2018-11-26 23:23:45

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 00/38] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock

v5: Include Kees Cook's rework of the lsm command
line interface. Stacking is not conditional.
v4: Finer granularity in the patches and other
cleanups suggested by Kees Cook.
Removed dead code created by the removal of SELinux
credential blob poisoning.
v3: Add ipc blob for SARA and task blob for Landlock.
Removing the SELinux cred blob pointer poisoning
results selinux_is_enabled() being unused, so it and
all it's overhead has been removed.
Broke up the cred infrastructure patch.
v2: Reduce the patchset to what is required to support
the proposed SARA and LandLock security modules

The SARA security module is intended to be used
in conjunction with other security modules. It requires
state to be maintained for the credential, which
in turn requires a mechanism for sharing the credential
security blob. It also uses the ipc security blob. The
module also requires mechanism for user space manipulation
of the credential information, hence an additional
subdirectory in /proc/.../attr.

The LandLock security module provides user configurable
policy in the secmark mechanism. It requires data in
the credential, file, inode and task security blobs. For
this to be used along side the existing "major" security
modules mechanism for sharing these blobs are provided.

A side effect of providing sharing of the crendential
security blob is that the TOMOYO module can be used at
the same time as the other "major" modules. The "security="
option works as before. A new "lsm=" option allows the
order of module execution to be supplied at boot time.

The security module stacking issues around networking and
IPC are not addressed here as they are beyond what is
required for TOMOYO, SARA and LandLock.

git://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#blob-4.20-rc2

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst | 13 +-
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +
fs/proc/base.c | 64 ++-
fs/proc/internal.h | 1 +
include/linux/cred.h | 1 -
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 40 +-
include/linux/security.h | 15 +-
include/linux/selinux.h | 35 --
kernel/cred.c | 13 -
security/Kconfig | 41 +-
security/apparmor/Kconfig | 16 -
security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/cred.h | 16 +-
security/apparmor/include/file.h | 5 +-
security/apparmor/include/lib.h | 4 +
security/apparmor/include/task.h | 18 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 65 ++-
security/apparmor/task.c | 6 +-
security/commoncap.c | 9 +-
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +-
security/security.c | 635 +++++++++++++++++++++---
security/selinux/Kconfig | 15 -
security/selinux/Makefile | 2 +-
security/selinux/exports.c | 23 -
security/selinux/hooks.c | 345 ++++---------
security/selinux/include/audit.h | 3 -
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 38 +-
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 4 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 1 -
security/selinux/xfrm.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 44 +-
security/smack/smack_access.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 316 ++++--------
security/smack/smackfs.c | 18 +-
security/tomoyo/common.h | 22 +-
security/tomoyo/domain.c | 4 +-
security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c | 15 +-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 49 +-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 8 +-
39 files changed, 1133 insertions(+), 793 deletions(-)

2018-11-26 23:28:07

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 01/38] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR

This adds a flag for the current "major" LSMs to distinguish them when
we have a universal method for ordering all LSMs. It's called "legacy"
since the distinction of "major" will go away in the blob-sharing world.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +++
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 1 +
security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 +
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 1 +
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 1 +
5 files changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index aaeb7fa24dc4..63c0e102de20 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2039,8 +2039,11 @@ extern char *lsm_names;
extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
char *lsm);

+#define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
+
struct lsm_info {
const char *name; /* Required. */
+ unsigned long flags; /* Optional: flags describing LSM */
int (*init)(void); /* Required. */
};

diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 42446a216f3b..2edd35ca5044 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1728,5 +1728,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)

DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
.name = "apparmor",
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
.init = apparmor_init,
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7ce683259357..56c6f1849c80 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7209,6 +7209,7 @@ void selinux_complete_init(void)
all processes and objects when they are created. */
DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
.name = "selinux",
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
.init = selinux_init,
};

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 81fb4c1631e9..3639e55b1f4b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4891,5 +4891,6 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
*/
DEFINE_LSM(smack) = {
.name = "smack",
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
.init = smack_init,
};
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 1b5b5097efd7..09f7af130d3a 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -552,5 +552,6 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)

DEFINE_LSM(tomoyo) = {
.name = "tomoyo",
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
.init = tomoyo_init,
};
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:29:00

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 02/38] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization

This provides a place for ordered LSMs to be initialized, separate from
the "major" LSMs. This is mainly a copy/paste from major_lsm_init() to
ordered_lsm_init(), but it will change drastically in later patches.

What is not obvious in the patch is that this change moves the integrity
LSM from major_lsm_init() into ordered_lsm_init(), since it is not marked
with the LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR. As it is the only LSM in the "ordered"
list, there is no reordering yet created.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
---
security/security.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 04d173eb93f6..0688dfd57e95 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -52,12 +52,30 @@ static __initdata bool debug;
pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \
} while (0)

+static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
+{
+ struct lsm_info *lsm;
+ int ret;
+
+ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+ if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) != 0)
+ continue;
+
+ init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
+ ret = lsm->init();
+ WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret);
+ }
+}
+
static void __init major_lsm_init(void)
{
struct lsm_info *lsm;
int ret;

for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+ if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) == 0)
+ continue;
+
init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
ret = lsm->init();
WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret);
@@ -87,6 +105,9 @@ int __init security_init(void)
yama_add_hooks();
loadpin_add_hooks();

+ /* Load LSMs in specified order. */
+ ordered_lsm_init();
+
/*
* Load all the remaining security modules.
*/
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:30:19

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 03/38] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state

In preparation for lifting the "is this LSM enabled?" logic out of the
individual LSMs, pass in any special enabled state tracking (as needed
for SELinux, AppArmor, and LoadPin). This should be an "int" to include
handling any future cases where "enabled" is exposed via sysctl which
has no "bool" type.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 5 +++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 +
3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 63c0e102de20..4e2e9cdf78c6 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2044,6 +2044,7 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
struct lsm_info {
const char *name; /* Required. */
unsigned long flags; /* Optional: flags describing LSM */
+ int *enabled; /* Optional: NULL means enabled. */
int (*init)(void); /* Required. */
};

diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 2edd35ca5044..127a540ef63a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1332,8 +1332,8 @@ bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true;
module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);

/* Boot time disable flag */
-static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
-module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
+static int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
+module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, int, 0444);

static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
{
@@ -1729,5 +1729,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
.name = "apparmor",
.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
+ .enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
.init = apparmor_init,
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 56c6f1849c80..efc0ac1b5019 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7210,6 +7210,7 @@ void selinux_complete_init(void)
DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
.name = "selinux",
.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
+ .enabled = &selinux_enabled,
.init = selinux_init,
};

--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:31:16

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 04/38] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs

As a prerequisite to adjusting LSM selection logic in the future, this
moves the selection logic up out of the individual major LSMs, making
their init functions only run when actually enabled. This considers all
LSMs enabled by default unless they specified an external "enable"
variable.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 -
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 6 ---
security/security.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 10 -----
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 --
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 -
6 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 4e2e9cdf78c6..dabd2761acfc 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2085,7 +2085,6 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
#define __lsm_ro_after_init __ro_after_init
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS */

-extern int __init security_module_enable(const char *module);
extern void __init capability_add_hooks(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA
extern void __init yama_add_hooks(void);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 127a540ef63a..d840c1ef3e4d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1662,12 +1662,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
{
int error;

- if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) {
- aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
- apparmor_enabled = false;
- return 0;
- }
-
aa_secids_init();

error = aa_setup_dfa_engine();
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0688dfd57e95..7562da854b62 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -52,33 +52,96 @@ static __initdata bool debug;
pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \
} while (0)

+static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+ if (!lsm->enabled || *lsm->enabled)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */
+static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1;
+static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0;
+static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
+{
+ /*
+ * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use
+ * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state.
+ */
+ if (!lsm->enabled) {
+ if (enabled)
+ lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
+ else
+ lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
+ } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) {
+ if (!enabled)
+ lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
+ } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) {
+ if (enabled)
+ lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
+ } else {
+ *lsm->enabled = enabled;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */
+static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+ /* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */
+ if (!is_enabled(lsm))
+ return false;
+
+ /* Skip major-specific checks if not a major LSM. */
+ if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) == 0)
+ return true;
+
+ /* Disabled if this LSM isn't the chosen one. */
+ if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_lsm) != 0)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/* Check if LSM should be initialized. */
+static void __init maybe_initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+ int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm);
+
+ /* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */
+ set_enabled(lsm, enabled);
+
+ /* If selected, initialize the LSM. */
+ if (enabled) {
+ int ret;
+
+ init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
+ ret = lsm->init();
+ WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret);
+ }
+}
+
static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
{
struct lsm_info *lsm;
- int ret;

for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) != 0)
continue;

- init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
- ret = lsm->init();
- WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret);
+ maybe_initialize_lsm(lsm);
}
}

static void __init major_lsm_init(void)
{
struct lsm_info *lsm;
- int ret;

for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) == 0)
continue;

- init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
- ret = lsm->init();
- WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret);
+ maybe_initialize_lsm(lsm);
}
}

@@ -168,29 +231,6 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)
return 0;
}

-/**
- * security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ?
- * @module: the name of the module
- *
- * Each LSM must pass this method before registering its own operations
- * to avoid security registration races. This method may also be used
- * to check if your LSM is currently loaded during kernel initialization.
- *
- * Returns:
- *
- * true if:
- *
- * - The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time,
- * - or the passed LSM is configured as the default and the user did not
- * choose an alternate LSM at boot time.
- *
- * Otherwise, return false.
- */
-int __init security_module_enable(const char *module)
-{
- return !strcmp(module, chosen_lsm);
-}
-
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
* @hooks: the hooks to add
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index efc0ac1b5019..b81239a09dbb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7138,16 +7138,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {

static __init int selinux_init(void)
{
- if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
- selinux_enabled = 0;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!selinux_enabled) {
- pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
- return 0;
- }
-
pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");

memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 3639e55b1f4b..56a114c1d750 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4841,9 +4841,6 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
struct cred *cred;
struct task_smack *tsp;

- if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
- return 0;
-
smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
if (!smack_inode_cache)
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 09f7af130d3a..a46f6bc1e97c 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -540,8 +540,6 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
{
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred();

- if (!security_module_enable("tomoyo"))
- return 0;
/* register ourselves with the security framework */
security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:32:31

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 05/38] LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize

This constructs an ordered list of LSMs to initialize, using a hard-coded
list of only "integrity": minor LSMs continue to have direct hook calls,
and major LSMs continue to initialize separately.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
security/security.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7562da854b62..4c193aba4531 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10

+/* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */
+#define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info)
+
struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);

@@ -45,6 +48,9 @@ char *lsm_names;
static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;

+/* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */
+static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms;
+
static __initdata bool debug;
#define init_debug(...) \
do { \
@@ -85,6 +91,34 @@ static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
}
}

+/* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */
+static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+ struct lsm_info **check;
+
+ for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++)
+ if (*check == lsm)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */
+static int last_lsm __initdata;
+static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from)
+{
+ /* Ignore duplicate selections. */
+ if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
+ return;
+
+ if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from))
+ return;
+
+ ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm;
+ init_debug("%s ordering: %s (%sabled)\n", from, lsm->name,
+ is_enabled(lsm) ? "en" : "dis");
+}
+
/* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */
static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm)
{
@@ -121,18 +155,32 @@ static void __init maybe_initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
}
}

-static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
+/* Populate ordered LSMs list from single LSM name. */
+static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
{
struct lsm_info *lsm;

for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
- if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) != 0)
- continue;
-
- maybe_initialize_lsm(lsm);
+ if (strcmp(lsm->name, order) == 0)
+ append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
}
}

+static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
+{
+ struct lsm_info **lsm;
+
+ ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ ordered_lsm_parse("integrity", "builtin");
+
+ for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
+ maybe_initialize_lsm(*lsm);
+
+ kfree(ordered_lsms);
+}
+
static void __init major_lsm_init(void)
{
struct lsm_info *lsm;
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:32:38

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 06/38] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM

This provides a way to declare LSM initialization order via the new
CONFIG_LSM. Currently only non-major LSMs are recognized. This will
be expanded in future patches.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
security/Kconfig | 9 +++++++++
security/security.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index d9aa521b5206..7de42bbacc28 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -276,5 +276,14 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC

+config LSM
+ string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
+ default "integrity"
+ help
+ A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
+ Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored.
+
+ If unsure, leave this as the default.
+
endmenu

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4c193aba4531..96e0b7d057b0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ char *lsm_names;
static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;

+static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM;
+
/* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */
static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms;

@@ -155,15 +157,30 @@ static void __init maybe_initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
}
}

-/* Populate ordered LSMs list from single LSM name. */
+/* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */
static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
{
struct lsm_info *lsm;
+ char *sep, *name, *next;
+
+ sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL);
+ next = sep;
+ /* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */
+ while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) {
+ bool found = false;
+
+ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+ if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) == 0 &&
+ strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
+ append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
+ found = true;
+ }
+ }

- for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
- if (strcmp(lsm->name, order) == 0)
- append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
+ if (!found)
+ init_debug("%s ignored: %s\n", origin, name);
}
+ kfree(sep);
}

static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
@@ -173,7 +190,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms),
GFP_KERNEL);

- ordered_lsm_parse("integrity", "builtin");
+ ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin");

for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
maybe_initialize_lsm(*lsm);
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:34:59

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 09/38] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic

This moves the string handling for "security=" boot parameter into
a stored pointer instead of a string duplicate. This will allow
easier handling of the string when switching logic to use the coming
enable/disable infrastructure.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
---
security/security.c | 17 ++++++++---------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ea760d625af6..f4a7b7d52d71 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -34,9 +34,6 @@

