data. This
allows a program in easily differentiate between the "current"
value for Smack and AppArmor.
$ cat /proc/self/attr/smack/current
System
$ cat /proc/self/attr/apparmor/current
unconfined
Patch 3/3 adds an interface that provides module identified
information that otherwise matches the "current" attr.
This allows a system with multiple modules to provide the
complete security "context" in one place. A (future) system
with both Smack and AppArmor might report:
$ cat /proc/self/attr/context
smack='System',apparmor='unconfined'
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/security/LSM.txt | 34 ++++++--
fs/proc/base.c | 95 +++++++++++++++++++---
fs/proc/internal.h | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +--
include/linux/security.h | 15 ++--
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 +++++++--
security/commoncap.c | 3 +-
security/inode.c | 26 +++++-
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 177 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 22 ++++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 22 ++---
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 2 +-
14 files changed, 395 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
Subject: [PATCH v6 1/3] LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm
I got tired of having to find indirect ways to
determine what security modules are active on a system.
I have added /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a
comma separated list of the active security modules. No
more groping around in /proc/filesystems, which won't
help if the module doesn't support its own filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/security/LSM.txt | 7 +++++++
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 ++++--------
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 3 ++-
security/commoncap.c | 3 ++-
security/inode.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 2 +-
11 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/LSM.txt b/Documentation/security/LSM.txt
index 3db7e67..c2683f2 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/LSM.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/LSM.txt
@@ -22,6 +22,13 @@ system, building their checks on top of the defined capability hooks.
For more details on capabilities, see capabilities(7) in the Linux
man-pages project.
+A list of the active security modules can be found by reading
+/sys/kernel/security/lsm. This is a comma separated list, and
+will always include the capability module. The list reflects the
+order in which checks are made. The capability module will always
+be first, followed by any "minor" modules (e.g. Yama) and then
+the one "major" module (e.g. SELinux) if there is one configured.
+
Based on https://lkml.org/lkml/2007/10/26/215,
a new LSM is accepted into the kernel when its intent (a description of
what it tries to protect against and in what cases one would expect to
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 558adfa..132650d 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1876,6 +1876,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
struct list_head list;
struct list_head *head;
union security_list_options hook;
+ char *lsm;
};
/*
@@ -1888,15 +1889,10 @@ struct security_hook_list {
{ .head = &security_hook_heads.HEAD, .hook = { .HEAD = HOOK } }
extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
+extern char *lsm_names;
-static inline void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
- int count)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
- list_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
-}
+extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
+ char *lsm);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
/*
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 41b8cb1..1d4843d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -886,7 +886,8 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
aa_free_root_ns();
goto alloc_out;
}
- security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks));
+ security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
+ "apparmor");
/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
apparmor_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 8df676f..6d4d586 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1093,7 +1093,8 @@ struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] = {
void __init capability_add_hooks(void)
{
- security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks));
+ security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
+ "capability");
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index c83db05..546e786 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
static struct vfsmount *mount;
@@ -204,6 +205,21 @@ void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_remove);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+static struct dentry *lsm_dentry;
+static ssize_t lsm_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count,
+ loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, lsm_names,
+ strlen(lsm_names));
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations lsm_ops = {
+ .read = lsm_read,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+#endif
+
static int __init securityfs_init(void)
{
int retval;
@@ -213,9 +229,15 @@ static int __init securityfs_init(void)
return retval;
retval = register_filesystem(&fs_type);
- if (retval)
+ if (retval) {
sysfs_remove_mount_point(kernel_kobj, "security");
- return retval;
+ return retval;
+ }
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ lsm_dentry = securityfs_create_file("lsm", S_IRUGO, NULL, NULL,
+ &lsm_ops);
+#endif
+ return 0;
}
core_initcall(securityfs_init);
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 89a46f1..1d82eae 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] = {
void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void)
{
pr_info("ready to pin (currently %sabled)", enabled ? "en" : "dis");
- security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks));
+ security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
}
/* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f825304..f0a802ee 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
+char *lsm_names;
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
@@ -78,6 +79,22 @@ static int __init choose_lsm(char *str)
}
__setup("security=", choose_lsm);
+static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)
+{
+ char *cp;
+
+ if (*result == NULL) {
+ *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL);
+ } else {
+ cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new);
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ kfree(*result);
+ *result = cp;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ?