#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2

-/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
-#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
-
/* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */
#define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info)

@@ -45,9 +42,8 @@ static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);

char *lsm_names;
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
-static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
- CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
+static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm;

static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM;

@@ -138,7 +134,7 @@ static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm)
return true;

/* Disabled if this LSM isn't the chosen one. */
- if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_lsm) != 0)
+ if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0)
return false;

return true;
@@ -168,6 +164,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
struct lsm_info *lsm;
char *sep, *name, *next;

+ if (!chosen_major_lsm)
+ chosen_major_lsm = CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
+
sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL);
next = sep;
/* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */
@@ -257,12 +256,12 @@ int __init security_init(void)
}

/* Save user chosen LSM */
-static int __init choose_lsm(char *str)
+static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str)
{
- strncpy(chosen_lsm, str, SECURITY_NAME_MAX);
+ chosen_major_lsm = str;
return 1;
}
-__setup("security=", choose_lsm);
+__setup("security=", choose_major_lsm);

/* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */
static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str)
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:35:04

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 08/38] LSM: Tie enabling logic to presence in ordered list

Until now, any LSM without an enable storage variable was considered
enabled. This inverts the logic and sets defaults to true only if the
LSM gets added to the ordered initialization list. (And an exception
continues for the major LSMs until they are integrated into the ordered
initialization in a later patch.)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 +-
security/security.c | 14 +++++++++++---
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index dabd2761acfc..272791fdd26e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2044,7 +2044,7 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
struct lsm_info {
const char *name; /* Required. */
unsigned long flags; /* Optional: flags describing LSM */
- int *enabled; /* Optional: NULL means enabled. */
+ int *enabled; /* Optional: controlled by CONFIG_LSM */
int (*init)(void); /* Required. */
};

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 38fc436e8b4b..ea760d625af6 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -63,10 +63,10 @@ static __initdata bool debug;

static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm)
{
- if (!lsm->enabled || *lsm->enabled)
- return true;
+ if (!lsm->enabled)
+ return false;

- return false;
+ return *lsm->enabled;
}

/* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */
@@ -117,7 +117,11 @@ static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from)
if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from))
return;

+ /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */
+ if (!lsm->enabled)
+ lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm;
+
init_debug("%s ordering: %s (%sabled)\n", from, lsm->name,
is_enabled(lsm) ? "en" : "dis");
}
@@ -210,6 +214,10 @@ static void __init major_lsm_init(void)
if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) == 0)
continue;

+ /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */
+ if (!lsm->enabled)
+ lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
+
maybe_initialize_lsm(lsm);
}
}
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:36:40

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 10/38] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable

For what are marked as the Legacy Major LSMs, make them effectively
exclusive when selected on the "security=" boot parameter, to handle
the future case of when a previously major LSMs become non-exclusive
(e.g. when TOMOYO starts blob-sharing).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
security/security.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f4a7b7d52d71..a7889885585e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -129,14 +129,6 @@ static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm)
if (!is_enabled(lsm))
return false;

- /* Skip major-specific checks if not a major LSM. */
- if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) == 0)
- return true;
-
- /* Disabled if this LSM isn't the chosen one. */
- if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0)
- return false;
-
return true;
}

@@ -164,8 +156,28 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
struct lsm_info *lsm;
char *sep, *name, *next;

+ /* Process "security=", if given. */
if (!chosen_major_lsm)
chosen_major_lsm = CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
+ if (chosen_major_lsm) {
+ struct lsm_info *major;
+
+ /*
+ * To match the original "security=" behavior, this
+ * explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major
+ * if the selected one was separately disabled: disable
+ * all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs.
+ */
+ for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info;
+ major++) {
+ if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) &&
+ strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) {
+ set_enabled(major, false);
+ init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s\n",
+ chosen_major_lsm, major->name);
+ }
+ }
+ }

sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL);
next = sep;
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:36:57

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 12/38] apparmor: Remove SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE

In preparation for removing CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY, this removes the
soon-to-be redundant SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE. Since explicit
ordering via CONFIG_LSM or "lsm=" will define whether an LSM is enabled or
not, this CONFIG will become effectively ignored, so remove it. However,
in order to stay backward-compatible with "security=apparmor", the enable
variable defaults to true.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
security/apparmor/Kconfig | 16 ----------------
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
index b6b68a7750ce..3de21f46c82a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
+++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
@@ -14,22 +14,6 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR

If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

-config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
- int "AppArmor boot parameter default value"
- depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
- range 0 1
- default 1
- help
- This option sets the default value for the kernel parameter
- 'apparmor', which allows AppArmor to be enabled or disabled
- at boot. If this option is set to 0 (zero), the AppArmor
- kernel parameter will default to 0, disabling AppArmor at
- boot. If this option is set to 1 (one), the AppArmor
- kernel parameter will default to 1, enabling AppArmor at
- boot.
-
- If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
-
config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
bool "Enable introspection of sha1 hashes for loaded profiles"
depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 37dafab649b1..e8b40008d58c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1332,7 +1332,7 @@ bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true;
module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);

/* Boot time disable flag */
-static int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
+static int apparmor_enabled __lsm_ro_after_init = 1;
module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, int, 0444);

static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:37:45

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 11/38] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM

In order to both support old "security=" Legacy Major LSM selection, and
handling real exclusivity, this creates LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE and updates
the selection logic to handle them.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 12 ++++++++++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 272791fdd26e..7d04a0c32011 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2040,6 +2040,7 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
char *lsm);

#define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
+#define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)

struct lsm_info {
const char *name; /* Required. */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index d840c1ef3e4d..37dafab649b1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1722,7 +1722,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)

DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
.name = "apparmor",
- .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
.enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
.init = apparmor_init,
};
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index a7889885585e..0009ef6c83fa 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM;

/* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */
static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms;
+static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive;

static __initdata bool debug;
#define init_debug(...) \
@@ -129,6 +130,12 @@ static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm)
if (!is_enabled(lsm))
return false;

+ /* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */
+ if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) {
+ init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name);
+ return false;
+ }
+
return true;
}

@@ -144,6 +151,11 @@ static void __init maybe_initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
if (enabled) {
int ret;

+ if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) {
+ exclusive = lsm;
+ init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name);
+ }
+
init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
ret = lsm->init();
WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b81239a09dbb..3687599d9d16 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7199,7 +7199,7 @@ void selinux_complete_init(void)
all processes and objects when they are created. */
DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
.name = "selinux",
- .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
.enabled = &selinux_enabled,
.init = selinux_init,
};
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 56a114c1d750..849426ac6a6c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4888,6 +4888,6 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
*/
DEFINE_LSM(smack) = {
.name = "smack",
- .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
.init = smack_init,
};
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index a46f6bc1e97c..daff7d7897ad 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -550,6 +550,6 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)

DEFINE_LSM(tomoyo) = {
.name = "tomoyo",
- .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
.init = tomoyo_init,
};
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:37:50

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 13/38] selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE

In preparation for removing CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY, this removes the
soon-to-be redundant SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE. Since explicit
ordering via CONFIG_LSM or "lsm=" will define whether an LSM is enabled or
not, this CONFIG will become effectively ignored, so remove it. However,
in order to stay backward-compatible with "security=selinux", the enable
variable defaults to true.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
security/selinux/Kconfig | 15 ---------------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 +----
2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index 8af7a690eb40..55f032f1fc2d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -22,21 +22,6 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM

If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

-config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
- int "NSA SELinux boot parameter default value"
- depends on SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
- range 0 1
- default 1
- help
- This option sets the default value for the kernel parameter
- 'selinux', which allows SELinux to be disabled at boot. If this
- option is set to 0 (zero), the SELinux kernel parameter will
- default to 0, disabling SELinux at bootup. If this option is
- set to 1 (one), the SELinux kernel parameter will default to 1,
- enabling SELinux at bootup.
-
- If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
-
config SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
bool "NSA SELinux runtime disable"
depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 3687599d9d16..edd5b8dd3e56 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -120,9 +120,8 @@ __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
#endif

+int selinux_enabled __lsm_ro_after_init = 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
-int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
-
static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long enabled;
@@ -131,8 +130,6 @@ static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
return 1;
}
__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
-#else
-int selinux_enabled = 1;
#endif

static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:38:05

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 07/38] LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection

Provide a way to explicitly choose LSM initialization order via the new
"lsm=" comma-separated list of LSMs.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 ++++
security/Kconfig | 3 ++-
security/security.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 81d1d5a74728..ea33bcbaecb2 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2302,6 +2302,10 @@

lsm.debug [SECURITY] Enable LSM initialization debugging output.

+ lsm=lsm1,...,lsmN
+ [SECURITY] Choose order of LSM initialization. This
+ overrides CONFIG_LSM.
+
machvec= [IA-64] Force the use of a particular machine-vector
(machvec) in a generic kernel.
Example: machvec=hpzx1_swiotlb
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 7de42bbacc28..41aa0be6142f 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -281,7 +281,8 @@ config LSM
default "integrity"
help
A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
- Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored.
+ Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be
+ controlled at boot with the "lsm=" parameter.

If unsure, leave this as the default.

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 96e0b7d057b0..38fc436e8b4b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ char *lsm_names;
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
+static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;

static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM;

@@ -190,7 +191,10 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms),
GFP_KERNEL);

- ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin");
+ if (chosen_lsm_order)
+ ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline");
+ else
+ ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin");

for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
maybe_initialize_lsm(*lsm);
@@ -252,6 +256,14 @@ static int __init choose_lsm(char *str)
}
__setup("security=", choose_lsm);

+/* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */
+static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str)
+{
+ chosen_lsm_order = str;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order);
+
/* Enable LSM order debugging. */
static int __init enable_debug(char *str)
{
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:39:36

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 14/38] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization

This removes CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY in favor of the explicit ordering
offered by CONFIG_LSM and adds all the exclusive LSMs to the ordered
LSM initialization. The old meaning of CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY is now
captured by which exclusive LSM is listed first in the LSM order. All
LSMs not added to the ordered list are explicitly disabled.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
security/security.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0009ef6c83fa..df71b54c1ba4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -169,8 +169,6 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
char *sep, *name, *next;

/* Process "security=", if given. */
- if (!chosen_major_lsm)
- chosen_major_lsm = CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
if (chosen_major_lsm) {
struct lsm_info *major;

@@ -198,8 +196,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
bool found = false;

for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
- if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) == 0 &&
- strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
+ if (strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
found = true;
}
@@ -208,6 +205,25 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
if (!found)
init_debug("%s ignored: %s\n", origin, name);
}
+
+ /* Process "security=", if given. */
+ if (chosen_major_lsm) {
+ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+ if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
+ continue;
+ if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0)
+ append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security=");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */
+ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+ if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
+ continue;
+ set_enabled(lsm, false);
+ init_debug("%s disabled: %s\n", origin, lsm->name);
+ }
+
kfree(sep);
}

@@ -229,22 +245,6 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
kfree(ordered_lsms);
}

-static void __init major_lsm_init(void)
-{
- struct lsm_info *lsm;
-
- for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
- if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) == 0)
- continue;
-
- /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */
- if (!lsm->enabled)
- lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
-
- maybe_initialize_lsm(lsm);
- }
-}
-
/**
* security_init - initializes the security framework
*
@@ -271,11 +271,6 @@ int __init security_init(void)
/* Load LSMs in specified order. */
ordered_lsm_init();

- /*
- * Load all the remaining security modules.
- */
- major_lsm_init();
-
return 0;
}

--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:40:37

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 15/38] LSM: Split LSM preparation from initialization

Since we already have to do a pass through the LSMs to figure out if
exclusive LSMs should be disabled after the first one is seen as enabled,
this splits the logic up a bit more cleanly. Now we do a full "prepare"
pass through the LSMs (which also allows for later use by the blob-sharing
code), before starting the LSM initialization pass.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
security/security.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index df71b54c1ba4..3fac0ff39944 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -139,22 +139,28 @@ static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm)
return true;
}

-/* Check if LSM should be initialized. */
-static void __init maybe_initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+/* Prepare LSM for initialization. */
+static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
{
int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm);

/* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */
set_enabled(lsm, enabled);

- /* If selected, initialize the LSM. */
+ /* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */
if (enabled) {
- int ret;
-
if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) {
exclusive = lsm;
init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name);
}
+ }
+}
+
+/* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */
+static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+ if (is_enabled(lsm)) {
+ int ret;

init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
ret = lsm->init();
@@ -240,7 +246,10 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin");

for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
- maybe_initialize_lsm(*lsm);
+ prepare_lsm(*lsm);
+
+ for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
+ initialize_lsm(*lsm);

kfree(ordered_lsms);
}
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:40:50

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 17/38] Yama: Initialize as ordered LSM

This converts Yama from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 -----
security/Kconfig | 2 +-
security/security.c | 1 -
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 8 +++++++-
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index b565c0c10269..6cfbd7d78a89 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2087,10 +2087,5 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS */

extern void __init capability_add_hooks(void);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA
-extern void __init yama_add_hooks(void);
-#else
-static inline void __init yama_add_hooks(void) { }
-#endif

#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 566d54215cbe..94a71e022b79 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ source security/integrity/Kconfig

config LSM
string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
- default "loadpin,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor"
+ default "yama,loadpin,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor"
help
A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0c092d62cc47..0c3c66dbf51c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -274,7 +274,6 @@ int __init security_init(void)
* Load minor LSMs, with the capability module always first.
*/
capability_add_hooks();
- yama_add_hooks();