* @module: the name of the module
@@ -97,6 +114,27 @@ int __init security_module_enable(const char *module)
return !strcmp(module, chosen_lsm);
}
+/**
+ * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
+ * @hooks: the hooks to add
+ * @count: the number of hooks to add
+ * @lsm: the name of the security module
+ *
+ * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
+ */
+void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
+ char *lsm)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
+ }
+ if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
+ panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
+}
+
/*
* Hook list operation macros.
*
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 09fd610..0d039fc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6320,7 +6320,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
avc_init();
- security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
+ security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 1cb0602..7c12198 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4832,7 +4832,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
/*
* Register with LSM
*/
- security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks));
+ security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 75c9987..edc52d6 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
if (!security_module_enable("tomoyo"))
return 0;
/* register ourselves with the security framework */
- security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks));
+ security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
cred->security = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
tomoyo_mm_init();
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 0309f21..f8ee60e 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -471,6 +471,6 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
void __init yama_add_hooks(void)
{
pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
- security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks));
+ security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
yama_init_sysctl();
}
--
2.7.4
Subject: [PATCH v6 2/3] LSM: module hierarchy in /proc/.../attr
Back in 2007 I made what turned out to be a rather serious
mistake in the implementation of the Smack security module.
The SELinux module used an interface in /proc to manipulate
the security context on processes. Rather than use a similar
interface, I used the same interface. The AppArmor team did
likewise. Now /proc/.../attr/current will tell you the
security "context" of the process, but it will be different
depending on the security module you're using. That hasn't
been a problem to date, as you can only have one module
that supports process attributes at a time. We are coming
up on a change to that, where multiple modules with process
attributes can be supported. (Not included here)
This patch provides a subdirectory in /proc/.../attr for
each of the security modules that use the LSM hooks
getprocattr() and setprocattr(). Each of the interfaces
used by a module are presented in the subdirectory. The
old interfaces remain and work the same as before.
User space code can begin migrating to the subdirectory
interfaces in anticipation of the time when what comes
from /proc/self/attr/current might not be what a runtime
wants.
The original implementation is by Kees Cook. The code
has been changed a bit to reflect changes in the direction
of the multiple concurrent module work, to be independent
of it, and to bring it up to date with the current tree.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/security/LSM.txt | 19 ++++++---
fs/proc/base.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
fs/proc/internal.h | 1 +
include/linux/security.h | 15 ++++---
security/security.c | 31 ++++++++++++--
5 files changed, 133 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/LSM.txt b/Documentation/security/LSM.txt
index c2683f2..125c489 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/LSM.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/LSM.txt
@@ -16,11 +16,10 @@ MAC extensions, other extensions can be built using the LSM to provide
specific changes to system operation when these tweaks are not available
in the core functionality of Linux itself.
-Without a specific LSM built into the kernel, the default LSM will be the
-Linux capabilities system. Most LSMs choose to extend the capabilities
-system, building their checks on top of the defined capability hooks.
-For more details on capabilities, see capabilities(7) in the Linux
-man-pages project.
+The Linux capabilities modules will always be included. For more details
+on capabilities, see capabilities(7) in the Linux man-pages project.
+This may be followed by any number of "minor" modules and at most one
+"major" module.
A list of the active security modules can be found by reading
/sys/kernel/security/lsm. This is a comma separated list, and
@@ -29,6 +28,14 @@ order in which checks are made. The capability module will always
be first, followed by any "minor" modules (e.g. Yama) and then
the one "major" module (e.g. SELinux) if there is one configured.
+Process attributes associated with "major" security modules should
+be accessed and maintained using the special files in the module
+specific subdirectories in /proc/.../attr. The attributes related
+to Smack would be found in /proc/.../attr/smack while the attributes
+for SELinux would be in /proc/.../attr/selinux. Using the files
+found directly in /proc/.../attr (e.g. current) should be avoided.
+These files remain as legacy interfaces.
+
Based on https://lkml.org/lkml/2007/10/26/215,
a new LSM is accepted into the kernel when its intent (a description of
what it tries to protect against and in what cases one would expect to
@@ -38,4 +45,4 @@ that end users and distros can make a more informed decision about which
LSMs suit their requirements.