/* Load LSMs in specified order. */
ordered_lsm_init();
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index ffda91a4a1aa..eb1da1303d2e 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -477,9 +477,15 @@ static void __init yama_init_sysctl(void)
static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */

-void __init yama_add_hooks(void)
+static int __init yama_init(void)
{
pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
yama_init_sysctl();
+ return 0;
}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(yama) = {
+ .name = "yama",
+ .init = yama_init,
+};
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:41:10

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 16/38] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM

This converts LoadPin from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 -----
security/Kconfig | 39 +--------------------------------------
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++++++-
security/security.c | 1 -
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 7d04a0c32011..b565c0c10269 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2092,10 +2092,5 @@ extern void __init yama_add_hooks(void);
#else
static inline void __init yama_add_hooks(void) { }
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN
-void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void);
-#else
-static inline void loadpin_add_hooks(void) { };
-#endif

#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 41aa0be6142f..566d54215cbe 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -239,46 +239,9 @@ source security/yama/Kconfig

source security/integrity/Kconfig

-choice
- prompt "Default security module"
- default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
- default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
- default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
- default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
- default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
-
- help
- Select the security module that will be used by default if the
- kernel parameter security= is not specified.
-
- config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
- bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
-
- config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
- bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
-
- config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
- bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
-
- config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
- bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
-
- config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
- bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
-
-endchoice
-
-config DEFAULT_SECURITY
- string
- default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
- default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
- default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
- default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
- default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
-
config LSM
string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
- default "integrity"
+ default "loadpin,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor"
help
A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 48f39631b370..055fb0a64169 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -187,13 +187,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
};

-void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void)
+static int __init loadpin_init(void)
{
pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
enforce ? "" : "not ");
security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
+ return 0;
}

+DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = {
+ .name = "loadpin",
+ .init = loadpin_init,
+};
+
/* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
module_param(enforce, int, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3fac0ff39944..0c092d62cc47 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -275,7 +275,6 @@ int __init security_init(void)
*/
capability_add_hooks();
yama_add_hooks();
- loadpin_add_hooks();

/* Load LSMs in specified order. */
ordered_lsm_init();
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:41:28

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 18/38] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order

In preparation for distinguishing the "capability" LSM from other LSMs, it
must be ordered first. This introduces LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE for the general
LSMs and LSM_ORDER_FIRST for capability. In the future LSM_ORDER_LAST
for could be added for anything that must run last (e.g. Landlock may
use this).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++++
security/security.c | 9 ++++++++-
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 6cfbd7d78a89..83858e3df9e5 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2042,8 +2042,14 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
#define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
#define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)

+enum lsm_order {
+ LSM_ORDER_FIRST = -1, /* This is only for capabilities. */
+ LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE = 0,
+};
+
struct lsm_info {
const char *name; /* Required. */
+ enum lsm_order order; /* Optional: default is LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE */
unsigned long flags; /* Optional: flags describing LSM */
int *enabled; /* Optional: controlled by CONFIG_LSM */
int (*init)(void); /* Required. */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0c3c66dbf51c..701507174f40 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -174,6 +174,12 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
struct lsm_info *lsm;
char *sep, *name, *next;

+ /* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */
+ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+ if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST)
+ append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "first");
+ }
+
/* Process "security=", if given. */
if (chosen_major_lsm) {
struct lsm_info *major;
@@ -202,7 +208,8 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
bool found = false;

for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
- if (strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
+ if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE &&
+ strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
found = true;
}
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:42:38

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 19/38] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST

This converts capabilities to use the new LSM_ORDER_FIRST position.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 --
security/commoncap.c | 9 ++++++++-
security/security.c | 5 -----
3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 83858e3df9e5..15fc49ee41a1 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2092,6 +2092,4 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
#define __lsm_ro_after_init __ro_after_init
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS */

-extern void __init capability_add_hooks(void);
-
#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 18a4fdf6f6eb..ec387535e597 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1363,10 +1363,17 @@ struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, cap_vm_enough_memory),
};

-void __init capability_add_hooks(void)
+static int __init capability_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
"capability");
+ return 0;
}

+DEFINE_LSM(capability) = {
+ .name = "capability",
+ .order = LSM_ORDER_FIRST,
+ .init = capability_init,
+};
+
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 701507174f40..eab64bdc60fb 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -277,11 +277,6 @@ int __init security_init(void)
i++)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&list[i]);

- /*
- * Load minor LSMs, with the capability module always first.
- */
- capability_add_hooks();
-
/* Load LSMs in specified order. */
ordered_lsm_init();

--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:43:14

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 20/38] procfs: add smack subdir to attrs

Back in 2007 I made what turned out to be a rather serious
mistake in the implementation of the Smack security module.
The SELinux module used an interface in /proc to manipulate
the security context on processes. Rather than use a similar
interface, I used the same interface. The AppArmor team did
likewise. Now /proc/.../attr/current will tell you the
security "context" of the process, but it will be different
depending on the security module you're using.

This patch provides a subdirectory in /proc/.../attr for
Smack. Smack user space can use the "current" file in
this subdirectory and never have to worry about getting
SELinux attributes by mistake. Programs that use the
old interface will continue to work (or fail, as the case
may be) as before.

The proposed S.A.R.A security module is dependent on
the mechanism to create its own attr subdirectory.

The original implementation is by Kees Cook.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst | 13 +++++--
fs/proc/base.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
fs/proc/internal.h | 1 +
include/linux/security.h | 15 +++++---
security/security.c | 24 ++++++++++---
5 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst
index c980dfe9abf1..9842e21afd4a 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst
@@ -17,9 +17,8 @@ MAC extensions, other extensions can be built using the LSM to provide
specific changes to system operation when these tweaks are not available
in the core functionality of Linux itself.

-Without a specific LSM built into the kernel, the default LSM will be the
-Linux capabilities system. Most LSMs choose to extend the capabilities
-system, building their checks on top of the defined capability hooks.
+The Linux capabilities modules will always be included. This may be
+followed by any number of "minor" modules and at most one "major" module.
For more details on capabilities, see ``capabilities(7)`` in the Linux
man-pages project.

@@ -30,6 +29,14 @@ order in which checks are made. The capability module will always
be first, followed by any "minor" modules (e.g. Yama) and then
the one "major" module (e.g. SELinux) if there is one configured.

+Process attributes associated with "major" security modules should
+be accessed and maintained using the special files in ``/proc/.../attr``.
+A security module may maintain a module specific subdirectory there,
+named after the module. ``/proc/.../attr/smack`` is provided by the Smack
+security module and contains all its special files. The files directly
+in ``/proc/.../attr`` remain as legacy interfaces for modules that provide
+subdirectories.
+
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 1

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index ce3465479447..e133de4897df 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -140,9 +140,13 @@ struct pid_entry {
#define REG(NAME, MODE, fops) \
NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), NULL, &fops, {})
#define ONE(NAME, MODE, show) \
- NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \
+ NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \
NULL, &proc_single_file_operations, \
{ .proc_show = show } )
+#define ATTR(LSM, NAME, MODE) \
+ NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \
+ NULL, &proc_pid_attr_operations, \
+ { .lsm = LSM })

/*
* Count the number of hardlinks for the pid_entry table, excluding the .
@@ -2517,7 +2521,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;

- length = security_getprocattr(task,
+ length = security_getprocattr(task, PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm,
(char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
&p);
put_task_struct(task);
@@ -2566,7 +2570,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
if (rv < 0)
goto out_free;

- rv = security_setprocattr(file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, page, count);
+ rv = security_setprocattr(PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm,
+ file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, page,
+ count);
mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
out_free:
kfree(page);
@@ -2580,13 +2586,53 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_attr_operations = {
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};

+#define LSM_DIR_OPS(LSM) \
+static int proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_iterate(struct file *filp, \
+ struct dir_context *ctx) \
+{ \
+ return proc_pident_readdir(filp, ctx, \
+ LSM##_attr_dir_stuff, \
+ ARRAY_SIZE(LSM##_attr_dir_stuff)); \
+} \
+\
+static const struct file_operations proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_ops = { \
+ .read = generic_read_dir, \
+ .iterate = proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_iterate, \
+ .llseek = default_llseek, \
+}; \
+\
+static struct dentry *proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_lookup(struct inode *dir, \
+ struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) \
+{ \
+ return proc_pident_lookup(dir, dentry, \
+ LSM##_attr_dir_stuff, \
+ ARRAY_SIZE(LSM##_attr_dir_stuff)); \
+} \
+\
+static const struct inode_operations proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_inode_ops = { \
+ .lookup = proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_lookup, \
+ .getattr = pid_getattr, \
+ .setattr = proc_setattr, \
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
+static const struct pid_entry smack_attr_dir_stuff[] = {
+ ATTR("smack", "current", 0666),
+};
+LSM_DIR_OPS(smack);
+#endif
+
static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
- REG("current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
- REG("prev", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
- REG("exec", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
- REG("fscreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
- REG("keycreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
- REG("sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
+ ATTR(NULL, "current", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "prev", 0444),
+ ATTR(NULL, "exec", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
+ DIR("smack", 0555,
+ proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
+#endif
};

static int proc_attr_dir_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index 5185d7f6a51e..d4f9989063d0 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ union proc_op {
int (*proc_show)(struct seq_file *m,
struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid,
struct task_struct *task);
+ const char *lsm;
};

struct proc_inode {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d170a5b031f3..35691877c3e1 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -390,8 +390,10 @@ int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd);
int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
unsigned nsops, int alter);
void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
-int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
-int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
+int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
+ char **value);
+int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
+ size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
@@ -1139,15 +1141,18 @@ static inline int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
return 0;
}

-static inline void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+static inline void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct inode *inode)
{ }

-static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
+static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm,
+ char *name, char **value)
{
return -EINVAL;
}

-static inline int security_setprocattr(char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+static inline int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, char *name,
+ void *value, size_t size)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index eab64bdc60fb..81ff6a71e78e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1472,14 +1472,30 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);

-int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
+int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
+ char **value)
{
- return call_int_hook(getprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ continue;
+ return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
}

-int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
+ size_t size)
{
- return call_int_hook(setprocattr, -EINVAL, name, value, size);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ continue;
+ return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
}

int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:44:47

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 22/38] SELinux: Abstract use of cred security blob

Don't use the cred->security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++++
security/selinux/xfrm.c | 4 +--
3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index edd5b8dd3e56..24b6b459fa2a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
{
const struct task_security_struct *tsec;

- tsec = cred->security;
+ tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
return tsec->sid;
}

@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
const struct cred *cred)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
int rc;

rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
const struct cred *cred)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
int rc;
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
@@ -1951,7 +1951,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
u16 tclass)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 sid, newsid;
@@ -1973,7 +1973,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
if (rc)
return rc;

- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), dir,
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()), dir,
&dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -2480,8 +2480,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (bprm->called_set_creds)
return 0;

- old_tsec = current_security();
- new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
+ old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+ new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
isec = inode_security(inode);

/* Default to the current task SID. */
@@ -2645,7 +2645,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
int rc, i;

- new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
+ new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
return;

@@ -2688,7 +2688,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct itimerval itimer;
u32 osid, sid;
int rc, i;
@@ -2991,7 +2991,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
u32 newsid;
int rc;

- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
&newsid);
@@ -3011,14 +3011,14 @@ static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
int rc;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;

- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(old->security,
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
&newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;

- tsec = new->security;
+ tsec = selinux_cred(new);
tsec->create_sid = newsid;
return 0;
}
@@ -3028,7 +3028,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const char **name,
void **value, size_t *len)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 newsid, clen;
int rc;
@@ -3038,7 +3038,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,

newsid = tsec->create_sid;

- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
dir, qstr,
inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
&newsid);
@@ -3500,7 +3500,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
return -ENOMEM;
}

- tsec = new_creds->security;
+ tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
/* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
tsec->create_sid = sid;
@@ -3920,7 +3920,7 @@ static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
*/
static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);

/*
* cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
@@ -3940,7 +3940,7 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;

- old_tsec = old->security;
+ old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);

tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
if (!tsec)
@@ -3955,8 +3955,8 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
*/
static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);

*tsec = *old_tsec;
}
@@ -3972,7 +3972,7 @@ static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
*/
static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
u32 sid = current_sid();
int ret;

@@ -3997,7 +3997,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
u32 sid = current_sid();
int ret;

@@ -4546,7 +4546,7 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
int protocol, int kern)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
u32 newsid;
u16 secclass;
int rc;
@@ -4566,7 +4566,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
int type, int protocol, int kern)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
@@ -5444,7 +5444,7 @@ static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
u32 tsid;

- __tsec = current_security();
+ __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
tsid = __tsec->sid;

return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
@@ -6381,7 +6381,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
unsigned len;

rcu_read_lock();
- __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
+ __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));

if (current != p) {
error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
@@ -6504,7 +6504,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
- tsec = new->security;
+ tsec = selinux_cred(new);
if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
tsec->exec_sid = sid;
} else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
@@ -6633,7 +6633,7 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
if (!ksec)
return -ENOMEM;

- tsec = cred->security;
+ tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
else
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index cc5e26b0161b..734b6833bdff 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -158,4 +158,9 @@ struct bpf_security_struct {
u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
};

+static inline struct task_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ return cred->security;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 91dc3783ed94..8ffe7e1053c4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
gfp_t gfp)
{
int rc;
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
u32 str_len;

@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void selinux_xfrm_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
*/
static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());

if (!ctx)
return 0;
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:44:59

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 21/38] Smack: Abstract use of cred security blob

Don't use the cred->security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
security/smack/smack.h | 17 ++++++++++---
security/smack/smack_access.c | 4 +--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
security/smack/smackfs.c | 18 +++++++-------
4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index f7db791fb566..01a922856eba 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -356,6 +356,11 @@ extern struct list_head smack_onlycap_list;
#define SMACK_HASH_SLOTS 16
extern struct hlist_head smack_known_hash[SMACK_HASH_SLOTS];

+static inline struct task_smack *smack_cred(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ return cred->security;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
@@ -382,13 +387,19 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
return tsp->smk_task;
}

-static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task_struct(const struct task_struct *t)
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task_struct(
+ const struct task_struct *t)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
+ const struct cred *cred;

rcu_read_lock();
- skp = smk_of_task(__task_cred(t)->security);
+
+ cred = __task_cred(t);
+ skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
+
rcu_read_unlock();
+
return skp;
}

@@ -405,7 +416,7 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
*/
static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_current(void)
{
- return smk_of_task(current_security());
+ return smk_of_task(smack_cred(current_cred()));
}

/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 9a4c0ad46518..489d49a20b47 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *tsp, struct smack_known *obj_known,
int smk_curacc(struct smack_known *obj_known,
u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());

return smk_tskacc(tsp, obj_known, mode, a);
}
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock);
*/
bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
struct smack_known *skp = tsp->smk_task;
struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
int rc;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 849426ac6a6c..f34117b8c3be 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
int mode, int rc)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];

if (rc <= 0)
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp);
char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];

@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];

@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
int mode, int rc)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,

rcu_read_lock();
tracercred = __task_cred(tracer);
- tsp = tracercred->security;
+ tsp = smack_cred(tracercred);
tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);

if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
int rc;
struct smack_known *skp;

- skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
+ skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(current_cred()));

rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
return rc;
@@ -915,7 +915,7 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
- struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
+ struct task_smack *bsp = smack_cred(bprm->cred);
struct inode_smack *isp;
struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
int rc;
@@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
return -EACCES;
mkp = isp->smk_mmap;

- tsp = current_security();
+ tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
skp = smk_of_current();
rc = 0;

@@ -1842,7 +1842,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
+ struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(tsk->cred));
const struct cred *tcred;
struct file *file;
int rc;
@@ -1895,7 +1895,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
- tsp = current_security();
+ tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
/*
* If the receiving process can't write to the
* passed socket or if the passed socket can't
@@ -1937,7 +1937,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
*/
static int smack_file_open(struct file *file)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = file->f_cred->security;
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(file->f_cred);
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -1984,7 +1984,7 @@ static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
*/
static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
struct smack_rule *rp;
struct list_head *l;
struct list_head *n;
@@ -2014,7 +2014,7 @@ static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
{
- struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
+ struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
struct task_smack *new_tsp;
int rc;

@@ -2045,15 +2045,14 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
*/
static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
- struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
+ struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
+ struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);

new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);

-
/* cbs copy rule list */
}

@@ -2064,12 +2063,12 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
*
* Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
*/
-static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid)
{
struct smack_known *skp;

rcu_read_lock();
- skp = smk_of_task(c->security);
+ skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
*secid = skp->smk_secid;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
@@ -2083,7 +2082,7 @@ static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
*/
static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
- struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
+ struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);

new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
return 0;
@@ -2101,7 +2100,7 @@ static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
- struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(new);

tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
@@ -2285,7 +2284,7 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
* specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
* we can't take privilege into account.
*/
- skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+ skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
return rc;
@@ -3612,7 +3611,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
*/
static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
struct cred *new;
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
@@ -3653,7 +3652,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
if (new == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;

- tsp = new->security;
+ tsp = smack_cred(new);
tsp->smk_task = skp;
/*
* process can change its label only once
@@ -4298,7 +4297,7 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));

key->security = skp;
return 0;
@@ -4329,7 +4328,7 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
{
struct key *keyp;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
- struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+ struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
int request = 0;
int rc;

@@ -4598,7 +4597,7 @@ static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new)
return -ENOMEM;
}

- tsp = new_creds->security;
+ tsp = smack_cred(new_creds);

/*
* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid
@@ -4626,8 +4625,8 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
const struct cred *old,
struct cred *new)
{
- struct task_smack *otsp = old->security;
- struct task_smack *ntsp = new->security;
+ struct task_smack *otsp = smack_cred(old);
+ struct task_smack *ntsp = smack_cred(new);
struct inode_smack *isp;
int may;

diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 06b517075ec0..faf2ea3968b3 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -2208,14 +2208,14 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = {

static void *load_self_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());

return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
}

static void *load_self_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());

return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
}
@@ -2262,7 +2262,7 @@ static int smk_open_load_self(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
static ssize_t smk_write_load_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());

return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, &tsp->smk_rules,
&tsp->smk_rules_lock, SMK_FIXED24_FMT);
@@ -2414,14 +2414,14 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_load2_ops = {

static void *load_self2_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());

return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
}

static void *load_self2_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());

return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
}
@@ -2467,7 +2467,7 @@ static int smk_open_load_self2(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
static ssize_t smk_write_load_self2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());

return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, &tsp->smk_rules,
&tsp->smk_rules_lock, SMK_LONG_FMT);
@@ -2681,14 +2681,14 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_syslog_ops = {

static void *relabel_self_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());

return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &tsp->smk_relabel);
}

static void *relabel_self_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());

return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &tsp->smk_relabel);
}
@@ -2736,7 +2736,7 @@ static int smk_open_relabel_self(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
char *data;
int rc;
LIST_HEAD(list_tmp);
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:45:15

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 23/38] SELinux: Remove cred security blob poisoning

The SELinux specific credential poisioning only makes sense
if SELinux is managing the credentials. As the intent of this
patch set is to move the blob management out of the modules
and into the infrastructure, the SELinux specific code has
to go. The poisioning could be introduced into the infrastructure
at some later date.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
kernel/cred.c | 13 -------------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ------
2 files changed, 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index ecf03657e71c..fa2061ee4955 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -704,19 +704,6 @@ bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
{
if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
return true;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
- /*
- * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
- * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
- */
- if (selinux_is_enabled() && cred->security) {
- if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
- return true;
- if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
- (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
- return true;
- }
-#endif
return false;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(creds_are_invalid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 24b6b459fa2a..41b230d459a6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3922,12 +3922,6 @@ static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);

- /*
- * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
- * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
- */
- BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
- cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
kfree(tsec);
}

--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:47:43

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 26/38] TOMOYO: Abstract use of cred security blob

Don't use the cred->security pointer directly.
Provide helper functions that provide the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
security/tomoyo/common.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
security/tomoyo/domain.c | 4 +++-
security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c | 15 +++++++++++----
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
4 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 539bcdd30bb8..41898613d93b 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/in6.h>
#include <linux/un.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/af_unix.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
@@ -1062,6 +1063,7 @@ void tomoyo_write_log2(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, int len, const char *fmt,
/********** External variable definitions. **********/

extern bool tomoyo_policy_loaded;
+extern int tomoyo_enabled;
extern const char * const tomoyo_condition_keyword
[TOMOYO_MAX_CONDITION_KEYWORD];
extern const char * const tomoyo_dif[TOMOYO_MAX_DOMAIN_INFO_FLAGS];
@@ -1196,6 +1198,17 @@ static inline void tomoyo_put_group(struct tomoyo_group *group)
atomic_dec(&group->head.users);
}

+/**
+ * tomoyo_cred - Get a pointer to the tomoyo cred security blob
+ * @cred - the relevant cred
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to the tomoyo cred blob.
+ */
+static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info **tomoyo_cred(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ return (struct tomoyo_domain_info **)&cred->security;
+}
+
/**
* tomoyo_domain - Get "struct tomoyo_domain_info" for current thread.
*
@@ -1203,7 +1216,9 @@ static inline void tomoyo_put_group(struct tomoyo_group *group)
*/
static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_domain(void)
{
- return current_cred()->security;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob = tomoyo_cred(current_cred());
+
+ return *blob;
}

/**
@@ -1216,7 +1231,9 @@ static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_domain(void)
static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_real_domain(struct task_struct
*task)
{
- return task_cred_xxx(task, security);
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob = tomoyo_cred(get_task_cred(task));
+
+ return *blob;
}

/**
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
index f6758dad981f..b7469fdbff01 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
@@ -678,6 +678,7 @@ static int tomoyo_environ(struct tomoyo_execve *ee)
*/
int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob;
struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain = tomoyo_domain();
struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
const char *original_name = bprm->filename;
@@ -843,7 +844,8 @@ int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
domain = old_domain;
/* Update reference count on "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */
atomic_inc(&domain->users);
- bprm->cred->security = domain;
+ blob = tomoyo_cred(bprm->cred);
+ *blob = domain;
kfree(exename.name);
if (!retval) {
ee->r.domain = domain;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
index 1d3d7e7a1f05..768dff9608b1 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
@@ -71,9 +71,12 @@ static ssize_t tomoyo_write_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (!cred) {
error = -ENOMEM;
} else {
- struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain =
- cred->security;
- cred->security = new_domain;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain;
+
+ blob = tomoyo_cred(cred);
+ old_domain = *blob;
+ *blob = new_domain;
atomic_inc(&new_domain->users);
atomic_dec(&old_domain->users);
commit_creds(cred);
@@ -234,10 +237,14 @@ static void __init tomoyo_create_entry(const char *name, const umode_t mode,
*/
static int __init tomoyo_initerface_init(void)
{
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
struct dentry *tomoyo_dir;

+ if (!tomoyo_enabled)
+ return 0;
+ domain = tomoyo_domain();
/* Don't create securityfs entries unless registered. */
- if (current_cred()->security != &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
+ if (domain != &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
return 0;

tomoyo_dir = securityfs_create_dir("tomoyo", NULL);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index daff7d7897ad..15864307925d 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -18,7 +18,9 @@
*/
static int tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *new, gfp_t gfp)
{
- new->security = NULL;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob = tomoyo_cred(new);
+
+ *blob = NULL;
return 0;
}

@@ -34,8 +36,13 @@ static int tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *new, gfp_t gfp)
static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
{
- struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = old->security;
- new->security = domain;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **old_blob = tomoyo_cred(old);
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **new_blob = tomoyo_cred(new);
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+
+ domain = *old_blob;
+ *new_blob = domain;
+
if (domain)
atomic_inc(&domain->users);
return 0;
@@ -59,7 +66,9 @@ static void tomoyo_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
*/
static void tomoyo_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
- struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = cred->security;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob = tomoyo_cred(cred);
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = *blob;
+
if (domain)
atomic_dec(&domain->users);
}
@@ -73,6 +82,9 @@ static void tomoyo_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
*/
static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+
/*
* Do only if this function is called for the first time of an execve
* operation.
@@ -93,13 +105,14 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* stored inside "bprm->cred->security" will be acquired later inside
* tomoyo_find_next_domain().
*/
- atomic_dec(&((struct tomoyo_domain_info *)
- bprm->cred->security)->users);
+ blob = tomoyo_cred(bprm->cred);
+ domain = *blob;
+ atomic_dec(&domain->users);
/*
* Tell tomoyo_bprm_check_security() is called for the first time of an
* execve operation.
*/
- bprm->cred->security = NULL;
+ *blob = NULL;
return 0;
}

@@ -112,8 +125,11 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = bprm->cred->security;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;

+ blob = tomoyo_cred(bprm->cred);
+ domain = *blob;
/*
* Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to do_execve()
* using current domain.
@@ -531,6 +547,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
/* Lock for GC. */
DEFINE_SRCU(tomoyo_ss);

+int tomoyo_enabled __lsm_ro_after_init = 1;
+
/**
* tomoyo_init - Register TOMOYO Linux as a LSM module.
*
@@ -539,17 +557,21 @@ DEFINE_SRCU(tomoyo_ss);
static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
{
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred();
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob;

/* register ourselves with the security framework */
security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
- cred->security = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
+ blob = tomoyo_cred(cred);
+ *blob = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
tomoyo_mm_init();
+
return 0;
}

DEFINE_LSM(tomoyo) = {
.name = "tomoyo",
+ .enabled = &tomoyo_enabled,
.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
.init = tomoyo_init,
};
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:48:30

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 25/38] AppArmor: Abstract use of cred security blob

Don't use the cred->security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/cred.h | 16 +++++++++++++++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 10 +++++-----
security/apparmor/task.c | 6 +++---
4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 08c88de0ffda..726910bba84b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
}
aa_put_label(cred_label(bprm->cred));
/* transfer reference, released when cred is freed */
- cred_label(bprm->cred) = new;
+ set_cred_label(bprm->cred, new);

done:
aa_put_label(label);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
index 265ae6641a06..a757370f2a0c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
@@ -23,8 +23,22 @@
#include "policy_ns.h"
#include "task.h"

-#define cred_label(X) ((X)->security)
+static inline struct aa_label *cred_label(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ struct aa_label **blob = cred->security;
+
+ AA_BUG(!blob);
+ return *blob;
+}

+static inline void set_cred_label(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct aa_label *label)
+{
+ struct aa_label **blob = cred->security;
+
+ AA_BUG(!blob);
+ *blob = label;
+}

/**
* aa_cred_raw_label - obtain cred's label
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index e8b40008d58c..803ec0a63d87 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers);
static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
aa_put_label(cred_label(cred));
- cred_label(cred) = NULL;
+ set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
}

/*
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
*/
static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
{
- cred_label(cred) = NULL;
+ set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
return 0;
}

@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
{
- cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old));
+ set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)));
return 0;
}

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
*/
static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old));
+ set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)));
}

static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -1484,7 +1484,7 @@ static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;