For extensive documentation on the available LSM hook interfaces, please
-see include/linux/security.h.
+see include/linux/lsm_hooks.h.
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 8e65446..c6dbe81 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -131,9 +131,13 @@ struct pid_entry {
#define REG(NAME, MODE, fops) \
NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), NULL, &fops, {})
#define ONE(NAME, MODE, show) \
- NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \
+ NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \
NULL, &proc_single_file_operations, \
{ .proc_show = show } )
+#define ATTR(LSM, NAME, MODE) \
+ NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \
+ NULL, &proc_pid_attr_operations, \
+ { .lsm = LSM })
/*
* Count the number of hardlinks for the pid_entry table, excluding the .
@@ -2466,7 +2470,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
- length = security_getprocattr(task,
+ length = security_getprocattr(task, PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm,
(char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
&p);
put_task_struct(task);
@@ -2506,7 +2510,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
if (length < 0)
goto out_free;
- length = security_setprocattr(task,
+ length = security_setprocattr(task, PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm,
(char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
page, count);
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
@@ -2524,13 +2528,82 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_attr_operations = {
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
+#define LSM_DIR_OPS(LSM) \
+static int proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_iterate(struct file *filp, \
+ struct dir_context *ctx) \
+{ \
+ return proc_pident_readdir(filp, ctx, \
+ LSM##_attr_dir_stuff, \
+ ARRAY_SIZE(LSM##_attr_dir_stuff)); \
+} \
+\
+static const struct file_operations proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_ops = { \
+ .read = generic_read_dir, \
+ .iterate = proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_iterate, \
+ .llseek = default_llseek, \
+}; \
+\
+static struct dentry *proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_lookup(struct inode *dir, \
+ struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) \
+{ \
+ return proc_pident_lookup(dir, dentry, \
+ LSM##_attr_dir_stuff, \
+ ARRAY_SIZE(LSM##_attr_dir_stuff)); \
+} \
+\
+static const struct inode_operations proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_inode_ops = { \
+ .lookup = proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_lookup, \
+ .getattr = pid_getattr, \
+ .setattr = proc_setattr, \
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
+static const struct pid_entry selinux_attr_dir_stuff[] = {
+ ATTR("selinux", "current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+ ATTR("selinux", "prev", S_IRUGO),
+ ATTR("selinux", "exec", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+ ATTR("selinux", "fscreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+ ATTR("selinux", "keycreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+ ATTR("selinux", "sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+};
+LSM_DIR_OPS(selinux);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
+static const struct pid_entry smack_attr_dir_stuff[] = {
+ ATTR("smack", "current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+};
+LSM_DIR_OPS(smack);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+static const struct pid_entry apparmor_attr_dir_stuff[] = {
+ ATTR("apparmor", "current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+ ATTR("apparmor", "prev", S_IRUGO),
+ ATTR("apparmor", "exec", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+};
+LSM_DIR_OPS(apparmor);
+#endif
+
static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
- REG("current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
- REG("prev", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
- REG("exec", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
- REG("fscreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
- REG("keycreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
- REG("sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
+ ATTR(NULL, "current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+ ATTR(NULL, "prev", S_IRUGO),
+ ATTR(NULL, "exec", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+ ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+ ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+ ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
+ DIR("selinux", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO,
+ proc_selinux_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_selinux_attr_dir_ops),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
+ DIR("smack", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO,
+ proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ DIR("apparmor", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO,
+ proc_apparmor_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_apparmor_attr_dir_ops),
+#endif
};
static int proc_attr_dir_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index 5378441..d5d90f2 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ union proc_op {
int (*proc_show)(struct seq_file *m,
struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid,
struct task_struct *task);
+ const char *lsm;
};
struct proc_inode {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index c2125e9..839e8b9 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -360,8 +360,10 @@ int security_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd);
int security_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
unsigned nsops, int alter);
void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
-int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
-int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
+int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
+ char **value);
+int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
+ void *value, size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
@@ -1098,15 +1100,18 @@ static inline int security_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+static inline void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct inode *inode)
{ }
-static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
+static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm,
+ char *name, char **value)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
-static inline int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+static inline int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm,
+ char *name, void *value, size_t size)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f0a802ee..23d5868 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1203,14 +1203,37 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);
-int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
+int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
+ char **value)
{
- return call_int_hook(getprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+
+ list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
+ if (rc != -ENOENT)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
}
-int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
+ void *value, size_t size)
{
- return call_int_hook(setprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value, size);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(p, name, value, size);
+ if (rc != -ENOENT)
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
}
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
--
2.7.4
Subject: [PATCH v6 3/3] LSM: Add context interface for proc attrs
The /proc/.../attr/current interface is used by all three
Linux security modules (SELinux, Smack and AppArmor) to
report and modify the process security attribute. This is
all fine when there is exactly one of these modules active
and the userspace code knows which it module it is.