- cred_label(cred) = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns));
+ set_cred_label(cred, aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns)));
task_ctx(current) = ctx;

return 0;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c
index c6b78a14da91..4551110f0496 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/task.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/task.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
*/
aa_get_label(label);
aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
- cred_label(new) = label;
+ set_cred_label(new, label);

commit_creds(new);
return 0;
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
return -EACCES;
}

- cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(label);
+ set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(label));
/* clear exec on switching context */
aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
ctx->onexec = NULL;
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
return -ENOMEM;

aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
- cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
+ set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous));
AA_BUG(!cred_label(new));
/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:50:29

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 24/38] SELinux: Remove unused selinux_is_enabled

There are no longer users of selinux_is_enabled().
Remove it. As selinux_is_enabled() is the only reason
for include/linux/selinux.h remove that as well.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/cred.h | 1 -
include/linux/selinux.h | 35 -----------------------------------
security/selinux/Makefile | 2 +-
security/selinux/exports.c | 23 -----------------------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 -
security/selinux/include/audit.h | 3 ---
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 1 -
7 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 65 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 include/linux/selinux.h
delete mode 100644 security/selinux/exports.c

diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 7eed6101c791..2e715e202e6a 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
diff --git a/include/linux/selinux.h b/include/linux/selinux.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 44f459612690..000000000000
--- a/include/linux/selinux.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * SELinux services exported to the rest of the kernel.
- *
- * Author: James Morris <[email protected]>
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <[email protected]>
- * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <[email protected]>
- * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <[email protected]>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
- * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
- */
-#ifndef _LINUX_SELINUX_H
-#define _LINUX_SELINUX_H
-
-struct selinux_audit_rule;
-struct audit_context;
-struct kern_ipc_perm;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
-
-/**
- * selinux_is_enabled - is SELinux enabled?
- */
-bool selinux_is_enabled(void);
-#else
-
-static inline bool selinux_is_enabled(void)
-{
- return false;
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX */
-
-#endif /* _LINUX_SELINUX_H */
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index c7161f8792b2..ccf950409384 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o

selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o \
- netnode.o netport.o ibpkey.o exports.o \
+ netnode.o netport.o ibpkey.o \
ss/ebitmap.o ss/hashtab.o ss/symtab.o ss/sidtab.o ss/avtab.o \
ss/policydb.o ss/services.o ss/conditional.o ss/mls.o ss/status.o

diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
deleted file mode 100644
index e75dd94e2d2b..000000000000
--- a/security/selinux/exports.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * SELinux services exported to the rest of the kernel.
- *
- * Author: James Morris <[email protected]>
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <[email protected]>
- * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <[email protected]>
- * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <[email protected]>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
- * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
- */
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
-
-#include "security.h"
-
-bool selinux_is_enabled(void)
-{
- return selinux_enabled;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_is_enabled);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 41b230d459a6..c82f11270de6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -79,7 +79,6 @@
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
#include <linux/syslog.h>
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
index 1bdf973433cc..36e1d44c0209 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -1,9 +1,6 @@
/*
* SELinux support for the Audit LSM hooks
*
- * Most of below header was moved from include/linux/selinux.h which
- * is released under below copyrights:
- *
* Author: James Morris <[email protected]>
*
* Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <[email protected]>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 12e414394530..1a745e2f49a9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/flex_array.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:50:42

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 27/38] Infrastructure management of the cred security blob

Move management of the cred security blob out of the
security modules and into the security infrastructre.
Instead of allocating and freeing space the security
modules tell the infrastructure how much space they
require.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 ++++++
security/apparmor/include/cred.h | 4 +-
security/apparmor/include/lib.h | 4 ++
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 9 ++++
security/security.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 51 +++++-----------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 4 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 3 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 79 +++++++++++-----------------------
security/tomoyo/common.h | 3 +-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 6 +++
11 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 102 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 15fc49ee41a1..c9458280214e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2024,6 +2024,13 @@ struct security_hook_list {
char *lsm;
} __randomize_layout;

+/*
+ * Security blob size or offset data.
+ */
+struct lsm_blob_sizes {
+ int lbs_cred;
+};
+
/*
* Initializing a security_hook_list structure takes
* up a lot of space in a source file. This macro takes
@@ -2053,6 +2060,7 @@ struct lsm_info {
unsigned long flags; /* Optional: flags describing LSM */
int *enabled; /* Optional: controlled by CONFIG_LSM */
int (*init)(void); /* Required. */
+ struct lsm_blob_sizes *blobs; /* Optional: for blob sharing. */
};

extern struct lsm_info __start_lsm_info[], __end_lsm_info[];
@@ -2092,4 +2100,8 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
#define __lsm_ro_after_init __ro_after_init
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS */

+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred);
+#endif
+
#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
index a757370f2a0c..b9504a05fddc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@

static inline struct aa_label *cred_label(const struct cred *cred)
{
- struct aa_label **blob = cred->security;
+ struct aa_label **blob = cred->security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;

AA_BUG(!blob);
return *blob;
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static inline struct aa_label *cred_label(const struct cred *cred)
static inline void set_cred_label(const struct cred *cred,
struct aa_label *label)
{
- struct aa_label **blob = cred->security;
+ struct aa_label **blob = cred->security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;

AA_BUG(!blob);
*blob = label;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
index 6505e1ad9e23..bbe9b384d71d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@

#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>

#include "match.h"

@@ -55,6 +56,9 @@ const char *aa_splitn_fqname(const char *fqname, size_t n, const char **ns_name,
size_t *ns_len);
void aa_info_message(const char *str);

+/* Security blob offsets */
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes;
+
/**
* aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated substring
* @str: a null terminated string
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 803ec0a63d87..70669e676212 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1150,6 +1150,13 @@ static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
}
#endif

+/*
+ * The cred blob is a pointer to, not an instance of, an aa_task_ctx.
+ */
+struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1484,6 +1491,7 @@ static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;

+ lsm_early_cred(cred);
set_cred_label(cred, aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns)));
task_ctx(current) = ctx;

@@ -1724,5 +1732,6 @@ DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
.name = "apparmor",
.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
.enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
+ .blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
.init = apparmor_init,
};
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 81ff6a71e78e..c49d4a18c75f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);

char *lsm_names;
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm;
@@ -139,6 +141,25 @@ static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm)
return true;
}

+static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs)
+{
+ int offset;
+
+ if (*need > 0) {
+ offset = *lbs;
+ *lbs += *need;
+ *need = offset;
+ }
+}
+
+static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
+{
+ if (!needed)
+ return;
+
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+}
+
/* Prepare LSM for initialization. */
static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
{
@@ -153,6 +174,8 @@ static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
exclusive = lsm;
init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name);
}
+
+ lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs);
}
}

@@ -255,6 +278,8 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
prepare_lsm(*lsm);

+ init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+
for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
initialize_lsm(*lsm);

@@ -382,6 +407,47 @@ int unregister_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_lsm_notifier);

+/**
+ * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob
+ * @cred: the cred that needs a blob
+ * @gfp: allocation type
+ *
+ * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) {
+ cred->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp);
+ if (cred->security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob
+ * @cred: the cred that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules if it's not already there
+ */
+void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (cred == NULL)
+ panic("%s: NULL cred.\n", __func__);
+ if (cred->security != NULL)
+ return;
+ rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rc)
+ panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__);
+}
+
/*
* Hook list operation macros.
*
@@ -1182,17 +1248,36 @@ void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)

int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
{
- return call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
+ int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
+ if (rc)
+ security_cred_free(cred);
+ return rc;
}

void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
+
+ kfree(cred->security);
+ cred->security = NULL;
}

int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
{
- return call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
+ int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
+ if (rc)
+ security_cred_free(new);
+ return rc;
}

void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c82f11270de6..ac6d8a2d00f1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -209,12 +209,9 @@ static void cred_init_security(void)
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;

- tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!tsec)
- panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
-
+ lsm_early_cred(cred);
+ tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
- cred->security = tsec;
}

/*
@@ -3899,47 +3896,16 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
}

-/*
- * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
- */
-static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
-{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-
- tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
- if (!tsec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- cred->security = tsec;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
- */
-static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
-{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
-
- kfree(tsec);
-}
-
/*
* prepare a new set of credentials for modification
*/
static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-
- old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
-
- tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
- if (!tsec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);

- new->security = tsec;
+ *tsec = *old_tsec;
return 0;
}

@@ -6889,6 +6855,10 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
}
#endif

+struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
@@ -6971,8 +6941,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),

LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
@@ -7191,6 +7159,7 @@ DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
.name = "selinux",
.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
.enabled = &selinux_enabled,
+ .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
.init = selinux_init,
};

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 734b6833bdff..c2974b031d05 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include "flask.h"
#include "avc.h"
@@ -158,9 +159,10 @@ struct bpf_security_struct {
u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
};

+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes;
static inline struct task_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred)
{
- return cred->security;
+ return cred->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
}

#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 01a922856eba..b27eb252e953 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
extern struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
#endif
extern int smack_ptrace_rule;
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes;

extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
extern struct smack_known smack_known_hat;
@@ -358,7 +359,7 @@ extern struct hlist_head smack_known_hash[SMACK_HASH_SLOTS];

static inline struct task_smack *smack_cred(const struct cred *cred)
{
- return cred->security;
+ return cred->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
}

/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index f34117b8c3be..459f7d523ca6 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -309,29 +309,20 @@ static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
}

/**
- * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
+ * init_task_smack - initialize a task security blob
+ * @tsp: blob to initialize
* @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
* @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
- * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
*
- * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
*/
-static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task,
- struct smack_known *forked, gfp_t gfp)
+static void init_task_smack(struct task_smack *tsp, struct smack_known *task,
+ struct smack_known *forked)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp;
-
- tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
- if (tsp == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
tsp->smk_task = task;
tsp->smk_forked = forked;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
-
- return tsp;
}

/**
@@ -1965,14 +1956,7 @@ static int smack_file_open(struct file *file)
*/
static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp;
-
- tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
- if (tsp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- cred->security = tsp;
-
+ init_task_smack(smack_cred(cred), NULL, NULL);
return 0;
}

@@ -1989,10 +1973,6 @@ static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
struct list_head *l;
struct list_head *n;

- if (tsp == NULL)
- return;
- cred->security = NULL;
-
smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);

list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
@@ -2000,7 +1980,6 @@ static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
list_del(&rp->list);
kfree(rp);
}
- kfree(tsp);
}

/**
@@ -2015,14 +1994,10 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
- struct task_smack *new_tsp;
+ struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
int rc;

- new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
- if (new_tsp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- new->security = new_tsp;
+ init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task);

rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
if (rc != 0)
@@ -2030,10 +2005,7 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,

rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
gfp);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
-
- return 0;
+ return rc;
}

/**
@@ -4659,6 +4631,10 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
return 0;
}

+struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -4837,20 +4813,25 @@ static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
*/
static __init int smack_init(void)
{
- struct cred *cred;
+ struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
struct task_smack *tsp;

smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
if (!smack_inode_cache)
return -ENOMEM;

- tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (tsp == NULL) {
- kmem_cache_destroy(smack_inode_cache);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
+ lsm_early_cred(cred);

+ /*
+ * Set the security state for the initial task.
+ */
+ tsp = smack_cred(cred);
+ init_task_smack(tsp, &smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor);
+
+ /*
+ * Register with LSM
+ */
+ security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
smack_enabled = 1;

pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
@@ -4864,20 +4845,9 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
pr_info("Smack: IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
#endif

- /*
- * Set the security state for the initial task.
- */
- cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
- cred->security = tsp;
-
/* initialize the smack_known_list */
init_smack_known_list();

- /*
- * Register with LSM
- */
- security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
-
return 0;
}

@@ -4888,5 +4858,6 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
DEFINE_LSM(smack) = {
.name = "smack",
.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+ .blobs = &smack_blob_sizes,
.init = smack_init,
};
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 41898613d93b..4fc17294a12d 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -1087,6 +1087,7 @@ extern struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain;
extern struct tomoyo_policy_namespace tomoyo_kernel_namespace;
extern unsigned int tomoyo_memory_quota[TOMOYO_MAX_MEMORY_STAT];
extern unsigned int tomoyo_memory_used[TOMOYO_MAX_MEMORY_STAT];
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes tomoyo_blob_sizes;

/********** Inlined functions. **********/

@@ -1206,7 +1207,7 @@ static inline void tomoyo_put_group(struct tomoyo_group *group)
*/
static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info **tomoyo_cred(const struct cred *cred)
{
- return (struct tomoyo_domain_info **)&cred->security;
+ return cred->security + tomoyo_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
}

/**
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 15864307925d..9094cf41a247 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -509,6 +509,10 @@ static int tomoyo_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
return tomoyo_socket_sendmsg_permission(sock, msg, size);
}

+struct lsm_blob_sizes tomoyo_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct tomoyo_domain_info *),
+};
+
/*
* tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
* registering TOMOYO.
@@ -562,6 +566,7 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
/* register ourselves with the security framework */
security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
+ lsm_early_cred(cred);
blob = tomoyo_cred(cred);
*blob = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
tomoyo_mm_init();
@@ -573,5 +578,6 @@ DEFINE_LSM(tomoyo) = {
.name = "tomoyo",
.enabled = &tomoyo_enabled,
.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+ .blobs = &tomoyo_blob_sizes,
.init = tomoyo_init,
};
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:51:13

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 28/38] SELinux: Abstract use of file security blob

Don't use the file->f_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 18 +++++++++---------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ac6d8a2d00f1..ce1d37378eb5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)

static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
{
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
file->f_security = NULL;
kmem_cache_free(file_security_cache, fsec);
}
@@ -1881,7 +1881,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct file *file,
u32 av)
{
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
@@ -2225,7 +2225,7 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
struct file *file)
{
u32 sid = task_sid(to);
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -3537,7 +3537,7 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
u32 sid = current_sid();

@@ -3572,7 +3572,7 @@ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
u32 requested, u16 cmd)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
@@ -3824,7 +3824,7 @@ static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
{
struct file_security_struct *fsec;

- fsec = file->f_security;
+ fsec = selinux_file(file);
fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
}

@@ -3839,7 +3839,7 @@ static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);

- fsec = file->f_security;
+ fsec = selinux_file(file);

if (!signum)
perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
@@ -3863,7 +3863,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
struct file_security_struct *fsec;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;

- fsec = file->f_security;
+ fsec = selinux_file(file);
isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
/*
* Save inode label and policy sequence number
@@ -4002,7 +4002,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
ad.u.file = file;

- fsec = file->f_security;
+ fsec = selinux_file(file);
if (sid != fsec->sid) {
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index c2974b031d05..e0ac2992e059 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -165,4 +165,9 @@ static inline struct task_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred)
return cred->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
}

+static inline struct file_security_struct *selinux_file(const struct file *file)
+{
+ return file->f_security;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:52:16

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 29/38] Smack: Abstract use of file security blob

Don't use the file->f_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
security/smack/smack.h | 5 +++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 12 ++++++++----
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index b27eb252e953..50854969a391 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -362,6 +362,11 @@ static inline struct task_smack *smack_cred(const struct cred *cred)
return cred->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
}

+static inline struct smack_known **smack_file(const struct file *file)
+{
+ return (struct smack_known **)&file->f_security;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 459f7d523ca6..3e11be8cce7e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1573,9 +1573,9 @@ static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
*/
static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);

- file->f_security = skp;
+ *blob = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}

@@ -1815,7 +1815,9 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
*/
static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
{
- file->f_security = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);
+
+ *blob = smk_of_current();
}

/**
@@ -1832,6 +1834,7 @@ static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
{
+ struct smack_known **blob;
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(tsk->cred));
const struct cred *tcred;
@@ -1845,7 +1848,8 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);

/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
- skp = file->f_security;
+ blob = smack_file(file);
+ skp = *blob;
rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);

--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:52:32

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 30/38] LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security

Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the infrastructure.
The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead
they tell the infrastructure how much space they require.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/include/file.h | 5 +++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 19 +++++++-------
security/security.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 25 ++----------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 2 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 3 ++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 14 +---------
8 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index c9458280214e..64499c2d44cd 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2029,6 +2029,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
*/
struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
+ int lbs_file;
};

/*
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
index 4c2c8ac8842f..8be09208cf7c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -32,7 +32,10 @@ struct path;
AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_LOCK | \
AA_EXEC_MMAP | AA_MAY_LINK)

-#define file_ctx(X) ((struct aa_file_ctx *)(X)->f_security)
+static inline struct aa_file_ctx *file_ctx(struct file *file)
+{
+ return file->f_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
+}

/* struct aa_file_ctx - the AppArmor context the file was opened in
* @lock: lock to update the ctx
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 70669e676212..3ae8c902d740 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -433,21 +433,21 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file)

static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
- int error = 0;
-
- /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
+ struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);
struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
- file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_ctx(label, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!file_ctx(file))
- error = -ENOMEM;
- end_current_label_crit_section(label);

- return error;
+ spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
+ end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+ return 0;
}

static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
{
- aa_free_file_ctx(file_ctx(file));
+ struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);
+
+ if (ctx)
+ aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label));
}

static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
@@ -1155,6 +1155,7 @@ static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
*/
struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
+ .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
};

static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c49d4a18c75f..499842ece0fb 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@
struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);

+static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
+
char *lsm_names;
static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;

@@ -158,6 +160,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
return;

lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
}

/* Prepare LSM for initialization. */
@@ -279,6 +282,15 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
prepare_lsm(*lsm);

init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+ init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+
+ /*
+ * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
+ */
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_file)
+ lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache",
+ blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0,
+ SLAB_PANIC, NULL);

for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
initialize_lsm(*lsm);
@@ -448,6 +460,27 @@ void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred)
panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__);
}

+/**
+ * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob
+ * @file: the file that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the file blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file)
+{
+ if (!lsm_file_cache) {
+ file->f_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (file->f_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Hook list operation macros.
*
@@ -1131,12 +1164,27 @@ int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)

int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
{
- return call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file);
+ int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_file_free(file);
+ return rc;
}

void security_file_free(struct file *file)
{
+ void *blob;
+
call_void_hook(file_free_security, file);
+
+ blob = file->f_security;
+ if (blob) {
+ file->f_security = NULL;
+ kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob);
+ }
}

int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
@@ -1254,7 +1302,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
return rc;

rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
- if (rc)
+ if (unlikely(rc))
security_cred_free(cred);
return rc;
}
@@ -1275,7 +1323,7 @@ int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
return rc;

rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
- if (rc)
+ if (unlikely(rc))
security_cred_free(new);
return rc;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ce1d37378eb5..9669a059ce0f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -145,7 +145,6 @@ static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);

static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
-static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache;

/**
* selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
@@ -377,27 +376,15 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)

static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
- struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
u32 sid = current_sid();

- fsec = kmem_cache_zalloc(file_security_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!fsec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
fsec->sid = sid;
fsec->fown_sid = sid;
- file->f_security = fsec;

return 0;
}

-static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
-{
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
- file->f_security = NULL;
- kmem_cache_free(file_security_cache, fsec);
-}
-
static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
@@ -3559,11 +3546,6 @@ static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
return file_alloc_security(file);
}

-static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
-{
- file_free_security(file);
-}
-
/*
* Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
* operation to an inode.
@@ -6857,6 +6839,7 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)

struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
+ .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
};

static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -6927,7 +6910,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {

LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
@@ -7112,9 +7094,6 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
- file_security_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_file_security",
- sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
- 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
avc_init();

avtab_cache_init();
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index e0ac2992e059..96374dbf4ace 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static inline struct task_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred)

static inline struct file_security_struct *selinux_file(const struct file *file)
{
- return file->f_security;
+ return file->f_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
}

#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 50854969a391..2007d38d0e46 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -364,7 +364,8 @@ static inline struct task_smack *smack_cred(const struct cred *cred)

static inline struct smack_known **smack_file(const struct file *file)
{
- return (struct smack_known **)&file->f_security;
+ return (struct smack_known **)(file->f_security +
+ smack_blob_sizes.lbs_file);
}

/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 3e11be8cce7e..c560cb8e155c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1579,18 +1579,6 @@ static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
return 0;
}

-/**
- * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
- * @file: the object
- *
- * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
- * label list, so no memory is freed.
- */
-static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
-{
- file->f_security = NULL;
-}
-
/**
* smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
* @file: the object
@@ -4637,6 +4625,7 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,

struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
+ .lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
};

static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4674,7 +4663,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),

LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, smack_file_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:52:43

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 31/38] SELinux: Abstract use of inode security blob

Don't use the inode->i_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 6 ++++++
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9669a059ce0f..3069e95d86e6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
struct dentry *dentry,
bool may_sleep)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);

might_sleep_if(may_sleep);

@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,

static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
{
- return inode->i_security;
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
}

static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, boo
error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
if (error)
return ERR_PTR(error);
- return inode->i_security;
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
}

/*
@@ -312,14 +312,14 @@ static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, boo
static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
{
__inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
- return inode->i_security;
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
}

static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);

- return inode->i_security;
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
}

/*
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentr
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);

__inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
- return inode->i_security;
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
}

static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)

static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;

/*
@@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@ static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
{
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
u16 sclass;
struct dentry *dentry;
@@ -1802,7 +1802,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
return 0;

sid = cred_sid(cred);
- isec = inode->i_security;
+ isec = selinux_inode(inode);

return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
@@ -3030,7 +3030,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,

/* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
isec->sid = newsid;
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
@@ -3130,7 +3130,7 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
unsigned flags)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
int rc;

ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
@@ -4150,7 +4150,7 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
u32 sid = task_sid(p);

spin_lock(&isec->lock);
@@ -6529,7 +6529,7 @@ static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)

static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);

spin_lock(&isec->lock);
isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 96374dbf4ace..26b4ff6b4d81 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -170,4 +170,10 @@ static inline struct file_security_struct *selinux_file(const struct file *file)
return file->f_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
}

+static inline struct inode_security_struct *selinux_inode(
+ const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return inode->i_security;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index f3a5a138a096..145ee62f205a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
goto out;
}

- isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
+ isec = selinux_inode(inode);
ret = security_genfs_sid(fsi->state, "selinuxfs", page,
SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
if (ret) {
@@ -1953,7 +1953,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
}

inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
- isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
+ isec = selinux_inode(inode);
isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL;
isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:55:12

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 32/38] Smack: Abstract use of inode security blob

Don't use the inode->i_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
security/smack/smack.h | 9 +++++++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++----------------
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 2007d38d0e46..436231dfae33 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -368,12 +368,17 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_file(const struct file *file)
smack_blob_sizes.lbs_file);
}

+static inline struct inode_smack *smack_inode(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return inode->i_security;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
static inline int smk_inode_transmutable(const struct inode *isp)
{
- struct inode_smack *sip = isp->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *sip = smack_inode(isp);
return (sip->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) != 0;
}

@@ -382,7 +387,7 @@ static inline int smk_inode_transmutable(const struct inode *isp)
*/
static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp)
{
- struct inode_smack *sip = isp->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *sip = smack_inode(isp);
return sip->smk_inode;
}

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index c560cb8e155c..c086110cba80 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
{
struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
- struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];

if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
- struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];

if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
- struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];

if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
/*
* Initialize the root inode.
*/
- isp = inode->i_security;
+ isp = smack_inode(inode);
if (isp == NULL) {
isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
if (isp == NULL)
@@ -914,7 +914,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (bprm->called_set_creds)
return 0;

- isp = inode->i_security;
+ isp = smack_inode(inode);
if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
return 0;

@@ -994,7 +994,7 @@ static void smack_inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
*/
static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);

/*
* The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
@@ -1022,7 +1022,7 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
void **value, size_t *len)
{
- struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
@@ -1360,7 +1360,7 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct inode_smack *isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));

if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
@@ -1441,7 +1441,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
if (rc != 0)
return rc;

- isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
+ isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
/*
* Don't do anything special for these.
* XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
@@ -1716,7 +1716,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file))))
return 0;

- isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
+ isp = smack_inode(file_inode(file));
if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
return 0;
sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
@@ -2063,7 +2063,7 @@ static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(new);

tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
@@ -2263,7 +2263,7 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
*/
static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);

isp->smk_inode = skp;
@@ -2726,7 +2726,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *nsp = smack_inode(inode);
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct socket *sock;
int rc = 0;
@@ -3334,7 +3334,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
if (inode == NULL)
return;

- isp = inode->i_security;
+ isp = smack_inode(inode);

mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
/*
@@ -4566,7 +4566,7 @@ static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new)
/*
* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid
*/
- isp = d_inode(dentry->d_parent)->i_security;
+ isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry->d_parent));
skp = isp->smk_inode;
tsp->smk_task = skp;
*new = new_creds;
@@ -4603,7 +4603,7 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
/*
* the attribute of the containing directory
*/
- isp = d_inode(dentry->d_parent)->i_security;
+ isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry->d_parent));

if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) {
rcu_read_lock();
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:55:25

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 33/38] LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security

Move management of the inode->i_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 ++
security/security.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 37 ++++---------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 9 +++--
security/smack/smack.h | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 76 +++++++++------------------------------
6 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 98 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 64499c2d44cd..65440005ec92 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2030,6 +2030,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
+ int lbs_inode;
};

/*
@@ -2101,6 +2102,8 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
#define __lsm_ro_after_init __ro_after_init
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS */

+extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred);
#endif
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 499842ece0fb..0cc48072eb3b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);

static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
+static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;

char *lsm_names;
static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
@@ -161,6 +162,13 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)

lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+ /*
+ * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to
+ * what the modules might need.
+ */
+ if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0)
+ blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
}

/* Prepare LSM for initialization. */
@@ -283,6 +291,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)

init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+ init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);

/*
* Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
@@ -291,6 +300,10 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache",
blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0,
SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode)
+ lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache",
+ blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0,
+ SLAB_PANIC, NULL);

for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
initialize_lsm(*lsm);
@@ -481,6 +494,27 @@ static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file)
return 0;
}

+/**
+ * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob
+ * @inode: the inode that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ if (!lsm_inode_cache) {
+ inode->i_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (inode->i_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Hook list operation macros.
*
@@ -727,14 +761,40 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_parse_opts_str);

int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
{
- inode->i_security = NULL;
- return call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
+ int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_inode_free(inode);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ /*
+ * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob
+ */
+ kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head);
}

void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
{
integrity_inode_free(inode);
call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
+ /*
+ * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
+ * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made
+ * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
+ * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
+ * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
+ * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
+ * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
+ */
+ if (inode->i_security)
+ call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security,
+ inode_free_by_rcu);
}

int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 3069e95d86e6..f0e7ac26f3a9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -144,8 +144,6 @@ static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);

-static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
-
/**
* selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
*
@@ -241,13 +239,9 @@ static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)

static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
u32 sid = current_sid();

- isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
- if (!isec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
isec->inode = inode;
@@ -255,7 +249,6 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
isec->task_sid = sid;
isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
- inode->i_security = isec;

return 0;
}
@@ -333,19 +326,14 @@ static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentr
return selinux_inode(inode);
}