It would require a major change to the "current" interface
to provide information about more than one set of process
security attributes. Instead, a "context" attribute is
added, which identifies the security module that the
information applies to. The format is:
lsmname='context-value'
When multiple concurrent modules are supported the
/proc/.../attr/context interface will include the data
for all of the active modules.
lsmname1='context-value1',lsmname2='context-value2'
The module specific subdirectories under attr contain context
entries that report the information for that specific module
in the same format.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/security/LSM.txt | 8 +++
fs/proc/base.c | 4 ++
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 35 +++++++++++--
security/security.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 +++++++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 20 ++++----
6 files changed, 180 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/LSM.txt b/Documentation/security/LSM.txt
index 125c489..af3eb11 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/LSM.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/LSM.txt
@@ -36,6 +36,14 @@ for SELinux would be in /proc/.../attr/selinux. Using the files
found directly in /proc/.../attr (e.g. current) should be avoided.
These files remain as legacy interfaces.
+The files named "context" in the attr directories contain the
+same information as the "current" files, but formatted to
+identify the module it comes from.
+
+if selinux is the active security module:
+ /proc/self/attr/context could contain selinux='unconfined_t'
+ /proc/self/attr/selinux/context could contain selinux='unconfined_t'
+
Based on https://lkml.org/lkml/2007/10/26/215,
a new LSM is accepted into the kernel when its intent (a description of
what it tries to protect against and in what cases one would expect to
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index c6dbe81..923e4e2 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2565,6 +2565,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry selinux_attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR("selinux", "fscreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
ATTR("selinux", "keycreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
ATTR("selinux", "sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+ ATTR("selinux", "context", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
};
LSM_DIR_OPS(selinux);
#endif
@@ -2572,6 +2573,7 @@ LSM_DIR_OPS(selinux);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
static const struct pid_entry smack_attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR("smack", "current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+ ATTR("smack", "context", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
};
LSM_DIR_OPS(smack);
#endif
@@ -2581,6 +2583,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry apparmor_attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR("apparmor", "current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
ATTR("apparmor", "prev", S_IRUGO),
ATTR("apparmor", "exec", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+ ATTR("apparmor", "context", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
};
LSM_DIR_OPS(apparmor);
#endif
@@ -2592,6 +2595,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+ ATTR(NULL, "context", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
DIR("selinux", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO,
proc_selinux_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_selinux_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 1d4843d..b865cf7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -476,9 +476,13 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ char *vp;
+ char *np;
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile);
+ else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0)
+ profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile);
else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous)
profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->previous);
else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec)
@@ -486,9 +490,29 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
else
error = -EINVAL;
- if (profile)
- error = aa_getprocattr(profile, value);
+ if (profile == NULL)
+ goto put_out;
+
+ error = aa_getprocattr(profile, &vp);
+ if (error < 0)
+ goto put_out;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) {
+ *value = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "apparmor='%s'", vp);
+ if (*value == NULL) {
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ goto put_out;
+ }
+ np = strchr(*value, '\n');
+ if (np != NULL) {
+ np[0] = '\'';
+ np[1] = '\0';
+ }
+ error = strlen(*value);
+ } else
+ *value = vp;
+put_out:
aa_put_profile(profile);
put_cred(cred);
@@ -530,7 +554,7 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
goto out;
arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value));
- if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
+ if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0 || strcmp(name, "context") == 0) {
if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
!AA_DO_TEST);
@@ -552,7 +576,10 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
else
goto fail;
} else
- /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
+ /*
+ * only support the "current", "context" and "exec"
+ * process attributes
+ */
goto fail;
if (!error)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 23d5868..656984a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1207,8 +1207,47 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