-static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
-{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-
- isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
- kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
-}
-
static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;

+ if (!isec)
+ return;
+ sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
/*
* As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
* empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
@@ -361,17 +349,6 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
list_del_init(&isec->list);
spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
}
-
- /*
- * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
- * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
- * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
- * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
- * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
- * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
- * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
- */
- call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
}

static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
@@ -6840,6 +6817,7 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
+ .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
};

static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -7091,9 +7069,6 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)

default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);

- sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
- sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
- 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
avc_init();

avtab_cache_init();
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 26b4ff6b4d81..562fad58c56b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -57,10 +57,7 @@ enum label_initialized {

struct inode_security_struct {
struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode object */
- union {
- struct list_head list; /* list of inode_security_struct */
- struct rcu_head rcu; /* for freeing the inode_security_struct */
- };
+ struct list_head list; /* list of inode_security_struct */
u32 task_sid; /* SID of creating task */
u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
u16 sclass; /* security class of this object */
@@ -173,7 +170,9 @@ static inline struct file_security_struct *selinux_file(const struct file *file)
static inline struct inode_security_struct *selinux_inode(
const struct inode *inode)
{
- return inode->i_security;
+ if (unlikely(!inode->i_security))
+ return NULL;
+ return inode->i_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
}

#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 436231dfae33..bf0abc35ca1c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_file(const struct file *file)

static inline struct inode_smack *smack_inode(const struct inode *inode)
{
- return inode->i_security;
+ return inode->i_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
}

/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index c086110cba80..9ff185af378a 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -288,24 +288,18 @@ static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
}

/**
- * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
+ * init_inode_smack - initialize an inode security blob
+ * @isp: the blob to initialize
* @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
*
- * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
*/
-static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
+static void init_inode_smack(struct inode *inode, struct smack_known *skp)
{
- struct inode_smack *isp;
-
- isp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
- if (isp == NULL)
- return NULL;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);

isp->smk_inode = skp;
isp->smk_flags = 0;
mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
-
- return isp;
}

/**
@@ -758,6 +752,13 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED)
return 0;

+ if (inode->i_security == NULL) {
+ int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
/*
* Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
@@ -826,17 +827,12 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
/*
* Initialize the root inode.
*/
- isp = smack_inode(inode);
- if (isp == NULL) {
- isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
- if (isp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
- inode->i_security = isp;
- } else
- isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
+ init_inode_smack(inode, sp->smk_root);

- if (transmute)
+ if (transmute) {
+ isp = smack_inode(inode);
isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+ }

return 0;
}
@@ -965,48 +961,10 @@ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();

- inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp);
- if (inode->i_security == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ init_inode_smack(inode, skp);
return 0;
}

-/**
- * smack_inode_free_rcu - Free inode_smack blob from cache
- * @head: the rcu_head for getting inode_smack pointer
- *
- * Call back function called from call_rcu() to free
- * the i_security blob pointer in inode
- */
-static void smack_inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
-{
- struct inode_smack *issp;
-
- issp = container_of(head, struct inode_smack, smk_rcu);
- kmem_cache_free(smack_inode_cache, issp);
-}
-
-/**
- * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob using call_rcu()
- * @inode: the inode with a blob
- *
- * Clears the blob pointer in inode using RCU
- */
-static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
-{
- struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
-
- /*
- * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
- * a call to smack_inode_permission() can be made
- * after smack_inode_free_security() is called.
- * To avoid race condition free the i_security via RCU
- * and leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
- * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
- */
- call_rcu(&issp->smk_rcu, smack_inode_free_rcu);
-}
-
/**
* smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
* @inode: the newly created inode
@@ -4626,6 +4584,7 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+ .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
};

static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4644,7 +4603,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),

LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:55:44

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 34/38] LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security

Move management of the task_struct->security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
The only user of this blob is AppArmor. The AppArmor use
is abstracted to avoid future conflict.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 ++
security/apparmor/include/task.h | 18 +++-----------
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 15 +++--------
security/security.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 65440005ec92..243c7c6e181d 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2031,6 +2031,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_task;
};

/*
@@ -2106,6 +2107,7 @@ extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred);
+void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task);
#endif

#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/task.h b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
index 55edaa1d83f8..039c1e60887a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/task.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
@@ -14,7 +14,10 @@
#ifndef __AA_TASK_H
#define __AA_TASK_H

-#define task_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
+static inline struct aa_task_ctx *task_ctx(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ return task->security;
+}

/*
* struct aa_task_ctx - information for current task label change
@@ -36,17 +39,6 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token);
int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 cookie);
struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task);

-/**
- * aa_alloc_task_ctx - allocate a new task_ctx
- * @flags: gfp flags for allocation
- *
- * Returns: allocated buffer or NULL on failure
- */
-static inline struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_ctx(gfp_t flags)
-{
- return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), flags);
-}
-
/**
* aa_free_task_ctx - free a task_ctx
* @ctx: task_ctx to free (MAYBE NULL)
@@ -57,8 +49,6 @@ static inline void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
aa_put_label(ctx->nnp);
aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
-
- kzfree(ctx);
}
}

diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 3ae8c902d740..83dc23f33a29 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -93,19 +93,14 @@ static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
{

aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task));
- task_ctx(task) = NULL;
}

static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned long clone_flags)
{
- struct aa_task_ctx *new = aa_alloc_task_ctx(GFP_KERNEL);
-
- if (!new)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task);

aa_dup_task_ctx(new, task_ctx(current));
- task_ctx(task) = new;

return 0;
}
@@ -1156,6 +1151,7 @@ static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
+ .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
};

static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1486,15 +1482,10 @@ static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
{
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
- struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = aa_alloc_task_ctx(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;

lsm_early_cred(cred);
+ lsm_early_task(current);
set_cred_label(cred, aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns)));
- task_ctx(current) = ctx;

return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0cc48072eb3b..d3d3963d7914 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0)
blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
}

/* Prepare LSM for initialization. */
@@ -292,6 +293,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
+ init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);

/*
* Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
@@ -515,6 +517,46 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
return 0;
}

+/**
+ * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob
+ * @task: the task that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the task blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
+ task->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (task->security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob
+ * @task: the task that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the task blob for all the modules if it's not already there
+ */
+void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (task == NULL)
+ panic("%s: task cred.\n", __func__);
+ if (task->security != NULL)
+ return;
+ rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
+ if (rc)
+ panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
+}
+
/*
* Hook list operation macros.
*
@@ -1346,12 +1388,22 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)

int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
- return call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
+ int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_task_free(task);
+ return rc;
}

void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
{
call_void_hook(task_free, task);
+
+ kfree(task->security);
+ task->security = NULL;
}

int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:55:51

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 35/38] SELinux: Abstract use of ipc security blobs

Don't use the ipc->security pointer directly.
Don't use the msg_msg->security pointer directly.
Provide helper functions that provides the security blob pointers.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 18 +++++++++---------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 13 +++++++++++++
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f0e7ac26f3a9..1e56b036018a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5889,7 +5889,7 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();

- isec = ipc_perms->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);

ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
@@ -5946,7 +5946,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();

- isec = msq->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(msq);

ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
@@ -5995,8 +5995,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *m
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;

- isec = msq->security;
- msec = msg->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
+ msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);

/*
* First time through, need to assign label to the message
@@ -6043,8 +6043,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *m
u32 sid = task_sid(target);
int rc;

- isec = msq->security;
- msec = msg->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
+ msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);

ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
@@ -6097,7 +6097,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();

- isec = shp->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(shp);

ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
@@ -6194,7 +6194,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();

- isec = sma->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(sma);

ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
@@ -6280,7 +6280,7 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)

static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
{
- struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
*secid = isec->sid;
}

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 562fad58c56b..539cacf4a572 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include "flask.h"
#include "avc.h"
@@ -175,4 +176,16 @@ static inline struct inode_security_struct *selinux_inode(
return inode->i_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
}

+static inline struct msg_security_struct *selinux_msg_msg(
+ const struct msg_msg *msg_msg)
+{
+ return msg_msg->security;
+}
+
+static inline struct ipc_security_struct *selinux_ipc(
+ const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
+{
+ return ipc->security;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:57:53

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 36/38] Smack: Abstract use of ipc security blobs

Don't use the ipc->security pointer directly.
Don't use the msg_msg->security pointer directly.
Provide helper functions that provides the security blob pointers.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
security/smack/smack.h | 11 +++++++++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 14 +++++++++-----
2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index bf0abc35ca1c..0adddbeecc62 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>

/*
* Use IPv6 port labeling if IPv6 is enabled and secmarks
@@ -373,6 +374,16 @@ static inline struct inode_smack *smack_inode(const struct inode *inode)
return inode->i_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
}

+static inline struct smack_known **smack_msg_msg(const struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+ return (struct smack_known **)&msg->security;
+}
+
+static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
+{
+ return (struct smack_known **)&ipc->security;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 9ff185af378a..ceda326a6e47 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2918,7 +2918,9 @@ static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
*/
static struct smack_known *smack_of_ipc(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
{
- return (struct smack_known *)isp->security;
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);
+
+ return *blob;
}

/**
@@ -2929,9 +2931,9 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_of_ipc(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
*/
static int smack_ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);

- isp->security = skp;
+ *blob = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}

@@ -3243,7 +3245,8 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg
*/
static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
{
- struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
+ struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -3264,7 +3267,8 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
*/
static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
{
- struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
+ struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;

*secid = iskp->smk_secid;
}
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:58:25

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 37/38] LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob

Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and
msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security
modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead
of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules
tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and
the space is allocated there.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 +
security/security.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 98 ++++++---------------------------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 4 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 4 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 32 ++-----------
6 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 121 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 243c7c6e181d..f2cc950e6172 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2031,6 +2031,8 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_ipc;
+ int lbs_msg_msg;
int lbs_task;
};

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d3d3963d7914..60ae6b470a0b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <net/flow.h>

#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -169,6 +170,8 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0)
blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
}

@@ -293,6 +296,8 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
+ init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+ init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);

/*
@@ -538,6 +543,48 @@ int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
return 0;
}

+/**
+ * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob
+ * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) {
+ kip->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (kip->security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob
+ * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) {
+ mp->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (mp->security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob
* @task: the task that needs a blob
@@ -1618,22 +1665,40 @@ void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)

int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
- return call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg);
+ int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_msg_msg_free(msg);
+ return rc;
}

void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg);
+ kfree(msg->security);
+ msg->security = NULL;
}

int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
{
- return call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq);
+ int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_msg_queue_free(msq);
+ return rc;
}

void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
{
call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq);
+ kfree(msq->security);
+ msq->security = NULL;
}

int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
@@ -1660,12 +1725,21 @@ int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,

int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
{
- return call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp);
+ int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_shm_free(shp);
+ return rc;
}

void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
{
call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp);
+ kfree(shp->security);
+ shp->security = NULL;
}

int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
@@ -1685,12 +1759,21 @@ int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmf

int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
{
- return call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma);
+ int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sem_free(sma);
+ return rc;
}

void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
{
call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma);
+ kfree(sma->security);
+ sma->security = NULL;
}

int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1e56b036018a..d4337aa7bb59 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5837,51 +5837,22 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
}

-static int ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
- u16 sclass)
+static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
{
- struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-
- isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!isec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
isec->sclass = sclass;
isec->sid = current_sid();
- perm->security = isec;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
-{
- struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
- perm->security = NULL;
- kfree(isec);
}

static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
struct msg_security_struct *msec;

- msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!msec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
+ msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- msg->security = msec;

return 0;
}

-static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
-{
- struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
-
- msg->security = NULL;
- kfree(msec);
-}
-
static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
u32 perms)
{
@@ -5903,11 +5874,6 @@ static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
}

-static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
-{
- msg_msg_free_security(msg);
-}
-
/* message queue security operations */
static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
{
@@ -5916,11 +5882,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;

- rc = ipc_alloc_security(msq, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- isec = msq->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
+ ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);

ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
@@ -5928,16 +5891,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
- if (rc) {
- ipc_free_security(msq);
- return rc;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
-{
- ipc_free_security(msq);
+ return rc;
}

static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
@@ -6067,11 +6021,8 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;

- rc = ipc_alloc_security(shp, SECCLASS_SHM);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- isec = shp->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
+ ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);

ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
@@ -6079,16 +6030,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
SHM__CREATE, &ad);
- if (rc) {
- ipc_free_security(shp);
- return rc;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
-{
- ipc_free_security(shp);
+ return rc;
}

static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
@@ -6164,11 +6106,8 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;

- rc = ipc_alloc_security(sma, SECCLASS_SEM);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- isec = sma->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
+ ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);

ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
@@ -6176,16 +6115,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
SEM__CREATE, &ad);
- if (rc) {
- ipc_free_security(sma);
- return rc;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
-{
- ipc_free_security(sma);
+ return rc;
}

static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
@@ -6818,6 +6748,8 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
+ .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
+ .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
};

static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -6928,24 +6860,20 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),

LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, selinux_msg_msg_free_security),

LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, selinux_msg_queue_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),

LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, selinux_shm_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),

LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, selinux_sem_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 539cacf4a572..231262d8eac9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -179,13 +179,13 @@ static inline struct inode_security_struct *selinux_inode(
static inline struct msg_security_struct *selinux_msg_msg(
const struct msg_msg *msg_msg)
{
- return msg_msg->security;
+ return msg_msg->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg;
}

static inline struct ipc_security_struct *selinux_ipc(
const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
{
- return ipc->security;
+ return ipc->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
}

#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 0adddbeecc62..9c7c95a5c497 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -376,12 +376,12 @@ static inline struct inode_smack *smack_inode(const struct inode *inode)

static inline struct smack_known **smack_msg_msg(const struct msg_msg *msg)
{
- return (struct smack_known **)&msg->security;
+ return msg->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg;
}

static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
{
- return (struct smack_known **)&ipc->security;
+ return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
}

/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index ceda326a6e47..4dcdea45e785 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2893,23 +2893,12 @@ static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
*/
static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_msg_msg(msg);

- msg->security = skp;
+ *blob = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}

-/**
- * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
- * @msg: the object
- *
- * Clears the blob pointer
- */
-static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
-{
- msg->security = NULL;
-}
-
/**
* smack_of_ipc - the smack pointer for the ipc
* @isp: the object
@@ -2937,17 +2926,6 @@ static int smack_ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
return 0;
}

-/**
- * smack_ipc_free_security - Clear the security blob for ipc
- * @isp: the object
- *
- * Clears the blob pointer
- */
-static void smack_ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
-{
- isp->security = NULL;
-}
-
/**
* smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
* @isp : the object
@@ -4589,6 +4567,8 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
+ .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+ .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
};

static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4660,23 +4640,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),

LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, smack_msg_msg_free_security),

LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, smack_ipc_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),

LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, smack_ipc_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),

LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, smack_ipc_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
--
2.14.5

2018-11-26 23:59:18

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: [PATCH v5 38/38] TOMOYO: Update LSM flags to no longer be exclusive

With blob sharing in place, TOMOYO is no longer an exclusive LSM, so it
can operate separately now. Mark it as such.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 9094cf41a247..066c0daf0efc 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
DEFINE_LSM(tomoyo) = {
.name = "tomoyo",
.enabled = &tomoyo_enabled,
- .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
.blobs = &tomoyo_blob_sizes,
.init = tomoyo_init,
};
--
2.14.5

2018-11-27 05:37:39

by Kees Cook

Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/38] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR

On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 3:26 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:

Hmmm... the "From: Kees..." in the body is missing. Are you using "git
send-email"?