char **value)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char *vp;
+ char *cp = NULL;
int rc = -EINVAL;
+ int trc;
+ /*
+ * "context" requires work here in addition to what
+ * the modules provide.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) {
+ *value = NULL;
+ list_for_each_entry(hp,
+ &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ continue;
+ trc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "context", &vp);
+ if (trc == -ENOENT)
+ continue;
+ if (trc <= 0) {
+ kfree(*value);
+ return trc;
+ }
+ rc = trc;
+ if (*value == NULL) {
+ *value = vp;
+ } else {
+ cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *value, vp);
+ if (cp == NULL) {
+ kfree(*value);
+ kfree(vp);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ kfree(*value);
+ kfree(vp);
+ *value = cp;
+ }
+ }
+ if (rc > 0)
+ return strlen(*value);
+ return rc;
+ }
list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
@@ -1225,7 +1264,76 @@ int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int rc = -EINVAL;
+ char *local;
+ char *cp;
+ int slen;
+ int failed = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If lsm is NULL look at all the modules to find one
+ * that processes name. If lsm is not NULL only look at
+ * that module.
+ *
+ * "context" is handled directly here.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) {
+ /*
+ * First verify that the input is acceptable.
+ * lsm1='v1'lsm2='v2'lsm3='v3'
+ *
+ * A note on the use of strncmp() below.
+ * The check is for the substring at the beginning of cp.
+ * The kzalloc of size + 1 ensures a terminated string.
+ */
+ local = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ memcpy(local, value, size);
+ cp = local;
+ list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr,
+ list) {
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ continue;
+ if (cp[0] == ',') {
+ if (cp == local)
+ goto free_out;
+ cp++;
+ }
+ slen = strlen(hp->lsm);
+ if (strncmp(cp, hp->lsm, slen))
+ goto free_out;
+ cp += slen;
+ if (cp[0] != '=' || cp[1] != '\'' || cp[2] == '\'')
+ goto free_out;
+ for (cp += 2; cp[0] != '\''; cp++)
+ if (cp[0] == '\0')
+ goto free_out;
+ cp++;
+ }
+ cp = local;
+ list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr,
+ list) {
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ continue;
+ if (cp[0] == ',')
+ cp++;
+ cp += strlen(hp->lsm) + 2;
+ for (slen = 0; cp[slen] != '\''; slen++)
+ ;
+ cp[slen] = '\0';
+
+ rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(p, "context", cp, slen);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ failed = rc;
+ cp += slen + 1;
+ }
+ if (failed != 0)
+ rc = failed;
+ else
+ rc = size;
+free_out:
+ kfree(local);
+ return rc;
+ }
list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
continue;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 0d039fc..cc7e95f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5795,6 +5795,8 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
sid = __tsec->sid;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "context"))
+ sid = __tsec->sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
sid = __tsec->osid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
@@ -5812,7 +5814,19 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
if (!sid)
return 0;
- error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
+ if (strcmp(name, "context")) {
+ error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
+ } else {
+ char *vp;
+
+ error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &vp, &len);
+ if (!error) {
+ *value = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "selinux='%s'", vp);
+ if (*value == NULL)
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+
if (error)
return error;
return len;
@@ -5852,6 +5866,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "context"))
+ error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
else
error = -EINVAL;
if (error)
@@ -5911,7 +5927,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
} else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
- } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
+ } else if (!strcmp(name, "current") || !strcmp(name, "context")) {
error = -EINVAL;
if (sid == 0)
goto abort_change;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 7c12198..54627dd 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3605,18 +3605,20 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
char *cp;
- int slen;
- if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+ if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
+ cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) {
+ cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "smack='%s'", skp->smk_known);
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ } else
return -EINVAL;
- cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (cp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- slen = strlen(cp);
*value = cp;
- return slen;
+ return strlen(cp);
}
/**
@@ -3653,7 +3655,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
return -EINVAL;
- if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+ if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0 && strcmp(name, "context") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
--
2.7.4
On Wed, Oct 26, 2016 at 4:56 PM, Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
> Subject: [PATCH v6 0/3] LSM: security module information improvements
>
> Changes from v5:
> Rebased on 4.9-rc2
>
> Changes from v4:
> Use kasprintf instead of kzalloc() ... sprintf in more places.