>
> This adds a flag for the current "major" LSMs to distinguish them when
> we have a universal method for ordering all LSMs. It's called "legacy"
> since the distinction of "major" will go away in the blob-sharing world.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +++
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 1 +
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 +
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 1 +
> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 1 +
> 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index aaeb7fa24dc4..63c0e102de20 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -2039,8 +2039,11 @@ extern char *lsm_names;
> extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> char *lsm);
>
> +#define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
> +
> struct lsm_info {
> const char *name; /* Required. */
> + unsigned long flags; /* Optional: flags describing LSM */
> int (*init)(void); /* Required. */
> };
>
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 42446a216f3b..2edd35ca5044 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -1728,5 +1728,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
>
> DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
> .name = "apparmor",
> + .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
> .init = apparmor_init,
> };
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 7ce683259357..56c6f1849c80 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -7209,6 +7209,7 @@ void selinux_complete_init(void)
> all processes and objects when they are created. */
> DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
> .name = "selinux",
> + .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
> .init = selinux_init,
> };
>
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 81fb4c1631e9..3639e55b1f4b 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -4891,5 +4891,6 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
> */
> DEFINE_LSM(smack) = {
> .name = "smack",
> + .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
> .init = smack_init,
> };
> diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> index 1b5b5097efd7..09f7af130d3a 100644
> --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> @@ -552,5 +552,6 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
>
> DEFINE_LSM(tomoyo) = {
> .name = "tomoyo",
> + .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
> .init = tomoyo_init,
> };
> --
> 2.14.5
>
>


--
Kees Cook

2018-11-27 14:26:03

by Ondrej Mosnacek

Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/38] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR

On Tue, Nov 27, 2018 at 2:27 PM Kees Cook <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 3:26 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Hmmm... the "From: Kees..." in the body is missing. Are you using "git
> send-email"?

Not to mention that you are sending (only) to the old SELinux mailing
list. The new list is at [email protected], see:

https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/[email protected]/

>
> >
> > This adds a flag for the current "major" LSMs to distinguish them when
> > we have a universal method for ordering all LSMs. It's called "legacy"
> > since the distinction of "major" will go away in the blob-sharing world.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
> > Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
> > Reviewed-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +++
> > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 1 +
> > security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 +
> > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 1 +
> > security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 1 +
> > 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > index aaeb7fa24dc4..63c0e102de20 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > @@ -2039,8 +2039,11 @@ extern char *lsm_names;
> > extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> > char *lsm);
> >
> > +#define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
> > +
> > struct lsm_info {
> > const char *name; /* Required. */
> > + unsigned long flags; /* Optional: flags describing LSM */
> > int (*init)(void); /* Required. */
> > };
> >
> > diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> > index 42446a216f3b..2edd35ca5044 100644
> > --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> > +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> > @@ -1728,5 +1728,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
> >
> > DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
> > .name = "apparmor",
> > + .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
> > .init = apparmor_init,
> > };
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > index 7ce683259357..56c6f1849c80 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > @@ -7209,6 +7209,7 @@ void selinux_complete_init(void)
> > all processes and objects when they are created. */
> > DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
> > .name = "selinux",
> > + .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
> > .init = selinux_init,
> > };
> >
> > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> > index 81fb4c1631e9..3639e55b1f4b 100644
> > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> > @@ -4891,5 +4891,6 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
> > */
> > DEFINE_LSM(smack) = {
> > .name = "smack",
> > + .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
> > .init = smack_init,
> > };
> > diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> > index 1b5b5097efd7..09f7af130d3a 100644
> > --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> > +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> > @@ -552,5 +552,6 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
> >
> > DEFINE_LSM(tomoyo) = {
> > .name = "tomoyo",
> > + .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
> > .init = tomoyo_init,
> > };
> > --
> > 2.14.5
> >
> >
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> _______________________________________________
> Selinux mailing list
> [email protected]
> To unsubscribe, send email to [email protected].
> To get help, send an email containing "help" to [email protected].

--
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com>
Associate Software Engineer, Security Technologies
Red Hat, Inc.

2018-11-27 19:30:43

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/38] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR

On 11/26/2018 9:34 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 3:26 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Hmmm... the "From: Kees..." in the body is missing. Are you using "git
> send-email"?

Not for this posting. I will use it henceforth. I had some
email configuration issues to work through.

2018-12-05 00:33:43

by Kees Cook

Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/38] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock

On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 3:22 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
> v5: Include Kees Cook's rework of the lsm command
> line interface. Stacking is not conditional.

Can you resend this series with corrected "From:" lines in the body, etc?

Beyond that, I obviously like it. James, what's needed for this to move forward?

--
Kees Cook

2018-12-05 02:38:54

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/38] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock

On 12/4/2018 4:31 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 3:22 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
>> v5: Include Kees Cook's rework of the lsm command
>> line interface. Stacking is not conditional.
> Can you resend this series with corrected "From:" lines in the body, etc?

Yes, I can. I was hoping to hear something other than crickets.

> Beyond that, I obviously like it. James, what's needed for this to move forward?

Agreed.

2018-12-05 02:53:27

by John Johansen

Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/38] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock

On 12/4/18 6:37 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 12/4/2018 4:31 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 3:22 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> v5: Include Kees Cook's rework of the lsm command
>>> line interface. Stacking is not conditional.
>> Can you resend this series with corrected "From:" lines in the body, etc?
>
> Yes, I can. I was hoping to hear something other than crickets.
>
I am trying to get to it, its the next thing on my list. So hopefully this week


>> Beyond that, I obviously like it. James, what's needed for this to move forward?
>
> Agreed.
>

2018-12-11 18:59:13

by James Morris

Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/38] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock

On Tue, 4 Dec 2018, Kees Cook wrote:

> On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 3:22 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
> > v5: Include Kees Cook's rework of the lsm command
> > line interface. Stacking is not conditional.
>
> Can you resend this series with corrected "From:" lines in the body, etc?
>
> Beyond that, I obviously like it. James, what's needed for this to move forward?

If there are no outstanding issues, I plan to merge this for 4.21.


--
James Morris
<[email protected]>

2018-12-11 21:20:46

by Kees Cook

Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/38] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock

On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 10:57 AM James Morris <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Tue, 4 Dec 2018, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> > On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 3:22 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > v5: Include Kees Cook's rework of the lsm command
> > > line interface. Stacking is not conditional.
> >
> > Can you resend this series with corrected "From:" lines in the body, etc?
> >
> > Beyond that, I obviously like it. James, what's needed for this to move forward?
>
> If there are no outstanding issues, I plan to merge this for 4.21.

Yeah, it looks good to me. (Excepting getting the authorship sorted.)

Thanks!

--
Kees Cook

2019-01-08 01:31:03

by Kees Cook

Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/38] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock

On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 1:19 PM Kees Cook <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 10:57 AM James Morris <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, 4 Dec 2018, Kees Cook wrote:
> >
> > > On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 3:22 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > > v5: Include Kees Cook's rework of the lsm command
> > > > line interface. Stacking is not conditional.
> > >
> > > Can you resend this series with corrected "From:" lines in the body, etc?
> > >
> > > Beyond that, I obviously like it. James, what's needed for this to move forward?
> >
> > If there are no outstanding issues, I plan to merge this for 4.21.
>
> Yeah, it looks good to me. (Excepting getting the authorship sorted.)

I didn't see this actually get merged? Was there something that needed
fixing? Should I send you a direct pull request for v5.1?

--
Kees Cook

2019-01-08 21:07:57

by James Morris

Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/38] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock

On Mon, 7 Jan 2019, Kees Cook wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 1:19 PM Kees Cook <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 10:57 AM James Morris <[email protected]> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Tue, 4 Dec 2018, Kees Cook wrote:
> > >
> > > > On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 3:22 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > > > v5: Include Kees Cook's rework of the lsm command
> > > > > line interface. Stacking is not conditional.
> > > >
> > > > Can you resend this series with corrected "From:" lines in the body, etc?
> > > >
> > > > Beyond that, I obviously like it. James, what's needed for this to move forward?
> > >
> > > If there are no outstanding issues, I plan to merge this for 4.21.
> >
> > Yeah, it looks good to me. (Excepting getting the authorship sorted.)
>
> I didn't see this actually get merged? Was there something that needed
> fixing? Should I send you a direct pull request for v5.1?

Yep, please send a new pull request.

--
James Morris
<[email protected]>

2019-01-08 21:40:20

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/38] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock

On 1/8/2019 1:05 PM, James Morris wrote:
> On Mon, 7 Jan 2019, Kees Cook wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 1:19 PM Kees Cook <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 10:57 AM James Morris <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>> On Tue, 4 Dec 2018, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 3:22 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>> v5: Include Kees Cook's rework of the lsm command
>>>>>> line interface. Stacking is not conditional.
>>>>> Can you resend this series with corrected "From:" lines in the body, etc?
>>>>>
>>>>> Beyond that, I obviously like it. James, what's needed for this to move forward?
>>>> If there are no outstanding issues, I plan to merge this for 4.21.
>>> Yeah, it looks good to me. (Excepting getting the authorship sorted.)
>> I didn't see this actually get merged? Was there something that needed
>> fixing? Should I send you a direct pull request for v5.1?
> Yep, please send a new pull request.

Do you want it as is or rebased on 5.0-rc1?

2019-01-08 21:46:07

by Kees Cook

Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/38] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock

On Tue, Jan 8, 2019 at 1:37 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On 1/8/2019 1:05 PM, James Morris wrote:
> > On Mon, 7 Jan 2019, Kees Cook wrote:
> >
> >> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 1:19 PM Kees Cook <[email protected]> wrote:
> >>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 10:57 AM James Morris <[email protected]> wrote:
> >>>> On Tue, 4 Dec 2018, Kees Cook wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 3:22 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
> >>>>>> v5: Include Kees Cook's rework of the lsm command
> >>>>>> line interface. Stacking is not conditional.
> >>>>> Can you resend this series with corrected "From:" lines in the body, etc?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Beyond that, I obviously like it. James, what's needed for this to move forward?
> >>>> If there are no outstanding issues, I plan to merge this for 4.21.
> >>> Yeah, it looks good to me. (Excepting getting the authorship sorted.)
> >> I didn't see this actually get merged? Was there something that needed
> >> fixing? Should I send you a direct pull request for v5.1?
> > Yep, please send a new pull request.
>
> Do you want it as is or rebased on 5.0-rc1?

I've rebased to 5.0-rc1, did some light (re)testing, and sent a pull request...

--
Kees Cook

2019-01-08 23:07:53

by Casey Schaufler

Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/38] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock

On 1/8/2019 1:42 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 8, 2019 at 1:37 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
>> On 1/8/2019 1:05 PM, James Morris wrote:
>>> On Mon, 7 Jan 2019, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 1:19 PM Kees Cook <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 10:57 AM James Morris <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>> On Tue, 4 Dec 2018, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 3:22 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>>>> v5: Include Kees Cook's rework of the lsm command
>>>>>>>> line interface. Stacking is not conditional.
>>>>>>> Can you resend this series with corrected "From:" lines in the body, etc?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Beyond that, I obviously like it. James, what's needed for this to move forward?
>>>>>> If there are no outstanding issues, I plan to merge this for 4.21.
>>>>> Yeah, it looks good to me. (Excepting getting the authorship sorted.)
>>>> I didn't see this actually get merged? Was there something that needed
>>>> fixing? Should I send you a direct pull request for v5.1?
>>> Yep, please send a new pull request.
>> Do you want it as is or rebased on 5.0-rc1?
> I've rebased to 5.0-rc1, did some light (re)testing, and sent a pull request...

Thank you.