> More in the documentation.
> Separate module information in contexts with ",". (not yet visible)
>
> Changes from v3:
> Use kasprintf instead of kzalloc() ... sprintf.
>
> Create interfaces that make it possible to deal with process
> attributes in the face of multiple "major" security modules.
>
> Patch 1/3 adds /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which provides
> a list of the active security modules on the system.
>
> $ cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm
> capability,yama,loadpin,smack
>
> Patch 2/3 adds a subdirectory in /proc/.../attr for each
> security module that exports process attribute data. This
> allows a program in easily differentiate between the "current"
> value for Smack and AppArmor.
>
> $ cat /proc/self/attr/smack/current
> System
>
> $ cat /proc/self/attr/apparmor/current
> unconfined
>
> Patch 3/3 adds an interface that provides module identified
> information that otherwise matches the "current" attr.
> This allows a system with multiple modules to provide the
> complete security "context" in one place. A (future) system
> with both Smack and AppArmor might report:
>
> $ cat /proc/self/attr/context
> smack='System',apparmor='unconfined'
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
>
> ---
> Documentation/security/LSM.txt | 34 ++++++--
> fs/proc/base.c | 95 +++++++++++++++++++---
> fs/proc/internal.h | 1 +
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +--
> include/linux/security.h | 15 ++--
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 +++++++--
> security/commoncap.c | 3 +-
> security/inode.c | 26 +++++-
> security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 2 +-
> security/security.c | 177 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 22 ++++-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 22 ++---
> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +-
> security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 2 +-
> 14 files changed, 395 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
>
I remain happy with this. :)
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
(With my LSM parts Acked-by...)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Nexus Security
On Wed, 26 Oct 2016, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create interfaces that make it possible to deal with process
> attributes in the face of multiple "major" security modules.
We don't have support for multiple major modules currently (perhaps ever),
so I'm not merging infrastructure which is only useful for them.
>
> Patch 1/3 adds /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which provides
> a list of the active security modules on the system.
>
> $ cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm
> capability,yama,loadpin,smack
This may make sense on its own. Has anyone requested this, or is likely
to adopt it into a distro?
--
James Morris
<[email protected]>
On 10/27/2016 03:32 PM, James Morris wrote:
> On Wed, 26 Oct 2016, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>
>> Create interfaces that make it possible to deal with process
>> attributes in the face of multiple "major" security modules.
>
> We don't have support for multiple major modules currently (perhaps ever),
> so I'm not merging infrastructure which is only useful for them.
>
>>
>> Patch 1/3 adds /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which provides
>> a list of the active security modules on the system.
>>
>> $ cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm
>> capability,yama,loadpin,smack
>
> This may make sense on its own. Has anyone requested this, or is likely
> to adopt it into a distro?
>
>
This is quite useful and Ubuntu will likely adopt it for the 17.04 release
On 10/27/2016 3:32 PM, James Morris wrote:
> On Wed, 26 Oct 2016, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>
>> Create interfaces that make it possible to deal with process
>> attributes in the face of multiple "major" security modules.
> We don't have support for multiple major modules currently (perhaps ever),
> so I'm not merging infrastructure which is only useful for them.
The 2/3 patch provides for disambiguation of "current"
whether you have multiple modules or just one. In effect
it corrects an error made in both Smack and AppArmor to
reuse the attribute interface names from SELinux. There
was substantial discussion on the LSM list about how best
to address this. I had originally suggested new names in
the attr directory, but the subdirectory approach was
greatly preferred by the populous.
The 3/3 patch is forward looking, I'll admit. Userspace
can start getting ready for the combined format in
advance of multiple major modules. When complete module
stacking patches are available I don't want to be addressing
"no userspace is set up to handle that" if at all possible.
I don't want to be Chicken or Egged to death. The attr/context
would be the ideal thing for the id command to report, as
the format would always be the same and identify the module(s).
>
>> Patch 1/3 adds /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which provides
>> a list of the active security modules on the system.
>>
>> $ cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm
>> capability,yama,loadpin,smack
> This may make sense on its own. Has anyone requested this, or is likely
> to adopt it into a distro?
As John mentioned, Ubuntu would like this. I expect to use
it in the Smack userspace, hence Tizen.
On Thu, 27 Oct 2016, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> The 3/3 patch is forward looking, I'll admit. Userspace
> can start getting ready for the combined format in
> advance of multiple major modules. When complete module
> stacking patches are available I don't want to be addressing
> "no userspace is set up to handle that" if at all possible.
> I don't want to be Chicken or Egged to death. The attr/context
> would be the ideal thing for the id command to report, as
> the format would always be the same and identify the module(s).
We do not add speculative infrastructure to the kernel.
There is no consensus that we need major module stacking, and some of the
technical issues (network secids, for example) are also as yet unresolved.
- James
--
James Morris
<[email protected]>
On 10/28/2016 2:28 AM, James Morris wrote:
> On Thu, 27 Oct 2016, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>
>> The 3/3 patch is forward looking, I'll admit. Userspace
>> can start getting ready for the combined format in
>> advance of multiple major modules. When complete module
>> stacking patches are available I don't want to be addressing
>> "no userspace is set up to handle that" if at all possible.
>> I don't want to be Chicken or Egged to death. The attr/context
>> would be the ideal thing for the id command to report, as
>> the format would always be the same and identify the module(s).
> We do not add speculative infrastructure to the kernel.
Fair enough. Development for the attr/context interface
in userspace can be done out of tree.
There is support for the other two patches, and I would
very much like to see them accepted.
>
> There is no consensus that we need major module stacking, and some of the
> technical issues (network secids, for example) are also as yet unresolved.
>
>
> - James
Casey Schaufler wrote:
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index f825304..f0a802ee 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
> /* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
> #define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
>
> +char *lsm_names;
> /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
> static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
> CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
> @@ -78,6 +79,22 @@ static int __init choose_lsm(char *str)
> }
> __setup("security=", choose_lsm);
>
> +static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)
> +{
> + char *cp;
> +
> + if (*result == NULL) {
> + *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL);
> + } else {
> + cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new);
> + if (cp == NULL)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + kfree(*result);
> + *result = cp;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
I didn't check past discussion, but how do you handle security_delete_hooks()
case (I mean, "selinux" will remain there when reading /sys/kernel/security/lsm
even after it is disabled at runtime)? I think holding module name as one of
"union security_list_options" members will avoid memory allocation handling
and simplify things.
On 11/1/2016 5:53 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index f825304..f0a802ee 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
>> /* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
>> #define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
>>
>> +char *lsm_names;
>> /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
>> static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
>> CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
>> @@ -78,6 +79,22 @@ static int __init choose_lsm(char *str)
>> }
>> __setup("security=", choose_lsm);
>>
>> +static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)
>> +{
>> + char *cp;
>> +
>> + if (*result == NULL) {
>> + *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + } else {
>> + cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new);
>> + if (cp == NULL)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> + kfree(*result);
>> + *result = cp;
>> + }
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
> I didn't check past discussion, but how do you handle security_delete_hooks()
> case (I mean, "selinux" will remain there when reading /sys/kernel/security/lsm
> even after it is disabled at runtime)?
Paul Moore says that SELinux is going to remove the ability
to delete itself in the near future. Since that's the only
module that allows deletion I don't see that it's an issue.
> I think holding module name as one of
> "union security_list_options" members will avoid memory allocation handling
> and simplify things.
I don't see how that would simplify things, and the memory
allocation handling here is pretty basic.
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Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 11/1/2016 5:53 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> > I didn't check past discussion, but how do you handle security_delete_hooks()
> > case (I mean, "selinux" will remain there when reading /sys/kernel/security/lsm
> > even after it is disabled at runtime)?
>
> Paul Moore says that SELinux is going to remove the ability
> to delete itself in the near future. Since that's the only
> module that allows deletion I don't see that it's an issue.
OK.
>
> > I think holding module name as one of
> > "union security_list_options" members will avoid memory allocation handling
> > and simplify things.
>
> I don't see how that would simplify things, and the memory
> allocation handling here is pretty basic.
I expected we can use simple_read_from_buffer() from iteration loop,
but I found it does not work like I want. So, it did not simplify things.